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E u r o p e a n  S t u d i e s  i n  E d u c a t i o n  
The political, economic, and social developments in the European 
Union pose new challenges to education in Europe, where each 
country has its own system. Under these circumstances, the relation 
between national, regional, and local traditions on the one hand and 
supraregional, transnational aspirations on the other must be 
conceived. The field of education is seeing the rise of new issues, 
responsibilities, and research requiring scholars from different Euro- 
pean cultures to work together. 
European Studies in Education constitutes an international forum for 
the publication of educational research in English, German, and 
French. The multilingual nature of this series mirrors that of Europe 
and makes it possible to portray and express cultural diversity. 
The present volume was written in the framework of the Network 
Educational Science Amsterdam (NESA), in which more than 30 
European and a few non-European faculties and research institutes 
cooperate in the area of education. 
We sincerely thank the Faculty of Education at the Freie Universitat 
Berlin, which facilitates the collaboration of the network's educatio- 
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Terrorist acts of violence, ethnic and nationalistic conflicts, violent 
attacks on resident as well as nonresident foreigners, drug-related 
crime, and familial violence have become constant occurrences in the 
countries of Europe. The claim is repeatedly made that we in Europe 
today live in societies which are more non-violent than any previous 
ones. At the same time, however, we are plagued by the problem of 
violence. 
The problems of violence, with which the current European states 
have to deal, have made a renewed reflection about violence neces- 
sary. Within the framework of this international discussion extending 
beyond the bounds of individual academic disciplines, we must en- 
gage in a fundamental consideration of the phenomenon of violence 
and its manifold manifestations. Scholars from a wide variety of dis- 
ciplines and from different countries in Europe and North America 
have made an attempt to do this in this publication. 
We are faced not only with the problem of finding adequate po- 
litical, juridical and pedagogical reactions, but, even more, with the 
question about the political and moral basis of democracy and any 
type.of civil society. Because apparently not directly politically moti- 
vated aggressiveness and willingness to employ violence against oth- 
ers or foreigners arising from religious or sexual differences are often 
treated as normal and because violence occurs not only in the deal- 
ings of people with each other but can emerge from national or state 
systems, it must not be met with the setting up of analytical taboos or 
with the quick answers of a moral majority. Although the public may 
with good reason react with moral indignation, it remains the task of 
scholars to inquire into the structure, the possible causes of and mo- 
tives for xenophobic, racist and nationalistic violence in an interdis- 
ciplinary manner and with their various respective instruments. 
The differences in the national scope of experience serve as the 
background for this volume, in which not merely integrative attempts 
at explanation with their various perspectives on the societal, politi- 
cal, cultural sociopsychological and anthropological situation are 
presented. On the contrary we have tried here to free the phenomenon 
of violence, especially the acts of violence of extreme right-wing 
youths - but also those committed singly and which cannot be attrib- 
uted to these youths - from possible theoretical prejudices and to ex- 
amine the phenomenon of violence anew in a conceptual-theoretical, 
hermeneutic-historical and descriptive-empirical manner: 
It may not be possible to explain the explosions of violent behav- 
ior without understanding the crisis of the basis of reproduction of 
the capitalist system in the states of Europe. 
Acts of violence and brutality - whether they be viewed as prede- 
termined, as tendencies or as unavoidable risks in the various in-
tellectual disciplines - could be rationalized or minimized by so- 
cial scientific or anthropological inquiries, if they shoi~ld, in de- 
nial of reality, conjure up and revive otlly the autonomous subject 
in spite of its evident barbaric deformation. 
Perhaps the cultures of Europe themselves provoke the emergence 
of violence, so that evil cannot be made to disappear along with 
the delinquents. 
))Human naturecc must not be overlooked if evil is to be explained. 
Perhaps the founding of the history of humanism was itself an act 
of violence. 
Violent behavior on the part of individuals or groups happens to 
victims who are seldom taken into consideration by a theory of 
behavior in society. 
))Europe(( is an historical dimension just as identity and self are 
biographical dimensions, which arise by means of multitudinous 
forms of delineation against others, as long as otherness is not as- 
sumed to be dissimilarity and automatically transformed into 
enmity. 
Whoever speaks of violence must take the trouble to conceptu- 
alize differences. Discussions about violence must bring to light not 
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only the possible violent quality of language but also the difference 
between force and violence in order to establish criteria that distin- 
guish between the legitimacy of force and the arbitrary violence of 
xenophobic attitudes or racist behavior and their possible goals. If a 
discourse about violence ignores the differences that characterize the 
concrete forms of violence - the physical, the symbolic, the structural 
or the official - then it can no longer distinguish between the lawful 
from the unlawful, the legitimate from the illegitimate, justice from 
caprice. 
How would a method of discourse look, if it took into account this 
reflection itself as a social phenomenon? What possible other ver- 
sions of the concept of violence would it force us to consider? In any 
case, the growing discrepancy between the ))newcc situation of in- 
creasing violence and xenophobia in Europe and the old ideas will 
not be resolved without an intensification of speculation about con- 
cepts and without efforts to revise the language of this discourse. 
Where, corresponding to the rationality of society, the irrationality 
and heteronomy of the subjects grow, their destructive blows to the 
))civilized ordercc as an expression of the natural history of the human 
race could paradoxically demonstrate their subjectivity. This, in any 
case, was the basic idea of the ))Dialectic of the Enlightenmentcc, the 
concept that namely the form of social control of human nature 
strikes back against the society and its individuals, who no longer 
master their own circumstances. Then all moralizing as a social 
means of debarbarization fails once and for all. Understanding acts of 
violence against foreigners and others means also understanding the 
logic of the functioning of social and communicative systems, which, 
nevertheless, do not make ethical maxims about behavior outdated. 
The various contributions in this volume approach the questions 
and the area of the phenomenon of racist, xenophobic and nationalis- 
tic violence by means different methods and from varying national 
perspectives. The essays and studies place an emphasis on consider- 
ing the concepts and metaphors of violence and attempt to differen- 
tiate between force and violence in terms of their relationship to 
power and to justice in order to make visible the continuities and dis- 
continuities that express themselves in the thought of European so- 
cieties and that have molded their historical identity. 
The hermeneutic-historical emphasis is centered around the rela- 
tionship of agreeable self-images and disparaging images of others 
and their function as a fixed devices for interpretation, which can 
overarch all internal social differences. Analyses provided by the 
media as well as ethnological and historical explanations and inter- 
pretations can no longer explain xenophobia and racism in exclu- 
sively political or moral categories. The previously widely accepted 
assumption was that every society itself gives rise to violence, which 
is, however, expressed, channeled and, to a great degree, neutralized 
in various social and cultural institutions. It now seems that the open 
explosion of xenophobic violence has demonstrated the impossibility 
proving this putative institutional containment. Do these theories and 
models, meanwhile so familiar to us, still suffice to illustrate or ex- 
plain our current experience of violence and the expression of ethno- 
centrism, which culminates in the intention to exclude others and, fi-
nally, in an ideology that shapes language and governs perceptions? 
Is a relationship to an other conceivable, in which sameness is not 
confused with identity, which does not lead to nationalism as a 
movement as the source of integration and identy, and which, upon 
recognizing differences, does not tragically proceed to set up a corre- 
sponding hierarchy of values? 
'The willingness to engage in violence and the economic and so- 
ciopolitical reasons for the growth of nationalism constitute a further 
focus of these studies. 
Whereas the establishment of Europe as a political entity was 
conceived of as an effort to overcome a number of manifestations of 
nationalism, these very sentiments are now experiencing a renais- 
sance at the national level and, expressed as a strong tendency toward 
autonomy and decentralization, at the regional and local levels as 
well. Bearing in mind that racism and xenophobia are not purely na- 
tional or European problems and that in different countries varied 
forms of disorder can be observed, it is necessary to name the condi- 
tions and factors which would make it possible to decide whether in 
each country the same causes of the definitely diverse manifestations 
of violence are to be found or whether qualitatively different struc- 
tures and sets of conditions underlie the multitude of expressions of 
violence and the willingness to engage in it. To what extent are 
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common factors such as global social developments or particular lo- 
cal reasons responsible for these developments in all countries? Are 
we, as a result of type of ))economic ethnocentrismcc on the way to a 
))fortress Europecc, which translates the dichotomy of rich versus poor 
as European versus foreigner? How are inclusion and exclusion 
marked respectively and then made into the very highest barriers? 
How far are political myths, programs and the use of symbols in- 
creasingly replacing necessary and complex conceptions of the 
world? 
Since racist and xenophobic acts of violence are largely commit- 
ted by young people, the socioeconomic conditions of youth: under- 
qualification, unemployment, the collapse of traditional social envi- 
ronment; the forms of and possible shortcomings in their educational 
and familial socialization and upbringing; and, above all, the influ- 
ence and effects of the mass media on attitudes and behavior must be 
examined. The studies on this subject in this volume decisively reject 
the idea of an ))aggressive core of human beings as an anthropologi- 
cal constantcc as well as the corresponding necessity for coercive 
measures and emphasize, above all, the importance of young people's 
uncertainty about their future, their fear of social decline, their expe- 
rience of powerlessness, their role as victims of complex tendencies 
toward modernization and social disintegration, and especially the 
role of the mass media. 
On the conceptual plane as well as in actual practice pedagogy is 
confronted by the acts of violence of young people with new prob- 
lems, not least of which is the problem of whether it can itself be 
conceived of as noncoercive at all, even if it is meant to be a 
))pedagogy of debarbarizationcc. It also is faced with the question of 
whether it should or can satisfy the unreasonable demand repeatedly 
made on it as an ))all-purpose curecc to find the missing answer to 
unsolved social problems. 
The Spanish novelist Jorge Semprun regarded evil as well as good 
as accounted for in freedom. Acts of violence were neither the result 
of a abortive ))taming of the human beingcc nor a remainder of his or 
her supposed animality - evil is immanent to the very humanity of 
humans. The propensity to evil of human beings can no more be 
eradicated than the concrete expression of their will to do good can 
be forbidden, which, given the in the end irrevocable freedom of hu- 
man beings and depending upon the circumstances, is called courage, 
solidarity, dissent, sympathy, self-sacrifice. In the examination of the 
structure, the forms and the expressions of violence it must not be 
forgotten that humans are free to resist evil, even when evil disguises 
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Recent writing on ))racecc and racism (Miles 1993; Goldberg 1993; 
Anthias and Davis 1993) indicates the continuing demise of old 
deterministic and unitary conceptions of race phenomena and their 
related axes of exclusion and subordination. There is a greater 
interest in ethnicity and nationalism now, and the idea of a new 
racism (Barker 1981) embodies a shift in the central organising 
elements of racist discourse away from explicit biological notions to 
culturalist or nationalist ones. The interest in ethnicity and 
nationalism has characterised theoretically much of the recent 
discussion on issues of racism as opposed to older frameworks that 
focused on racism and colonialism, race and class or race and 
prejudice and discrimination. The argument is that much racist 
discourse is now couched in terms of cultural identity and national 
boundaries rather than using the idea of the biological inferiority of 
groups (Barker 198 1; Gilroy 1987; Miles 1989). The ))new racismcc 
as it has come to be called has been the subject of much debate 
(Miles 1989). The notion of the plurality of racisms as opposed to 
some unitary system of representations and practices has now 
become common place (Cohen and Bains 1988) although a core of 
racism must lie in any definition of racisms in order for the term to be 
meaningful (see Anthias 1990 and 1992). 
The issue of a specific European racism, at times posed as an es- 
sence of European culture and at other times posed as a unity of 
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concrete forms, has also become current in debates on new forms of 
racism. Whether this form is new or not has been variously asserted 
or contested (see Miles 1992). There has also been a shift away, 
somewhat unfortunately perhaps, from a concern with racial 
disadvantage to a concern with group identification and culture, with 
a postmodernist tendency to talk about the proliferation of identities 
and the growth of new ethnicities (Hall 1988). An equally significant 
development, is the increasing use of notions of diasporic 
populations (R. Cohen 1993; Gilroy 1993; Hall 199 1) identifying 
new social processes and new conceptual tools for understanding 
movements of population and settlement across and between nation 
state borders. The focus here is on the development of new 
transnational identities but the issues of racial exclusion do not 
become of less significance even within this problematic. 
There is much confusion on issues of ))racecc and racism in acade- 
mic and policy debates concerning the bounds of the object to be 
tackled and how that object should be tackled. The legal framework 
has not been up to the task of tackling racist violence and the institu- 
tional structures of the race relations industry have been largely 
paralysed by lack of resources, cooptation and confused interventio- 
nism. The multiculturalist and anti racist practices in schools have 
been seen as less than effective, working with fairly simplistic 
notions of prejudice formation and a belief that racist responses, 
which are seen as irrational, should be tackled by rational means 
(Rattansi 1 992). 
C o n c e p t u a l i s i n g  R a c i s m s  a n d  t h e i r  O b j e c t s  
The way we think about race and racism is central to formulating anti 
racist strategies and for building a truly participatory and 
multicultural democracy. One of the most important problems in anti 
racist strategy is to think out what indeed is to be tackled and how it 
is to be tackled. Before being able to focus on the question of how, 
that is of strategy and struggle, there needs to be a fairly clear 
conception of what it is that is being fought against and what is being 
fought for. There are dangers otherwise of ineffective and indeed 
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possibly reactionary outcomes that may reproduce the categories and 
inequalities. 
At one level it is crystal clear that prejudice, discrimination, dis- 
advantage and violence, all forms of racism (Wieviorka 1991), are to 
be countered. This is not at issue. What is at issue however, is the 
modes by which these operate and the targets to which they apply. 
Much literature in Britain has challenged the race relations tradition 
which has tended to concentrate on the relations between so-called 
race groups, and instead prioritize the exploration of racism(s). Miles 
(1993) believes that ))racecc concepts and race relations concerns 
should be abandoned and racism and its trajectory become the central 
concern for understanding this series of phenomena in modern 
Europe. He stresses the importance of a historical perspective on the 
central role of migration in the development of capitalist social 
formations and on the expression of racism within these and he 
explores the interrelation between immigration and the economic, 
political and ideological integration of the EC. 
The main thrust of the critique of the category race is that it 
neglects interpersonal relations, it homogenises practices that should 
be separated and that it reifies the phenomenon to which it refers. 
Historical analysis can reveal different and specific racisms towards 
outsiders ie there have been ideological and political reactions to 
migration and towards insider minorities such as the Gypsies and 
Jews, the enemy within. However, according to Goldberg (1993), 
racial definitions and the attendant racist articulations emerged with 
modernity and change with modernity. He tells us: ))The concept of 
)race( enters European social consciousness more or less explicitly in 
the 15th century ... It is only from this point on that social differentia- 
tion begins increasingly to take on a specifically racial sense ... There 
is considerable evidence of ethnocentric and xenophobic discrimi- 
nation in Greek texts, of claims to cultural superiority, yet little 
evidence that these claimed inequalities were generally considered to 
be biologically determined(( (p. 2 1). 
We find a subtle historicised account of the extremely fluid refe- 
rents of race terms. He looks at the shifting definitions and usages of 
the term stating that it is ))a fluid, transforming, historically specific 
FIoya Anthias 
concept parasitic on theoretic and social discourses for the meaning it 
assumes at any historical moment.(( (p. 74) 
We can reject the view that racism is a product of the irrational 
prejudices of individuals (as or that it involves ))irrational appeals to 
irrelevant categories(( (Goldberg 1993, 7). Racism is rational (p. l l). 
It is not a question therefore of being a set of false ideas or a specific 
form of ideology that can be countered by knowledge or rational 
argument. 
In rejecting this view writers like Goldberg posit a totalising 
version of racialised discourse it with the whole of culture in the 
modern period. Racism therefore is omnipresent and ubiquitous; at 
the very heart of the social order. The race category serves to 
naturalise the groupings it identifies and treats then as unchangeable. 
This notion of the fixity of race is not new (see Rex 1973; Hall 
1988). If ))racecc is a naturalising discourse how are we to distinguish 
between notions of generic class or sexual difference as natural and 
))race(c? What is missing is the object to which this is applied. What 
is missing is the common social ontology specified by racial 
expressions. I would suggest that we can see them as one form of 
ethnic articulation concerned with constructing boundaries around 
populations identified by the notion of differences of origin and 
destiny. It is misleading to treat ))racecc to be about physical diffe- 
rence and ethnicity about cultural difference since cultural difference 
can become treated as generic and unchanging. 
As Miles (1993) states ))the boundary and meaning of the concept 
of racism is the site of theoretical strugglecc (p. 7). 
His own position is that the origins of racism lie in precapitalist 
societies, thus explicitly rejecting the equation between racism and 
capitalism found in Cox (1970) and Sivanandan (1982) or that its 
origins are in colonialism. The reproduction of racism is determined 
by both nation state and colonialism (see also Miles 1989, 38-40, 99- 
100, 1 1 1-121). Wallerstein's (1988) view attempts to produce a dual 
theory of origins seeing the ideology of universalism with its 
requisite of exclusion of certain categories from the universalist 
umbrella, to coincide with capitalism. In this formulation, racism was 
invented to explain the subordination generated by capitalism. For 
him, it is a subordinated form of inclusion, therefore, rather than the 
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exclusion or expulsion produced by xenophobia. For Wieviorka 
(1991, 1992), the growth of racism in France since the 1970s has 
been the result of the decline of industrial society and the 
disappearance of the proletariat as a social movement. The object of 
analysis for such an approach must be racism and its modalities. 
It is interesting to contrast Miles and Goldberg who are very much 
apart on the issue of the conceptualisation of the limits of the object 
of racism. Miles wishes to confine the concept of racism to a system 
of false ideas about groups treated in a deterministic way. and tied to 
the development of capitalism and the nation state form: to nation 
building projects in a period of capitalist expansion. It is a specific 
system of ideas tied to the categorisation of sections of the 
populations as essentially inferior on the grounds of stock 
attributions. Not all social categories are racialised. For Miles there 
are exclusions of class (and presumably of gender although he has 
really nothing to say on these) which CO-exist with racialised 
exclusions. Miles is opposed to including institutional effects or 
other exclusions in defining racism. He does not therefore have a 
totalising version of culture and action as racist in modern society. 
Goldberg inflates the concept to include all discourse, acts and 
consequences (therefore including institutions, structures, practices 
and outcomes which he sees as discursive). Racism is omnipresent 
and it is difficult to see how it might not become coterminous with 
Western Culture. He sees the whole of modern culture as 
endemically racialised at its very centre. His empirical examples 
come mainly from the US, South Africa and to a lesser extent 
Europe. Miles draws mainly from the British and the European 
experience. 
There have been attempts to provide typologies of racism, such as 
those that are based on inegalitarianism and those on difference; the 
distinction between subordination as a form of inclusion and 
separation and exclusion or exploitation and extermination. The 
recent work of Wieviorka (1991) distinguishes between prejudice, 
discrimination, disadvantage and violence. The problems with these 
typologies is that they tend to be a bit like shopping lists and it is not 
clear how they begin and where they can end. It may be preferable to 
distinguish between the discourse of racisms and their systemic 
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implications for action (Anthias 1990). We can designate 
ideological/discursive, practices/intersubjectivities, and outcomes as 
three different modes for identifying racisms. 
Racisms come in different guises. All are, however, underpinned 
by a notion of a natural relation between an essence attributed to a 
human population, whether biological or cultural, and social 
outcomes that do, will, or should flow from this. It is not possible to 
seek an exhaustive list of racisms and their empirical identification as 
though we can discover their essential truths. However, what are 
referred to as racist practices and outcomes cannot be understood 
exclusively as outcomes of race categorisation. There are invisible 
Others not addressed by the issue of ))race((. These include insider 
minorities, outsider minorities and new migrants. 
It is necessary to specify the distinguishing feature of the general 
case of racism in order to clarify what the particular racisms are. This 
is given by the naturalisation of difference and the internalisation of 
this difference to produce boundaries of identity that then give rise to 
racial exclusion. Racisms promote exclusions on the basis of mem- 
bership of supposed race groups (however they are taken to be consti- 
tuted). This includes racist institutions and racist outcomes. Power is 
central in this formulation since subordinate groups may use an 
ideology of naturalised inferiority which might lead to social exclusi- 
ons but they do not have the facility to put this into practise (see also 
Anthias 1992). 
In some literature racism is regarded as an ideology specifying 
biology, evaluated negatively and self reproducing (e.g. Miles 1993). 
What is missing from this definition are exclusions as outcomes and 
their institutional framework. Exclusionary practice is distinguished 
from racism rather than being part of it since racism is conceived as 
only ideological. This is a very limited and virtually useless defi- 
nition for identifying racism in contemporary societies, particularly 
given the growth of culturalist forms of racism that do not specify 
biological inferiority but rely on cultural difference and notions of 
undesirability. 
The delineation of racisms does not arise from the project of 
being able to label inequalities. The discussion is motivated more by 
being able to identify constellations of social meanings and practices 
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that are regressive from the point of view of participatory social 
democracies. The identification is for elimination rather than for 
labelling with regard to any concrete effect for any one individual or 
group. We must refocus on the question of democratisation and 
increasingly breaking down ethnic enclavisation and the border 
constructions that lie at the heart of both racisms and multi-
culturalisms. We must also interrogate the cultural imperialism that 
lies deep in multiculturalist policy. 
Race categories, identities and meanings are complex and multidi- 
mensional. This is more and more acknowledged (eg the title of 
Cohen and Bains: Multiracist Britain 1988). This acknowledgement 
is part of a postmodernist tendency to recognise fragmentation and 
difference. However, despite this recognition in some quarters, there 
is a sense in which certain types of race categories and racism creep 
into much academic discourse and policy discussions. 
For example, within arguments around meo racism(( in Britain, 
the assumption has been that there has been a shift of focus from bio- 
logical notions of race difference to cultural or nationalist notions as 
they present themselves to Blackpeople. So although the new racism 
allows for a different type of racism which uses culturalist arguments 
rather than biological ones, the victims and perpetrators have been 
defined in racial terms as Black and White. However, the notion of 
cultural racism cannot be used when the object of racism is not so 
clearly culturally visibly distinct. If Black cannot be seen in cultural 
terms in as much it doesn't denote cultural difference it then becomes 
an issue of the extent to which the symbol of colour stands for 
national belongingness and the impossibility of being authentically a 
member of a European ))nationcc and also Black. It is blindness to this 
which problematises the view of racism(( as focused on culture 
rather than colour. The latter can become a sign of culture and 
national belonging despite the lack of contents which might justify 
this. Young people who do not appear as culturally different may still 
be subjected to racism eg young Asians and Blacks who see 
themselves as British and whose culture cannot be depicted therefore 
as undesirable. The growth of syncretic cultures (Gilroy 1993), of 
hybridity (Bhabha 1990), needs to be incorporated as well as the 
existence of transethnic solidarity amongst young adolescents. 
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Racisms are forms of ideology and practice that serve to 
inferiorise and exclude (or include in subordinate positions) all 
groups whose boundary is defined in terms of an ethnic or collective 
origin (Anthias 1992). The boundary does not have to be a racialised 
one in order for racist exclusions to operate therefore. We can no 
longer treat anti racist struggle as organisable around the question of 
blackness nor can we see racism as a system of beliefs about groups 
(only as an ideology) as in Miles (1982, 1989, 1993). A restrictive 
use of racism is unhelpful but we need to be able to specify what is 
common to racisms also. We should note the danger of inflating the 
category too much (found in Goldberg) so that it subsumes the 
totality of inequality faced by groups conceived as ))races(( in society. 
Such an approach treats racism as a totalising discourse deeply 
entrenched in European culture and it is difficult to see the forms 
which would allow effective contestation. 
The object of racialisation is not exclusively constructed in terms 
of colour racism but can use culture and religion as symbolic markers 
of difference, inferiority and undesirability as the debates on nco 
racism have pointed to (Barker 1981). Black may nonetheless be 
situationally understood and politically important. However, as an 
analytical category or explanatory category it is largely wanting. The 
contextual nature of identifications with such a political category that 
denotes a common experience of racism needs to be acknowledged. 
For example Asian women in a study of S.E. London (Anthias and 
Yuval Davis 1992) said they shared this depiction with Afro 
Caribbeans because of their colour but do not see themselves as 
Black when they are asked to define their identity. They say they are 
Sikhs or Asians. But pan-Asian itself may be a reactive category and 
also one that is used about the groups rather than by the groups - in 
the ethnic Census question Asians wanted the country of origin 
distinction included for this very reason whereas African Caribbeans 
did not wish the Caribbean islands to be included. To a large extent 
the value of the term Black as a political category needs to be judged 
with reference to its potential for forging solidarity with regard to 
fighting racism and in terms of its political effects. 
The term Black cannot articulate processes of racialisation in ge- 
neral or in their specificity. It is both too limited because it excludes 
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those who do not experience what Brah (1992) calls colour racism. It 
is not necessarily wrong to see the targets of racism in Britain as 
primarily Black (although the notion of Blackness has some problems 
(see Anthias and Yuval Davis 1992). However it is clear that such a 
depiction cannot recognise the forms of racism faced by Cypriots, 
Jews, the Irish, the Turks, the Kurds and Gypsies in Britain as well as 
Third World migrants nor by Muslims who may be defined (or define 
themselves) more by their non Europeanness or Otherness than their 
colour. It is too broad because it cannot tackle specific forms of 
racism such as those against Asian women or Afro Caribbean youth, 
in the first case linked to gender and sexuality (eg the practice of 
virginity tests at immigration control) and in the second case linked 
to gender, generation and unemployment (criminalisation). It reduces 
racism to a homogenous set of experiences and practices organised 
around the centrality of skin colour as the visible marker of racist in- 
tentionality. Racism is therefore defined in intersubjective terms, 
being seen as exercised. in and against subjects with particular 
ascriptive characteristics rather than being a set of outcomes of a 
large range of legal, policy, institutional and discursive practices 
(Anthias 1990). 
. There is the argument that colour visibility makes assimilation 
into the hegemonic culture and structure of a society impossible. 
Racism is here usually confined to the product of colonialist 
discourse of ))the Othercc, which is seen to have ongoing effects in the 
present, often derived from class interests (as in the work of Rex 
1973; Sivanandan 1982). In some arguments this prototype is seen to 
predate the colonial experience and to be a product of the historical 
signifier of blackness (Jordan 1974). 
Gilroy (1987) stresses the existence of a Black culture and organi- 
sation that is not merely structured in, and through, the experience of 
racism. However, he assumes a homogenous cultural and political 
entity. Miles (1989) extends racism beyond colour, and indeed points 
out that racism is not the privileged domain of whites, and that blacks 
can be racist. This needs to be modified, however. Racism is not just 
about beliefs or statements (discourse in this narrow sense). Racism 
also involves the ability to impose those beliefs or world views as 
hegemonic, and as a basis for a denial of rights or equality. Racism is 
thus embedded in power relations of different types. From this point 
of view, although racialised groups may be racist in terms of 
believing that some groups are endemically inferior, they do not 
usually possess the power to effect change. 
There are good reasons, therefore, for rejecting a unitary subject 
as victim and culprit around the binary opposition of Black and 
White. In both the British and the broader European context a 
multitude of ethnic exclusions and otherness exist that bear no 
resemblance to Black categorisation. Different ethnic groups ex-
perience racism differently - it has different outcomes depending on 
class location, political position, forms of regulation and control 
exercised by the state, forms of citizenship and so on. 
W h e r e  is  t h e  M i s s i n g  T e r m :  E t h n i c i t y ?  
Racism can be regarded as the most extreme form of the exclusionary 
face of ethnic phenomena (which can also involve practices of 
extermination, repatriation, exploitation, slavery as well as racial 
harassment and unequal social rights and denial of access to 
resources of different types). Other forms of the exclusionary face of 
ethnic phenomena are to be found in ethnocentrism (the belief in the 
naturalness or taken for granted superiority of the ways of being of 
the ethnic group) and xenophobia or the dislike of outsiders which 
becomes racist when the group has power to exclude as already noted 
in a diverse number of ways (Anthias 1992). 
There is a view that ))ethnicity tends to emphasise a rhetoric of 
cultural content whereas race tends to resort to a rhetoric of descentcc 
(Goldberg 1993, 76). Here we can pause to delineate the distinctive- 
ness of ethnicity and racism. There are more and less benevolent 
forms of the articulation of ethnic processes. Ethnicity is dedicated to 
boundary formation and assertion in the face of difference and threat 
to the group; whether the group is more or less powerful will 
determine the form it takes. Racism is dedicated to maintaining 
existing borders and resisting usurpation by minority or subordinate 
groups or to attempt to dominate over these groups. Racism is both 
defensive and expansionist, defensive of the border but expansionist 
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in terms of areas of domination over other groups and resources. 
Ethnicity is a resource that can be marshalled in the exercise of both 
usurpation and exclusion and can be used by both racists and 
antiracists in order to provide effective political mobilisation through 
the assertion of common interests that override those of class and 
gender. 
Racisms do not rely only on race categorisation, but use the ethnic 
category more generally as their essential building block. The histori-
cal manifestations of racism, however, are linked to a diversity of 
economic and political projects and do not, therefore, emanate 
exclusively from ethnic processes (Anthias 1990, 1992). A useful 
question to ask is what the ontological referents of racisms are. It is 
not possible to see these as being ))races(( only since this would 
delimit the recognition of inferiorising and excluding populations to 
only those who discursively have been regarded as a race. A more 
inclusive and sensitive application of racisms would seek the 
specificity of racism (as opposed to sexism or class inequality) to lie 
in its working on the notion of ethnic groupings. It is a discourse and 
practice whereby ethnic groups are inferiorised. Racism need not rely 
on a process of racialisation in the sense of constructing its object in 
))racecc terms. As Balibar has suggested it is possible to think of a 
))racism without racecr (Balibar 1991). Racism can also use the notion 
of the undesirability of groups, as well as the notion of biological 
inferiority. Undesirable groups need not be conceptualised in explicit 
racial terms but as Others more generally. This may lead to attempts 
to assimilate, exterminate or exclude groups. These attempts may be 
justified by the negative attribution given to culture, ethnic identity 
and personality as well as racial stock. For example, anti Muslim 
racism in Britain relies on notions of the ))non civilised((, and 
supposedly inferior and undesirable, character of Islamic religion and 
way of life, rather than an explicit notion of biological inferiority. 
However what allows us to refer to all these discourses and practices 
as racist, is to be found in the attribution of collective features to a 
given population. This population is endowed with fixed unchanging 
and negative characteristics, and subjected to relations of inferi- 
orisation and exclusion. 
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Indeed the question of power and racist effects is central to 
racism. For example, subordinated and powerless groups may hold 
beliefs that other groups are inferior. Such beliefs and attitudes may 
be characterised as racist (or women may be sexist towards men) but 
this is not coterminous with the racism propagated by dominant 
powerful groups. This is because the beliefs of powerless groups 
cannot produce social effects of subordination or inferiorisation. 
Racism is not just about beliefs or statements (discourse in this 
narrow sense), therefore. Racism also involves the ability to impose 
those beliefs or world views as hegemonic, and as a basis for a denial 
of rights or equality. Racism is thus embedded in power relations of 
different types. From this point of view, although blacks may be 
racist in terms of believing that some groups are endemically inferior, 
they do not usually possess the power to effect change (Anthias 
1992). 
A n o t h e r  M i s s i n g  T e r m :  W h e r e  i s  G e n d e r ?  
Racist exclusions operate differently also on the basis of the sexist 
relations within ethnic and racialised groups to produce different 
outcomes. For example men from such groups may use sexist rules 
and power in order to counteract ethnic and racialised exclusions as 
in the super exploitation of women within ))ethnic economies(( eg the 
Clothing industry (Anthias 1983). Phoenix (1990) has argued that 
gender relations relating to motherhood amongst young Afro Carib- 
bean women are not derived from a static cultural attribute but are 
produced in interplay with the sexist and racist nature of British 
society. Bhachu (1988) has argued that Sikh women in Britain are 
taking an important role in the development of business enterprise as 
a response to racist exclusions that the whole of the Sikh community 
faces. In other words gender relations are also not static but are 
produced in interplay with class and racialisation processes. 
I have argued before (Anthias 1991) that gender divisions are cen- 
tral to understanding the social placement of minority ethnic and 
racialised groups. This does not merely mean that men and women 
from ethnic minorities are positioned differently in relation to each 
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other. It also means that the social and economic position of men and 
women from ethnic minorities is partially determined by the ways in 
which gender relations, both within the ethnically specific cultures of 
different groups and within the wider society interact with one 
another. This interaction has implications for both the positioning of 
men and women from these groups on the one hand and for the whole 
of the minority or racialised group on the other. There are therefore 
two sets of gender relations that are involved, those of the minority 
and those of the dominant majority. These gender relations then 
produce a particular class structuration for different groups in con- 
junction with labour market processes and racialisation. 
Racialisation processes, which relate differently to men and 
women and the class disadvantages already attendant on migrant and 
ethnic minority status, will affect the way in which gender relations 
within the groups may be dynamically constituted in the setting of a 
racist exclusionary society also. Therefore gender relations should 
not regarded as static or as pregiven as in much feminist analysis of 
the labour market (see Beechey 1977). 
The sexist bases of ethnic culture (which includes racist articulati- 
ons) both of the minority and the dominant majority, limit the place 
to which women can be positioned but in different ways for different 
groups. For subordinate ethnic groups two different modes of sexist 
ideology and practice, internal and external to the group, may operate 
in different directions and thus intersect to produce distinct effects. 
For example where the notion of women as economic dependents is 
primary in white working class gender relations this may not be the 
case for African Caribbean gender relations (Phoenix 1990). Yet the 
ideology of economic dependency is implicated in producing 
outcomes for such women in their day to day lives through the 
postulate of economic dependency as ))normal(( and such women as 
pathological and abnormal. Minority ethnic and racialised women are 
not only subjected to racist exclusions unlike dominant majority 
women. They are also subjected to two sets of sexist relations. 
The centrality of gender for the understanding of racist 
articulations and outcomes has hardly been touched upon in the 
available literature. Where the fact of family labour, for example, has 
been noted (Ward and Jenkins 1984; Wilson and Stanworth 1988), 
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the implications of this in terms of the centrality of analysing gender 
relations have been totally missed. Phizacklea (1990) on the other 
hand is aware of the importance of gender but misses the double set 
of sexist relations that are implicated for minority ethnic and 
racialised women, ie those internal to the group and those of the 
dominant group and the state. For example, a quick perusal of labour 
market processes in Britain as they relate to ))ethnic minorities(( acts 
to nullify notions of a unitary category of the racialised which is 
positioned only through racism or the internal choices of groups (two 
alternative explanations adopted by writers and policy makers 
(Anthias 1991)). 
C o u n t e r i n g  R a c i s m s  
There is an urgent need to refocus the terms of reference of 
discussions on antiracism and multiculturalism. The first takes as an 
object a race (a given group who is the victim) and racism. This fails 
to note what the positive goal is and instead concentrates on the 
enemy. The kind of society (anti racist) that is implied cannot be 
assumed merely in these negative terms. Similarly in multicul-
turalism (and they are not the same animal every where), the pro- 
blematic is that of recognising and facilitating cultural diversity and 
preserving difference. The assertion of group rights contained in race 
conscious policies versus individual rights for the rest of society 
(liberalism classically focuses on the latter) is problematic not least 
because it means that some individuals only emerge as members of 
collectivities (the race and ethnic groups identified) whereas others 
(dominant race and ethnic groups) emerge in terms of their rights as 
individuals (the rest of society). 
The tendency to treat categories of the population as unitary and 
static is found in debates on antiracism whose target is seen as a 
group defined as race who experiences racism. In multiculturalism 
the target is a group defined by a difference in culture whose pre- 
servation and reproduction is to be encouraged. Both these positions 
fail to note the dynamic character of culture and ethnic and race 
identities are defined as possessive properties rather than fluid and 
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processual social relations. They may have the effect of ethnicising 
and producing modes of struggle that focus on culture and identity, 
repeating for themselves the static and ahistorical nature of racialised 
definitions. They serve furthermore to promote forms of politics that 
can be divisive. 
Greater inclusion in the polity has resonances both in terms of the 
representation of diverse cultures and groupings on an equal level, as 
constituencies of advocacy and on an individual level in terms of 
social and political rights; what may be broadly termed those of 
citizenship. There is also recognition that anti racisms need to work 
on a number of fronts in terms of socio-material conditions, the 
discursive apparatus and mechanisms of subjective identification. 
Formulating anti racist practices pragmatically, however, is laden 
with problems. For example one of the weakest parts of Goldberg's 
argument (1993) is when suggests ))unannounced testing and 
auditing(( (p. 226) for seeking out discriminatory practices in indu- 
stry. He also suggests that ))where a verbal racist expression - an 
epithet, a joke, a story, for example - can be shown to be not just 
offensive but harmful((, all those witness to it should register their 
objections through letters to the local press. It is clear that penalties 
need to be imposed through legislating against racist practices. It is 
not so clear, however, that a ))big brothercc approach in industry will 
have a positive effect in terms of countering racism in the workplace. 
It is also not clear that responding to racist verbal expressions 
through vocal dissent, or writing to a usually racist press and for a 
usually'racist audience, will be very effective. At one point he also 
states that ))charges of racism and sexism can be mistakencc (p. 228) 
such as when ))A student charges racism of an instructor for using the 
work )niggardly( in class, while another demands that a reproduction 
of a Klimt nude hanging in her instructor's office be removed because 
it is sexistcc (p. 228). He suggests the first student should be asked to 
look the word up in a dictionary and the second be given a good 
reader on censorship and pornography. What is missing is the attempt 
to deal with the real disquiet of the subjects in this case and the 
failure to consider what is going on in the interaction process. 
Goldberg is assuming some objective yardstick here for measuring 
what is racist or sexist and a prescriptive approach is given. 
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Nor is it possible to coherently argue the rights of cultural 
practice, found in some forms of multiculturalism. The rights of 
culture - of a way of life - can only be sustained as part of the goal of 
struggling against exclusion and is not an end in itself. It is because 
denial of validity to cultural practices symbolises the denial of rights 
that it is an arena for struggle not because any culture has its own 
rights. The problem of racism is both one of being included in the 
polity and society on subordinate terms or outcomes, and of being 
excluded completely, 
A distinction can be drawn between multiculturality (which invol- 
ves diversity, cultural penetration and hybridity) and multiculturalism 
(difference, cultural reproduction and enclavisation). Multicultura- 
lism uses the notion of separate communities espousing the rights to 
autonomy on a cultural level but not a polity level, and therefore de- 
pends on a separation of state and society,or what Rex (1991) has 
called ))the two domains thesis((. The object of multiculturalism is the 
community and the aim is to allow and celebrate cultural diversity as 
a mode of pursuing egalitarianism. 
Culture, however, can never be lost. The fear of loss and the need 
to preserve confounds the meaning of culture as the existence of a 
patterned way of doing and knowing with the contents of the things 
we know and do. The existence of patterns to knowing and doing 
does not entail that the contents are fixed either in terms of the 
symbols and rituals themselves or their meanings over time and 
space. Multiculturalism in the sense of cultural diversity is, in any 
case, a reality; we need to pose the question as one of democracy. 
Multiculturalism is the interventionism that seeks to reproduce 
and preserve. Multiculturality is the removal of barriers to the 
legitimacy of different ways of being and is not dedicated to 
reproduction. Multiculturality goes along with both hybridity and 
assimilation. Neither is to be feared as a loss or a demise of a group 
although assimilationism is an ideology and practice of forced 
acculturation and therefore deeply delegitimising. Multiculturalism 
focuses on the reproductive processes of culture rather than the 
transformative ones. 
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C o n c l u s i o n  
There is a general recognition both in academic and policy discourse, 
that there is a crisis in racism and anti racism. This appears to be 
informed by a number of advances and a growth of a more sophisti- 
cated critical awareness and therefore has a positive aspect. There is 
a recognition for example that race categories and meanings are com- 
plex. A critical re-examination of race categories and the political 
uses to which they are put as well as the unpacking of what consti- 
tutes racism are important elements of this advance. Concepts after 
all contain sets of assumptions about the object of intervention and 
how this intervention should take place. Ideas about the social forces 
and networks that dynamically constitute and reproduce racisms are 
important elements. 
That the tackling of racisms needs to be done on many fronts is 
now more generally accepted than in the past. But one important 
issue is whether it is correct to talk about tackling racism as such and 
what this means or whether to tackle naturalising discourses more 
generally as well as sites and practices of exclusion which reproduce 
inequalities. If culture is a sphere of knowing and doing, historically 
emergent, then to build a culture that is non racist requires the 
manipulation of social conditions and a rational challenge to its 
forms of classification and ordering. This requires sustained and 
radical theoretical work in the social sciences and scientific 
discourse. 
It is clear that policy makers and activists, dedicated to fighting 
racism in the 1990s, must be aware of the dynamic and shifting 
nature of the terrain of racism and how ethnicity may be used in both 
the pursuit of racism and its attack. The static and reified notions of 
difference embodied in much multiculturalist policy, from education 
to support and funding of the voluntary sector, need to be abandoned. 
Attention must be paid to the complexities involved. The European 
framework highlights these complexities further by providing dif- 
ferent instances of ethnic and racist practices. For example, there has 
been the growth of racism and hostility in Spain and Greece towards 
migrants from Poland and Albania. In Germany and the Netherlands 
the Turks have been targets of racist hostility but more recently 
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Rumanians and Poles in Germany have been the subject of neo Nazi 
attacks. But more than anything it is the growing malignancy of racist 
violence and the increasing ramifications of what has been termed 
))ethnic cleansingcc (or the extermination of populations by ethnic 
(racial?) violence) that has alerted us to the urgency of rethinking 
))race((, ethnicity and racisms. There is still much work to be done in 
order to enable a more multidimensional, historically and situation- 
ally sensitive, theoretical and political intervention in this sphere of 
overwhelming human tragedy and loss. 
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Christoph Wulf 
V i o l e n c e ,  R e l i g i o n  a n d  C i v i l i z a t i o n  
I .  M i m e s i s  a n d  V i o l e n c e  
1. One theory of violence places the origin of violence in human 
beings' ability to imitate - the mimesis (RenC Girard). The starting 
point of this theory is the insight that mimesis, on the one hand, 
makes possible the development of the human race in as much as 
attitudes, skills and behaviors once acquired can be passed on from 
one generation to the next and can be creatively modified. On the 
other hand, there lies in mimesis, a necessity inextricably connected 
with being human, a reason for the emergence of violence among 
humans. Mimetic appropriation of attitudes and behaviors creates 
competition and rivalry, which then become the starting point of acts 
of violence. Violent behavior especially is imitated. In earlier cultures 
every act of violence was followed by a retaliatory act of violence, an 
occurrence which threatened the cohesion of the society. 
2. Two strategies present themselves as methods of mastering the 
potential for violence emerging from mimesis: prohibition and ritual. 
By means of prohibitions everything which threatens the sense of 
community is supposed to be excluded. These include conflicts of 
competition, rivalry and violence, to all of which mimesis gives rise. 
Mimetic behavior which aims at eliminating differences which are es- 
sential to the structural maintenance of the internal order of a society, 
such as those behaviors necessitated by hierarchies and the division of 
functions, is forbidden. These essential types of behavior must be pre- 
served because they fulfil1 an integrative function and the society 
would be threatened if unlimited mimesis were allowed. It is ne- 
cessary to restrain mimesis with prohibitions in order to strike a ba- 
lance between its powers of social cohesion and social dissolution. 
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For this reason mimetic behavior in the form of rivalry and compe- 
tition for the most desired objects is above all forbidden. 
3. While prohibitions strive to suppress violence that threatens the 
cohesion of a society by excluding the mimetic rivalry which contains 
the potential for such violence, rituals represent the attempt to channel 
manifest mimetic crises in such a Inamer that integration within the 
society is not endangered. When prohibitions are violated, a mimetic 
crises that jeopardizes the social consensus as a result of a vicious cir- 
cle of reciprocal violence arises. It is the task of rituals to master the 
danger to the cohesion of a society in mimetic conflict by involving 
its members in a cooperative act. By mimetically creating an aware- 
ness of the dangerous dissolution of the society and thereby strength- 
ening the powers of and the desire for integration, rituals serve to 
avert menacing crises. While prohibitions aim to prevent mimetic 
crises from arising in the first place, rituals pursue the goal of over- 
coming such crises by the repetition of certain acts intended to foster 
integration and the maintenance of the society. The purpose of the re- 
petition of these rituals is to make the integrative forces relevant and 
to overcome the corrosive violence found in rivalry. If they both are 
carried out, the community can, through the mimetic process, benefit 
from their reconciliatory power. Rituals and prohibitions are thus va- 
rious means to the same end. They serve to avoid or overcome crises 
of inherent violence. 
4. Many rituals are brought to an close with a sacrifice that confirms 
the end of the mimetic crisis staged by the rituals themselves. Some- 
times these sacrifices are executed by one person; at other times, by 
many so that it resembles a lynching The decisive factor is that the 
saci-ifice should take place in the name of everyone. While the com- 
munity presents itself within the framework of a ritual as if it were in 
a crisis with its basic consensus threatened by self-destructive acts of 
violence, the sacrifice changes the situation immediately. The entire 
community is now against the victim, which cannot defend itself and 
the death of which, because of the victim's powerlessness, will give 
rise to no further acts of violence. The sacrifice itself is in fact an act 
of violence, but it is one which is expected to close the circle of 
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violence, to be the very last and to effect a reconciliation within the 
society. 
5. Given the differences in rituals of this type the unanimous soli- 
darity of the collective against the victim, which is often chosen by 
chance, is surprising. The reason for this can be found in the mimesis 
of the antagonist, a development which brings about an alliance 
against a common enemy and, thereby, the end of the crisis. Two 
processes come into effect here. Firstly, the victim is made respon- 
sible for all acts of violence and ascribed a power it does not possess. 
Secondly, the capacity for effecting the reconciliation the society ex- 
periences after the death of the victim is attributed to it. In both cases 
it concerns attributions and transference which guarantee that the 
sacrifice brings about the expected results. The return of peace seems 
to prove that the victim was responsible for the mimetic crisis. In re- 
ality, however, the situation is different. It is not the society which 
suffers from the aggression of the victim, but rather the latter which 
suffers from the violence of the society. In order for this reversal to 
function it is necessary that both transferences not be seen for what 
they are. Should they be understood, then the victim loses its recon- 
ciliatory, liberating power. 
6. A scapegoat is sacrificed. It represents the sacrifice that society 
makes in order to master its own inherent violence. According to 
Girard's studies the concept of the scapegoat can be traced back to the 
caper emissarius of the Vulgate, a translation of the Greek apompaios 
meaning ))he who removes plagues((. In this manner the Septuagint 
carries over the Hebrew term, the translation of which means ))des- 
tined for Asasel(c, an ancient demon. Also where the term scapegoat is 
used figuratively such as in many rituals, which can be called ))scape- 
goat rituals((, the same structure can be found. The victim becomes 
the bearer of the misdeeds of the society for which it makes recon- 
ciliation possible .by dying. A generally accepted belief in the guilt of 
the victim is decisive for the success of the sacrifice. The belief also 
determines who plays the role of the victim. The victims are often 
marked by frailties such as a limp or a humpback. They are thus bear- 
ers of a sign that makes them scapegoats. Or they are chosen by an 
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apparent random method that, nevertheless, guarantees that the sacri- 
fice will not lead to revenge being taken on society. Mimetic rivalry is 
often the reason for the sacrifice of ))doublescc. They jeopardize dif- 
ference and are especially suited to reconciling the violence in 
mimetic rivalry by their death. Romulus and Remus, Cain and Abel 
are proof of the fact that a double must die. Whereas in the case of 
Rome the death of Remus because of his provocation of Romulus 
appears justified, the killing of Abel by Cain was regarded from the 
very outset as a crime. A characteristic of the Judeo-Christian nar-
rative, which distinguishes it from the myths and rituals of other cul- 
tures, emerges here: the account is told from the point of view of the 
victim, not, as in other cultures, from that of the victor. 
7. According to Durkheim the sacred demands the renunciation of 
self-referential, gain-oriented acts and the development of devotion 
and self-denial. In its aura terror and horror mix with attraction and 
enchantment. This is the reason for its ambivalent character. A de- 
finition that confines rituals and their victims to the sphere of the 
sacred alone misses the mark. It is ritual sacrifices themselves which 
produce the sacred with its mixture of horror and attraction. Many 
forms of violence exercise this ambivalent fascination. So that society 
does not destroy itself by self-destructive violence, the act of violence 
is centered on the victim, whose death brings reconciliation. ))The 
sacred is violence itself.(( The religious is the enormous effort to 
establish or maintain peace. In Girard's words, ))If the religious honors 
violence, then it only does so because it assumes that violence brings 
peace. The religious is oriented entirely towards peace, but the ways 
to peace are not entirely free of great sacrifices.(( The effectiveness of 
sacrificial mechanism in producing the sacred depends upon these 
mechanisms being misjudged. In societies in which they are even- 
tually seen through, they lose their power to focus the existing poten- 
tial for violence on the victim. The fascination of the sacred de- 
clines.Freedom and non-violence do not, however, necessarily follow. 
On the contrary, the danger arises that an attempt will be made to 
overcome the crisis of the system of sacrifice by increasing the num- 
ber of victims. Acts of violence carried out in the context of the vani- 
shing of the sacred no longer bring the peace mentioned in connection 
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with the religious. In other words, the sacred is full of violence; the 
religious is its confirmation and the vain hope for overcoming it. 
8. There may be the risk today of secularized societies having to make 
continually greater sacrifices of money, material and life precisely 
because of their rejection of sacrificial offerings. For some time now 
the sacred has been mixed with the profane and a game with simu- 
lacra and simulations of the holy has been played. A situation now 
exists in which the holy and the profane can hardly be distinguished 
from each other. Overlapping and transposition take place. Com- 
modities are invested with an aura of holiness and that which was 
once sacred becomes profane. The standpoint, on the basis of which 
clear distinctions can be made, is missing. Under these circumstances 
violence has become the great problem facing humanity. Should this 
problem not be mastered, then the end of the human race and many 
other forms of life will be the result. 
11. U n i v e r s a l i s m ,  D i f f e r e n c e  a n d  V i o l e n c e  
9. Religions are systems which provide a universal interpretation of 
the world. They present answers to unanswered questions and demand 
acceptance of these answers. They insist on the validity of the ans- 
wers and demand subjection to their interpretation of humanity, the 
world and the universe. 
10. Since religions offer all-encompassing interpretations and endeav- 
or to gain acceptance of their validity, there is in religion no room for 
deviation. Religions resort to violence in order to prevent deviations, 
since they qualify the claim to universal validity and threaten its 
effect. 
11. In this manner religions exclude of necessity everything which 
does not belong to them. With spiritual, intellectual, social and physi- 
cal violence they prevent contradictions. They advocate homogeneity 
not heterogeneity. The exclusion of disagreement and heterogeneity 
leads to violence. 
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12. In politics, the sciences, culture and religion the maintenance of 
dissent, the safeguarding of the rights of others and radical pluralism 
are imperative. The claim to universal validity, especially that of reli- 
gion, is often accompanied by violence in its effort to gain acceptance 
from the particular individual or collectivity. The European civili- 
zation process offers many examples of this. The annihilation of the 
Indians in Latin America is a striking case, in which the extermination 
of others was called for. 
13. European civilization has, in its obsession with understanding 
human beings, destroyed many expressions of humanity in other cul- 
tures with symbolic, structural and physical violence. This is es-
pecially true of the modern era. In other words, in order to constitute 
manlwoman (according to the European model with the help of capit- 
alism, science and technology) many cultures were wiped out. They 
were sacrificed to the delusion of a European civilization process. 
14. In this perspective human rights can be interpreted as an expres- 
sion of the bad conscience of European peoples with regard to the 
peoples they have oppressed. It is time to reexamine the suitability of 
human rights for the present situation of these peoples and, if need be, 
to modify it to accentuate the particular rights of an individual col- 
lectivity, the right to disagree and the right to be different. 
15 Violence can be avoided, if disagreement is conceived of as a 
condition of the possibility of intercultural communication. Consen- 
sus must consist in mutual recognition of the right to contradict. 
Variability, pluralism, otherness and renunciation of the demand to 
understand whatever is foreign is necessary. The starting point of a 
less violent behavior of peoples and individuals toward each other has 
to be the insight that it is impossible to understand the other, the 
different one. On this basis it is then possible to communicate and 
cooperate. 
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16. Universal claims lead to a reduction of complexity. They lessen 
fear, and the abatement of fear through the reduction of the foreign to 
the familiar serves as a justification for violence. It is necessary to re- 
store particularism to its rightful place in relation to universalism. In 
this way the complexity of social relations will rise. The prevention of 
this rise in complexity by violent means must be avoided. 
17. It is essential to develop heterological thinking and a corre-
sponding behavior that tolerates otherness, foreigness and the com- 
plexity involved in the confrontation with it, so that the increase in 
complexity need not be answered with reduction or violence. 
18. A hitherto unknown degree of complexity of relations in the Euro- 
pean civilization process is on the rise. This development affects the 
relations of the European people to each other and to the political, 
social and cultural relations within a people as well are subject to it. 
This applies also to the development in the humanities. This degree of 
complexity, which has been rapidly increasing since the death of God 
and man, is creating insecurity to an extent previously unknown. 
19. As far as the future development of Europe is concerned, un-
certainty is the most certain condition of development. 
This uncertainty arises form the process of transformation of 
nation-states into a supranational Europe. In Central Europe we are 
experiencing a crisis of nation-states, which is being intensified by the 
recent emergence of antitotalitarian politics, which had for some time 
been longed for. The security guaranteed by authoritarian Socialist 
politics and the nation-states has been shattered. Disassociation, anta- 
gonism and fear of the future are the results. 
In this crisis it can come to the decline of the political, to the loss 
of any sense of responsibility, indeed to the collapse of civilization in 
Central Europe. At the moment we are experiencing the endanger- 
ment of the present by the past: the revival of ethnic entities and the 
decline of the forces of order which had until recently functioned. 
Christoph Wulj 
In the end the uncertainty about the future of Europe is connected 
to the crisis of the world society, a crisis caused in large part by 
Western culture and civilization. 
20. How the development in Europe will continue is an open question. 
Will the principle of association or of disassociation triumph? Will 
there be one united Europe and a collective responsibility in Europe? 
These developments will take time. Not an acceleration, but rather a 
deceleration of these processes is called for. Whether a multiple cata- 
strophe in the areas of atomic energy, ecology and politics in Europe 
can be avoided is more than doubtful. Europe constructed the modem 
world and is surprised at its contradictions, its paradoxes and the vio- 
lence in it. 
Yves Michaud 
V i o l e n c e ,  I d e n t i t i e s  a n d  t h e  S t a t e  
The revolts and the popular wars of the 1960s and 1970s, with the 
insurrections, dictatorships, terrorisms and counter terrorisms which 
accompanied them, as well as the apparantly unshakeable stability, 
dissent notwithstanding, of the totalitarian socialist regimes and the 
oriental despotisms, produced a profound disorientation of European 
political philosophy. Anglo Saxon thought, for its part, remained as 
always immunized against history. 
On the one hand, numerous intellectuals persisted in defending on 
principle the cause of the liberation movements and the right to revolt 
against the violence of the state and that of the dominant right. In so 
doing they merely took up the marxist denunciation of the violence 
dissimulated behind every dominant order. For exactly the same au- 
thoritarian and libertarian reasons however, it was more and more 
difficult for them to defend the legitimacy of the political consequen- 
ces of revolt: it was difficult for them to recognize the legitimacy of 
the authoritarian states which, in each case, took over from the libe- 
ration movements, and they could even less accept with closed eyes 
the means of the revolt itself. In France, those who were known in the 
1970s as the ))nouveaux philosophescc, intellectuals like Andre 
Glucksman or Bernard I-Ienri Levy, were examples of this contra- 
diction. Their point of departure was a Marxism-Leninism nuanced, 
so to speak, by Maoist variants. With the support of an aging Sartre, 
they started by justifying the right to revolt1 but shrank back before 
the perspective of terrorism on the model of the Baader gang in Ger- 
many or the Red Brigades in 1taly2. They had to reconcile themselves 
rather quickly to recognizing the evidence of state totalitarianism 
which prevailed in the countries which they had for a long time held 
up as their models: The Soviet Union, Maoist China, Albania, Cuba, 
etc. There, under the idyllic traits of realized utopia, reigned barba- 
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rism with a human face. Sartre and Glucksman, with the surprising 
collaboration of an elderly Raymond Aron, were to be seen working 
together to sollicit the intervention of the president of the Republic 
Giscard dlEstaing to furnish humanitary aid to the Vietnamese who, 
as heroes in the struggle against American imperialism, had received 
not so long before the resonant support of the Vietnam base commit- 
tes, without thinking that many of them would rapidly become boat 
people seeking to flee by sea the paradise on earth. 
On the other hand, the partisans of liberal democracy had also be- 
en shaken by the dominating analyses and were no longer able to 
thing the conditions of liberty and eqality in a world governed by 
profit, technical rationality, competition of social groups and the me- 
ans of mass communication. The divided and ambiguous positions of 
a writer like Hans Magnus Enzensberger are typical of this bad con- 
science of a post-marxist democrat with a disabused but still militant 
view of the contemporary world. 
The concept of violence has served for twenty years to apprehend 
this disorder, one could say this chaos of political phenomena. 
Its indiscriminate use reflected at the same time the disorder of the 
thoughts and conceptualizations in the face of this disorder. 
There was indeed a time not so long ago when everything was 
categorized and denounced as violence, from rampant colonialism to 
elementary education, from brain washing through propaganda to 
publicity for soap, from terrorism, whatever its origin, to bourgeois 
law, from war to the auto-repression of the desires. 
In a book entitled Violence et politique (Michaud 1978), 1 under-
took to establish that this recent and probably temporary use of the 
concept of violence in political theory was at heart characteristic of a 
way of thinking henceforth incapable of conceiving of the political 
world in terms of social contract, incapable also of tracing the line 
between the legitimate and the illegitimate - or simply incapable of 
believing in the validity of the distinctions and legitimation criteria 
still in effect. 
As in all similar intellectual situations, the diagnostic of this in- 
capacity reflected less a direct weakness in thinking than a crisis of 
the traditional models of the political community and the novelty of 
the situations to which they were persistently applied. The history of 
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science presents numerous similar cases of the crisis of paradigms 
and vogues of hazy substitutive concepts (phlogiston, ether, catastro- 
phes, chaos, etc.). 
As to the actual use of violence within societies and between sta- 
tes, it seemed to me to flow from two series of closely linked factors: 
on the one hand the disapearance of landmarks and normative points 
of reference in a social and historic context where everything was 
apprehended as permitted, and on the other hand the irrepressible rise 
of technical instrumentalization. 
The weakening of norms, the disenchantment of everything that 
could pass for legitimate, the suspicion directed from all sides against 
the surreptitious function of domination or oppression in norms, 
made possible a national and international porno-politics, where 
everything could happen because everything was permitted. The state 
terrorism and the terrorism against the state of the 1970s and 80s 
were a perfect illustration of this porno-politics where any end at all 
could justify the worst means. The murders committed by the death 
squads in Latin America echoed the attacks of the Red Brigades or 
the terrorism of ETA on the same level of murderous banalization of 
behaviour. 
As to the instrumentalization of violence under the sign of 
technology, it did not introduce any radical novelty but gave instead 
an unprecedented scope to known phenomena. 
Violence has always been a normal and fairly efficient means of 
action in the human animal, whose aggressiveness serves him to 
dominate his habitat and chase off rivals. War, prime means of 
procuring riches, has been the proof throughout history. In the same 
way crime, gangsterism, domestic and familial violence have shown 
that violence is a paying means of arriving at one's ends. 
As to the process of rationalization and instrumentalization of 
violence, it is also no newcomer on the scene: it has since the earliest 
times accompanied the development of technology and one looks in 
vain for a technical invention whose initial motivation or application 
did not originate in violence. 
What has considerably changed since the 19th century is the scale, 
the efficiency and the rationalization of the management of violence. 
With the First World War, the first war of the industrial era, humani- 
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ty came into the epoch of the industrial production and management 
of violence - and has not ceased to make baffling progress ever since. 
In the 1990s history seems to offer new challenges. The ethnic 
wars that oppose fragmented communities reduced to savagery, the 
return of xenophobia and racism, the rise of anathema bringing fun- 
damentalism~ strike us as just as many new manifestations of violen- 
ce. At the same time we are seized by a doubt in the face of what 
appears also as a return to stages of archaic inhumanity. 
At the moment when Francis Fukuyama diagnosed in a typically 
postmodern fashion the end of eschatological history, history itself, 
with its noise, its fury and its absurdity, returns like a sort of pre- 
lived nightmare. There is a mixture of old and new here which deser- 
ves to be closely studied, but more than ever we must be wary of the 
temptation to localize the evil in the past or in the future. 
Four series of facts, it seems to me, call for reflection. 
1 .  The totalitarianisms and the authoritian regimes have collapsed. 
This can hardly be just a fact to be stated. Everywhere or almost 
everywhere the authoritarian regimes have collapsed. And they 
collapsed almost of their own accord, more through their incapacity 
to continue to come to terms with the economic and political situa- 
tion than through the blows of identifiable adversaries. This was the 
case in Latin America during the 1980s, when the military regimes 
often gave up power on their own which the guerrillas had failed to 
wrest from them. This was the case more recently in the countries of 
the defunct Eastern Bloc following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. 
Even in Africa the authoritarian powers are disappearing or are being 
shaken. This certainly does not mean that everything is for the best in 
the best of all possible worlds. As can be seen in the countries of 
Eastern Europe or in Africa, the disappearance of the state leviathan, 
whether it be a large, small, or miniscule leviathan, leaves the indivi- 
duals and groups to their former confrontations, most often without 
the help of the intermediary bodies or the traditions which would 
permit them to deal with these confrontations. The analyses of Hob- 
bes regain on this view all of their depressing pertinance. 
Incontestably the individual and the social group attain here the 
liberty that the revolutionaries, the dissidents and the democrats had 
tirelessly but unavailingly laid claim to. At the same time they find 
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themselves caught up in transactions that range from competetive 
cooperation to open conflict without the aid of norms of behaviour. 
While the tryingly scholastic books of Charles Bettelheim and his 
disciples tried in the late 1960s to theorize the passage of the liberal 
economies to socialism and the mechanisms of a transition economy, 
it is the opposite which has been on the agenda for the last years. 
Whole countries have to learn new ways to act and interact, to fit 
themselves out with property codes and commercial law, democratic 
habits that the young generations know nothing of and that the elder 
generations cannot recollect. This applies to the countries of the ex- 
Soviet Union as well as to South Africa and Togo. It brings to mind 
the revolutionary and Napoleonic epoch in Europe when under the 
shock of the changes in France numerous countries had to reconstruct 
entirely their legal system in appealing to personalities and juriscon- 
sults like Bentham. 
The negative consequences of this disintegration of the authorita- 
rian regimes were a collapse of norms and a freeing up of the violen- 
ce of individuals suddenly deprived of their social adherences, their 
local orientations and their traditional obligations. There followed 
situations of generalized civil war, from before the social pact or af- 
ter its collapse, between national groups or within states. The theses 
of Hans Magnus Enzensburger on the molecular civil war (cf En- 
zensberger 1994) take on here their full significance. The return to 
freedom is also the return to the war of all against all. The worst is 
that a rapid issue to these crises is not in sight. From Thucydides to 
Hobsbawm (cf Thucydides; Hobsbawm 1971) all the analysts of civil 
conflicts, confronted with dizzying progressions of vengeances and 
counter vengeances, with a balance-sheet of massacres and responses 
to massacres, have underlined the slowness and the difficulty with 
which shared norms of conduct and stable conventions of interaction 
can be reconstituted in a torn society, conventions which permit new 
and confident expectations by which the state of peace can be defi- 
ned. Hobbes already, as is too infrequently remarked, does not define 
on principle man as a wolf for man, but sees him rather as fundamen- 
tally social and benevolent. But he remarks that what hinders the na- 
tural laws of sociability from operating is precisely the absence of 
guarantees of reciprocity in the state of nature. There is violence 
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when no one knows what to expect, when nothing can any longer be 
counted on, when anything can happen, - when the rules are lacking 
that render behaviour forseeable and ground the expectations of reci- 
procity in interactions. 
2. Second observation: in the democratic countries on the other hand 
we feel a new need to distinguish between the legitimate and the il-
legitimate in social and political action. The Italian-style ))clean 
handscc operations, the increased power of judges, the denunciation of 
corruption are the first steps in this direction. From the theoretical 
point of view, the renewal of interest in thinkers like Hannah Arendt, 
the slow penetration of ideas such as those of John Rawls and Mi- 
chael Walzer, a certain return to Raymond Aron and Paul Ricoeur are 
symptomatic of this change of attitude. It is difficult to continue 
saying that everything is ultimately violence when we have the fee- 
ling that there is nevertheless a difference between aggressors and 
those aggressed, between assassins and victims. It becomes once 
more indispensable to set out distictions with legitimating functions. 
Even if the punks and skins are often not better off than the immi- 
grants they attack, and are themselves rejects and victims of the 
social order, it is hard to see how not to condemn their violence. 
Where previously there was only oppression, overt or hidden, we 
must once more be able to draw limits and operate condemnations. 
The theoretical difficulty is that this work is just starting, and it 
must be carried out against the background of a conscience disen- 
chanted through years of the thinking of suspicion. 
Practically, the difficulty is further that these preoccupations have 
not yet had any effect on the doctrines of the political parties. These 
remain frightfully lacking with respect to reflexion on social cohesi- 
on, the city, education - and the elementary deontology of behaviour. 
The collective ideologies are in an even worse state: the rising awa- 
reness of the malaise seems only to translate by an antipolitical 
hankering which for the moment serves to further the fortunes of 
none other than the demagogues. There is nonetheless one encoura- 
ging exception, seen in the ludicrous forms of a runaway humanita- 
rian conscience transformed into a televised commercial product. 
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3.  Third observation, the double evolution in the instrumentalization 
of violence. 
On the one hand, the rationalization of the means of violence and 
their use by the police and the military ushered us long ago, well be- 
fore the advent of 1984, into a science-fiction world whose reality 
and irreality alike were demonstrated at the time of the Gulf War. 
The Gulf War was a transparent and literally telegenic war, where 
the technological damagecc was apparantly staggering without our 
being able to know exactly the scale of the human damage, and 
without our being able to know the real effect of the ))technological 
damagecc. Saddam Hussein is still well in place and no one knows 
exactly what percentage of scuds the patriot missles are able to shoot 
down. 
At the same time, violence as a pre-technological and even archaic 
means of political competition is making a massive come-back in all 
localized conflicts, from the Balkans and the Caucasus to Africa or 
Mexico. It is true that there are enough arms for sale, or even up for 
grabs, to keep the combattants well supplied. 
As Raymond Aron laid out in Peace and War (Aron 1966), the duo- 
poly of the American and Soviet imperialisms had frozen the risk of 
localized wars. With the end of this duopoly, war and violence have 
become again, even at the heart of the so called developed countries, 
the continuation of politics by other means. Whoever knows a little 
about the history of the Balkans over the last six centuries can not be 
surprised at what is happening there, nor can they be horrified at the 
violence that is taking hold there in its worst forms. 
What does scandalize us however in the events in Bosnia is that 
they are taking place within a world that we believed to be unified 
and pacified. Not only are we horrified, we are also rationally 
shocked by this return to archaic modes of territorial conquest, as 
vain and as murderous as those of the 19 14- 19 18 war or, closer to us, 
of the war between Irak and Iran - which lasted, let us recall, 8 years. 
4. Last observation: in comparison with the set of these developments 
where the last cry of technology and the vestiges of barbarism are 
continually set off against each other, the grand novelty, so to speak, 
is the reappearance of even more primitive forms of violence, linked 
to the search for identity on the part of groups without identity or, 
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what amounts to the same thing, of perfectly disoriented individuals. 
Such is the violence of the skinheads, of the neo-fascist groups in 
Germany and in the Eastern Bloc countries, the Cabezas Rapadas in 
Spain, the Hooligans in England or Holland, the ))casseurscc of the 
suburbs in France. This is the violence of groups against outsiders, 
against immigrants,- against others in general, against the ))them((, 
that is to say those who are not like ))us((. 
This violence has the surprising characteristic of being pure vio- 
lence - I employ volontarily this provocative adjective - that is to say 
non-instrumental, gratuitous. A vagrant or a passing immigrant is 
killed, a home for refugees is attacked, or the supporters of the op- 
posing club, an underground passenger whose face does not please 
the aggressors. 
Psychologists have long recognized that ultraviolent pathological 
behaviour arises in general in people who have been victims of vio- 
lence in their childhood (murderers were often beaten as children). 
We know also that violence is the weapon of those incapable of ma- 
naging (for example verbally) a too-complex situation. Moreover, 
despite all the social mechanisms of control and ritualization of vio- 
lence (sports, automobile accidents, autodestruction through drug 
abuse), and probably because of them as well, there remains a form 
of violence which seeks means of exteriorization above all in mo- 
ments of extreme social change that disrupt the traditional mecha- 
nisms of control. 
The conjunction of these factors is today at the root of the gratui- 
tous violence, without instrumental aims, whose sole significance is 
the impossible affirmation of the self in the refusal and the negation 
of the other. 
It is extremely significant that the neo-nazis, the skins, the hooli- 
gans, the ))casseurscc, have never had the slightest program or concer- 
ted action. They act erratically, randomly. In fact they seek to exist 
only in exteriorizing their violence against others. What shocks us is 
here again a major contradiction: that this brutal and gratuitous se- 
arch for identity should express itself within democratic - or recently 
))democratized((- societies whose principles, juridical as well as po- 
litical, fundamentally exclude violence. The gap between principle 
and reality is here at a maximum. We experience it with even greater 
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disbelief and outrage that we no longer have the means to condemn 
the principles of this democratic organisation in the name of an ideal 
society of the future, or in the name of a nostalgically reconstructed 
traditional communal society. 
In these conditions we need the intellectual courage to face up to 
the paradox that it is the very principles of democratic society that 
engender this search for identity. 
All of the principles of modern democratic society that enhance 
the rights of the abstract autonomous individual in creating duties of 
real individuals and of the state, tend in fact to detach the individual's 
links to a localized community and to an easily assignable identity, 
and affirm the principle of equality and liberty not only within the 
state but also outside it in all other democratic states. This is the idea 
behind the different declarations of human rights (Universal Decla- 
ration of the United Nations, European Convention of Human Rights, 
African Charter, etc.) which release the individual from his sub- 
jection to the state and generate a fundamental cosmopolitanism. 
This cosmopolitanism is already that of the ))jet setcc of the wealthy 
individuals who are everywhere at home. It is also that of the hordes 
of tourists whose comings and goings homogenize the continents. But 
it is in the same way the cosmopolitism of the migrants and immi- 
grants who come in search of the benefits of the right of the indivi- 
dual elsewhere than ))at homecr. This cosmopolitainism is also the 
principle behind the legitimations of what is called humanitarian in- 
terference, or the right to humanitarian invervention. 
At the same time as the principles of this cosmopolitanism as a 
stoic world citizenship is spreading, there remain entire groups who 
escape completely this cosmopolitanism even while they are submit- 
ted to the effects of its dedifferenciating power. For these orphans of 
the state, dispossessed of all belongings and adherences, violence is 
all they have left to exist. In many respects they bring to mind the 
vagabonds whom the enclosures movement threw onto the English 
streets under the reign of Henry VIII, or, further back, the ragged 
crusaders who left to liberate the tomb of Christ. 
Alone a reflexion on the contemporary identity and its possible 
roots will bring us out, practically as well as theoretically, of our pre- 
sent situation. We will have to take up once more the dialectic of the 
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particular and the universal, of the local and the planetary. We will 
also have to come back to the question of education. But my purpose 
here was merely to establish a diagnostic. 
Notes 
I On a toujours le droit de rkvolter is the title of a work by Pierre Victor (1974). 
2 The terrorist episode of Action Directe was precisely an episode, and did not 
receive the support of the intellectuals. 
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T h e  C h a l l e n g e  p o s e d  t o  T h e o r y  i n  t h e  

S o c i a l  S c i e n c e s  by  E t h n o s o c i a l  W a r s  i n  

E u r o p e  

C h a n g i n g  t h e  R e s e a r c h  P a r a d i g m  
Peace and conflict studies are now facing a new challenge; anyone 
planning to investigate war in Europe nowadays, whether their inten- 
tion is to develop procedures to end or merely restrict the violence 
will be confronted with this new development. Politics, in practice, is 
in a similar situation. Neither of the two conventional dominant war 
scenarios, that of internal or civil war and war between two separate 
countries, covers what is happening at present in a disintegrated Yu- 
goslavia or in the Caucuses. Consequentially, previous ways of dea- 
ling with the conflict no longer work. These concepts of dealing with 
conflict remain fixated on the nation-state as the basic element within 
an international structure (compare Ropers 1992, 1); either war is 
internal within the nation-state (primarily to force a change-over in 
power or to prevent one) or else the nation-state, possibly as part of 
an alliance, wages war against other states. Neither of these are more 
than marginally applicable to the ethnosocial war in modern Europe. 
The new type of problem stems from large unions of states, as for 
example, the former Soviet Union or ex-Yugoslavia, disintegrating in 
the course of the transformation which has become apparent since the 
end of the cold war with single ethnic groups trying to violently force 
secession, claiming the right of a people to self-determination, while 
other ethnic groups violently try to stop them. In the area previously 
under socialist control ethnic wars have arisen not because these 
were previously successfully repressed (which, in addition, they 
were) but because minorities wrongly imagine their previously mar- 
ginal position has changed during the political and economic crises. 
A further reason is the general crisis in the state opening up the chan- 
ce for an ethnic group to participate in the re-shaping of their own 
political and social situation. 
International law or United Nations' resolutions are powerless in 
the face of this phenomenon. Many of the bloody incidents commit- 
ted in the new ethno-war are therefore better covered by the Russian 
term ))pogromcc or similar terms than the Geneva Conventions. We 
are not dealing solely with massacres or pointless bloodbaths, but 
with directed acts whose driving forces have to be revealed. 
The general problem cannot simply be defined as a transitional 
difficulty caused by the change-over in the political system in pre- 
viously communist-ruled states to a parliamentary democracy, or as 
the change-over from a command economy to the free-market. It's 
certainly hard to imagine a more dramatic change in social structure 
than the one taking place in the political and economic system of 
central and eastern Europe; and, indeed, this transformation entails 
many various conflicts, offering to some opportunities for outbreaks 
of violence. However - and this is the first thesis - the genuine roots 
of the ethllosocial conflict we want to analyze are not to be found 
here. 
There is certainly an element reflecting the reaction to the tho- 
rough repression of ethno-culture and ethnosocial desires and the 
completely undifferentiated former East Bloc policy towards the va- 
rious nationalities within their (see Balekjian 1991; Grotzky 1991 ; 
Nowikow 199 1;Auch 1992; Halbach 1992; Bundesinstitut fur Ost- 
wissenschaftliche und Internationale Studien (German Federal Insti- 
tute for Eastern Europe and International Studies) 1993; Umbach 
1993). The underlying force which turns the crisis into war, however, 
comes from another source. 
After the end of the East-West conflict Europeans were confron- 
ted by a new type of war which had been considered extinct in civili- 
zed societies, especially those within occidental cultures. Research 
until recently, wars of secession and anti-regime wars or racist po- 
groms were primarily located in Third World countries (Krell 1990, 
233). 
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However, the recent wars in central and southern Europe are di- 
rectly comparable in form to well-known ethnosocial conflicts al- 
ready involving military action in western and southern Europe, like 
the Northern Ireland conflict, the Basque struggle in Spain or even 
the secessionist desires of the Corsicans. 
The alternate pogroms of the Hutsi and Tutsi in Ruanda or Bu- 
rundi are exactly the same as the ))ethnic cleansingcc of in the former 
Yugoslavia. This would support our first theses, which is that the 
transformation in systems may be the trigger but is not the cause of 
the new wars in the eastern part of the continent; this naturally im- 
plies the conflicts will not be limited to the transformation period it- 
self but will carry on beyond it. 
There are estimated to be 5,000 ethnic groups worldwide which 
would have a potential right to their own sovereign state were they to 
decide to claim their right to self-determination. There are at present 
roughly 260 ethnic groups who do militantly claim this right. The 
total number of ethnic groups determines the upper limit of potential 
conflicts and, in addition, the total membership of a future United 
Nations. Our second thesis says the phenomenon of ethnosocial war 
has a vast potential for expansion. In an older statistic relating to our 
topic, there were around 50 ethnic conflicts counted in the western 
part of the continent in handbooks of western European regional mo- 
vements; this is equivalent to one per cent of the total number of 
ethnic groups worldwide (Blaschke 1980; Miroglio/Miroglio 1978). 
In Europe, 200 national minorities were counted in total if one inclu- 
ded ethnic distinctions not leading to militant action (Focus 1111994, 
254). 
As is usually the case with fresh starts in the social sciences, there 
has been an abundance of new terminology which is moving away 
from the orientation towards a national state. 
Terms arise like ))pluri-ethnic conflictscc (Krippendorf); ))ethno- 
national conflictscc (Ropers); ))identity conflictscc (Konig); ))ethno- 
territorial conflictscc (Halbach); ))ethclasscc wars (Gordon). These 
have developed alongside older terms such as ))secessions conflictcc 
(Horowitz); ))anti-regime warcc (Gantzel); ))regional movement((; ))mi- 
nority conflict((; ))irredentismcc etc. There are yet other writers on the 
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topic who see socio-cultural factors (especially religious ones) and 
social contradictions as key variables. 
This multitude of terms reflects a lack of analytical assurance. 
Many of the various terms are not convincing. It's simplest to see this 
in the explanation of the religious dimension (cf especially Scheffler 
1985; Dehdashti-Zadeh 1993). 
European mosques and churches are not fuller than they used to 
be. Labelling conflicts as ))ethno-religiouscc doesn't mean they are 
wars of religion, as we know them from the period after the Refor- 
mation in Europe. Religion bestows identity, at least in terms of one's 
own historical experience. However, we cannot draw the conclusion 
out of the diversity of material that the,combatants stem from some 
fanatical religious sect. 
After all, the epithet ))religiouscc proves itself to be (along with the 
reference to the genesis of the conflict) far more a simple method of 
ordering the material in order to divide up the opposing conflicting 
groups. Thus, in Northern Ireland, there are the Catholics versus 
Protestants, in the former Yugoslavia Catholics against orthodox 
Christians or Muslims, and in Lebanon there are Sunni Muslims vs. 
Shiites vs. Druse vs. Maronite Christians. Dehdashti-Zadeh (1993, 
124j sees a particularly close ))connection between the fragmentation 
of religious denominations in a society and the political conflict.(( 
However, the result is that as analytical categories religious labels 
have nothing more to reveal in a secular world than a notion of ori- 
gins. They are neither able to bring out the underlying object of the 
conflict, nor are they able to make the pattern of the behaviour of 
those involved - let alone, how the war could develop - clear to an 
outsider. 
The epithet ))ethnocc does not fare much better. The tenn is highly 
problematic in itself. The basic textbooks in ethnology and political 
science largely indulge in lists of qualities in an attempt to explain 
the term, along the lines of a ))historically developed unity(( which 
))through particular characteristics like language, shared race, cultural 
tradition, ethnic characteristics, etc differs from other )peoples(. An 
individual identity is claimed for each of these ethnic groups.(( 
(Blaschke 1980, 15) A number of these characteristics take the politi- 
cal scientists into treacherous waters which they try to avoid, as for 
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example, terms like )>belonging to a racial groupcc or ))ethnic cha- 
racter((. Constant use of such connotations of the term ethnocentrici- 
ty, like irredentism or nationalism, don't lead us much further. 
At present, the discussion is going round in circles, as when Barth 
(1969), for example, is in actual fact going back to Weber, who cate- 
gorized people into ethnic groups: ))By reason of the similarity of 
their external habitus or mores or both or by reason of memories of 
settlement and migration leading them to cherish a subjective belief 
in a communal origin.(( 
Furthermore, according to Weber ethnicity is a socially defined 
))inclusive category(( which goes beyond the ))belief in tribal bondscc 
(Stammverwandtschaftsglauben); this ))inclusive category(( in the 
same way as the class of terms dealt with above is made dependent 
on a definition of characteristics like religion, tradition, habits, and 
physical appearance. 
Simply the fact that an agglomeration of inexact terms can hardly 
be expected to lead to analytically differentiating concepts ought to 
be enough to make one discontinue in this direction of war analysis, 
but there are other reasons too. 
Firstly, the ethnic identity of warring groups or factions is pro- 
blematic especially in modem states; this is also true historically, if 
one follows in detail the authoritarian population policies of different 
countries. Secondly, for an explanation of why there is war, or why 
human rights are systematically and brutally violated, or why there is 
such a readiness to use violence in places where wars break out, the 
term ))ethnocc, as little as the category ))religion((, has no explanatory 
force at the end of the twentieth century. 
Unlike religion, the idea of ))ethnocc appears to be not only back- 
ward-orientated but also subjectively to feed the flames of the con- 
flict. Thus, in contrast to religion, in what follows we ought to ex- 
amine the escalation parameters to openness to violence for the pur- 
poses of a more exact definition. 
War cannot be explained either by the argument that we are dea- 
ling with an identity conflict of larger ethnic groups. Certainly, the 
prohibition of mother tongue usage, or hindering the structures wan- 
ted for self-organization, no doubt leads to a situation more emotio- 
nally-loaded and an increased readiness to use violence. The repres- 
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sion of natural processes which construct identity or endow identifi- 
cation in the previously communist governed areas is still a manifest 
reason why conflicts of this type break out in a particularly virulent 
form in that part of Europe. Helmut Konig (1992, 3) defined identity 
conflicts as follows: ))Identity conflicts ... have a fundamentalist cha- 
racter. In no time at all there is a lot at stake. It is difficult to intro- 
duce compromise in such conflicts and they are not usually open to a 
calculated weighing up of advantages and disadvantages. They result 
from deep-seated existential uncertainty. And are related to the fear 
of being overrun, assimilated and alienated.(( 
However, war as the mere act of killing, as the pernicious de- 
struction of identity symbols like the cultural monument of Dubro- 
vnik is not explicable in this way either. The idea that worries about 
identity lead directly to aggression will soon be found to be lacking. 
In a similar way to the term ))ethnocc, the problematic nature of 
))identity(( has to be brought into play to understand the escalation of 
violence. 
Last but not least, the use of the term ))ethnosocial(c will also be 
found inadequate. Various essential dimensions fall under the use of 
this term and become apparent: social differentiation in the war areas 
show discrepancies, suggest social envy, insinuate an aggressive po- 
tential. One line of argument for the causes of the new wars in Euro- 
pe is, without doubt, to be looked for in the ))dynamic modernization 
process which is incomplete and asymmetriccc (Ropers 1992, 8). 
However, nowadays, social discrepancies are usually dealt with in 
another way than simply by fighting wars. Connecting the gap be- 
tween rich and poor with aggression would too simple; it would be 
far from being a viable thesis to explain the cruelty in how some wars 
are carried out. Nonetheless, a look at social differences as a variable 
of cruelty in the new wars within Europe would be worthwhile. 
It must be emphasized, in addition, that the societies of central 
and eastern Europe are not simply returning to a market economy and 
a democratic party system after decades of state socialism and a brief 
period of German occupation in the Second World War. The period 
between the World Wars was consistently marked by authoritarian, 
militaristic, nationalistically involved policies, partly leaning towards 
fascism - with a few exceptions, as in Czechoslowakia. The range of 
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research into these changes should go further back than the end of the 
Second World War in 1945. And the momentum for ethno-nationa- 
lism starts with historical conditions which took place long before 
this crucial date. 
Thus, we can conclude that a new topic has arisen through the 
discussion of social science and war in Europe, making it clearly ne- 
cessary to develop further previous analytical concepts. The result of 
our brief survey has been to show that religious labelling is solely 
putting a badge, as it were, on the opponents but has no further ana- 
lytical significance. The terms ))ethnocc and ))identity(( were conside- 
red as being a step closer to the process of analytical breakthrough, 
because they imply possible escalation, which can be expressed suc- 
cinctly by saying we are dealing with an ))ethno-warcc. The ethno- 
dimension or related hypotheses will admittedly be unable to comple- 
tely explain war and pogroms. The acceptance of the use of violence 
and the negation of all civilized limits in the course of the conflicts 
make it vitally important to strengthen present efforts to provide an 
analytical understanding of this bloody phenomenon. 
The objection doesn't hold that certain acts of war explicitly ap- 
peal to such categories, as, for example, ))ethnic cleansingcc by those 
involved in the war in the former Yugoslavia, the brutal expulsion of 
minorities, or ordering mass rape of defenceless woman. As Duerr 
(1993) in particular has pointed out in his outstanding study in two 
volumes, when such measures are viewed as part of a detailed study 
of a war they appear as a means of psychological deprivation of the 
men involved in the war on the other side; in other words, as a means 
of war. Thus, we return once again to the question of the roots of the 
wars in present-day Europe. The second part of this paper is an at- 
tempt to answer this question. 
E x t e n d i n g  t h e  P a r a d i g m  
The multiplicity of ethno-conflicts in Europe alone brings home the 
need systematically to introduce concepts from peace studies and to 
narrow down the focus for theoretical considerations. A part of these 
European conflicts will remain latent; at least, we can say with relati- 
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ve certainty they will not escalate into violence, as, for example, with 
the Channel Islanders, Belgians of German origin, or the Inuit in 
Greenland. The topic we specifically wish to discuss is ethno-war, 
not simply ethno-conflict; after all, there will always be conflicts and 
disputes about problems and tensions between ethnically and socially 
differentiated groups in a population. 
To want to try to remove all of this would be a utopian underta- 
king. In fact, competition between groups has even been recognized 
in democratic theory as having a positive potential. 
Helmut Konig (1992, 1) points out that our problem area contains 
within it particular potential for escalation when he writes: ))In gene- 
ral, ethno-national movements are determined by claims about identi- 
ty or at least include a momentum which easily leads to the domina- 
tion of aspects of identity over rational and negotiable interests. 
Where questions of ethno-nationality are central, negotiations are 
difficult, compromises rare, and violent conflicts common.(( 
A little further on (ibid., 2), Konig emphasizes the ))enhanced 
danger of escalation and increased readiness to use violence. Appa- 
rently, there are no suitable methods within these societies nor in the 
larger international framework for solving the conflict peaceably.(( 
We can only agree with him; the specific connection between ethno- 
social struggle and the general transformation in areas previously un- 
der state socialism is to be found within the societies themselves; 
above all, it is to be found in the almost total absence of intermediary 
institutions such as political parties and associations which could 
have been effective in informally directing disputes and conflicts of 
interest. As Friedhelm Neidhardt (1994) put it, in general intermedi- 
ary organizations have ))to deal with the discrepancy in expectations 
in differing reference groups.(( Within the political landscapes of 
western societies, the symbolic political forms indicate a compara- 
tively wide-spread potential to bring out ethnosocial contrasts in a 
non-violent way. 
The main question, according to Neidhardt, is what leads to an es- 
calation of conflict into violence, public pogrom, or war. And here 
we are not dealing with war as it understood by the Hague Conven- 
tion, where in an ideal case the civilian population does not even no- 
tice that two sovereign powers are fighting each other. Civil war is 
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almost the complete opposite: the civilian population bears the brunt 
of the war, and the uniformed combatants suffer almost no casualties. 
Here we are talking about strategic violation of human rights for a 
majority of the victims, about mass rape of women as a means of 
waging a war, or about ethnic cleansing, which is at the very least the 
forced expulsion of large groups (cf most importantly the edition 
211993 of Sicherheit und Frieden; Duerr 1993; Seifert 1993; Stigl-
mayer 1993). To cite just one fact as an example: according to 
UNICEF, by the end of 1992 approximately a million children in the 
former Yugoslavia had suffered war trauma sufficient to warrant 
therapy (Neue Ziiricher Zeitung, 10.1.93). This is a picture of war 
more or less contrary to the attempts in the European tradition to 
limit the theatre of war and the suffering of the innocent. 
The basic question is which analytical tools are suitable to deal 
with this recurring wasteland of violence. Pogroms and massacres are 
not simply consequences of the way a war develops, nor are they 
even strategic steps in a war. My personal suggestion is to combine 
research into ethno-wars with research into extremism. The word 
))combinecc is meant literally: what the social sciences have worked 
on in ethno-wars ought to be brought together with work from ex- 
tremist studies to explain the escalation in cruelty during a conflict. 
One particular connection to extremism, for example, is to be seen 
when considering the moments which induce escalation towards the 
use of violence: in both cases, they are not only formally similar. 
This suggestion to extend the paradigm of peace studies into ex- 
tremist studies introduces a completely new dimension. To meet 
these demands it is necessary to define new goals in studying and 
dealing with conflicts in a number of European and neighboring 
Asian states going through a forced process of societal transforma- 
tion, in which there are radicalized ethnic groups engaged in violent 
conflicts or pogroms. Such conflicts may also be of a cross-border 
nature. 
Admittedly, it would simplistic to see the cause of extremism 
solely in a revival of attitudes long thought to be overcome, as for 
example, nationalism or religious fanaticism, or else to attempt to 
establish a social psychological ))narcissistic indignationcc in those 
individuals involved, and to bring these divergent elements together 
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in a suitable combination in the process of research. For the increase 
in extremism, one can assume there are also genuine political factors 
which could explain the central component in the various manifesta- 
tions in this country and abroad. Extremist activists and their sup- 
porters consider new societal structures unable to satisfy their de- 
mands on the state and society. At least in a transitional process there 
are attempts, which also include violence, to shift the new lines 
marking the internal division of power for each group's particular 
gain. This process culminates in the rejection of the new state: it be- 
comes an adversary because it has not succeeded in finding workable 
forms for the coexistence of antagonistic ethnic groups. 
A s u g g e s t e d  a p p r o a c h  
Practical application: The latest work (Burton and Galtung) specifi- 
cally emphasizes the need for ))therapeuticcc intervention to solve 
conflicts, in addition to the necessary analysis of the conflict itself. 
Galtung has even gone as far as to develop a training curriculum. The 
task of preventing the outbreak of violence is further stressed by 
Burton and others. Generally one can say the dimension of preven- 
tion is being more widely dealt with in peace and conflict studies. 
Psychosocial application: nEthnonational movements(( (as Konig 
referred to them) prove to be determined to a large extent by claims 
of identity. Present conflict-resolution models prove to be too full of 
presuppositions to be effective here. A necessary requirement would 
be the initial investigation of the de-escalation of such conflicts. Af- 
ter all, there is an analytical connection between causes and devel- 
opment and they don't just develop arbitrarily. Only after this, could 
we establish what conflict mediation as taught by the social sciences 
would be able to do. 
In conclusion, one can say the above mentioned ways of applica- 
tion refer to two basic streams in the political science discourse: the 
question of the subjectivity of the actor, as well as the research ap- 
proach adopted. 
SpeciJications: Scientific work required for this area is: 
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1.  	to construct a more exact typology of diverse conflicts (in addi- 
tion to the conflicts of interests and identity established by Seng- 
haas, locating conflicts between ethnic groups, cultures, lan-
guages, and religiously opposed groups; 
2. 	to determine with greater empirical certainty the configurative 
interlocking or overlapping of these categories; 
3. 	to establish whether there are movements within the conflict con- 
figuration, especially with regard to extremist escalation and the 
extent of violence; 
4. 	to research into intervention points for conflict mediation; 
5 .  	to attempt to alter the way of dealing with conflicts and especially 
the prevention (or, as Burton refers to it, the ))provention(() of ex- 
tremist violence. 
Conflict studies is often accused of merely trying to turn manifest 
conflict back into latent conflict, that is, to stop open violence, with- 
out, however, really resolving the conflict. Conversely, conflict 
studies is also accused of wanting to completely neutralize conflict as 
a fundamental social phenomenon and is so unrealistic as to want to 
remove it entirely. The view put forward here of therapeutic conflict 
intervention (to paraphrase Burton) ought to refute such criticisms. 
In concrete research into the development of extremism in Ger- 
many, it's particularly important to bear in mind that we are dealing 
with city violence and that experience of violence within familiar 
areas (family, school, youth gangs, or similar; cf. Ropers 1992, 8) 
appears to play a major role. On the other hand, it would also be nec- 
essary to look into the role played by supra-national processes, in 
particular the dynamic effect of incomplete and asymmetrical on-go- 
ing modernization processes. They lead to a dissolution of tribal 
identity and bonds and enlarge the individual's sphere for personal 
choice. 
Furthermore, social groups which have an extreme reaction are 
especially those which do not benefit from the promised material im- 
provements. As Ropers put it: ))Without the satisfaction of such 
needs, the offers of identification with the modem consumer and 
media society have a provocative effect.(( 
Peace and conflict studies which are concretely dealing with ex- 
tremism can profitably adapt Lance Clark's approach. He distin- 
guishes between three levels within relevant factors: 
1 .  	Push factors: divisible into root causes and proximate events, thus 
linking long-term causes to those developments leading to escala- 
tion; 
2. 	Variables of intervention, which modify the development of ex- 
tremism; and 
3 .  	Triggering events, which bring about particularly violent acts of 
extremism. 
Peace and extremist studies are not only examining an undoubt- 
ably important partial area of social development, but have proved to 
be variously connected with other current problems and their investi- 
gation within the social sciences, for example, as when extremism 
occasionally collides with adherence to human rights. There are dif- 
ferent orientations to, expressions of, and values attached to human 
rights dependent on the various cultures and ideologies. 
Nonetheless there is a wide gulf between the protection of the in- 
dividual's rights in various cultures and the development of extrem- 
ism. 
The tension involved in developing the internationalization of 
human rights and the insistence on the individual states' sovereignty 
under international law, even when there is an apparent extremist 
development within a single state, currently leads to the question of 
justifying ))humanitariancc intervention - or more exactly, intervention 
for humanitarian reasons. In the eighties, root causes became part of 
the international debate about mass movements of refugees, with 
extremism being accorded an important role in all its various mani- 
festations. 
In the final analysis, international extremist studies is to be un- 
derstood as a contribution to an nearly warning system(( especially 
with regard to the mass exodus of refugees caused by political ex- 
tremism. Thus we can see that in concentrating on ethnosocial con- 
flicts as a central theme of social science we are trying to concern 
ourselves with a broad-range of social needs. 
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Edgar Morin 
D i s c o u r s e  i n  S a r a j e v o .  

T h e  E u r o p e a n  I n t e l l i g e n t s i a  b e t w e e n  

M i s s i o n  a n d  D e m i s s i o n .  

The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina evokes in me not only a feeling of 
repugnance for war in general, but also appears to me to be appalling 
in view of the destruction of a peaceful polyethnic and polyreligious 
construct, which had distinguished itself not only by tolerance and 
coexistence but also by exchange, communication, genuine commu- 
nal life and marriage. This Bosnia-Herzegovina was the concrete 
anticipation of the Europe that we want. What remains are only some 
besieged, bombarded, oppressed cities, Sarajevo among them. With 
every bomb, with every piece of destruction, with every death this 
Europe in the making is being shattered and is withering away. 
What a development since 1989/90! What we thought was a won- 
derful sunrise was actually the deadly explosion of a gigantic red 
star. The spring of the peoples of Europe was destroyed by a frost 
once again and even more terribly than in the past. 
When reflecting on this tragedy we must go beyond the direct re- 
sponsibility of the aggressors. It is always the task of the intelli- 
gentsia to put the single case in a context, to view it in terms of the 
global situation. This global situation is the result of a process in 
which worldwide unification and separation are inseparable and con- 
tradictory. The planetary age in which we live has made all societies 
dependent upon each other. All human beings, wherever they live, 
share the same life and death problems and are faced with the same 
mortal threats. All major problems are beyond the competence of 
nation-states, even though we are living in an epoch in which nation- 
states are multiplying and becoming ever smaller. 
Why? 
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It is necessary to understand the modem and at the same time ar- 
chaic essence of the idea of the nation. The term Heimat, native 
country, is a concept with maternal and paternal aspects. It encom- 
passes the love and security of the mother symbolized by the earth 
and simultaneously the protective authority of the father, embodied 
by the state, to which we have to pay respect and obey uncondition- 
ally. Where, however, tribal ties, the extended family and even the 
nuclear family itself disintegrate, the Heimat revives a mythological 
family complex which makes the ))children of the Heimatcc the broth- 
ers of those to whom they are in no manner related by blood. 
The idea of the nation-state, which arose in Western Europe, was 
disseminated worldwide in the 19th and 20th centuries and used by 
peoples subjugated by the Great Powers for their emancipation. They 
were able in this way to root themselves in their identity and culture, 
i.e. in their past, by conquering a state that had at its disposal modern 
technical and, above all, military means of defense. To this extent the 
nation-state enhances the re-establishment of a relationship with 
one's own past, the affirmation of the present and the ability to cope 
with the future. 
In addition a crisis of the future that arose in the 70s is spreading 
throughout the world. Western Europe had dissiminated the idea of 
the certainty of progress guaranteed by the ))laws of historycc, the 
inexorable advance of evolution, and the uncreasingly beneficial de- 
velopments in science, technology and industry. Overall shone on our 
planet either the Communist promise of a ))radiant futurecc, the assur- 
ance that the Third World would develop, or the reliance on the pro- 
gress of industrial democracies. The future has become uncertain and 
disquieting. Wherever the future collapses and, above all, the present 
is plagued by fear and morbidity, there is a return to the past, i.e. to 
ethnic, religious and national roots. 
This is precisely what is happening at present in the crisis of post- 
communist Europe. Ethnic groups or nationalities are attempting to 
detach themselves from large polyethnic structures (ex-USSR, ex- 
Yugoslavia, ex-Czechoslovakia) and are striving to create states of 
their own. Yet the main difference to the European nation-states in 
the West like France, England and Spain is that these entities were 
created by pre-existing states and that these nations have integrated 
Discourse in Sarajewo 
completely dissimilar and even more heterogeneous ethnic groups 
than those in ex-Yugoslavia. France has integrated the Bretons, the 
Flemish and the people of Alsace, but only in the course of a long 
historical process of six hundred years. In the East, however, the state 
is not creating a nation encompassing the ethnic group, but rather the 
ethnic group is creating a state by means of which it is becoming a 
nation. 
Not only has Yugoslavia not had sufficient historical time to 
evolve into a polyethnic nation, but it has had to cope with the vio- 
lent breaks in its development caused by the Nazi invasion. Neverthe- 
less Yugoslavia contained in its heart a creation both multiethnic and 
multicultural - Bosnia-Herzegovina, which through its integration of 
religious and ethnic diversity had come very close to being a model 
nation. 
The war in Yugoslavia has shown that the formation of ethnona- 
tions in Eastern Europe has been perverted by the legacy of the three 
great polyethnic empires - the Ottoman, the Austrian and the Soviet 
Russian - in which completely heterogeneous populations overlay 
and interpenetrated each other in the course of centuries. For this 
reason when an ethnic entity becomes a nation and its open adminis- 
trative borders become impenetrable national borders, one or more 
now foreign minorities find themselves in its midst, while parts of the 
entity are, as minorities themselves, enclosed in other nations. In this 
manner the problem of mixed ethnic groups is transformed into the 
problem of endangered and oppressed minorities. A fierce national- 
ism then manifests itself in a threefold crisis: the national crisis, of 
which I speak; the economic crisis, in which the society loses the 
security of a bureaucratic economy without having gained the advan- 
tages of a market economy and a political crisis, in which fragile de- 
mocracies are threatened simultaneously by the crisis and by a na- 
tionalism that is interested in silencing every dissenting voice and, in 
the case of a war, every call for peace. Fierce nationalism gives rise 
to dictatorships, which, in turn, spur on this fierce nationalism. Appa- 
ratchiks, having converted to nationalism in order to save their 
power, add to this their brutality and cynicism. In this way the justi- 
fied hopes for a sovereignty of the spiing of the peoples of Europe 
have transformed themselves into a surge of hysterical nationalism 
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with numerous wars, of which the most hideous is taking place here 
in Sarajevo. Adam Michnik once said that nationalism was the high- 
est state of communism. We can say that ethnic cleansing is the high- 
est stage of ethnonationalism and total nationalism. 
Yugoslavia has fallen apart and Bosnia-Herzegovina is about to 
fall apart. If both of them had never existed, as some claim, why do 
they then have to be shattered by blows of the ax, by cannons and by 
deportations? 
It is precisely here that the tragedy of Sarajevo, the tragedy of 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the tragedy of ex-Yugoslavia and the tragedy of 
Europe are taking place. 
Following the suicide of World War I1 Europe embarked on a 
course of unification. France and Germany, former enemies, have 
joined together to create a European community. Because of the Iron 
Curtain this process was, to be sure, limited to the West and met with 
a great many political obstacles arising from the refusal of nation- 
states to surrender even a small part of their sovereignty. The process 
pursued an economic path in order to get around the enormous politi- 
cal resistance to it and, with the help of the boom of the years from 
1955 to 1975, resulted ultimately in the establishment of the Com- 
mon Market. Maastricht was supposed to stimulate a new attempt to 
create a politically interconnected Europe. However, the lack of a 
confederate political organization prevented the opening of the West 
to the countries of the East that had turned to it. The West's common 
market could not be opened to closed economies. The economic cri- 
sis it was experiencing also lead to a retreat of the West into itself 
and the establishment of a small iron curtain against the products and 
immigrants from the East. Finally Europe demonstrated an alarming 
incompetence, a deadly blindness, in relation to the war in Yugosla- 
via without being aware of the fact that precisely this war and espe- 
cially the dismemberment of Bosnia-Herzegovina was thwarting the 
entire European project. Like in all of Europe in 1992193 we now see 
enormous forces of disintegration spreading in the West. 
The decisive splits have not yet occurred. The battle has not yet 
been decided. Europe's destiny will be decided in the struggle be- 
tween the forces of disintegration, discontinuity and deepening na- 
tional, ethnic and religious hate, on the one hand, and the forces of 
Discourse in Sarajewo 
integration, solidarity and confederation, on the other. Instead of 
having become invalid, the principle of interconnection has gained in 
relevance as a result of this war. The failure to hold on to or to rees- 
tablish unification will lead to new horrors. 
It is the duty of the European intelligentsia to reaffirm sovereignty 
as well as unification. The rights of a people, the rights of minorities, 
the rights of the individual, and the right of Europe itself to engage in 
unification must not be separated. 
It is the responsibility of the European intelligentsia to resist war 
hysteria, by means of which a people is hated rather than a system or 
regime being condemned. This task forces us to put the problem of 
Sarajevo in a context, that of the insane irruption of ethnonationalism 
and total nationalism in the crisis of the future, in the crisis of com- 
munism and in the crisis of Europe. 
It has to be understood that the dismemberment of Bosnia-
Herzegovina is a deadly attack on the future of Europe. But the final 
hour has yet not passed. We must do all we can to save the multicul- 
tural cities, the cities of the citizens, the cities of the democrats cities, 
which are still putting up resistance, especially Sarajevo, and which 
have to resist the powers of internal disintegration driven by endless 
and merciless sieges. We must constantly think about peace, for 
peace is the only way which enables the democratic forces being 
strangled in Serbia and Croatia to rise again and challenge ethnona- 
tionalism and total nationalism. Under the guarantee of the Great 
Powers this peace will, however, have to guarantee open borders, like 
those of the European Community, and make preparations for new 
unions. 
I speak here at the University of Sarajevo. 
I am formulating a discourse, not as a politician, but as a citizen of 
Europe. 
I am addressing the discourse of an intellectual to other intellec- 
tuals. 
I am creating a discourse within an organization which is obliged 
to transcend politics - the university. 
The university has a transsecular and transnational purpose: 
- because it receives, passes on, teaches and produces a cultural and 
intellectual heritage. 
Edgar Morin 
- because it renews and revitalizes this heritage by reexamining it 
and passing it on. 
- because it produces knowledge and culture. 
The purpose of the university is not fulfilled by education alone, 
by the teaching of professions and technology. It must offer metapro- 
fessional and metatechnological instruction. It must inoculate the so- 
ciety with a culture not created to correspond with the transitory and 
provisional aspects of the zeitgeist. It must not only modernize the 
culture, but rather ))culturizecc the modern. It must defend intrinsic 
values - first and foremost, the independence of knowledge and the 
precedence of truth over utility. 
The European cultural legacy which must constantly be renewed 
is questioning. It is here that we find the contribution of this rebirth -
the questioning of the world, Nature, God and mankind. This is ac- 
tually a dialogue, i.e. a fruitful opposition of great ideas: beliefldoubt, 
reasonlreligion, speculation/proof. 
And it is also a question of tolerance, not only the tolera~ice of the 
first degree which recognizes the right to express those ideas we re- 
gard as erroneous and disputable. It is further the tolerance of the 
second degree, the one which encompasses the recognition that the 
opposite of our fundamental truths are also fundamental truths. This 
is a tolerance which is aware of the truth in opposing ideas. 
It is rationality - not only the critical, but the self-critical as well -
which openly and actively sets itself in opposition to cold, arrogant 
and inaccessible reason. 
It is resistance to prohibitions of thought, to intimidation, to judg- 
ments of those in authority. 
The challenge with which the twentieth century opposes these 
values is not only the result of the monstrous invention of totalitari- 
anism. It is not simply an outcome of a ethnonationalistic or total na- 
tionalistic hysteria. It emerges from the pressure of a process promot- 
ing specialization and the technical approach. This process demands 
an orientation towards the latest methods and technology (which 
soon become outdated) in instruction and increasingly reduces gen- 
eral education to a remnant of its former self. It fosters a mental 
structure that is no longer able to contextualize and generalize. 
Thinking can make progress only if it is able to put partial and spe- 
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cific pieces of knowledge in a larger context and to generalize. Intel- 
ligence is in the words of Herbert Simon a ))GPS((, a ))General Prob- 
lem Solving((, a machine with the general ability to solve problems. 
In future a double impoverishment will have to be fought against -
that of a humanistic culture with no access to scientific knowledge 
and that of a scientific culture no longer able to reflect on itself and 
on the blind course of science in the current world. The university 
should devote itself to a renaissance of a general education which is 
the fruit of the exchange between the two separate cultures. 
We are standing then in a transsecular place devoted simultane- 
ously to the past and the future. 
We find ourselves in the middle of an age and are standing in one 
of the most tragic places of the tragedy of the century. This inevitably 
forces us to reflect on this century, to understand it and, even more, 
to resist all barbarities, which threaten the intellect. This includes 
those which threaten the members of the University of Sarajevo in 
their state of exhaustion and helplessness, namely the barbarities of 
isolation, closure and rejection. 

Ulrich Herrmann 
D i s c i p l i n e  a n d  E d u c a t i o n .  

P e d a g o g i c  A s p e c t s  o f  t h e  T r a n s f o r m a t i o n  

o f  E x t e r n a l  C o n s t r a i n t  i n t o  S e l f - C o n s t r a i n t  

P r e f a t o r y  R e m a r k s  t o  t h e  F r a m e  o f  A r g u m e n t  
The concept ))violence(( has been avoided in the formulation of the 
theme. As a historian and education researcher, I would like to point 
out - about something which, perhaps, agreement already exists -, 
that the violence-formation of human behavior and the powerful vio- 
lence-activity of persons and groups is always also a result of indi- 
vidual and collective learning processes and as such should be ob- 
served and from this viewpoint experienced other than the ordinary 
ways. 
Therefore, some aspects must be considered which have been 
mostly overlooked when we are concerned with violence, racism, and 
hostility to foreigners. As a rule these are discussed as an expression 
of convictions and (political) options. Thereby it is subordinate -
without it being made expressly clear; it is a question of rationally 
arguably comprehensive options which, so to speak, have a solid 
))cognitive(( kernal. However, in regard to young people whose politi- 
cal orientation and options either are still unstable or are first form- 
ing, it is not plausible and not explanatory for their behavior, because 
these orientations and options begin to form first under the impres- 
sion of prevailing relevant - and changeable - life experiences. From 
the pedagogical aspect it is not the ))cognitive(( kernal of behavior 
that is of interest, but the emotional-affective dimension, dependent 
on a life history, in the course of which the stability of a cognitive 
attitude first appears as learning history. 
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The origin-history of individual and collective life histories and 
life forms is defined here as the learning history: as socialization in 
the sense of imprinting, as a behavioral history in the context of the 
learning of social rleationships, as a history of consciousness in the 
self-reflexive conduct of life. The event is for some the individual 
character of a person - from the viewpoint of complying with norms, 
moral convictions and maxims etc. -, for others the superindividual 
determination of behavior in terms of form - from the viewpoint of 
taking over behavior structures from the collective. These origin - as 
well as developmental histories - always occur through socialization 
and educational influences coming from outside, i.e., active influ- 
ences whose aim is above all to affect modifications of behavior and 
consciousness, be it as changing consciousness through behavior or 
of changing behavior through consciousness. 
These changes arej7rst of all to be observed in the light of differ- 
ent pedagogic objectives: behavior security, demand for creativity, 
readiness for cooperation, strengthening from a will to achieve, 
among others (contrary objectives are pedagogically-ethically not 
allowed). In the center is almost always the tense relationship of 
))individualization(( and ))socializationcc; that is, the self-determined 
construction of the ))Egocc of a person in his relation the the ))You((, 
that is, to a ))Wecc on the one hand and on the other the unavoidable 
outside determined adaptation to social-cultural norms. These 
changes are secondly to be observed - and this is for the following 
considerations of the more important aspect - in the light of different 
forms, which can indeed not be independent from the respective 
aims, which as forms represent, however, certain superindividual 
collective forms of communication, that is, life forms, within which 
(or also alternatively to which) we live out our individual behavioral 
norms: competition, solidarity, dominance, justice, etc. 
The tense relationship of ))individualization(( and ))socializationcc -
as well als ))passingcc from forms of communication and behavioral 
norms: individual behavioral norms are adapted (accomodated) to 
collective forms of communication, social forms of communication 
are internalized (assimilated) as individual behavioral norms - must 
be regulated and learned in an organized way, because the seFde- 
termination of a human being as a moral subject can occur first on 
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the basis of an insight into these processes and the necessity of their 
active and successful control, that is, on the basis of a learning his- 
tory as a formative- and educational history of consciousness, as a 
history of an intellectual-cognitive gain from selfreflexivity and ra-
tionality. Without this regulation, chaos will resign in the relationship 
of a human being to other human beings and above all in the relation- 
ship to one's self: Therefore, the learning histories as origin histories 
of individual and collective life histories are planned and staged, in 
order to normalize consciousness and behavior. This begins in a child 
already with the first nursing and feeding, as well as with language 
acquisition, finally with the formation of this primary elementary 
emotional and social contacts. This must be so, because otherwise -
psychoanalysis and developmental psychology teaches us about this -
under the circumstances, lasting undesirable development, if not ter- 
rible harm to the personality can occur. 
This normalization is necessary as well as unavoidable. It occurs 
in the transformation (assimilation) from outside constraints into 
self-constraints, as Norbert Elias has designated it in his genetic cul- 
tural anthropology and theory. Constraints are applied - causes, 
forms, methods, duration, intensity, etc., are most controversial and, 
therefore, variable -, in order that the intended consciousness -,i.e., 
behavioral imprinting or -modification go into effect and to establish 
an attitude (therefore, one uses this expression in the literal sense) -
i.e., mentality in the long term. One can imagine the inner psychic 
process as a model1 - the formation of behavior and the formation of 
consciousness: the impulse to changing, the necessity for assimila- 
tion, the control of the modified status and whose final fixation 
(accomodation) forms a circle of rules, which - as far it is a question 
of I-active learning and not only external behavioral conditioning - is 
open to new impulses and, thereby, to the acquisition of new forms of 
consciousness and behavior and behavioral content. Thus, learning is 
carried out in active relationship with oneself and at the same time in 
a mutual relationship with culture and society. 
It is desirable in two ways: 1. a person must learn to take this 
process of transformation from outward constraint into self-constraint 
under one's own control - that is, he must himself become the con- 
structer of his Ego, his biography, his life relations. Thus, a subject 
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derives from an individuum, and this develops into a self-responsible 
person. 2. The ever new events in the transformation of conscious- 
ness and behavior inwardly must be conveyed to the surrounding eve- 
ryday world in a social and emotionally controlled way, because this 
is registered otherwise as ))eccentric actions(( and ))deviations(( and, if 
necessary, sanctioned. 
))Disciplinecc a n d  ))Educationcc 
We will now observe a special case of these processes, which at the 
same time from a genetic point of view is one of the most decisive -
namely the life-historical beginnings of such practive in behavioral 
forms and forms of consciousness in childhood, under the additional 
circumstances of guidance of a child's life and learning through eld- 
ers (children or grown-ups) -, then we note immediately the violence 
formation which, what we call ))educational environment((: because 
behavior coding, behavioral correction, - normalization and behav- 
ioral stabilization are modelled through processes of reinforcement of 
failure - therefore, through induced learning: through weward and 
punishmentcc - all ))moderncc pedagogy begins as a psycho-technique 
since the Halle Pietism and relational behavior conditioning of the 
late Enlightenment. This behavior can be alleviated through psycho- 
logically instrumentalized manipulation techniques, which in their 
elementary form we also call ))educationcc - deviation from the unde- 
sired awakening of interest of desired attention, etc. - does not, how- 
ever, entirely lose the character of violence formation, on account of 
the effective threats of sanction latent in the background. In this way 
through the circumstance that for the purpose of socialization the 
child inevitably is exposed to a normalizing discipline, the experience 
of violence, in the worst case in the form of bodily aggression or psy- 
chic terrorization (e.g., through deprivation of love). All our begin- 
nings in our life- and learning histories are imprinted by normalizing 
concepts. They open for us, whether we like it or not, the access to 
the real experience of violence formation of life relationships. In this 
respect a requisite setting for social survival takes place outside of 
the family sphere as well as the private one. The institutions which 
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were created with this aim of socialization - all before school - serve 
above all for the buffering of social structural violence, so that this 
cannot (under any circumstances) deform or demolish the young 
people, who cannot resist it yet with their own forces. 
))Educationcc proceeds out of ))discipline((, insofar and in as much 
as the normalizing influence pursues the goal through other people, 
that the child learns to normalize himselj This can obviously not 
occur through imprinting or training, but requires communication and 
understanding with the one to be educated about the content and 
structure of his self-consciousness. In these terms, education in the 
real sense intendsfreedom (self-determination), and it can reach this 
goal only through the fact that the goal is established as a means: one 
can become self-determined and emancipated only through the pos- 
sibility of practice in free communication, in self-determined behav- 
ior, in self-responsible argumentation. The primary environment of 
the child, considered as life-historical as well als learning-historical -
protection, care, ))discipline((, ))waiting(( -, is transformed into a sec- 
ondary environment with the adolescent - communication as argu- 
mentation, in which the parental violence must be transformed into 
an authority requiring explanation. ))Disciplinecc is transformed into 
))upbringing((, ))upbringing(( into (self-)))education((, dependence is 
transformed into self-determination on one hand and purtnership on 
the other hand. 
V i o l e n c e  a s  A t t i t u d e  
It is necessary to become acquainted very briefly with the ))small 
catechism of pedagogic argumentation((, because proceeding from 
this, it turns out that the violence-capability as well als (potential) 
violence-propensity and as well als (manifest) violence activity al- 
ways have their source also in experiences in upbringing and rela- 
tionships associated with upbringing, and, indeed, to the extent that 
the above-mentioned transformations in the educational and con-
sciousness forming relationships and processes in the direction of 
self-determination and partnership had not taken place or had not 
taken place completely. Violence as behavior is grounded not simply 
Ulrich Herrmann 
in aggressivity as a so-called ))anthropological constantcc in the hu- 
man-biological, i.e., in the behavioral-ethological perspective. It also 
is not plausible as a consequence of ))early childhood harmcc, because 
here the developmental- as well as life-historical causality attribution 
are more asserted than imposed. The experience of violence is organ-
ized in terms of life-history and biography much more in a culturally 
spec13c manner - in Europe, for example, differently from in Asia, 
with children in Italy differently from in Germany, the relationship of 
the sexes in the Orient differently from in the U.S., etc. Thereby vio- 
lence as the adjustment in behavioral- and consciousness structures, 
i.e., behavioral and consciousness disposition are structural. Vio-
lence becomes everyone's potential and occurs in everyone's behav-
ioral repertoire. 
If this is so - irrespective of the other approaches to explanations 
of violence-propensity and violence-activity - then the phenomen 
))violence(( is obviously mobilizable and actualizable through self- 
and external cultivation, therefore, on the basis of life- and learning 
histories. But it is this which also opens the perspectives, that vio- 
lence consequently is also controllable (at least should be), since the 
genesis and form of violence-propensity as well as the causes and 
manifestation of violent activity are explicable: the latter through in-
tended impulses (partly of the mass media), through creation of 
situational ))more favorablecc circumstances (for example, through 
unemployment, through closing of youth centers, etc.), through the 
))right(( reinforcement (for example, in influential and norm-setting 
peer-groups scenes) and life-historical perspectives ())What do I 
achieve through my provocation?cc), above all, however, the violation 
of public taboos. 
In this way it is possible conclusively to explain how violence- 
prononess can be produced with educational-manipulative means, not 
only in totalitarian regimes but mainly in all forms of socialization 
through the combination of 
-	 the experience of violence in primary relationships related to up- 
bringing, 
-	 the brutalization of conditions of existence in adolescence, 
-	 (mass)media reinforcement of modes of behavior, whose violence- 
formation can appear as normality. 
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The phenomen ))violence(( in the form of public violent activity 
must always be seen in its social origin- and circumstantial connec- 
tions, in its ))social place((, that is, in that perspective, under which 
this behavior appears as plausible, i.e. ))rational(( (without which 
violent activity would be excusable, understandably). What owe((, for 
example, call ))society(( in its state and in its non-private organizabil- 
ity, is always also characterized through the institutionalized, ra-
tionalized, organized and legitimized violence-formation of social 
forms of communication: for example, in the subjection of citizens 
-	 as ))sovereigncc under the commandment of loyalty in contrast to 
enforced constitutional order; 
-	 as legal subjects under the violence-monopoly of enforced legal 
order; 
-	 as economic citizens under the achievement- and competition 
principle of the market within the prevailing economic order; 
- as learning and educating under the achievement- and selection 
principle of the existing instructional- and educational system. 
This subjection does not prevent, but on the contrary guarantees 
the effective perception of basic rights; it also requires, however, ir- 
refutably the principal violence-formation of its guarantee. The other 
side of the medal lies at hand: if this political, economic, legal basis 
order appears questionable to any individuals or groups because it 
does not profit from it, but is put at a disadvantage, then the violence- 
formability of the guarantee of this order must necessarily evoke the 
violence-activity of each, which see no other real chance for execu- 
tion for its requests. It requires only a small trigger in order to trans- 
fer latent violence-prononess into violence-activity: annoyance grows 
out of protest, protest is articulated as provocation; its unhealthy 
containment inflames counterviolence: the educated supports, only 
weak wherever possible, of the ))learned self-constraintcc break away. 
C o n c l u s i o n s :  T h e  L i m i t s  o f  U p b r i n g i n g  
Violence-propensity in Germany (and naturally not only there) - one 
must turn to the history of education - was always on a massive scale: 
in the authoritarian structures of the families and schools, at place of 
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work and in public; in the form of nationalism an racism; in political 
instrumentalization of war enthusiasm and hatred of foreigners. The 
examples from the time of the Wilhelm empire, the NS-regime, the 
DDR can be quickly enumerated: they show the arrest of conscious- 
ness in the subject-mentality as a consequence of standarization of 
behavior through subjection; they demonstrate the deformation of 
consciousness as a consequence of the defamation of civil courage: 
they verify - under the prerequisite of corresponding arrangements of 
life- as well as learning- and consciousness processes - the dominat- 
ing effect of imperative collective communication forms over the in- 
dividual-moral behavior norms. 
If this is correct, then the conclusions must be that with instruc- 
tion and explanation ())education for insight(() violence-prononess 
and violence-activity are not to be developed, becausefirst of all the 
violence formability of early education experience cannot be cor-
rected later nor can its consequences be set aside for adjustment and 
behavior potential, and because secondly the life experience of daily 
manifest social structural violence is not pedagogically to be denied. 
The teaching of history - for society as a whole as well as for the 
individual life history - unfortunately is: violence-propensity under 
the dominating principles of our social- and economic order means 
the normality of the to be acknowledged communication forms of the 
competition- and achievement society, the conquerer and the con- 
quered, the successful and the subject, privileged and the discrimi- 
nated must produce; violence-activity is from this point of view 
functional-rational, because it is goal-achieving and practical: vio- 
lence-activity by juveniles produces offers of help. And its legacy is 
reactivated through renewed violence-activity. This is directed 
against persons, i.e., institutions. 
As long as these relationships as general conditions of life models 
are organized in terms of the market, i.e., are perceived as such - that 
is, under the condition of providing only temporarily limited scarce 
material resources of the needy, i.e., it is not affected by 
(socia1)pedagogic means. Moreover: education - as I had to point out 
- communicates the process of violence-formation of experience and 
behavior: education structurally cannot avoid this process and, 
thereby, this experience and, therefore, it cannot cure it even in the 
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period of childhood, where the everyday life of this young person 
now and in the future must follow other stipulations: the threat of 
social declassification. 
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S e l f p s y c h o l o g i c a l  E x p l a n a t o r y  M o d e l s  o f  

A g g r e s s i o n  

When human beings turn towards the world around them they receive 
conflicting signals. There are those which we experience as familiar 
and taken for granted, raising neither problems nor suspicions; then, 
on the other hand, there are those which are suspicious, mysterious, 
unsuspected and possibly dangerous. This constant inner sorting, 
weighing up, and comparison between the pleasant and familiar and 
the mysterious and dangerous always contains in itself the alternative 
options of retreat and aggression, of consideration and approach. In 
the following, selfpsychological models and processes dealing with 
the construction of identity with respect to aggression are connected 
with these fundamental decision-making possibilities of more devel- 
oped species. 
The development and formation of an aggression neither control- 
lable nor comprehensible must be considered as the central problem 
of civilisation today. This is especially so since, due to technical pro- 
gress, both actual and potential aggressive energy are far greater 
today than they ever have been. There is no unified theory to explain 
the occurrence of the intra-psychological, inner and inter-societal 
formation of aggression which can help us come to grips with the 
problem. And this at a time when there is an ever-closer similarity 
between Auschwitz, camps in ex-Yugoslavia, and the hatred of for- 
eigners in the former GDR culminating in the arson attack on a 
Turkish family in Solingen. 
In depth psychology and psychoanalysis, though, aggression is 
seen as having a certain positive value. Thus Stavros Mentzos writes 
in his book Neurotische Konfliktverarbeitung (Overcoming neurotic 
conflicts), ))In my view, what is important is the fact that aggression 
is activated by every obstacle to satisfying the libidinous and narcis- 
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sistic (self) needs (Bediirfnisse). In this way, aggression )ensures( the 
implementation of such needs and contributes decisively to the sur- 
vival of both the individual and the species.(( 
Cultural and social anthropologists will not be able to accept such 
an analysis without protest since they are aware of the destructive 
force in mass phenomena. However, for the psychoanalyst aggression 
is primarily positive as without it there could be no contact, no 
struggle and no conflict. 
In this connection, what is interesting is the emergence of the as- 
pect whereby aggressive conflict is always re-formulated into terms 
of spatial location. Conflicts are forever being described as ))terri- 
torial conflicts(( even when these are meant to be understood meta- 
phorically. The issue is ))homecc territory, social status, job-status, the 
. specific identity of races, of origins and culture - all of which are to 
be defended. This is reflected in the origin of the word: agreddi 
comes from Latin, and signified ))attack((, thus to go against someone 
or something. 
The basic aggressive territorial conflicts are seen as resting on the 
solid foundation of intra-psychological conflicts, partly conscious, 
partly unconscious, but which need to be brought to expression. We 
are dealing with a struggle between alternatives, and alternative op- 
tions for ways of living. And we are dealing with the conflict be- 
tween the desire for security and individual autonomy as explicated 
by the social biologist Norbert Bischof. 
Questions about the origins of aggression are frequently answered 
with reference to a human being's natural drive, the ))so-called evil(( 
of Konrad Lorenz. A naturalistic, biological model is conjured up of 
the nature of the human being, or the dichotomy of a human being's 
nature respectively, consisting of natural drives and reason with Frie- 
drich.Schillerfs aesthetic education as reason's motor. It is not the 
intention here to argue about the basic possibility of such models 
being right. However, in what follows the thesis is to be put forward 
that a major part of aggression formation originates in something far 
less animal and much more human than is often considered the case. 
The thesis which concerns us is that rather than aggression for- 
mation in humans being primarily attributable to a slipping back into 
))natural drives((, it stems far more from the process of identity for- 
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mation and stabilization underlying personal identity being able to be 
endangered or destroyed, and this ensuing destabilization is then ac- 
companied by aggression formation. If we start from Max Scheler's 
concept of personal identity, we can see it not as a single ))identi- 
fiable(( structure but more as a special way of ))becoming((, of de- 
veloping; that is, as a constitution of the self. In Robert Spaemann's 
interpretation of Scheler, personhood is not the result of the process 
of becoming, but rather the process itself. This implies, of course, the 
task facing philosophical/psychologicaltheory in this area is to de- 
lineate and describe the dynamic of this process of becoming. 
S e l f p s y c h o l o g y  a n d  R e p r e s e n t a t i o n  
System theory models of selfpsychological processes, as they are 
presented in the cognitive sciences at the moment, assume that the 
intentional connection between the subject and hislher ))reality(( can 
be portrayed as neuronal representations, with the connections be- 
tween intention systems and intentional content as a continuum. (Let 
it be said here in advance that it is exactly this presupposition which 
runs into difficulties when it comes down to a satisfactory description 
of interpersonal relationships.) 
One major problem faced by shaping cognitive performance in 
artificial systems is to show the process of learning in the sense of 
acquisition of something new; that is, the acquisition of semantic 
content not yet contained within the parameters of the system. How 
does such a system cope with the unexpected, strangers, new events, 
things which have not occurred before, the pre-rational, the acate- 
gorial? In what way can one describe the process of the ))break(( in 
the intentional process through the non-understood or the acate-
gorial? Here there seems to be a dialectical relationship between in- 
tentionality and familiarity; whereas intentionality points to that ob- 
ject which is ))intended(( at the moment, or is ))meaningful((, then 
))familiarity(( relativizes this pointing out. It delimits an area as al- 
ready known and thus opens the horizon of the unfamiliar, the still 
strange, and so contains within it the classical philosophical theme of 
the infinite horizon. 
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This is a question which Emmanuel Levinas dealt with in his book 
Totalitat und Unendlichkeit (Totality and Infinity). His central argu- 
ment is that the ))graspingcc (Begreifen) of the Other, the totalisation, 
is in the final analysis an act of violation for which he develops the 
term ))ontological warcc (Kriegsontologie), whereas dialogue with the 
Other allows the infinite horizon to open. He writes: ))Metaphysical 
desire strives after the Other as completely different.(( Apparently 
there is a kind of oscillating process in self-enhancement (Selbst- 
aufschaukelungsprozeJ) between intentionality and the appropriation 
of the previously unfamiliar. Starting from the germ of the familiar 
we successively appropriate unfamiliar parts of the world. In doing 
so, though, there is always a horizon which remains unbroken. This 
process, which can he explained within the framework of the 
intentional-introjectional cycle model, describes the struggle of sub- 
jective spheres for their ))selfhoodcc in the shadow of ))othernesscc. It 
is a struggle between selfhood and otherness in the sense LCvinas 
uses to describe the approach to the exterior world. Personal identity 
experiences this as a painful assimilation and limitation as part of the 
process of becoming, the process of becoming different in the sense 
already used above by Spaemann to define personal identity. 
How can one imagine this complex organization, this differentia- 
tion of selfhood and otherness? For the neo-analytical concepts in 
selfpsychology the most important point of departure is the theory of 
the ))inner Objectcc. This theory claims everything is an ))inner Ob- 
jecttc, both what we are for ourselves and for others, as well as what- 
ever reality, world or object there may be; all of this is based on inner 
representation. In the final analysis, we are only dealing with this. 
The appearance of the ))alien((, the ))unfamiliar((, is the first impe- 
tus towards the destruction of the dynamic balance within internal 
object-representation between the sphere of the familiar and the area 
not yet understood, not yet annexed. 
This generates a sort of ))induced curiositycc which results in an 
intentionality which incorporates two meanings. Firstly, there is in- 
tentionality as directedness towards the external not yet subjugated, 
and secondly, there is intentionality as the ))what is meantcc (etwas 
Meinens) of the intentional content which has not yet been subju- 
gated nor yet revealed its meaning. The intentional impetus towards 
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the unfamiliar comprises the first step of the intentional-introjec- 
tional cycle. Within the framework of this cycle, in the course of an- 
nexing that which is nearest, categories and concepts are driven 
through into the acategorial exteriority. This process leads to an ex- 
tension of the sphere of subjective identity and out of the prerational 
internal structures generates a model of reality, with accessible logi- 
cal operations, consistency checks and criteria for usefulness and 
reasonableness. Such differentiated introjection involves selective 
appropriation and exclusion, equivalent to categorizing, acceptance 
and rejection. 
In connection with this, Levinas talks of our generally declaring 
war on the external in this context with an ensuing loss of our own 
identity. ))War,(( LCvinas writes, ))does not show exteriority and the 
Other to be other but rather destroys the identity of the Self.(( And if 
we have understood Sartre correctly, Flaubert too had clearly seen 
that this process of appropriation we have described was one of 
counterfeiting. In his monumental work ))L'idiot de la famillecc, Sartre 
describes through the use of his protagonist Flaubert how the catego- 
rization of the unknown by ))wordscc is a never-ending act of counter- 
feiting. He tries to show how Flaubert refuses to speak since he sees 
in words the danger of a violent alteration of reality. Botho StrauR 
goes a step further in this direction; in his constructivist-critical play 
~~SchluRchorcc,he has the female protagonist at the end of the play 
being tom apart by an eagle in a masochistic act of love-making. One 
can interpret this scene to the effect that underlying human nature so 
described, subdued through constructive achievement and concep- 
tualization, revolts against the deprivation of power inherent in the 
process. It is the revolt of nature outraged against coldly constuctivist 
reason. 
S e l f p s y c h o l o g i c a l  C o n c e p t s  a n d  t h e  

N o n - l i n e a r  D y n a m i c  

As we have seen, the criticism of psychological identity brought by 
artists and philosophers corresponds to the endangering of identity 
from, we might say, ))inner reasonscc, something particularly plausible 
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in neo-analytical models. The identity of Self is threatened simply by 
the sheer being (Sosein) of the Other. The question then arises of 
how this threat is made plausible. The preceding section describes a 
structural-dynamic model which illustrates the transition between the 
latent and manifest representation of internal objects. What we here 
assume is that a manifest Structure I is associated with a latent and 
to a large extent non-annexed, not yet effective Structure 2, whose 
meaning lies in having a type of resonance function with respect to 
possibilities in external experience and meaning. Unforeseen experi- 
ences in life can now activate the latent structure, in the sense of the 
intentional-introjetional cycle described above, which leads to a 
transformation of an outer dynamic into an internal one. The struc- 
tural-dynamic transformation which results has the character of the 
' 
unforeseen, within the theory of a non-linear dynamic system, and 
thus entails a threat to the stability of identity established up to then. 
Such systems include the unforeseeable in the critical area of so- 
called ))instabilities((. Those systems which are riot described within 
the non-linear dynamic have as a distinctive feature the capability of 
))deterministic chaos((; that is to say, they tend towards the unfore- 
seen. After passing through instability into a new state they are ca- 
pable of moving on to a ))new attractor((, depending on whether an 
event happened or not, as with the famous example of the beat of the 
butterfly's wing causing a hurricane in the USA. It isn't possible to 
predict the behaviour of such a system within unstable areas since 
there are too many parameters unknown to the observer. In this case, 
only development of single instances can be observed and described. 
Basic possibilities can be established through the creation of models, 
but these will not predict the actual future development in individual 
cases. 
D e s c r i p t i o n  o f  C a s e s  w i t h i n  T h r e a t e n e d  I d e n t i t y  
a n d  A g g r e s s i o n  
The German writer Heinrich von Kleist's description of Michael 
Kohlhaas has become a particularly important example in psychopa- 
thology, illustrating how a threat to identity is transformed into ag- 
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gression. The series of aggressive acts Kohlhaus commits are accom- 
panied by an over-zealous feeling of a sense of justice. They are 
rooted in a row of injustices which threaten his identity as. a law- 
abiding citizen and family father. Four humiliations following close 
on one another's heels lead through two phases from resignation to 
ideas of revenge, and then from delusions of grandeur to megaloma- 
nia. Thus, Kohlhaas becomes a proponent of aggressive self-justice; 
as Kleist wrote in the Preface to his book: ))A sense of justice, 
though, turned him into a thief and a murderer.(( 
Such descriptions are not only of literary value. They allow us to 
see how a particular form of aggressive sense of mission with pa- 
tients suffering from so-called ))delusions of grandeur(( is accompa- 
nied by previous and subsequent repeated disturbances in identity 
structure and the resultant sense of injury. This pattern I have found 
in my own practice. One of the patients I examined was a customs 
inspector suffering from aggressive delusions of grandeur. He was at 
that time 55 years old. It transpired that he had a history of repeated 
humiliation, sometimes having been driven to the very edge of a total 
loss of identity. A characteristic example would be his experience as 
a German Luftwaffe pilot in 1944. He flew 60 missions and was shot 
down six times and wounded twice. However, he was interrogated by 
the SS surrounded by trees on which were hanging the bodies of 
highly-decorated officers and the SS made a game of betting on 
whether he would be hung too or not. There are many other examples 
of humiliation from patients examined by court order. Even the psy- 
chopathology of Hitler, as the central apocalyptic figure of the 20th 
century, isn't free from these kinds of typical symptoms. (I have pub- 
lished a pathographic sketch to support this argument: see Emrich 
1992.) 
However, in the following we would like to deal with current 
problems. It appears nowadays as though the main aspect of identity 
and aggression can be found in the transcultural formation of aggres- 
sion, in connection with mass migration, which brings with it the 
question of the relationship between ))owncc and ))foreigncc and thus 
relates to basic questions of interpersonal relations. 
Looked at in the context of migration problems, radical cultural 
change and societal re-organization, aggressive behaviour in periods 
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of transition endangering a sense of identity are not based primarily 
on drives but rather have their roots in the existential threat to the 
identity forming structures as described in selfpsychology. Such 
processes can clearly be seen in research into, for example, refugees 
and displaced persons, or the traumatizing effects on those interned 
in camp-like conditions. Just one example among many is the report 
compiled by Zarah Mohammadzadeh on the care of refugees in Bre- 
men. In one case she describes, the wife of an Afghani became preg- 
nant. The married couple were refugees from Afghanistan, living in 
shared accommodation and in this aggressively-laden atmosphere the 
husband became violent. The wife went to the women's refuge and 
there was advised to have an abortion. The uprooting of the family 
which entails the threat to identity thus led to aggression and, in this 
case, very nearly to abortion. This is, of course, the side of the vic- 
tim. It is more difficult to explain the other side where there is no up- 
rooting and yet migrants are attacked, verbally and physically, in a 
range of acts from humiliation to the arson attack in Solingen. 
The ))all-pervading power to kill(( within an individual's ))patho- 
logy of consciencecc remains, in the final analysis, non-compre-
hensible, as Joachim Zeiler recently showed in a psychogram of the 
Auschwitz commandant Rudolf HOB.However, there are indications 
that in his case, he was in a kind of permanent identity crisis, coupled 
with a permanent state of ))self-destruction((. He wrote: ))It frequently 
happened that when 1 was at home suddenly matters relating to the 
extermination of the Jews crossed my mind. At such moments I 
couldn't bear the intimacy of my family but had to get out ... 1 had to 
appear cold and heartless ... had to watch callously as mothers went 
into the gas chambers with their children, sometimes in tears, some- 
times laughing ... I was compelled to watch all the steps of the proce- 
dure ... I had to do all of this - because I was the one everyone was 
looking at.(( 
The difficulties of finding a philosophical basis for a psychology 
of aggression in relation to such cases are enormous. One possible 
hypothesis which could lead to a solution of this problem assumes 
that such acts of violence represent frequently painful identity form- 
ing processes which have been avoided. To act certain extent, what is 
attacked in others is what endangers the stability of one's own Self: 
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that is, challenge, attraction, temptation, the ))unlived life((, the par- 
tially repressed difference between wish and reality, between the 
picture of the other and that of the self. 
This is the area of ))projective perception((, as it is called, or iden- 
tification, in which one's own problems are seen as others' problems. 
The theory of the ))shadowcc which C.G.Jung developed is especially 
important here. The theory comprises the notion that the unappealing 
dark sides not recognized in one's own 'self are found and fought 
against in the Other and in the unknown. One type of ))therapy(( 
which could help this is taking seriously the process of maturing in 
young people and the crises this involves; talking about and being 
aware of the painfulness of the identity forming process, which in the 
end means it leads to a de-theorizing about life, freeing one from ab- 
straction and bringing one back the concrete processes of maturing. 
When we consider this aspect we can see that rather than the 
))territory(( on which these conflicts take place being limited to a sin- 
gle person or individual, it is far more necessary to assume an ))inter- 
personal self((. Inside this ))interpersonal self(( it is possible to de- 
scribe intra-psychological domains which, due to conflicts within 
them, lead to identity problems, developmental disturbances and de- 
stabilization; aggression is necessary to completely overcome a part 
of these problems. 
The aim of therapy from the psychotherapeutic standpoint can be 
defined in selfpsychological terms as the training of a ))coherent 
self((. If one posits this as the aim of therapy for the interpersonal 
area, then the task of our present cultural development is to generate 
a coherent interpersonal self and such a process cannot take place 
without abrupt transitions and then development of aggression. Rend 
Girard's 'scapegoat theory' is a particularly succinct example of a 
theory taking such socio-cultural processes into account. The theory 
assume that the scapegoat has the function of being the victim for an 
))underlying violence((, free-floating and circulating within society. 
Without being channeled towards the scapegoat, this free-floating 
violence would lead to a destruction of the community. There are, of 
course, other alternative constructs. 
In any case, cultural achievement aims at preventing abrupt tran- 
sitions and crisis-like identity conflicts in the changing micro- and 
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macro-social structure from leading to dehumanization and the de- 
struction of communities. The selfpsychological models here de- 
scribed in order to understand such processes may be categorized as 
resonance-conflict models; their main thrust is to point out how reso- 
nance phenomena arise between latent elements in (unconscious) 
self-experience and expected experience of the ))unknowncc where 
resolution entails solutions involving conflict. This theory is in 
agreement with the ideas of Heinz Kohut (1979, 106) in which de- 
structiveness from a selfpschological perspective leads us not to 
consider it as a ))manifestation of a primary drive, slowly revealed by 
an analytical process, but rather (judging it as) a point of disintegra- 
tion((. 
Stavros Mentzos writes something similar when he distinguishes 
between ))functional(( and ))destructive aggression((. ))Purely destruc- 
tive and )a-functional( aggression characterizes a product of the dis- 
integration process.(( A similarity between the selfpsychological and 
cultural-anthropological concept of systems could be found in them 
both converging towards the intended avoidance or resolution of the 
interpersonal and social disintegration process. The theoretical diffi- 
culties this involves most likely stem from the fact that the modern 
notion of consciousness is so fixated on the subjective as to make any 
concept of an irreducible interpersonal self problematic. However, it 
is only as dyads, or triads respectively, that people are what they are. 
If we split this they are no longer what they are and they loose their 
identity. One has to assume that within this dyad or group identity, 
that is in the realm of the ))interpersonal self((, territorial conflicts 
take place between cohesion and disjointedness, between familiarity 
and the unknown, with an intentionality aimed at annexing the new 
but fluctuating between a longing for the secure and desire for the 
independent; it is this which initially creates the complexity of cul- 
tural development, but also makes the danger of ungovernable ag- 
gression formation possible. 
In conclusion, we can say that contemporary selfpsychological 
models of depth psychology assume dysfunctional aggression forma- 
tion relates to the inner coherence of the parts of the self being under 
threat or disturbed. Thus, a reduction in aggression must aim at in- 
creasing both social and intrapsychological coherence. 
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I n t e r p e r s o n a l i t y  a n d  I d e n t i t y  
The question which arises in considering the topic of the interper- 
sonal nexus is: how are we to describe the real world of relationships 
between people, that is the ))in-between worldcc, the inner area which 
binds two people together and yet which neither of them possess 
outright? Michael Theunissen has dealt with this in his large-scale 
study of contemporary social ontology (Der Andere). He has shown 
how the interpersonal realm, Martin Buber's ))ontology of between- 
nesscc (Ontologie des Zwischen), continually confirms and simulta- 
neously transcends the intentional pattern through the double poles of 
recognition and acceptance and the ambiguity of talking in ))talking 
tocc and ))talking aboutcc ())Anredencc and ))Bereden((). Thus, selfpsy- 
chology confronts the unresolved problem of interpersonality which 
has not only theoretically implications but also concrete and practical 
ones. 
Dichgans, a neurologist from Tubingen, recently showed in a re- 
view of neuro-plasticity and learning processes in humans that the 
early childhood link forged between mother and child in the interper- 
sonal ))betweennesscc frequently occurs in such a way that the child is 
merely perceived as an object of care but not of acceptance 
())Anerkennungcc). This is clear from a lack of eye-contact between 
mother and child during breast feeding or bottle feeding. Such lack of 
contact can be carried to extremes: in Rumanian orphanages, babies 
were bottle fed from wire frames thus precluding any construction of 
an interpersonal world. 
In highly-developed western countries, that babies are frequently 
brought up according to a theory which is at least problematic, if not 
wrong probably has to do with the modern approach to subjectivity 
since this theory doesn't do justice to the early intersubjective reality 
of the mother-child relationship. The result is mistaken advice to 
young mothers and parents to see the babies and toddlers as ))events 
in the worldcc and not as subjects in their own right or as part of an 
interpersonal Self. In this way, the core of identity creation is 
wrongly placed in the baby, namely in the ))I((. and not in the ))we((. 
The implication is that we have, to an extent, learnt the wrong les- 
sons from Kant and Fichte's transcendental philosophy: it is not the 
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transcendental subject as a solipsism which is crucial for the theory 
of personhood, it is rather the transcendental subject as ))interper- 
sonal((, as ))we((. 
When asked ))Is that your mother's breast?((, the twenty-one month 
old toddler Lydia, already talking well, and occasionally drinking 
from her mother's breast, sometimes answers ))Yes, it's mummy's 
breastcc and sometimes answers ))Lydia's breast((. She indicates that 
her mother's breast in reality occupies a ))between world(( between 
mother and child and cannot be attributed totally to one of them or 
the other. To a certain extent, it is the reality of an ))interpersonal 
self((. Later on, this realm is only metaphorically accessible although 
it has more effect on us than we psychologically imagine. After all, 
clashes and disputes within the family which shape the inner life of 
people and their neurotic development, are not in fact arguments 
between single entities, but rather take place in the realm of the 
'interpersonal self as we have described it. It is here that psyche can 
be hurt, and it is here that the loss of relationships is felt. 
P a r a d o x  
This article puts forward the thesis that we are unable to describe the 
decisive transition from threatened identity to aggression using con- 
temporary philosophical or psychological language - including that of 
selfpsychology. This is because we are unable to render a recon- 
struction in system theory terms of the factuality of the interpersonal 
structures in the ))ontology of betweennesscc. As Michael Theunissen 
has shown, within the ontology of betweenness, ))talking to...(( means 
))the revolt of the I-You-relationship against the web of intentional- 
ity((; this itself implies that the ontology of hetweenness can be indi- 
cated but not explicated. On the other hand, it is precisely this ontol- 
ogy of betweenness which makes people into people. The nature of 
the structure as not-being-able-to-be-explicated is one of the reasons 
why the problem of transition from identity crisis to aggression can 
not be resolved by psychology alone. There is far more need for 
philosophical psychology as a science experienced in dealing with 
paradox. From such a perspective, one may develop the outline of a 
Sel/psychological Explanatory Models of Aggression 
))system theory of the interpersonal selfcc. Not only have we not, as 

yet, come to grips with the subject-object relation and the body-mind 

problem, neither do we have terms for interpersonal relations in the 

meaning of ))between((. However, we are confronted by a non-com- 
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Christiane Buhmann 
H o s t i l i t y  a n d  F o r e i g n e r s  i n  t h e  L i g h t  o f  

L a c a n i a n  T h e o r y  o f  A g g r e s s i v e n e s s  

This article is devoted to the examination of the sources of aggres- 
siveness potential in the phases of the subject's developmental his- 
tory. These phases are not overcome at their conclusion, but can be 
reactivated at any time in their predominating relations-mode. Lacan 
speaks about every phase having a tendency toward aggressivity, of a 
wish to get rid of the other and of the possibility of overcoming this 
wish, which aims at the destruction of the other or of the removal of 
his otherness. My theme is the sources of this aggressive relationship 
to the other, not the realization of the more destructive wish in vio- 
lent action. The question of the turning of a tendency into violent 
behavior remains open and refers perhaps to a limit to clarification, 
to the discursive assimilability of violence. 
In the second part I will go into some aspects of the contemporary 
adolescent forms of violence in Germany and relate them to the La- 
canian concept of rejection of the symbolic, which returns on the 
level of the real, of the body. 
The  Mi r ro r  S tage  
In 1936 Lacan delivered a lecture concerning the looking-glass phase 
at the Fourteenth Congress of the international psychoanalytic or- 
ganization. Thirteen years later, in 1949 at the Sixteenth Congress in 
Ziirich, Lacan extended his research on the meaning of this phase for 
the genesis of the I: ))The Mirror Stage as Image of the Ego-Func- 
tioncc. 
Through the invention of the mirror stage, Lacan revealed the 
sources of racism. Actually racism obtains its power from the origi- 
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nal fascination of an individual for his fellowmen: the captures vision 
of the form of the body of the other as mirror. On the contrary, this 
point of view excludes the alien, the one with whom I cannot iden- 
tify: it would break my mirror. 
The other skin color, the obviois obstacle - the image does not 
arise in the mirror. This other does not reflect the ideal image of the 
unscathed, similar body, but another which must be attacked. Being 
disabled shows that the body is vulnerable; the others skin color or 
also the other physiognomy relativizes one's own ideal. 
According to Lacan, the dual relationship involves the other, the 
mirror relationship, a tendency for aggression. A feature of the mirror 
relationship to the other is its transitivity. 
Transitivity designates the reversibility, the exchangeability of 
both positions. An everyday example from the Kindergarten is the 
expression of a child who has hit another child: ))He hit me((, or in 
unedited form: ))He began it((. The tit for tat is also an example of 
this. A says: ))You are crazy((. B answers: ))Whoever says this is so 
himself((. It is a question of the reversibility of subject and object in 
the utterance. These are harmless examples which can be observed in 
any encounter between children, and, therefore, the self-cornprehen- 
sion and the personal logic of more difficult violent criminals corre- 
sponds to this thinking- and perception mode. 
The hostility that subordinates the victim, greed, and unpredict- 
ability distinguishes the perpetrator in his behavior to the victim. His 
thinking schemata in relation to the object of aggression is transposed 
into the action of the perpetrator. He is dangerous, greedy, and de- 
structive. In the ))mirror((, this time of the German liberal weekly 
(Der Spiegel) and also in other mass media, the perpetrators are 
presented as cold, inconsiderate monsters. The monstrous behavior 
subjecting the victims by the perpetrators is constantly used in the 
media. And fascinated, we the readers, the viewers read reports of 
violence with digust, horror and indigantion. The perpetrator be- 
comes a social monster. I will come back to this aspect later. 
A further characteristic of the dual imaginary relationship to the 
other is the either-or-logic, the ))You((-or-))Ego((-logic; a logic of 
mutual exclusiveness. You and Ego are set in quotation marks, be- 
cause in this logic there is no You' which could be acknowledged in 
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its subjectivity, therefore, also no I which first arises out of the rec- 
ognition of the subjectivity of the other. 
For Lacan aggressiveness results, which characterizes the dual 
relationship to the other out of its nature toward the alienating mirror 
experience. The self-constructing Ego in this experience is an other. I 
am the other. This arrest by the complete, total image of human form 
has a manifold meaning. It makes possible the production of a unity, 
an imaginary wholeness of the body image over the abyss of a multi- 
tude of chaotic, discordered bodily feelings of a dissociated body im- 
age. The achieved form of unity is extremely fragile, a form only in- 
completely cemented together out of fragments, which threatens to 
fall apart again in crisis developing under the circumstances. The 
danger established ))withincc will be located ))outsidecc. It is the delir- 
ium of a beautiful misanthropic soul which reflects the disorder onto 
the world which extinguishes its being. 
An essential concept which is inseparably connected with this 
concept of the Ego-construction is narcissism. This structural rela- 
tionship of transitivity, the fusing unity between I and the object, is a 
narcissistic one. Lacan emphasizes the mortal character of this nari- 
cissistic identification, which loses itself in the image of the other, in 
which I see myself. One may, thereby, visualize the myth calmly -
Narcissis bending over the mirror image loses himself in this mirror. 
Mortal self-love. In concluding this section about the dual relation- 
ship to the other, I would like to cite Herbert Lang (Lang 1973, 53; 
translated by C.B.): ))Lacan calls this mode of intersubjectivity dual 
or imaginary. It is thereby characterized by the fact that here the 
subjects do not unite in an informal recognition, but each strives to 
cancel the other-beingness of the You, in order to fuse with it into an 
illusionary unity of the Ego. Narcissus wants only himself in the 
You. Fascination and aggression, therefore, form a circle in which 
this imaginary relation operates. Sympathy, horror and jealousy per- 
form by virtue of their tendency toward seduction and dominance in 
itcc. That the subjects here do not unite in casual recognition - it is a 
question of the recognition of the other, the recognition of the fact, 
that it is my mirror image, my imaginary creature, which breaks 
through the vicious circle of fascination and destruction. 
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T h e  C o m p l e x  o f  t h e  I n t r u d e r  ( I ' i n t r u s )  
In his article ))La Famillecc Jacques Lacan discusses the identification 
crises of the subject further from a psychogenetic perspective. This 
crisis is distinguished by a reinforcement of aggressive tendencies. 
The ))complex of the intrudercc occupies a prominant place here. The 
intruder is, for example, the milk brother from the Confessions of St. 
Augustine who writes, that he has seen and observed very carefully, 
with his own eyes, a very small child as it developped the feeling of 
jealousy; it could not yet speak and could only observe his milk 
brother with his hostile, poisoned glance. Here an object arises, 
which is a question of jealousy, the object of the other, of the milk 
brother, the milkgiving mother's breast. Also here is the imaginary 
passion to occupy the brother's place in order to enjoy it like he does, 
whereby the enjoyment given to the other is an absolute, an unlimited 
one, fullness. Exactly to the extent in which this enjoyment for the 
child watching is impossible, it becomes enormous in his imagina- 
tion. The rivalry with the brother can find another solution rather 
than the destructive passion of jealousy. Sigmund Freud also has 
demonstrated this way out in ))Mass psychology and Ego-analysiscc. 
The initial wish to destroy the other in order to take his place is 
substituted by a reaction formation which is transformed into the re- 
quirement for equality and justice. No one should wish to be distin- 
guished, each should wish to be equal and have the same - according 
to Freud. Social justice means that one denies oneself a lot, thereby 
others must renounce much. This demand for equality is the root of 
social conscience. The basic mistrust toward the stranger arises per- 
haps from this assumption, that he is not subject to the same renun- 
ciation; through his otherness he undermines the demand for equality. 
Lacan presents the alternative for the subject in terms of the in- 
truder. Therefore, it turns out that through identification the subject 
entangled in jealousy before a new alternative in which the fate of the 
rivalry is conclusive: either it finds the maternal object again and 
clings to the denial of reality and the destruction of the other, or it 
allows itself to be led to another object, which in human communi- 
cation takes on characteristic forms: as comn~unicable object, be- 
cause competition at the same time as rivalry and agreement occurs: 
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thereby, however, at the same time it recognizes the other and the 
socialized object. It turns out that for Lacan human jealousy is an 
))archtype of social feeling((. Let us once again sum up the two pos- 
sibilities: destruction of the other and return to the direct enjoyment 
of the mother-object or recognition of the other with general renun- 
ciation of pleasure and the substitution of the primary object by a 
communicable one. In language, renunciation of the direct object oc- 
curs, recognition and agreement occur. 
Was this not also the way out of the mortal rivalry of the brothers 
after the mutually committed patricide in the myth of ))Totem and 
Taboo((? Thus as the unlimited possession and enjoyment of all 
women of this primal father is mythic, so also is the evidently unlim- 
ited enjoyment of the brother at the mother's breast. First the passion 
of jealousy, ttie imaginary passion rises to the image of a feeling of 
pleasure, which the subject has not experienced in this way. The 
contract contains the renunciation of mythical pleasure and the 
pleasure of the destruction of the other and generates social feeling 
among brothers - and sisters? 
1 would like to end this section with a quotation from Lacan (a 
lecture examinating aggressiveness, which he gave 1948 in Brussels), 
in which he appears as an analyst to be commited to the principle of 
brotherhood. From this quote, moreover, it appears that he also re- 
lates the lack of relationship among people in the modern age to a 
multitude of social desintegration processes. ))In this )liberated( per- 
son of the modern world now this being, who has been torn into 
pieces until now, is at the basis of the existence of its enormous split. 
It is the neurosis of self-punishment with the hysterical-hypochon- 
driac symptoms of its nonrealization of the other and the world, with 
its social consequences of breakdown and crime. It is this moving, 
fleeing victim that otherwise is irresponsible, that has broken with all 
conventions which damns modern men to the most tremendous social 
wandering, whom we receive when they come to us. Our everyday 
task is to reveal to this existence of the nothing-new the way of its 
meaning in a discrete brotherhood, to which we are always too un- 
equal((. 
Just briefly some more observations on the Oedipus complex, the 
third crisis: here in the best case is the idealizing destructive relation- 
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ship to the other removed through th insertion of the ego-ideal, which 
contains the renunciation of the direct, also sexual enjoyment of the 
infantile love object. The insertion of the ego-ideal implies the rejec- 
tion of cannibalism and incest. The recognition of the symbolic order 
also contains the recognition of the lack, the renunciation of the 
imaginary vision of the totality, the entirety. 
In conclusion I would like to go into a few specific aspects of 
contemporary violence in Germany. My thesis is that for these young 
people the process of symbolization has not taken place to a suffi- 
cient extent, that the decisive point, which adolescence represents in 
the development of a person, is activated on the level of the body. 
In Germany 65% of all holdups are carried out by children, ado- 
lescents and young adults between the ages of 10 and 20 (e.g. Stiiwe 
1993, 346). This type of crime has risen dramatically in the last 
twenty years. What is it that is robbed? - The universal means of 
exchange, money, but also, and this in increasing quantity, items of 
clothing from other children in the schollyard, from other adolescents 
on the street. As a rule in terms of these items of clothing it is a 
question of the trademark, therefore, not so much their actual func- 
tion, but more their symbolic value. The subject could, in order to be 
recognized, be distinguished by a certain trademark. The greed for 
this symbolically valuable object of the other is translated immedi- 
ately into violent action. 
This demand for a trademark, which is worn on the body or on the 
feet (frequently shoes are stolen) - we think of the meaning of shoes 
in fetishism and feet in the name of Oedipus -,I could point out as a 
part of the symbolic. There are, perhaps, new, very individualized 
and violent rites of passage in adolescence in which it is attempted to 
obtain fragments of the symbolic, but in a violent way? In order to be 
recognized as ))brother(( in the clique, I put on the jacket of my 
))brothercc because of its trademark. Thus, new clan signs, markings 
arise out of trademarks. 
There is yet another specific form to mark one's own body in the 
name of belonging to a clan. It is the swastika, which is the symbol 
not of an order based on contract, but an arbitrary order. Again a 
fragment of the symbolic. The swastika on the breast or even on the 
face and at the same time skinheads make the adolescents an alien- 
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ated part of our society. At the same time carrying the signs of the 
perpetrator and the victim of the Shoah on their body, they become 
the new monsters of our society. It required two generations in order 
to bring forth a psychotic. The Skotom, rejected in the grandfather 
generation in the symbolic sense, returned on the level of the real, the 
body. These adolescents have certainly no psychotic structure. It is a 
question of a parallelization of two generations. 
Forty-nine years after the liberation of Auschwitz, the police chief 
of a large German city cannot guarantee the security of a state spon- 
sored game because it takes place on April 20th! The behavior of the 
powers in authority is a scandal, which is no worse than the behavior 
of the adolescents committing the violence. 
And the monstrous behavior of these adolescents conveyed by the 
media developed perhaps their worst effect: the imaginary overe- 
valuation of the power of adolescence and the retreat of the power of 
authority. In the schools as well as prisons not-wishing-to-see and 
silence appear to be the dominating modes of encounter between the 
authorities and adolescents committing violence: resignation, anxious 
flight and ostrich-like politics toward violence, instead of discussion, 
strong prevention tactics and also punishment. This is a very mild, 
lenient interpretation of the behavior of the authorities, i.e., the ad- 
ministrative power. At least with organized violent behavior against 
asylum apllicants the non-intervention of the police, the extreme re- 
straint and also surrender of the communal administration in the form 
of resettling the refugees can be judged as passively admitted consent 
to the intentions of the right radical perpetrators of violence. 
What concerns the newly inflamed racism of the adolescents in 
the most recent years is, according to my suggestion, that these ado- 
lescents are carrying out what was withhold from them in the media. 
The recognition of guilt was withheld from them, or at least the 
communication of the concern over the Nazi-crimes committed in the 
name of the German people by their grandparents. What was sym- 
bolically condemned returns again in reality on the level of the body. 
In psychoanalysis, mind you not in terms of legal justice, it is a 
question of a substitution a symptom by a question. 
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I n c l u s i o n  a n d  E x c l u s i o n  i n  E u r o p e  
Soc ia l  D ive r s i t y  and  the  European  S t a t e  
The two European organisations which have had an impact on the 
educational developments which relate to social diversity in Euro- 
pean society, are the Council of Europe and the European Commu- 
nity. Their impact on the national educational policies has however, 
been limited because the European states have not allowed these 
organisations to interfere in the educational domain, which is seen as 
only being part of the national jurisdiction. 
The Council of Europe and the European Community have fo- 
cused issues revolving around social diversity, through their concerns 
about the education of ))migrants((. The migrations which informed 
these policies started in the late 1950's when de-colonisation process 
began to gather momentum. 
The Council of Europe began to survey the position of ))migrantcc 
children's education in 1966. During each subsequent year resolu- 
tions were adopted by the Council on different aspects of the educa- 
tion of ))migrantcc families. This process culminated in the launch of a 
five year ))Project No. 7c( in 1980. 
The European Community developed a programme in the 1 9 7 0 ' ~ ~  
and it also initiated discussions about education of ))migrantcc work- 
ers, and issued a Directive to this effect in 1977. 
While, the Council of Europe has increasingly focused on an in- 
tercultural approach to education, the underlying assumption appears 
to be that the European nation states are cohesive and coherent. What 
has so far developed in relation to educational policies, such as they 
are, is a response at the wider European level which does not take 
into account the underlying diverse natures of European societies. It 
instead focuses in on the immigrant dimension and ignores how for 
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instance, educational policies for immigrants ought to be formulated 
in the context of general educational policies which include indige- 
nous European minorities and policies towards their education. 
This is particularly a problem at the present time because govern- 
ance of nations, particularly in Europe, has become an extremely 
problematic issue. The rise of violence and instability is made worse 
by the ways in which economic decline in many areas of Europe is 
leading to a rise in tensions and a disintegration of communities. 
Where these communities are diverse the tensions are greater. The 
development of narrow nationalisms east of the Elbe have had dan- 
gerous consequences in the western European context of providing 
strength to presumed purer identities which construct an imagined 
past which excludes diversities. 
Social scientists in the so called developed countries have been 
concerned for a long time with the integration of the new nations in 
the developing countries. What has been forgotten is that national 
integration is a permanent issue for all nations whether old or new; 
))developingcc or ))developed((. The tendencies towards disintegration 
may be linked to different factors in different contexts but the need to 
re-examine the basis on which nations are governed require continual 
appraisal. Those who govern most of the European polities seem im- 
mune to the dangers that the polities confront unless measures to en- 
sure inclusive citizenship rights are implemented. At another level 
the education and media systems have a major role to play in ensur- 
ing that the educational and informational process does take on the 
substantive issues of the ))belongingnesscc of all groups to the polity. 
The representation of ))the othercc and images which construct the 
immigrant as an alien do not help. 
The national project which set out to make ))one out of the manycc 
has faltered and there is a lack of solidarity because people have be- 
come surplus to the requirement of the state. This solidarity of all 
groups within Europe has to be an inclusive proposition so that the 
national minorities, immigrant communities and the under-class are 
all seen to belong to it. 
The notion of a nation state which is caring and nurturing of all 
the citizens has received a serious setback. Within western Europe 
the malaise of racism has assisted in disintegrating communities, 
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which may yet aid and abet the process of disintegrating nations, as 
it has in the case of the now fragmented clear and acquiring Yugo- 
slavian state and parts of eastern Europe (e.g. Denitch 1990). There is 
a present danger of the rise of the violent notions of >)ethnic cleans- 
ing(( a legitmately in Europe, merely fifty years after they were de- 
feated. The spillover of this abominable notion into other parts of 
Europe would have catastrophic consequences. 
If citizens within the state feel that they are treated fairly, that 
they belong, and are accorded their full rights, they would then fulfil 
their obligations. Therefore, the accordance of full citizenship rights 
would lead to the loyalities which are necessary for nation states to 
function. In the recent phase of frenzy about the market, social rights 
of groups have also been negated with a consequent withdrawal by 
groups from their social responsibilities. Yet, this is far from the 
case, and if anything the issues are getting worse not better. In the 
absence of greater equalities seige communities are being established 
which hark back to narrow nationalism and fundamentalisms (Gun- 
dara 1992). 
The secular nation state has received set-backs at various levels. 
The lack of a commitment by politicians to secular ideals and a cor- 
ruption of the polity has led to an increase of what Galbraith fa- 
mously described as private wealth and public squalor, and this has 
lost the state the loyalty of many people. In Britain the reference to 
monarchy raises issues of whether they are worth keeping for finan- 
cial reasons. Yet, at the underlying level a narrow minded govern- 
ment has unleashed this argument by undermining the legitimacy of 
the Crown by denying that there is any notion of society at the under- 
lying level. This market-orientated approach applied to eveiy aspect 
of British life, propelled by new conservativism has led to destroying 
the glue that has held the imagined British national community to- 
gether. 
The marginalisation of large groups of people from different 10-
calities, regions and nationalities in European countries undermines 
the fabric of European nation states. If at times of hardship and eco- 
nomic crises, immigrant groups are seen as being the only element of 
diversity in societies, they can be constructed as being the problem. 
In many European contexts they are being blamed for causing many 
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of the social problems, thus activating the syndrome of blaming the 
victim, for being cause of the problem. 
These European nation states have indigenous diversities on the 
basis of religion, language, and social class through regional or na- 
tional minorities. Now, in the post world war period, many of these 
countries have acquired new group of settlers. These groups have 
different patterns of settlement, social class affiliations, legal statuses 
as well as levels of family reunification. 
The earlier distinction between the countries into which people 
migrated in northern Europe and the southern European countries 
from which emigration took place has now changed. Even the emi- 
gration countries in southern Europe have now become immigration 
countries. Schools in both northern and southern Europe have ex- 
tremely diverse student populations. 
With the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the establishment of 
an open market in the European Union, a newer pattern of intra- 
European Union migration is also taking place. The position of the 
earlier postwar immigrants from outside Europe, who had to fight for 
their and their children's educational and training rights, is markedly 
different from the European Union immigrants who as a matter of 
right, demand high levels of social policy and educational provision 
for their children. 
While the rural and smaller towns in many European countries' 
may have little in common with the diversity in large urban areas, the 
new reality might mean that the larger European capitals would have 
similar potentials and problems to devise educational policies for 
mixed populations. Hence, a rural area in one country may have 
similarity with a rural area in another, and urban areas in different 
national contexts, would be able to develop broader intercultural 
educational strategies. 
As the larger processes of integration take place and there is a 
greater need for specialisation and social differentiation within so- 
cieties, each nation state would have to ensure that greater economic, 
political and cultural policies are developed to enable greater coop- 
eration. Such measures would also have to take account of the local 
and national peculiarities. 
Inclusion and Exclusion in Europe 
F r o m  M i g r a n t  T o  S e t t l e r  
There have been various types of migration since World War I1 in- 
volving the movement of over 30 million people, of whom about 10 
million have stayed on in Europe. Immediately after the war, a mas- 
sive migration of displaced persons involved 20 million people. This 
movement on a massive scale included 10 million Germans from 
Poland and Eastern Europe to Germany and lasted until the early 
1950s. During the post-colonial phase very different migratory pat- 
terns took shape. The first type of migration consisted of European 
colonialists who returned to Europe. These included the British from 
India, French )pied noirsc from Algeria, the Dutch from Indonesia 
and the Portuguese from Angola and Mozambique. 
The second type of migration included, many refugees, particu- 
larly from Eastern Europe who migrated to Western Europe. In the 
1970s small numbers of political refugees from Third World coun- 
tries also came to settle in Europe. The third and the largest type of 
migration consisted of migrant labour which initially came from It- 
aly, a number of Irish migrated to Britain. The fourth type were 
skilled workers and employees within the Nordic labour market and 
the European Common Marketand were mostly related to the multi- 
national companies (Gundara 1990, 99). Fifthly, France, Britain and 
the Netherlands received a large number of immigrants from Africa, 
the Caribbean and Asia, many of whom were citizens of receiving 
countries. Germany recruited a large number of workers from 1956 
onwards in attempting to catch up with other European countries; 
these included numbers of Turks particularly since many southern 
Europeans had returned home. Britain, France and Germany are the 
largest immigration countries and over 40% of such populations are 
of third world origin (e.g. Castles et.al. 1984). 
Britain stopped the migration of workers in 1962 and only al- 
lowed skilled people to enter the country after that date (Castles and 
Kosack 1973). 
Across Europe this discrimination was linked to the European 
Voluntary Worker Scheme in Britain, the Belgian contingent-system, 
the French OfJiceNational d'lmmigration, and the West German 
Federal Labour Office recruiting scheme. In Switzerland, Sweden 
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and the Netherlands there were state regulations which controlled 
workers coming to these countries voluntarily (OECD 1983). Institu- 
tionalised controls even applied to those who came to settle from the 
ex-colonies of France and Britain even though they were nationals of 
the country of settlement. 
The Guest Worker System was different from the settlement of 
nationals from the former colonies of European countries. However, 
both these systems of migration, while facing different policies, laws 
and bureaucratic rules have led to a somewhat similar issue: settle-
ment. France, Britain and the Netherlands have all enacted legislation 
to stop the migration of their citizens from their former colonies (for 
instance The British Nationality Act 198 1). The discriminatory na-
tionality legislation has caused an enormous amount of hardship to 
the disenfranchised citizens because it was enacted with the express 
purpose of controlling immigration. The stricter the rules against 
immigration and citizenship have become, the faster has been the 
transition of temporary stay to a process of permanent settlement. 
For example, in Sweden, apart from the Finns and the indigenous 
Samish peoples in Sweden, it had until 1930 one language and one 
religion. At the present time 1 million out of 8 million have a non- 
Swedish origin. In Germany it is estimated that in 1990 there were 6 
million Turkish people in Germany. Clearly the issue for educational 
policies in Sweden and in Germany to accommodate the Auslander 
and the Aussiedler are important (OECD 1989,23-25). 
The new settlers belong to the working class because of their re- 
lationship to the means of production. However, their relationship to 
the European working classes is marred by racism, which in turn is 
nurtured by the state. European governments had expected that with 
the deepening economic crisis many of the new settlers would return 
to the countries of origin and that the governments would thus be 
able to export any accruing social costs. This, in fact, has not hap- 
pened. In addition expenditures on housing, schools, health and so- 
cial services have been cut. This has led to an increase in tensions in 
many cities in Europe. The ruling classes have seized upon these 
tensions and blamed the very workers who have assisted in the crea- 
tion of the post-war expansion as a threat to public order and safety, 
and urban decline. The black community in Britain and the new set- 
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tlers in Europe have on the one hand been used as exploited labour 
and on the other hand have been blamed for social unrest and urban 
decline. In most countries very conservative politicians have whipped 
up racism by stressing foreign swamping. No European governments 
have provided the newly settled communities with confidence in their 
place in European societies. 
R e d e f i n i n g  N a t i o n a l i t i e s  
As the immigrants have become more settled in Europe there has 
been a concern about defining their legal and political position within 
European societies. In Germany the situation is compounded by the 
))ethniccc Germans arriving from Eastern Europe and Russia and ac- 
quiring citizenship rights soon after their arrival. This is in sharp 
contrast to the auslander who have been resident in Germany for a 
long time, and cannot acquire such rights. 
The new settlers to Europe have come from nation states and most 
of these states have diverse populations. These settlers are therefore 
either nationals of the country of origin or of the country of settle- 
ment. Their position in legal and political terms is continually being 
undermined through legislation. This legislation is racist in its intent 
and is not directed against the ))ethnicitycc of the new settlers. The use 
of ))ethnicity(( by social anthropologists has certainly not helped in 
clarifying this complex issue. It is necessary for those involved with 
such issues to undertake a more systematic analysis of the basis of 
European nation states in historical and contemporary terms so that a 
clear definition may emerge. For instance, what are the differences 
between the national minorities and ))ethniccc minorities? Do the na- 
tional minorities (in Jura, Scotland, Brittany, Wales) accept the states 
as defined by the dominant nationalities? There is furthermore, a 
need to define the nature of European societies and their relationship 
to the structures of the nation state. 
The national minorities in Europe generally have a territorial basis 
(Scotland, Wales) which are constitutionally recognised by the state. 
The newly settled communities however, also occupy urban spaces 
which may not be constitutionally recognised but nevertheless, repre- 
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sent the birth of new communities. The black community in Brixton, 
Southall and Handsworth, live as part of a largely disempowered 
group. Similarly, the Turks in Kreuzberg in West Berlin live in a 
)sanctuary( against racism which nevertheless, they still experience. 
Schools in these neighbourhoods reflect the communities in which 
children live. 
E u r o  C e n t r i s m  a n d  E d u c a t i o n  
At the basic level the issue which is being is raised is how does 
Europe construct itself as an entity and how are notions of inclusion 
and exclusion articulated, at least in the educational and knowledge 
do remain. 
Knowledge systems confront dual challenges as European inte- 
gration takes shape. On the one hand Europe confronts a Eurocentric 
tradition in many domains of knowledge. These hegemonic under- 
standing~ are informed by the imperialism of Europe. As Edward 
Said writes: 
))Without significant exception the universalising discourses of 
modern Europe and the United States assume the silence, willing or 
otherwise, of the non-European world. There is incorporation; there 
is inclusion; there is direct rule; there is coercion. But there is only 
infrequently an acknowledgement that the colonising people should 
be heard from, their ideas known.(( (Said 1993, 58) 
As a result of the imperial enterprise not only is Europe in the 
world but the world is in Europe. Ostensibly this has profound impli- 
cations for the transfer of knowledge. Yet, discourses from the colo- 
nised peripheries are still treated as being marginal in contemporary 
Europe. 
Martin Bernal indicated how in the 18c and 19c Europeans devel- 
oped a historiography which denied the earlier understanding that the 
Greeks in the Classical and Hellenistic periods had learnt as a result 
of colonisation and interaction between Egyptians, Phoenicians and 
Greeks (Bernal 1987). Part of the reason for this new historiography, 
has been with the rise of racism and anti-semitism in Europe, and the 
European Romantics and racists wanted to distance Greece from the 
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Egyptians and Phoenicians and construct it as, the pure childhood on 
Europe. It was unacceptable from their perspective that, the Europe- 
ans would have developed any learning and understandings from the 
Africans or the Semites. 
This historiographic shift has major implications for how Euro- 
pean history is constructed, and particularly for how knowledge and 
linguistic systems from civilisations constructed as being inferior are 
excluded from the European academe. As Bernal states, the paradigm 
of ))progresscc was used to put the Greeks to the fore and to cast aside 
the Egyptians who were governed by priests. With the rise of the 
slavery of blacks by Europeans blacks were construed by European 
thinkers to be uncivilised and consequently distanced from xivi -  
lisedcc Europe. 
The notion of a European culture separated from the world south 
of the Mediterranean is a mythical construction. The contributions to 
knowledge in the ancient period from this immediate region include 
Mesopotamian astronomy, the Egyptian calendar and Greek mathe- 
matics, enriched by the Arabs. As Samir Amin states: 
))The opposition Greece = the WestIEgypt, Mesopotamia, Persia = 
the East is itself a later artificial construct of Eurocentrism. For the 
boundary in the region separates the backward North African and 
European West from the advanced East; and the geographic unities 
constituting Europe, Africa and Asia have no importance on the level 
of the history of civilisation, even if Eurocentrism in its reading of 
the past is projected onto the past the modem North-South line of 
demarcation passing through the mediterranean.cc (Amin 1989) 
Amin argues that the Euro-Islamic Medieval world ceased to exist 
during the Renaissance when Europe adopted the road towards capi- 
talism: ))In Europe, civilisation gradually wins over peoples of the 
North and East; to the South of the Mediterranean, Islamic culture 
gains ground in the Maghreb. Christianity and Islam are this both 
heirs of Hellenism and remain for this reason, twin siblings, even if 
they have been, at certain moments, relentless adversaries. It is prob- 
ably only in the modem times - when Europe from Renaissance on- 
ward, takes off on the road towards capitalism that the Mediterranean 
boundary line forms between what will crystallise as the centre and 
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periphery of the new woridwide and all-inclusive system.(( (Amin 
1989,26). 
The syncretisms of the Hellenistic period thus prepare the ground 
for Christianity and Islam and their universalistic message. With the 
emergence of the Renaissance in Europe the dominance of metaphys- 
ics is broken and the material foundations of the capitalist world are 
laid. Scientific progress becomes manifest in the development of the 
forces of production in the context of a secularised society which 
becomes increasingly democratic. 
The Renaissance is also a point of departure for the conquest of 
the world by Europe: ))If the period of the Renaissance makes a 
qualitative break with the history of humanity, it is precisely because 
from that time on, Europeans become conscious of the idea of the 
conquest of the world by their civilisation is henceforth a possible 
objective.(( (Amin 1989, 73) 
This is to a certain extent marked in 1492 by the mapping of the 
world, as well as, the construction of a typology of different empires. 
As the relative strengths of different peoples and societies are tabu- 
lated peoples, Eurocentrism is c~ystallised, and it becomes a global 
project. This Europeanisation of the globe bears within it an inherent 
deuniversalisation of knowledge and it developed for three hundred 
years from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment. It expressed itself 
as European, nationalist and secular with a worldwide scope. This 
dominant European culture had to arbitrarily and mythically con-
struct its counterpart in ))the Othercc and ))the Oriental(( (e.g. Gundara 
1990). 
Critical to this is the construction of Greece as ))the pure child- 
hood of Europecc and to severe its link from its milieu in the Mediter- 
ranean and make it a part of Europe. Endemic to this is the racism of 
the European who is constructed as belonging to a superior and uni- 
fied culture. 
The implications for constructing images, information and know- 
ledge systems from such a foundation not only distorts knowledge 
and it's history but remains profoundly racist. The issues for inter- 
cultural education and information systems in Europe and perhaps 
the North American continent are not therefore, as simplistic as 
critics like D'Zouza assert (D'Zouza 1992). 
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This legacy of distortion is based on the assumption that the 
Greek heritage predisposed Europe to rationality, and while Greece 
was the founder of rational philosophy the Orient is still locked into 
the metaphysical phase. As Amin asserts: ))The history of so-called 
Western thought and philosophy (which presupposes the existence of 
the other, diametrically opposed thoughts and philosophies, which is 
called Oriental) always begins with Greece. Emphasis is placed on 
the variety and conflicts of the philosophical schools, the develop- 
ment of thought free from religious constraints, humanism, and the 
triumph of reason - all without reference to the )Orient( whose con- 
tribution to Hellenic thought is considered to be non-existent.(( (Amin 
1989,91) 
This view of history assumes that Europeans took over Greek 
thought in the Renaissance and this thought comes of age in modern 
philosophy. The period of two thousand years separating ))Greek an- 
tiquity from the European Renaissance are treated as a long and hazy 
period of transitioncc (ibid). Amin's understanding of this issue reso- 
nates with Martin Bernal's research demonstrating the fabrication of 
ancient Greece. 
For European education and information systems the challenge is 
to engage in a wide ranging establishment of connections with other 
cultures and civilisations which are part of the fabric of contempo- 
rary European society, and also develop an understanding of its past 
which includes, Greece, Egypt and the Near Eastern connections. 
The issue of Eurocentrism is not simply an issue of prejudices and 
errors which heighten xenophobia and chauvinism. Eurocentrism, 
according to Amin: ))has replaced rational explanations of history 
with partial pseudo-theories, patched together and even self contra- 
dictory at times ... The Eurocentric distortion that makes the domi- 
nant capitalist culture negates the universalist ambition on which that 
culture claims to be founded.(( (Amin 1989, 104). 
The Enlightenment came not as a universal phenomenon, despite 
attempts to learn from other cultures, but as a narrowly defined 
European response to the obscurantism of Christianity. 
There are obvious contributions that the academic, information 
and educational systems can make in the context of democratic 
egalitarianism which are also a feature of European societies. Such 
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theoretical issues should have implications for what constitutes the 
common curricula and shared images in European schools and com- 
munities. Without such a curriculum and informational changes in- 
dividual groups would demand separate political structures, schools 
and media systems for their own religious or ethnic groups. The rise 
of ethnic, culturalist and fundamentalist nationalisms in Europe at the 
present had to dire consequences for nation states as currently con- 
structed. 
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R a c i a l  V i o l e n c e  i n  t h e  T w e n t i e t h  C e n t u r y  
All societies in all historical periods have experienced both racial 
intolerance and racial violence. However, both racial intolerance and 
racial violence have varied from one society to another. The mani- 
festations of racial intolerance range from a simple refusal to enter 
into social and economic intercourse with a member of an out-group 
to the extreme of genocide. At the same time racial violence also 
varies from isolated attacks upon individuals to mass murder orga- 
nised by the state. A variety of factors determine both the types of 
general racism which exist within a society and the ways in which 
this manifests itself both in a non-violent and violent way. The aim of 
this paper is to examine ways in which racism manifests itself and 
then to proceed to look at varieties of racial violence. The paper then 
asks why racial violence breaks out before examining why it mani- 
fests itself in different ways within different states. 
We need to begin by focusing on racial intolerance generally and 
recognising that 'racial violence is just its most potent manifestation. 
We can divide varieties of racial intolerance into official and unof- 
ficial, and begin with the former. In the twentieth century, the exi- 
stence of the nation state has led to the inevitable bureaucratization 
of racism, leading to the implementation of particular measures, 
which are structural components of the existence of the nation state, 
especially in its liberal-democratic form. The first of these compo- 
nents consists of immigration controls, whose existence mean that 
individuals not born within a country are not, in the case of western 
liberal democracies, offered the economic, social and political bene- 
fits of the native population. 
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The second structural component in the existence of the nation- 
state consists of nationality laws, which, again, are designed to ex- 
clude ))foreigners(( from the benefits enjoyed by natives. Using the 
example of Germany during the twentieth century, we can illustrate 
the ways in which nationality laws have remained from an autocracy, 
through a dictatorship and on to a liberal democracy, so that through- 
out these three regimes German citizenship has been determined by 
national origins rather than .birth within Germany, ius sanguinis 
rather than ius solis, meaning denial of basic rights to second-gen- 
eration immigrants born within Germany. The Nazi racial laws were 
an extension of nationality laws to suit Nazi racial goals (see 
Hoffmann 1992; Dawidowicz 1987,78- 10 1). 
For the maintenance of nationality laws, the forces of law and or- 
der are used, varying from the SS in the case of Nazi Germany 
(Broszat 1979; Dawidowicz 1987) to the county constabularies and 
immigration officers of contemporary Britain (Supperstone and 
Cavanagh 1988). All police forces also have an ingrained racial bias 
in their everyday work, discriminating against members of minorities, 
a process which is usually helped by the judiciary (see Scarman 
1981;Solomos 1989,99-121). 
Continuing with Government legislation, in extreme circum-
stances measures to control movement are introduced such as hap- 
pened, for instance, against Germans in Britain during the First 
World War (Panayi 1991a, 47-59; Bird 1986) and Japanese Ameri- 
cans during the Second World War (Daniels 1975). Measures are 
also sometimes introduced which take away the property of the per- 
secuted minority such as Jews in Nazi Germany as well as Germans 
in Britain during the First World War and Japanese Americans and 
Canadians during the Second World War (Panayi 1990; Sunahara 
1981; Gilbert 1986). 
Relocation is also a common response amongst governments to- 
wards minorities, especially in wartime, and can take various forms. 
In the first place it can simply involve forcing people to a specific 
geographical location, a classic example consisting of Russia under 
Catherine the Great during the eighteenth century with the formalisa- 
tion of the Jewish Palle of Settlement created by one of her predeces- 
sors Tsarina Elizabeth (Baron 1964). A more common policy with 
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regard to relocation, especially during the twentieth century, is the 
implemetation of internment, which has happened almost universally, 
practiced by both autocratic and liberal democratic states, especially 
in wartime (Panayi 1993,7-8). 
The state can also turn to violence. With regard to the forces of 
law and order we can point to the role of the police in the late nine: 
teenth century Russian pogroms as well as the role of the German 
army and police forces in Kristallnacht, discussed below. Even more 
extreme, we can point to genocidal policies which obviously must 
have central government authority to work because of their scale. 
Unofficial hostility goes hand in hand with official racism and can 
be state led in autocracies or can influence the Government in liberal 
democracies. We can point to various manifestations of popular ra- 
cism. Most basically, a refusal to enter into social or economic inter- 
course with a member of minority, endemic in all systems of gov- 
ernment, and difficult to measure (see Panahi 1980). 
Economic discrimination is also widespread and this can manifest 
itself in the following ways. Firstly, in refusing to employ workers of 
a minority group. Britain during the 1950s would illustrate this situ- 
ation, with black and Asian newcomers having difficulty in securing 
the sort of employment for which they were trained. Also in Britain 
during the 1950s as well as at the end of the nineteenth century there 
existed trade union hostility towards immigrants (Garrard 1971 ; 
Pilkington 1988). 
Remaining with popular manifestations of racism, we can further 
point to press hostility which can also manifest itself in a variety of 
ways. For instance, we can mention media stereotypes which are 
essentially ever present (Hartmann and Husband 1974). In more ex- 
treme circumstances press campaigns can also develop over specific 
issues, a very good example being Germany immediately after re- 
unification, where the press became obsessed with the threat of asy- 
lum seekers. Under conditions of serious insecurity within a state, 
especially one where racial images have been long standing, a con- 
spiracy theory can develop as happened in interwar Germany al- 
though we need to bear in mind that antisemitic conspiracy theories 
existed throughout Europe during the late nineteenth and early twen- 
tieth centuries (Panayi 1994,284; Cohn 1967). 
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Pressure groups can also develop as another manifestation of 
popular hostility and again we can give countless examples. For in- 
stance, Britain during the late nineteenthth century (Gainer 1972) or 
during the First World War (Panayi 1991a, 202) or, once again, con- 
temporary Germany (Panayi 1994, 286). Racial violence might be 
seen as the most potent manifestation of unofficial hostility varying 
from the attacking of individuals to the total destruction of an entire 
community, discussed further below. 
The relationship between unofficial and official hostility is ex- 
tremely close. In autocracies the latter is fundamental in the manifes- 
tations of racial hostility. But in liberal democracies a more complex 
relationship between state and popular racism exists. In such cases 
we can see public opinion and the state feeding off each other and it 
often proves difficult to determine which leads the other. 
Racial violence can be divided into four categories in the following 
order of severity. Firstly, isolated attacks upon houses and individu- 
als which are universally present in the modern nation-state, although 
they manifest themselves at different times with different levels of 
severity as well as often being dependent upon geographical location 
within a country. We can examine the examples of Great Britain and 
Germany. 
In Great Britain such incidents were probably endemic against 
nineteenth century Irish immigrants in areas where they were heavily 
concentrated such as Lancashire, London and Glasgow (Gallagher 
1987; Neal 1988). Referring to the East End of London during the 
1930s the historian Richard Thurlow has pointed to ))the number of 
increased, unprovoked attacks upon Jews and Communists by young 
hooligans in the Stepney, Bethnal Green and Shoreditch areas during 
1 9 3 6 ~together with ))the breaking of shop windows, the desecration 
of Jewish cemeteries and synagogues in the massive spread of an- 
tisemetic graffiti.(( (Thurlow 1987, 110) In more recent British his- 
tory we can point to a 1987 Commission for Racial Equality report 
on racial harassment in housing which demonstrated that during the 
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previous 12 months 1 in 4 of the London borough of Newham's black 
residents had been victims of racial harassment, ranging from insult- 
ing behaviour to physical assault and damage to property. Further- 
more, between 1917 and 1985 there were 63 racist murders in Great 
Britain according to Paul Gordon's research including 26 in 1981 
(Tompson 1988, 17 1). 
In Germany a similar situation has existed which deteriorated im- 
mediately after re-unification. In 1991 the extreme right in the Fed- 
eral Republic committed more crimes than the extreme left for the 
first time ever. In 1992, 17 people were killed in racial attacks; the 
most serious and publicised incident occurred on 23 November 1992 
when 3 Turks were killed in a arson attack in Molln. Even worse was 
the killing of three women and two children by a firebomb in Solin- 
gen on 29 May 1993 (Panayi 1994). 
A second manifestation of racial violence consists of riots against 
property and people. The important factor in this case is that large 
numbers of people are involved, in contrast to the previous category 
of racial attacks, where a few, usually anonymous, individuals are 
involved in sporadic incidents. In the case of the riots they break out 
against a background of recently increased xenophobia, which has 
developed against the more deep-rooted cause of the endemic racism 
of the nation state. The increase in xenophobia is caused by any one 
of a number of factors, considered below, including economic de- 
pression, political change, and war. The actual outbreak of rioting 
requires, further, a spark. 
In Britain during the First World War riots broke out inspired by 
the press resulting in widespread violence affecting virtually every 
German property in Great Britain. On other occasions in Great Brit- 
ain a riot has broken out in just one location such as Middlesborough 
in 1961 (Panayi 1991b, 139). In Brazil during the First World War 
we can point to riots against German property which broke out in 
April and October of 19 17 (Luebke 1 987). 
Germany after re-unification offers an interesting illustration be- 
cause of the question of whether the violence against asylum seekers 
consists of riots or attacks. In most cases they are the latter, involving 
just a handful of perpetrators. However, there are exceptions. For 
instance, the rioting against an asylum home in Hoyerswerda in Sep- 
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tember 1991. In addition, we can point to the attack upon a refugee 
hostel in Greifswald on 3 November 1991 involving the football fans 
of the East Berlin football club BFC. The worst violence of all oc- 
curred in Rostock in August 1992 and involved skinheads cheered on 
by local residents, with an ineffective local police force, meaning that 
the disorder lasted for a week (see Funke 1993). 
The attitudes of the authorities plays a role in the destructiveness 
of race riots which break out. If they are slow to react, or, worse still, 
are implicated in outbreaks of disorder, then any disorder which does 
break out is likely to escalate. We can give several examples. First, 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century Russia which became 
saturated with antisemitism as we can see by the attitudes of the 
Tsars, the bureaucracy and the police which led people to believe that 
they could attack Jews with absolute impunity. Several major out- 
breaks of violence occurred. Firstly, that in 1881 focused especially 
in Odessa and Kiev. 45 Jews were killed in pogroms in 1903 affect- 
ing a variety of locations and then in 1905 a further 660 conlmunities 
endured violence resulting in 1,000 deaths (Judge 1992; Aronson 
1990; Klier and Lambroza 1992). 
The role of the police and army in US racial violence duririg the 
first half of the twentieth century has also been called into question. 
In the East St Louis riots of 191 7, for instance, violence ))occurred in 
full view of armed soldiers who took no steps to halt the carnage(( 
(Grimshaw 1963, 83). During the Chicago riots of 1919, which in- 
volved blacks and whites attacking each other, the police acted in a 
biased fashion in favour of the latter with regard to those they pro- 
tected and those they arrested. 
In the Kristallnacht pogrom of 1938, which took place against an 
increase in official anti-semitism in Germany, various facts point to a 
more direct complicity of various strands of authority. In the first 
place, after a Nazi party meeting with Hitler (on the night of the as- 
sassination of the German ambasador in Paris, Ernst von Rath, the 
spark for the disturbances), those Gauleiter who had been present 
told their local propaganda offices to strike out against Jewish busi- 
nesses and homes. They also informed police posts to prevent looting 
but also to prepare for the arrest of Jews. In addition, members of the 
SA also took part in the rioting (Adam 1991 ;Read and,Fisher 1991). 
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We can separate from the above what we might describe as the 
killing of individuals which ties in with the first subgroup of attacks 
upon individuals but has developed particularly in the USA in the 
form of lynching. Between 1886 and 1968 3,446 blacks and 1,297 
whites were killed in US lynchings (Zangrando 1980, 5-8). If we 
wanted to define the characteristics of a lynching we would point to 
its ritualised nature, as events of this nature follow a particular pat- 
tern. Gordon Allport divided lynchings into two types. The first, 
which he described as ))vigilante((, was carried out by a small band of 
individuals in a quiet manner. The second type, ))mob lynching((, in- 
volved larger numbers of people and was more ferocious. In both 
varieties, the attitude of the authorities, is crucial, usually remaining 
out of sight, if not actually participating. in events. Such activities are 
not completely unique to the USA (Allport 1954). We can draw a 
connection between lynchings and the attacks in our first category, 
especially if, as is often the case in the actions of youths involved in 
incidents within western European democracies, the intention is to 
kill, usually through use of a firebomb. 
The most extreme form of racial violence in the twentieth century 
is genocide. This has the following characteristics. First, it involves 
the desire to exterminate all representatives of a particular minority. 
This is government policy which means that the state puts vast re- 
sources behind the extermination of members of a minority group. In 
some cases genocide is the central core of Government policy (see 
Dadrian 1975). The twentieth century has facilitated the process of 
genocide because of the development of methods of killing connected 
with technological changes so that the Nazi genocide was far more 
efficient than that carried out by the young Turks against the Arme- 
nians. 
The above are the two major instances of genocide during the first 
half of the twentieth century. The Turkish massacre of Armenians 
during the First World War meant that, out of a population of 1.5 
million Armenians who lived in the Ottoman Empire before the 
conflict, one million were murdered. The method of killing essen- 
tially revolved around deportation of the Armenian population from 
their homeland in eastern Turkey to Syria, with people either dying in 
large numbers on the journey (within trains or on foot) or perishing 
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from exposure or starvation once they reached the Syrian desert 
(Kuper 1982). 
More sophisticated and effective, because carried out by a more 
advanced state against a larger minority over a far greater geographi- 
cal area, was the Nazi extermination of European Jewry during 
World War I1 which meant 6 million deaths or the annihilation of 67 
per cent of the Jews in countries invaded by Germany, together with 
the killing of other minorities in the lower echelons of the Nazi racial 
hierarchy (Dawidowicz 1987, 480; Berenbaum 1990). As Zygmunt 
Bauman has pointed out, the effectiveness and efficiency of Nazi 
methods of killing is explained by the fact that bureacratic business 
methods were employed (Bauman 1989). 
Having examined the manifestations of racial violence we can now 
ask why racial violence breaks out. In order to explain this we need 
to look at the following factors. First, if we accept the indisputable 
fact that nationalism has been the dominant ideology in the modern 
world, inextricably linked with state creation, we have to accept that 
racism inevitably exists in all states. However, the existence of an 
underlying racism can only explain small scale attacks upon individ- 
ual members of minorities, who would be seen as legitimate targets 
by young males, who are invariably responsible for such incidents. 
Such individuals, who are more prone to carrying out violence of 
varying sorts than any other groups in society, would interpret the 
racism of the nation state, especially its media manifestations, as le- 
gitimising their racial attacks upon members of minority groups 
(Panayi 1994). 
Rioting, meanwhile, only takes place against the background of an 
increase in racism within the dominant society of a nation state. A 
range of factors can lead to this increase in racism, which we can 
divide into socio-economic and political. With regard to the first of 
these, economic setbacks are fundamental in virtually all periods for 
the growth of racism. This has taken place throughout Europe. The 
classic example here is the inter-war years but we also need to men- 
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tion the late nineteenth century and the 1990s. All of these periods 
witnessed racial riots in many parts of Europe, often on a nationwide 
scale, or at least affecting large numbers of locations (see Judge 
1992; Aronson 1990; Klier and Lambroza 1992; Panayi 1993; 
Hockenos 1993). 
Increases in immigration can be considered as another soci-eco- 
nomic factor which leads to a rise in racism and consequently racial 
riots. In this situation members of the dominant society perceive their 
social and economic position being threatened by newcomers, with 
particular concern shown towards housing and employment. Such 
fears are invariably wipped up by the press. A classic example of this 
situation is Britain during the late 1950s and early 1960s (Panayi 
1991b). However, riots caused by the perceived socio-economic 
threat of immigrants are usually isolated and break out in particular 
locations because of factors particular to that location. 
A variety of political causes can lead to an increase in racial vio- 
lence, invariably linked, in some way or another, with the onset of 
political instability due to a profound change. We can first point to 
state creation. A good example here is Germany both from the 1870s 
until the outbreak of the First World War (Adler 1969) as well as 
contemporary Germany after re-unification. In both cases the 
euphoric atmosphere created by state formation led to a rise in both 
nationalism and xenophobia. 
Changes in the system of government can also lead to a rise of 
racism. We can point to the Weimar Republic, the impostion of a lib- 
eral democratic system upon a country with little experience of de- 
mocracy, but which harked back to imperial greatness which, in the 
perception of its opponents, had been destroyed by aliens (see Kolb 
1988). But we can also point to contemporary Russia, again a situ- 
ation in which a liberal democracy follows a period of imperial 
greatness in a country with an autocratic tradition. 
War is as important as any other medium-term socio-economic or 
political factor in leading to a rise in racism. In fact, anyone studying 
the history of race during the twentieth century cannot avoid the 
conclusiuon that the worst persecution of minorities has occurred 
during wartime. Apart from genocide, illustrated by the Armenian 
genocide in World War I and the Nazi Holocaust in World War Two, 
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states such as Britain and Brazil experienced some of their worst 
twentieth century outbreaks of violence during the First World War. 
The explanations as to why war leads to an increase in intolerance 
are many, but revolve around the increase in ostracisation of out- 
groups, facilitated by the seizure of control, directly or indirectly, by 
the military, as members of the dominant society gel1 closer together 
to fight the external enemy. 
Another political factor which clearly leads to an increase in ra- 
cism is the seizure of power by an overtly racist regime. The classic 
example here is the Nazis, who were, like the Young Turks who 
seized power in the Ottoman Empire in 1908, revolutionary, which 
meant that neither were bound by the constraints imposed upon po- 
litical behaviour by the traditions of the state in which they seized 
power (Melson 1992); in both cases genocide followed. However, 
even in liberal democracies, the existence of overtly racist presssure 
groups and political parties influence the ruling party and create an 
atmosphere in which which violence is likely as the example of the 
Weimar Republic or 1990s Germany would illustrate (Broszat 1987; 
Leggewie 1993). 
If we focus specifically upon rioting against minority groups, 
medium term factors simply increase the likelihood of racial violence 
breaking out. The increase in racism needs sparks for racial violence 
to break out. Against the backgound of an increase in immigration 
any one of a large number of incidents can spark off a disturbance, 
even as petty as an altercation over a restaurant, although more com- 
mon are industrial disputes or sexual jealousies as numerous inci-
dents in twentieth century Britain indicate (Jenkinson 1985,46). 
If nationwide riots break out against a background of rising racism 
caused by political factors, these can often be sparked off by an ex- 
ternal event. We can give several examples. First, the assassination of 
Tsar Alexander I1 in 1881, which was followed by widespread po- 
groms, because of the perception that Jews had been responsible for 
the murder (Aronson 1990). Second, the sinking of the the passenger 
liner Lusitania in May 191 5 by a German submarine off the coast of 
Ireland with the loss of over 1,000 civilian lives, which led to na- 
tionwide anti-German riots in Britain. And, third, the Kristallnacht 
pogrom in Germany in November 1938, sparked off by the assassi- 
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nation of the German amabassador in Paris. In all three of these cases 
in which a murder or murders were involved we can see the riotous 
reactions as a way in which members of the dominant society felt that 
they were returning blood with blood. 
How do we explain variations in racial violence from one state to 
another? Clearly, not every minority in every country endures the 
same experience, ranging from the isolated attacks which take place 
in most post-War liberal democracies to the genocide carried out by 
the Ottoman Empire and the Third Reich. We can offer a variety of 
explanations for the variation. 
Firstly, a cultural approach, while carrying the potential for reduc- 
ing explanations revolving around national stereotypes, can provide 
insights, as illustrated by Johnathan Steinberg's comparative study of 
antisemitism in Germany and Italy during the Second World War. In 
this volume the author stresses particular aspects of culture within 
these two states, especially the importance of obedience to civic vir- 
tue in Germany, compared with the ))disorder, disobedience and me- 
nefieghismo (I-could-not-care-less-ism) of Italian public lifecc. The 
former meant that all orders within any bureaucracy tended to be 
carried out, while the latter meant an inefficient system operated. 
When the goal of a bureacracy is to carry out genocide, the former 
system has far-reaching consequences. 
Some historians have taken an interactionist approach in their at- 
tempts to explain the severity of racial violence which breaks out in 
particular states. Frederick C. Luebke (1987, 217), for instance, uses 
this as an explanation for the differing responses of Brazil and the 
USA towards their German minorities during the First World War, 
with the former behaving in a more extreme manner, including the 
outbreak of nationwide riots on two seperate occasions. The basic 
arguments of interactionists is that a minority's refusal to assimilate 
increases the likelihood of racism and racial violence. However, we 
can dismiss this line of argument because the attitude of the dominant 
society is paramount, as the experience of European Jewries in the 
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries illustrates. In this case 
German Jewry, as assimilated as Jews in any other European state, 
were the first to be dealt with by the Nazis. Subsequently, as the Na- 
zis marched through Europe, levels of assimilation were meaningless. 
The most important factors in determining the severity of racial 
violence within individual states are the system of Government which 
exists together with national traditions of intolerance, especially to- 
wards an individual minority. In times of instability, brought on by 
the socio-economic and political factors outlined above, racial vio- 
lence becomes more likely. 
For our purposes, we can divide sytems of Government into lib- 
eral democracies and autocracies. In the former, in times of stability, 
racial violence will be confined to small scale attacks, although when 
the socio-economic or political order is upset, then riots against a mi-
nority can break out. However, because of the rights of individuals 
guaranteed by liberal political systems, such events tend not to get 
out of hand, a development facilitated, especially during the twenti- 
eth century, by an all-embracing national media which focuses upon 
every perceived injustice within its borders. This applies especially to 
the West in the post-War years. However, just as important in liberal 
democracies is the fear of any disorder, which means that, whoever 
the perpetrators of violence are, the forces of law and order will sup- 
press their activities. 
Nevertheless, within liberal democracies, especially before the 
spread of a mass media in the post-War period, large-scale racial 
violence was usual, as the example of anti-black riots in the USA 
illustrates. In this instance the explanation lies in the all-embracing 
anti-black racism of American society and politics which could turn a 
blind eye to lynchings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen- 
turies. Furthermore, when blacks were perceived as having upset the 
status quo such as in Chicago immediately after the outbreak of the 
First World War, race riots could follow. In this case white society 
viewed newly arrived migrants from the south as competing for re- 
sources, while the self-confidence of former black soldiers, who ex- 
pected a degree of emancipation in return for their fighting in 
Europe, also caused resentment amongst whites. 
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The US case is not unusual. In the case of Britain during the First 
World War the German minorities came under attack on a series of 
occasions. Again, we need to see these events against the background 
of the ubiquitous Germanophobia affecting all sections of British 
society while Britain fought a war against Germany. By the Second 
World War, however, a more mature British liberal democracy, 
which demonstrated some concern about the rights of minorities, in- 
sured that rioting against enemy aliens did not get out of control. 
Autocracies, whatever their nature, be it monarchichal, fascist or 
communist, are, by their very nature, not controlled by public opinion 
and are therefore capable of resorting to more extreme forms of racial 
violence, often state led, which can culminate in genocide. The two 
examples of genocide considered in this article follow a similar pat- 
tern. 
First, there exists a centuries long tradition of vicitmisation of a 
particular minority by the dominant society - Armenians in Turkey 
and Jews in Germany. Second, expectations were created during the 
course of the nineteenth century by the emancipation of Jews in 
Germany and the Tanzinat period in the Ottoman Empire, 1839-76, 
which called for the concept of equality between Muslims and non- 
Muslims. However, in both cases this was followed by a reversal, 
manifested in the rise of unofficial anti-semitism in Germany and an 
increase in state persecution of Armenians, resulting in pogroms on a 
massive scale before the First World War. The seizure of power of a 
revolutionary regime and a wartime situation and the effects of both 
of these developments, previously considered, are the final elements 
which made genocide almost inevitable in the Ottoman Empire dur- 
ing World War I and the German Empire during World War 11. 
As this essay has made clear, genocide represents the most extreme 
and potent form of racism. The nation-state, by its very nature in 
creating a dominant ruling group, is racist. This racism manifests it- 
self in numerous ways, both official and unofficial, the former being 
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far more important in autocracies, ranging from refusal to enter into 
social and economic intercourse to racial violence. 
This racial violence varies from attacks upon individuals, endemic 
in most liberal democracies, to genocide, although a particular set of 
circumstances is needed for the latter to occur, especially the seizure 
of power of a revolutionary regime and a wartime situation. How- 
ever, large scale racial violence can break out in any nation-state 
providing the correct intervening factors creating instability, together 
with particular sparks, develop. 
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Crispin Jones  
X e n o p h o b i a  a n d  t h e  E d u c a t i o n a l  

C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  E u r o p e  

I n t r o d u c t i o n  
In Cavafy's poem ))Waiting for the Barbarianscc (Cavafy 1961, 19), 
the rich city fathers waited at the gate of their city, waiting to surren- 
der to the barbarians. The barbarians never turned up, leading to the 
ironic comment that without barbarians the city fathers might have a 
legitimation crisis. The feared outsider was the justification for many 
of the actions of the city fathers, and indeed the outsiders, the bar- 
barians, fulfil a similar role in many modern states. Indeed, what is 
frequently conventionally defined as European and Europe in the 
schools of the European Union (EU), in contradistinction to the rest 
of the world, is a similar exercise to that of Cavafy's city fathers. 
Many living, learning and teaching within the EU, define themselves, 
their Europe and their ))Europeanesscc through the claimed inferiority 
and more certain fear of others defined as non European and living 
outside of Europe. But such definitional positions and exercises pre- 
suppose answers to an earlier set of questions, namely, where and 
what is this Europe, who are these Europeans and indeed, who are 
the barbarians? 
How schools use these terms is vitally important, for if the terms 
are used as they have been traditionally used in education in most EU 
states, they will continue to be terms that exclude areas and peoples 
that have a right to be considered European.' The issue at stake here 
is the lack of recognition in school curricula of the contingent nature 
of both concepts. This paper attempts to demonstrate this contin- 
gency and does it through an examination of the academic underpin- 
nings of some of the relevant subjects of the school curriculum in 
what is conventionally described as Europe, such as history, geogra- 
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phy, religious education and science. As these subjects use terms like 
Europe and European constantly, they help to shape, in the minds of 
young people as well as in their teachers, views of themselves and 
their position in and relationship to the world. And without an 
awareness of this contingency, such conventional definitions not only 
do not fit the facts, they help perpetuate chauvenisms, ethnocentrici- 
ties, narrow nationalisms, anti-semitism and racism. 
To assist schools in tineir task of counteracting such perspectives 
this paper seeks to put forward a view of Europe and the European 
that has been and continues to be constantly changing. Such a view 
of a changing Europe, almost a series of Europes, does not do defini- 
tional violence to the terms ))Europe(( and ))European((. This is be- 
cause, as this paper will argue, they have always been conditional 
terms, changing their meaning as the political and economic context 
within which the terms are located has changed over time. In other 
words, as with so many other aspects of education, it is important to 
understand the origins and provenance of current educational knowl- 
edge, policy and practice. In the context of this paper's concerns, this 
means a better understanding of the old Europes if sense is to made 
of the new and current one. And it is this new and current Europe that 
has to be at the focus of the school curriculum, not the old one. Fur- 
thermore, tracing the evidence put forward in this paper is itself part 
of the blueprint of a new European curriculum that better reflects 
current European realities. 
However, the paper is not putting forward a postmodern relativis- 
tic agenda for combatting racism and xenophobia within European 
schools. It is arguing that the modern agenda is not discredited but 
should be seen as more complex than has hitherto been the case. As 
Giroux puts it: 
))Modernism is far from dead - its central categories are simply 
being written within a plurality of narratives that are attempting to 
address the new set of social, political, technical and scientific con- 
figurations that constitute the current age.(( (Giroux 1991,63) 
In other words, plurality and complexity have been a constant 
feature of European societies; it has now become an urgent task for 
schools to recognise this state of affairs. 
Xenophobia and the Educational Construction of Europe 
T h e  C h a n g i n g  M a p  o f  E u r o p e  
As a scientific term, ))Europe(( is a convenience only. Geographically, 
it is a continent by convention and should better be known as being 
part of the Eurasian land mass.2 Biologically, the zoogeograpical area 
that includes conventionally defined Europe is the Palearctic and, 
like the Eurasian land mass, extends from Iceland to Japan (see 
Campbell and Lack 1985, 145-148, 429-430; Cramp et al. 1977 on-
wards) In other words, Europe is a scientific ~ a n i t y . ~  It is a vanity 
that extends even to our maps, with a distorted Europe at the centre 
of a diminished world as in Mercator's famous projection. It is also a 
vanity with a long history as its origins reveal. 
The starting point for any such examination of origins has to be 
the origin of the term ))Europe(( itself. It is of Greek origin, already 
being used before the 5th century BC to distinguish mainland Greece 
from the islands. By the 5th Century BC, the concept was refined to 
distinguish the Greek world from the non-Greek world that lay to the 
~ a s t . ~In other words, the term Europe was being used to distinguish 
))our land(( from ))their land((. It has continued to be used in this way 
down to the present: Europe is ))ourcc territory in contradistinction to 
that which is not ))ourscc or which is non-European. The problem is 
who is ))uscc and what is ))ourscc and who is ))themcc and what is 
))theirs((. 
The subsequent growth or development of Europe as is frequently 
taught in schools is very much a process of looking at the past 
through the spectacles of the present. The great empires of so called 
European history, as taught about in schools within the EU, were sel- 
dom in the same place or contained the same peoples. The Roman 
Empire was a Mediterranean empire rather than a European one: 
indeed, the comparative neglect of Mediterranean studies is very 
much a feature of a dominant North West Protestant European schol- 
arship that is almost completely divorced from the ~ed i t e r ranean .~  
The consolidation of the Frankish Empire under Charlemagne was 
not so much a delineation of Europe but a delineation of Christen- 
dom, seen very much as being in territorial and religious conflict with 
the new and expanding religion of Islam. Interestingly, a religious 
map of Christendom in the early Middle Ages would very roughly 
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correspond with the current dominant image of Europe, although the 
differences are not without contemporary significance.6 
Although this medieval image of Europe is surprisingly similar to 
many more modern ones, it corresponded to a political/religious real- 
ity for a surprisingly short period of time. If a map of Christendom in 
1360 looks like a modern, stereotypical map of Europe, by the end of 
that century the map had begun to change rapidly as the Ottoman 
Turks moved westwards beyond the Bosphorus. Their expanding 
empire soon included much of the Balkans, reaching to the gates of 
Vienna, with religious and demographic consequences which con-
tinue to dominate the politics of the area, as this Turkish and Islamic 
presence has continued to the present day. However, this particular 
European empire is seldom in the school history books of the EU. It 
is still often presented as the alien presence that Europe defeated and 
threw back, as at Vienna, when in fact it was seen at the time as more 
the defeat of Islam by Christianity. Indeed, much of the educational 
and curricula discourse about the concept of Europe within the states 
that now make up the EU has continued to operate by excluding, ig- 
noring or misrepresenting this reality.7 
This is not the sole example, however. Other boundaries of 
Europe have remained, and continue to remain obscure. A classic 
example of this is the position of Russia. Is Russia in Europe or not? 
If it is, is all of Russia, to Siberia and beyond, or is it Russia West of 
the Urals, the most c,ommon boundary used today? This issue has 
vexed Russian politicians and intellectuals since the time of Peter the 
Great. For example, the Russian Slavophile, Danilevsky, argued in 
the 1860s for a clear division between an Orthodox Russian domi- 
nated Slavic Eurasia and a Latin Christian Europe (cf. Balace 1991; 
Delrot 1992). These and similar views were still influential in pre- 
1917 Russia and, indirectly, may still influence the politics of both 
Russia and the Balkans to this day.g 
These examples demonstrate that Europe is very much a moveable 
geographical and historical feast. It would appear that use of the term 
Europe was, and still remains an excluding category masquerading as 
an objective spatial referent. However, for obvious practical reasons 
the term Europe will continue to be used as a convenient label in 
classrooms, lecture theatres and in everyday discourse, but students 
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should be made more aware of the term's semantic history. Part of 
that awareness lies in the recognition that the term is still used in a 
wide range of ways and meanings. In other words, the one single and 
agreed definition has always been and continues to be an illusion. For 
example, the World Bank uses the category ))Europe and Central 
Asia(( to avoid a boundary drawing issue, drawing lines around 
countries of similar income levels, such as one might call isoecono- 
mies, rather than clear lines around operational regions of the globe. 
Under this scheme, adopted by the World Bank amongst others, 
within Europe, the Isle of Man and Greece rub shoulders with former 
states of the Soviet Union such as Moldova (World Bank 1993, 28- 
29, 125 seq.). Such examples help demonstrate the definitional plu- 
rality and flexibility that is needed in a rapidly changing world. In 
educational terms, they add to the uncertainties that schools tradi- 
tionally find difficult to handle but which increasingly they will have 
to face.9 
Where  a r e  t h e  E u r o p e a n s  if no t  in Europe?  
If discussions about Europe's boundaries have frequently been used 
to exclude, the term European has an even more exclusive history. In 
English for example, the Oxford English Dictionary (Murray 1933) 
gives a comprehensive, and most interesting definition of ))Euro- 
pean((. The dates of first usage are equally interesting, coming from 
the period when the European domination of the globe commenced. 
Three related meanings are given: 
1. ))Belonging to Europe, or its inhabitants.(( (First used in 1603.) 
2. ))Taking place in, 	or extending over, Europe.(( (First used in 
1665.) 
3. ))A native of Europe.(( (First used in 1632.) 
In the 1972 Supplement (Burchfield 1972) a further meaning is 
added, relating to the third one, interestingly enough also coming 
from the seventeenth century, this time from 1696. This fourth defi- 
nition states that a European is a ))person of European extraction who 
lives outside Europe: hence, a white person, esp. in a country with a 
predominately non-white population.(( (Emphasis added.) By the time 
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of the second edition (Simpson and Weiner 1989), only the defini- 
tions 1. and 2. mentioned above survived.lO These changes are fasci- 
nating, and reflect an increasing sensitivity about the power of the 
term in question. (They also indicate that national intellectual insti- 
tutions are not above self censorship.) In relation to this paper, they 
reveal that in the English language at least, the term European was 
synonymous with only the white population of Europe, with even that 
problematic term (white), being seen as self evident. The interesting 
shift in perception that these definitions reveal is that from seeing a 
European as a person living in a Christian state, to that of a white 
person living in the same. In other words, not only has the shifting 
nature of the European boundary been forgotten, but so has the fact 
that there has been a constant non-white European presence (see 
Fryer 1984; and Shyllon 1977). 
Despite such a complex etymological and demographic history, 
school history books and lessons have not always taught how mixed 
the population of Europe has always been. What has been most often 
taught is that there is a clearly definable group of people to whom the 
descriptor ))European(( can be attributed, as opposed to other groups 
of people living within Europe who may be described as ))foreig- 
nerscc. Of course, it is legitimate for a state or superstate like the EU 
to define its non-citizens as foreigners, but it is not logical and legi- 
timate to define citizenship through principles of exclusion that rest 
solely on stereotypical perceptions of putative national identities. For 
how a state defines its nationals or citizenry is crucial, as is the 
portrayal of such status in the cu r r i~u lum.~~  In other words, who is or 
was German, who is or was Spanish, who is or was English? 
The history of Europe over the last few hundred years shows how 
difficult it is to answer such questions in ways which all citizens 
consider just. At a very obvious level, a citizen is often considered a 
person born within the boundaries of a state andlor a person de- 
scended from a recognised citizen of that particular state (commonly 
citizenship by blood andlor birth). However, Europe's history, par- 
ticularly its recent history, has been bedeviled by the confusion be- 
tween a national group and a national boundary, the two rarely coin- 
ciding. Many politicians would claim otherwise, unfortunately, and 
two major European communal wars this century, as well as the cur- 
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rent violence within the former Yugoslavia, confirm the power of 
such ))natural(( perceptions.12 For example, at the beginning of the 
French Revolution, the revolutionary Danton, who had earlier corus- 
cated Bourbon territorial aggrandizement, reiterated the view that 
France had ))natural boundaries(( within which, presumably, French 
people lived or had the right to live. He claimed: ))The limits of 
France are marked out by nature. We shall reach them at their four 
points; at the Ocean, at the Rhine, at the Alps, at the Pyrenees.(( 
(quoted in Doyle 1989, 200) 
Even then, it was not clear whether some groups of people living 
within these boundaries were French, the obvious examples being the 
French Jews. Yet, many key concepts relating to human rights derive 
from this era, an era preoccupied with the relationship between the 
state and the citizenry, with both key terms being seen in restricted 
terms. In their discussions, the politicians and (mainly essentialist) 
political philosophers of that time failed to resolve crucial areas of 
debate over the extent of state power over groups and individuals, 
debates which have bedeviled most states subsequently. And, of con- 
cern to education, the rights of children remained obscure, the more 
so as there had only recently been significant changes in the social 
construction of childhood as a result of the writings of romantic phi- 
losophers such as Rousseau. 
More recently, but still within that Rousseauesque paradigm, the 
1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child provides an interna- 
tionally agreed set of principles that give children not just the right to 
survival but also rights to protection and to personal development 
free from discrimination.13 Thus, de jure if not de facto, most states 
should formally approve of the centrality of a perspective that es- 
pouses civic (including educational) rights for all children, including 
children from minorities who may or may not be defined by that state 
as the children of citizens. These rights include ones in respect of 
their education, insofar as that is provided by the state. 
Despite such exhortations by international organisations, citizen- 
ship and being European remain problematics. The many nationali- 
ties andlor groups contained within modem Europe and its constitu- 
ent states are often ignored or submerged. At the national level this is 
done through the creation and propagation of national stereotypes 
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and at the European level by a further set of stereotypes that ape the 
national ones. Such myths of national state identity and European 
identity are, in fact, partly a codification and legitimation of the 
dominant group(s) social and economic arrangements and partly a 
reflection of dominant concepts of the nature of Europe and its citi- 
zens (see Jones 1992). Thus, the manner in which the term ))Euro- 
peancc, is propounded in the curricula of many EU states, could well 
have the following characteristics: 
1. 	a view that within Europe there are European languages (like 
French and German) and non-European languages (like Turkish 
and Arabic); 
2. 	an agreed set of economic arrangements, mature capitalism, of 
which the EU is one international facilitator; 
3.  	a common European history, although of course one with agreed 
national emphases and variation; 
4. 	the belief that the religion of Europe is Christianity, with all its 
denominational variation. Other religions, such as Judaism or Is- 
lam, may be present but they are not essentially ))European((; 
5. 	a belief in a common European philosophical and political per- 
spective, based on democracy, rationality and tolerance. 
However, none of these assertions stand up to any detailed em- 
pirical scrutiny. Like the boundary issues explored earlier in this pa- 
per, they are all based on operational, contingent definitions. Some 
are ideal typical models with little purchase on social reality, such as 
the belief that Europe should be distinguished by its tolerance. Others 
are simply incorrect, as is the case with the belief that Christianity, a 
middle Eastern religion like Judaism and Islam, is somehow ))more 
Europeancc than the other two. In other words, many Europeans do 
not share these characteristics. 
The issues that arises for education from this confusion are com- 
plex and difficult to handle. One way forward is to accept (and teach 
about), not just the contingent, plural nature of Europe and the plural 
nature of the states within it but also the acceptance of the concept of 
individual plural identities (or decentred subjectivities) for individu- 
als at both the national and international, European level. As Stuart 
Hall puts it: ))The fully unified, completed, secure and coherent 
identity is a fantasy. Instead, as the systems of meaning and cultural 
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representation multiply, we are confronted by a bewildering, fleeting 
multiplicity of possible identities, any one of which we could identifL 
with.(( (Hall 1992, 277) 
Within most EU states, such plural identities have been accepted 
at the level of practice if not at the level of policy (or academic the- 
ory), although seldom in any systematic way. In Britain, for example, 
there has been long acceptance of certain traditional national identi- 
ties such as English, Scots, Welsh and Irish. More recently, there has 
been acceptance of other minorities, such as Jewish people, Gyp- 
sies/Rom and other travelling people.14 A similar, more contested 
acceptance has been given to various black British groups.15 It is 
important to note that acceptance of such plurality can have both 
positive and negative social consequences, more often the latter. 
Such national complexity is not accepted by all in British society and 
is one of the key factors in the continuation of racism, anti-semitism 
and other ))ethnonational(c discrimination in Britain. Similar patterns 
of plurality exist in most other EU states, although details will differ, 
often quite markedly. Education, with the support of other social 
agencies such as the mass media, still has a great deal to do in intro- 
ducing and explaining such perspectives to children and young peo- 
ple. 
But even before this first task,- the explication of the complex and 
plural nature of each EU state is completed, a similar task has to be 
undertaken in respect of plural identity at the EU level. Staying with 
the British example just put forward, that same person could also, if 
slhe wished, be European and African. Other groups of British citi- 
zens could be European and Indian, even European, Indian and Afri- 
can. In other words, schools need to put forward the perspective that 
a European is someone who sees himherself andlor is seen by others 
as belonging to a contingent, operationally defined Europe, whose 
life takes place in such a Europe, and who is indeed, a ))nativecc of 
Europe. In other words, the whole definitional debate needs to be- 
come fluid and perhaps, more importantly, has to enter into the cur- 
ricula of Europe's schooling systems. This is because such a plural-
istic European identity would contradict much in the existing curricu- 
lum. 
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Thus, the terms Europe and European are more complex than is often 
seen in the textbooks used in schools and colleges within the EU and 
in the way such education systems prepare both students and teachers 
in relation to teaching both in and about Europe. So, in the same way 
that intercultural education attempted to make national systems look 
again at what they did in relation to the multicultural society they 
sewed, so it also has the added task to look again at the broader 
European context within which state systems are located.16 The con- 
sequences of such a new intercultural perspective are many and will, 
of course, vary within individual state contexts as well as over time. 
For the curriculum for example, just as ethnocentricity has to be 
combatted and countered in the curriculum so must a false eurocen- 
tricity. Much of the debate about a eurocentric curriculum argues for 
an international dimension to be laid against a European one. What 
has to be clarified is the boundaries of such a European curriculum, 
as well as its content.17 
Two key curriculum areas in this respect are the geography and 
history curricula. In relation to geography, the earlier part of this pa- 
per, in its discussion of the concept and positioning of Europe, sets 
out a potential agenda for teaching about the geography of Europe. It 
also sets a potential agenda for the history curriculum, for perhaps it 
is within the history curriculum that the hidden hatreds of Europe 
linger on most insidiously as some of the statements that have come 
from participants in the break up of the former Yugoslavia indicate. 
Similarly, in Northern Ireland, where the hatreds of history are sel- 
, 
dom hidden, Catholic and Protestant children learn alternative histo- 
riesj depending on their community affiliations, such affiliations be- 
ing increasingly supported by residential segregation.'* Suppressing 
such partial and xenophobic histories is not enough, however. Indeed, 
suppression is seldom an effective pedagogical or didactic strategy. 
For example, the current rise of anti-semitism, fascism and racism 
across Europe may show how unsuccessful the education service has 
been in teaching about Europe's More to the point, it would 
seem that the Holocaust, perhaps the key to an understanding of 
contemporary Europe, is still not given the curricula space and treat- 
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ment that it deserves.20 Clearly, the teaching of history in the former 
states of Yugoslavia failed to give many people the skills with which 
to deal with the rise of ethnic particularism. Indeed, in respect of this, 
the response of many within the EU to the Muslirn/Christian violence 
has been one of puzzlement about the presence and long standing 
survival of Islam within Europe.21 
If schools within Europe have, in general, failed to teach the full 
range of histories that have made it,22 the teaching of andlor about 
religion has done even worse. Within the teaching of andlor about 
religion there are even more obvious opportunities for the conscious 
or unconscious repetitions of old antagonisms, misconceptions and 
even hatreds. The concept that there are three major world religions 
in Europe, Islam, Judaism and Christianity, would still be seen as bi- 
zarre and wayward by many who organise education systems within 
the states of ~ u r o p e . ~ ~  Continuing with the same theme, how many 
EU states support or accept the presence of Muslim schools within 
their formal education system? To illustrate this point, although the 
law is clear in Britain, in that Muslim schools are, under the same 
conditions as Christian and Jewish schools, entitled to state support, 
none has yet been so funded, despite numerous application^.^^ 
As Edward Said had commented, albeit in relation primarily to 
literature, itself another critical curriculum area in relation to these 
issues, ))fictional identities are the weapons of cultural war((.25 
School definitions of Europe and Europeans are currently being used 
in a similar fashion. If not subject to constant critical examination, 
EU schools will continue to contribute towards Europe's becoming a 
narrow, self-regarding and excluding group of states on the periphery 
of Asia and Africa. Such a view also means that a narrow eurocentric 
and xenophobic curriculum is likely to continue to be the norm rather 
than the exception in the education systems of Europe.26 And this in 
turn will contribute little to the combatting of the racism, anti-semit- 
ism and xenophobia that plagues the EU and its schooling systems. 
This definitional issue then, far from being an arid intellectual ex- 
ercise, is crucial to a perception of a genuinely intercultural educa- 
tion for European states. If Europe's borders are recognised as being 
fluid, as indeed they are, and if a European becomes an including 
rather than an excluding category, as it should, then some essential 
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first steps are taken in providing an appropriate political context 
within which an intercultural educational debate can take place. 
Notes 
And include others, e.g., Israel competes in the Eurovision Song Contest (!). A 
fascinating area for definitions of Europe is that found in the small print of travel 
insurance, where distinctions between Europe and the rest of the world are rarely 
in agreement and often include countries (e.g. some North African states) that 
reflect the imperatives of tourism rather than geopolitics. 
The term continent is merely an operational division, with no scientific authority, 
hallowed by long usage in schools and elsewhere. I t  is doubtless useful but it is 
not scientific. If it is to be maintained, it has to be related to real divisions of the 
Earth's surface, such as those proposed by plate tectonics. However, one of the 
main divisions of the globe that this branch of science puts forward, the l i -
thospheric plates, while having African, Antarctic, South American, North 
American, Indo-Australian and Pacific plates, has no European plate, simply a 
Eurasian plate, reaching from Spain to Japan. In other words, geology has some 
difficulty in relation to Europe, because it has no need of it. 
Science has not always been so dispassionate. The nationalistic debates about the 
pre-eminence of German science in the eighteenth century shows how scientists 
can be swayed by xenophobia within their field (Schneider 1989). 
The information here comes from the entry on ))Europe(( in Encyclopedia Bri-
tannica 1947. 
The work of Martin Bernal (e.g. Bernal 1987) is an important attempt to look in a 
new way at this issue. 
The major difference was in part of the Iberian peninsula, where, under Moorish 
rule, Moslems, Jews and Christians lived in a multicultural society which the rest 
of Christendom feared and hated, whose memory has been almost forgotten in 
the collective European consciousness and which is rarely given a positive men- 
tion in the history books used in the education systems of Europe. Another dif- 
ference would be where the Crusader states of the Middle East (Antioch, Edessa, 
Jerusalem, Joscelin, Tripoli, etc.) would fit in to Europe. 
The classic example of this would be the contemporary debates about Turkish 
entry to the EU. 
The relations between Russia and Serbia (both Orthodox in historical terms) are 
different from the relations between Russia and the other states of the former Yu- 
goslavia. For a comment on this, see Marr 1993. 
Cosmology, particle physics and chaos theory would suggest that general unify- 
ing theory (GUT) and similar certainties are not to be readily found (Gleick 1987; 
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Overbye 1991). As Stephen Hawking put it ))Why is it we remember events in the 
past but not in the future?(( (Quoted in Overbye, op.cit., p. 377.) 
10 A new third one had appeared, referring to the new European institutions, first 
used in 1952. 
1 1  	The term citizen is preferred to national here, although it usually refers to adult 
status. The term ))nationalcc links in with concepts of the oxymoronic ))nation 
statecc and is not preferred as a consequence.The term ))inhabitantcc is also not 
used, as it confers no status save that of location. 
12 As this paper was being written, as a further example, conflict between Slovakian 
Hungarians and the Slovakian government seemed imminent. 
13 As of January 1994, the Convention had been ratified by over 126 states. 
UNICEF claimed its proper implementation would cost $25 billion a year; this is 
roughly about the same amount of money spent on wine in Europe each year. 
14 The acceptance does not yet seem to have been extended to New Age Travellers. 
15 Of course, Hall's multiplicity of identities would include other aspects of an 
individuals identity besides their race or ethnicity. These might include sexual 
orientation, class, disability, religion, language or gender. 
16 See, for example, the work of the Council of Europe in this area (e.g. Jones and 
Kimberley 1986) as well as recent issues of the European Journal of Intercul-
tural Studies. 
17 In Science for example, the Ptolomaic cosmological system is often taught as a 
European contribution to scientific knowledge. Equally, his map of the world is 
often taught in Geography as one of the first European attempts to map the 
world. Yet Ptolomy was, by some of the definitions explored earlier in this paper, 
an African. Greek Alexandria in Egypt was one of the centres of scientific 
thought for nearly eight centuries. But where was Alexandria and who were the 
Alexandrines? Trying to claim it ))for uscc (whoever ))uscc are, or, indeed, ))them(() 
seems a ridiculous act of educational xenophobia. 
18 In many ways, this segregation has been a less violent form of ))ethnic cleansingcc. 
On a more positive note, the work of educational institutions like Lagen College 
in Belfast, that make a real effort to bridge the gap between the two communities 
should also be mentioned. 
19 This may be unfair as comparisons cannot readily be made. It could equally be 
argued that things could be a good deal worse if it had not been for the efforts 
made in schools, colleges and other educational institutions. 
20 At secondary school, the writer's children studied both the 1914-18 and the 1939- 
45 wars. The causes and the horrors of war were well explored; the Holocaust 
was given hardly a mention. The same was true when the writer was at secondary 
school. Yet anti-semitism was a feature of school culture for both generations. 
21 	 It is useful to point out that the current European disgust in relation to ))ethnic 
cleansingcc within the states of the former Yugoslavia seldom mentions that this 
ChristianIMoslem antagonism not only has long historical roots but has contem- 
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porary precedents, as in Cyprus following its United Nations supervised partition 
in the mid 1970s and the Northern Ireland example given earlier in the paper. 
22 	A good British example of such hidden history is revealed in Peter Fryer's excel- 
lent history of blacks in Britain (Fryer 1984). Another English example would be 
Shyllon (1977). 
23 Of course there are secular education systems within Europe, even secular consti- 
tutions. However, the Christian churches are still perceived as being the norma- 
tive religious manifestation in just about every state. Bosnia-Herzegovina may 
yet be the first European state whcre this is not the case, though such a possibility 
was looking more unlikely as this paper was finalised. 
24 The last government enquiry into the area, the Swann Report (DES 1985), argued 
against new state funded religious institutions while accepting those already op- 
erating. This issue did, however, formally divide the committee in that there was 
a minority opinion dissenting from this view. 
25 Edward Said, talking about his book Culture and Imperialism in a BBC 2 I'V 
programme Arena, 12 February, 1993. 
26 	Such a state of affairs is, of course, not confined to Europe. It appears to be a 
feature of dominant groups of states elsewhere in the world. For example, the 
concept of Central America, it could be claimed, was brought into being to ex- 
clude Mexico from North America, in a remarkably similar way to the treatment 
of Turkey in the European context. 
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S t r u g g l i n g  w i t h  N o r m a l i t y  

The horror of racist violence is not something to be treated lightly. 
The excesses of mindless nationalism, the resentment and fear of 
outsiders, the persecution, intimidation, and sometimes murder of 
ethnic minorities, all take their place in a catalogue of human misery 
and suffering which is part of late twentieth century life. The crucial 
difference between this and earlier centuries, however, may or may 
not be that things are worse now than they have ever been. There 
have been in the past pogroms, massacres, chauvinistic excursions 
which sought to colonise and exploit vast areas of the globe. And, of 
course, there has been that chilling reminder of the depths to which 
modernity can sink with the holocaust (see Bauman 1989). It is not 
surprising, then, that concerned individuals, organisations or aca-
demic communities wish to concentrate upon such abominations in 
order to try to understand what is happening at the local, regional and 
global level. 
What distinguishes the present from the past most significantly is 
the fact that today television brings reports of events to what is vir- 
tually a global audience within a very short amount of time. There is 
not the literal or metaphorical space for the messenger to travel over 
land and sea with the news of a fresh disaster or atrocity. Today the 
audience may be there as it happens. In the press in most parts of the 
world it is possible to read of these same (televisual) happenings no 
more than twenty four hours later. Wars, murders, racist attacks, are 
part of the seemingly endless flow of media messages'. It is hardly 
necessary to point out, however, that the events of which we may 
hear or read are mediated accounts of what has happened, and these 
mediations need to be carefully studied in order to clarify their for- 
mal organisation, the principles upon which they are based, and the 
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interests likely to be served by the way in which such messages offer 
up their meaning. The key point for the moment is the recognition 
that what we know (and in this context ))we((, means the vast majority 
of the media audience), is based almost entirely upon media mes- 
sages. 
On the one hand the messages of which I am writing may be sen- 
sationalised in the tabloid press or treated with a version of intellec- 
tual and analytical rigour in the broadsheets; on the other they may be 
sent out in sound bytes and image clusters like bursts from an omni- 
present electronic machine gun along the radio and television air- 
waves. The result of this media deluge, this perpetual discourse of 
violence and hatred, is to normalise such matters. Not in the sense 
that they are accepted by audiences as just a part of life, but in the 
sense that they have become a late twentieth century material and 
psychological hazard. Something to be avoided if possible and toler- 
ated with some stress. By the same metaphor, they are also happen- 
ings about which one can do little or nothing, because hazards are 
dealt with by the professionals. 
In a break from writing this piece, I have been watching 
))Euronewscc on cable television. In five minutes I have seen - without 
any commentary, because they have a section entitled ))No Com- 
mentcc - Palestinian youths in Gaza in running battles with the Israeli 
forces. After some rock throwing and lobbing of teargas grenades, 
one young boy was shot in the leg. He dropped like a stone and then 
began to scream in agony. I stared at his image, numbed by the in- 
tensity of his pain. Within a couple of minutes there was another se- 
quence filmed in Pakistan. It showed a truck full of troops and a sin- 
gle man not in uniform who had, for some reason, been arrested. As 
the sequence began, and as if aware of the presence of the camera, 
one soldier slapped this man hard around the head. In the next shot 
the man was shown, cowed, being dragged from the army truck by 
his hair. More followed of people with little or no food in Bosnia; 
then South Africa; then Angola. The whole sequence took no more 
than five minutes. 
Within this tapestry of cruelty and hardship one also finds images 
of overtly racist violence. One thing, however, is sure. Although 
these recurrent sequences of brutality may offer details of how a 
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person looks who has been shot, or the physiognomy of the starving 
and dying, they provide no way of making sense of what is going on. 
We live in a world where what were once referred to as ))real rela- 
tions(( are merely hinted at through phenomenal forms. The abun- 
dance of instantaneous imagery which is on offer is no guarantee that 
any insight will be gained into the underlying causes, the power rela- 
tionships, the political positions assumed by all those ))participants(( 
in acts of violence. A great deal of the reportage of violence which 
we receive falls on our heads like the water on a wet rag placed over 
our face to stop us breathing. There is no respite, no pause in the 
))flow((. The contemporary means of dealing with intractable prob- 
lems is to change channels. 
Given this concentration on the reportage of certain2 violent acts, 
it is not surprising that seminars concerned with violence look to 
those acts, the way they occur and how they are reported in order to 
provide data for discussion and debate. It is not the purpose of this 
paper to argue against such research. It is necessary and can be eluci- 
dating. What will be argued here, however, is that the violent activi- 
ties and chauvinist excesses which occur and are reported on as part 
of daily life are rather like the visible part of an iceberg. If this meta- 
phor is sustainable for long enough to explore certain discursive and 
ideological possibilities, then the bulk of this great floating mass will 
have to be perceived as underwater and hence not immediately ap- 
parent. It is not, however, buried in our unconscious. It is merely out 
of sight. For the purposes of this paper, that great mass of ideological 
ice upon which violence, xenophobia, nationalism and racism can be 
sustained, will be designated as norrnali~. 
The concepts of normality and the ))natural(( are of considerable 
significance in relation to the construction and sustenance of ideo- 
logical positioning. Following Barthes (1957, particulary the essay 
))Myth Today((), this paper suggests that naturalisation is the process 
by which certain social relationships, often of power and subordina- 
tion, are made to seem natural rather than being the result of the 
complex interaction of groups and individuals, ethnic groups and 
genders, classes and power blocs. Representations of normality, or 
the invocation of a discursive structure of normality, are used again 
and again in the media in order to provide ballast for views and rep- 
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resentations which are, upon further consideration, highly question- 
able. Normal life is that which can be summed up in the common 
sense phrase ))it's only natural((. The construction of ))otherness(c is, 
unsurprisingly, something which stands in symbiotic relationship to 
the discourses of normality. Chauvinistic and xenophobic behaviour 
towards the outsider, the stranger can thus be not only justified, but 
made to seem natural. From these relatively simple beginnings, a 
whole range of popular discourses can arise and flourish. Such dis- 
courses, at least from the viewpoint of the ))Natural Englishmancc, 
justify the retention of the crassest racist stereotypes in the name of 
))ourcc normality. The second part of this paper will consider in some 
detail the ways in which such discourse might be constructed. 
There is very little about normality in the literature about the me- 
dia and issues of racism and violence. The emphasis tends to be on 
concepts of deviance, and how they are treated or represented by the 
media. Just as a newspaper editor might tell one that a good story 
does not come from reporting that thirty thousand anti-racists went 
on a demonstration where there was no violence and much goodwill 
generated, so the media researcher and theorist might decide that 
researching the normal would be unbelievably boring and possibly 
academically and intellectually unrewarding. Debates about the na- 
ture of ideological domination have tended to centre on discussion of 
whether or not audiences are being manipulated or are ))making usecc 
of media messages for their own ends. The former position has found 
a large number of sympathisers linked with what has become known 
as the ))effects(( tradition in media research. The latter position has 
become more significant in recent years, and has been argued with 
some persuasiveness by De Certeau, who writes of the ))silent, trans- 
gressive, ironic or poetic activities of readers (or television viewers) 
who maintain their reserve in private and without the knowledge of 
the )masters((( (Certeau 1984, 172). This is a generous and a possible 
reading of some audiences in some socio-cultural settings. Another, 
and parallel reading might be more appropriate for many contempo- 
rary European audiences. This would conceptualise media audiences 
as amorphous bodies which somehow seek stability (homeostasis) in 
the messages they receive and consider many communicators as pro- 
fessionals who seek to maintain stability in the messages they con- 
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struct. Such stability is premised upon the maintenance of established 
relations of power and subordination in society, so messages which 
undemiine that stability are likely to be curtailed or rejected. Despite 
possible disquiet at developments in one's vicinity, or nationally and 
internationally, the best course of action is to be sure not to rock the 
boat. The world, after all, has enough troubles, so one should keep 
one's head down and not muddy the waters. Indeed, it is possible that 
the link between political inactivity and the process of normalisation 
is most often given discursive form through the use of such meta- 
phoric strategies by both the producers and the consumers of media 
messages. 
This paper wishes to argue for a detailed and patient engagement 
with representations which serve to confirm ideological positions, 
mainly through appeals to common sense and a notion of normality. 
The example which has been chosen here is one which relates to an 
occasion when a public figure - in this case a government minister in 
the UK - publically voiced racist sentiments which are usually left to 
the relative privacy of the bar or the meal table. The voicing of such 
discourses of racism and power, it will be argued, has a critical role 
to play in the maintenance of what might be called the ))discursive 
reservecc. What this suggests is that there is available in social and 
cultural formations a range of rhetorical and linguistic reference 
points which are identified and passed from individual to individual 
and group to group. These reference points do not require subtlety of 
argument or clarity of exposition and they are usually invoked 
through the process of implicature. This concept is derived from the 
work of the philosopher H.P. Grice. ))An implicature is a proposition 
emerging from something that is said, but not actually stated by the 
words uttered, nor logically derivable from them. It must therefore be 
a product of the relationship between utterance and context; and a 
vital part of context would be the knowledge and motives of the 
speaker and addresseecc (Fowler 1986, 106). This concept of implica- 
ture will now be linked in an analysis with the construction of 
))normality((. 
The example chosen relates to a speech made on Thursday 4 Feb-
ruary 1994 by Mr.Michae1 Portillo of the British Conservative Party, 
and a newspaper column written by a fellow Tory, Mr.Alan Clark, 
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some days later. Mr.Portillo had been speaking to a gathering of stu- 
dents at Southampton University when he launched a virulent attack 
on the corruption of (unnamed) foreigners. His speech was widely 
reported in the British media and elicited, amongst other things, the 
response from his colleague Mr.Clark which will be analysed below. 
The core of Mr.Portillo's argument was that Britain was the most 
honest country in the world. Foreigners did not rate so highly in 
Mr.Portillo's estimation: ))Outside of this country the standards of 
public life are way below what goes on in this country. If any of you 
in this room have got an A level it is because you have worked to get 
it. Go to any other country and when you have got an A level you 
have bought it or because you were a friend of a minister.(( (sic) (The 
Guardian, 5 February 1994) 
The construction of this argument is based around gross and un- 
problematic generalisation. The students to whom Mr.Portillo was 
speaking Inay or may not have accepted his statement as a serious 
commentary on ))othercc countries. Through the concept of implica- 
ture, however, it is possible to understand Mr.Portillo's comments as 
redolent with the discourse of British middle class white racism. Un- 
derstanding implicature is about understanding how to f i l l  in blank 
spaces, be they literal or metaphorical. Mr.Portillo' speech was, then, 
widely reported. Some newspapers suggested, correctly in my view, 
that Mr.Portillo's political credibility was under severe strain as a re- 
sult of his ill-judged remarks. For others, as we shall see, Mr.Portillo 
was a man of integrity. The piece written by Clark which will now be 
analysed is probably more important in ideological terms than was 
the original speech. 
Alan Clark has a weekly column in the right wing Mail on Sun- 
day. On 6 February 1994, he chose to devote the whole column to a 
discussion of Mr.Portillo's speech. In so doing he erected a paradig- 
matic argument justifying the soft and hence ))normal(( dimension of 
white British racism. It is an argument built around an upper middle 
class-based judgement of ))foreigners((, and one which serves to sus- 
tain deeper and more worrying judgements about otherness. 
Under the photograph of Mr.Clarke and his name - there to signify 
his personal column, the piece is headed ))A sorry )gaffe( blown out 
of all proportion((. This title establishes the general modality of the 
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article. It is based around invocations of what ))wecc all know to be 
the case. The unpleasant inferences scattered throughout are offered 
up with an air of bonhomie and bravura. Indeed words from ))othercc 
languages seem appropriate here. The use of the word ))gaffecc in 
inverted commas is itself either ironic or grossly misjudged, coming 
as it does from the French! But the phrase ))sorry gaffecc is very much 
a piece of upper middle class English chattiness. To speak of a ))sorry 
messcc, a ))sorry gaffecc cr a sorry anything is to place the situation 
described in the world of public school education or after dinner chat. 
This is confirmed by the remainder of the title - ))blown out of all 
proportioncc, for which, from a position inside the ideological frame- 
work of the Mail on Sunday, one might read ))made into something 
much more significant than it should have been to anyone with half a 
grain of common (English) sensecr. 
Mr.Clark thanks God that Mr.Portillo is around. This is not an act 
of religious devotion. Its is another piece of class rhetoric, inviting 
silent discourses of reactionary fervour in the reader. Thank God that 
Mr.Portillo is around so that somebody at least can tell the truth 
about these bloody foreigners! He praises Mr.Portillo for two other 
speeches made earlier in the month. Clark uses very English descrip- 
tive terms such as a ))showercc to describe the British Establishment. 
The connotation of the term ))showercc is generally that of a disorgan- 
ised and disreputable group of people. It is also used, as with the ad- 
jective ))sorry((, as a means of colloquialising and euphemising un- 
pleasant or potentially offensive judgements. By demonstrating that 
Portillo has been critical of the Establishment, Clark seeks to vindi- 
cate the former's judgement of ))foreigners((. In this way the dis- 
courses of racism and chauvinism can be offered as no more or less 
than common sense judgements by reasonable men. 
Clark, however, is in no mood to compromise with the critics of 
Portillo. ))Since when has it been a gaffecc, he wants to know, ))to say 
what everyone knows to be truecc. Portillo had suggested that outside 
the sanctity of the United Kingdom, people were corrupt and bought 
their qualifications. No country was named by him. Clark does not 
adress this allegation directly. Instead he rounds on alleged bureau- 
cratic procedures and the corruption of officials in France, Italy and 
Greece. He equates, bizarrely, this alleged corruption with xenopho- 
Robert Ferguson 
bia - probably that of the corrupt officials, but this is not clear. By 
this time in the argument it does not really matter. Clark then turns 
his venom on those ))closet liberals or worsecc who are suspicious of 
nationalism. He has moved away from Mr.Portillo's scurrilous alle- 
gations and into the discursive modality which allows for the 
(re)construction of Great Britain and those who dare to criticise her. 
In order to so he has to introduce some fifth columnists in the form of 
liberals and high-minded commentators. These unidentified persons 
are then linked to the humiliation of Britain. It is of no consequence 
that Clark has by now moved into a new and more vicious discursive 
mode. He is, metaphorically at least, foaming at the mouth: ))So it 
does not matter to what humiliation Britain is subjected, the recom- 
mended response is always the same - roll about on the ground and 
wave your paws in the aircc. The reader has been taken a long way 
from the speech of Mr.Portillo. Clark moves with ease from the visit 
of Gerry Adams to the USA, to unintelligible but sombre warnings 
about North American society and its ))urban concentrations of power 
on Eastern and Pacific seabords which are violent, rootless, and 
prone to hysteriacc. A brief diversion into Tory politics and the article 
has come almost full circle. 
Mr.Portillo, according to Clark, is someone who can articulate 
ideas and who should be listened to in the name of Tory unity. It is 
time to administer to the reader the final rhetorical blow. Clark ad- 
mits that ))what Michael Mr.Portillo said might have seemed, from 
the lips of the Foreign Secretary indecorous. But he is a junior mem- 
ber of the Cabinet and he was talking to a student meetingcc. The 
choice of the word ))indecorouscc is important here. Once again it is a 
word with a good middle or upper middle class pedigree. It carries 
with it connotations of lacking propriety or good taste. It is from the 
same discursive repertoire as terms such as ))sorry gaffecc. Such terms 
are a cover for vindictive thought and malicious discourse. They also 
serve to impart an air of normality to what might otherwise be ex- 
posed as jingoistic and reactionary claptrap. 
Mr.Clark's logic has not yet reached its point of exhaustion. He 
reminds his readers that what might have seemed ))indecorouscc from 
the lips of the Foreign Secretary can hardly be deemed so when it 
comes from the lips of a mere junior member of the Cabinet. Not 
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only that, but he was talking to an audience of students. Presumably 
this gives license to any junior Cabinet member to let his words and 
thoughts run riot. What's wrong with a little xenophobia, racism and 
chauvinism when talking to a group of students cries Clark's dis- 
course from between the lines? Any sympathetic reader of Clark's 
column, and it is for them that he writes, might now be waiting for 
some kind of climb down or move towards reconciliation with 
Mr.Portillo's critics. But it is not to be: ))Now we have been told he is 
)sorry(. So am I. There are few spectacles so distasteful as that of one 
who has told the truth being compelled to apologise.(( (italics added). 
In this final comment there is the self-righteous indignation of the re- 
actionary who reserves the right to spread his views as ))normal(( 
thinking. 
This brief analysis has been offered in order to demonstrate just 
one way in which xenophobic and chauvinist ideas can be con-
structed as both normal and desirable. Clark's column is not a so- 
phisticated piece of rhetoric, but it demonstrates very adequately the 
general line of approach adopted by those racists and chauvinists 
who insist on remaining stubbornly normal. The context of their dis- 
course is that it usually operates most powerfully on ideological 
home ground. Clark is preaching to the converted, but such preaching 
is very important to maintain morale amongst beleaguered conserva- 
tives, whether or not they vote for the Conservative Party. 
The limitations of space have made it necessary to concentrate 
here on a single example of newspaper journalism. The final section 
of this paper will attempt to identify other ways in which the 
))normal(( and invocations of normality, with their context of poten- 
tial intimacy or discursive closeness, facilitate the circulation, nurture 
and practice of racism and xenophobia. It will also be argued that 
behind the invocation of normality there lurks the promise of vio- 
lence which will come from those who wish to preserve normality at 
all costs. These invocations may come from the relative anonymity of 
newspaper editorials, or from the mediation of the speeches and 
comments of public figures. One way of theorising this situation is 
through the concept of hegemony put forward by Antonio Gramsci 
j1971), but this is less appropriate when one is trying to understand 
the intimacy and directness characteristic of many media messages, 
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particularly when they are dealing with issues of racism and chauvin- 
ism. Media messages address their audiences in the language of the 
everyday and require a theorisation which recognises that everyday 
life has become the apolitical centre of the mediazation (see Thomp- 
son 1990) of culture. Making media sense of the outsider through the 
discourses of racism and xenophobia is something which is done by 
appeals to that (usually national) lifestyle which, allegedly, existed 
once and which is now potentially under threat. There is no need to 
define such a lifestyle in any detail. The less said the better. The 
))pastcc for the xenophobe is sacred and to be guarded as a precious 
memory. Normality must invent the ))good old days((, whether these 
take the form of street parties and the exercise of community spirit or 
the Great Empire which was once the civilising force in an alien 
world. 
There is also, to conceptualise implicature slightly differently, the 
frequent use in racist and xenophobic discourse of what might be 
called the ))nod-and-wink(( approach to issues relating to ))race((, na- 
tionalism and xenophobia. Clark is an expert at such inferential ar- 
gumentation. His technique of bemoaning the fact that one can no 
longer speak the truth about issues and (Other) people is one which is 
replicated on occasion in bus queues, in right wing newspaper edito- 
rials and in some bars where alcohol loosens the tongue. Such repli- 
cation is not easily quantifiable and would be both costly and morally 
and ethically questionable to research3. Sometimes it is necessary to 
turn to the world of the dramatist and the film maker to hear what the 
researcher cannot collect as data for analysis. The status of drama- 
tised or ))fictional(( evidence is, understandably, problematic. The 
more problematic alternative, however, is that research will have to 
become synonymous with spying and informing. Everyday life and 
the ))normal(( are two of the most inaccessible facets of our social 
existence. It is easier to research our rituals and our celebrations than 
the mundanities of our quotidian existence. Yet it is with the latter 
that we may find the ideological cornerstones upon which the social 
edifices of chauvinism and xenophobia are erected. 
It may be that ~normalitycc, upon closer analysis, will be identified 
as much of a fiction as any other generalising concept designed to 
explain the operations of daily living. But that does not mean that the 
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media cannot and do not recycle this concept in order to make ideo- 
logical appeals through other fictional constructs such as ))the na- 
tional interestcc or ))our tradition(( (see Hobsbaum and Ranger 1983). 
In this way there is a direct route through the normal to the alleged 
need to protect a fictional sense of identity to practices which are 
anything but fictional. It is upon the complacency in the behaviour of 
those who inhabit the world of the normal that the violence of those 
who have left the domain of verbal discourse for that of physical ac- 
tion can survive or thrive. This is not to suggest that racist violence 
and xenophobia can be reductively attributed to the ways in which 
normality is constructed and maintained. It is, however, to suggest 
that it is crucial to problematise our notions of normality in order to 
better understand how the concept may serve to legitimise existing 
relations of power and subordination in societies. 
This paper has put forward some tentative suggestions which seek 
the possible roots and sustenance of violence and xenophobia in con- 
cepts of normality. It has been suggested that the study and research 
of the horror of violent acts is important, but may be misleading. One 
of the most uncomfortable realisations for those who see themselves 
as responsible and ))normal(( citizens of their country (and perhaps of 
the world), is that we are all implicated in that violence. Violence and 
xenophobia can be explained and sometimes justified through ap- 
peals to normality. Those who wish to better understand how and 
why this might happen would do well to focus their research upon 
quiet residential areas as much as run down inner cities, upon the 
honeyed persuasiveness of grey suited pundits of the normal as much 
as the angry and dispossessed. It would be naive to suppose that such 
a refocussing of academic attention would render up sufficient or 
final explanation of racism and xenophobia. But it would be short- 
sighted and willful negligence if researchers did not recognise that 
the toleration of racist violence and xenophobia has to be related to 
the lifestyle and ideological predispositions of those who live in so- 
cieties where child abuse and domestic violence CO-exist with moral 
outrage at the outsider and the Other. 
It is to media representations of normality in relation to the above 
issues that we, as academic researchers, may turn to unravel more of 
the ideological puzzle which is the backdrop for racist and xenopho- 
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bic behaviour. But we must do so in the knowledge that we are im- 
plicated in and may be complicit with the )world( which we investi- 
gate. 
Notes 
1 The concept of ))flowcc has been invoked by Raymond Williams in relation to 
television programmes as a means of identifying the apparently seamless continu- 
ity by and through which television messages are made constantly available in may 
of the industrialised countries. There is the endless pressure to ))placecc issues and 
then move on. Of course, a similar argument could be made in relation to the 
recurrent presence of the daily press, although newspapers are unlikely to achieve 
the immediate international audience of television news. See Williams (1974). 
2 	A notable and perhaps understandable absence here is the graphic presentation of 
domestic violence. The absence on screen of violent acts in the home can easily 
lead an audience to forget or underestimate the prevalence of such acts in our 
societies. 
3 	There is no reliable research methodology which will allow the ))noormal(c to be 
studied without, in the process being de-normalised. The only possibility left, apart 
from living reflectively in a state of normality, is spying! 
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F a n t a s i z i n g  A b o u t  V i o l e n c e :  
M e m o r y ,  A l t e r i t y ,  a n d  I d e n t i t y  
i n  G e r m a n  P o l i t i c a l  C u l t u r e  
E p i s o d e s  o f  V i o l e n c e  in P o s t - C o l d  W a r  G e r m a n y  
According to a New I'ork Times report from October 1993, ))A wave 
of anti-Semitic and xenophobic violence has claimed 24 lives over 
the last year and a half (in Germany), with the bulk of the attacks 
inspired, if not directly ordered, by militant nationalists and neo-Nazi 
groups ...(( (Whitney 1993, Al). 
A surge of firebombings, directed particularly against Turkish 
immigrants and eastern European refugees, has been reported since 
1989: 4,147 violent crimes against foreign residents in Germany were 
recorded in 1992, of which 550 were arsons (Archiv fur Sozialpolitik 
1993a, 3 1). Nationalist violence displays a remarkable continuity in 
cultural form, relying on symbols significant to German culture: 
Rightist militants, in their attempt to annihilate the ethnic other, make 
use of fire, which is in Christian (and Nazi) symbology a sign of 
overcoming, a possible transformation into a new period. It is re- 
markable that the same repertoire of symbols and images is invoked 
as a medium of violent protest by the political left: By setting fire to 
large shopping centers, which were despised during the seventies as 
products of capitalist culture and consumption (and historically as the 
property of wealthy Jews), members of the Red Army Faction re- 
turned to the violent tactics of the generation that preceded theirs -
))though, of course, they conceived of themselves as fighting for the 
exact opposite cause, and their appeals were no longer linked with 
anti-Semitism(( (Borneman 1992, 256). This synchrony of memory 
and violence, and the persistence of these historically problematic 
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symbols in the repertoire of the political left is the subject of my in- 
vestigation. 
))(A)fter a long period of playing down the violence ... Chancellor 
Helmut Kohl and other leaders have taken a sharper tone of condem- 
nation: ))The damage that neo-Nazis have done to our reputation in 
the world cannot be described drastically enough(( (Whitney 1993, ). 
A series of arson attacks against eastern European refugees were 
reported from the vicinity of Bamberg, Upper Franconia, in February 
1989. During the first incident, two firebombs were hurled against a 
housing complex occupied by fifteen refugees from Hungary and 
Poland. As reported in the news media, like Die Tageszeitung, for 
instance, ))Memmelsdorf residents react with indifference to last 
night's occurence; the catholic priest points out that after all one 
asylum-seeker costs the government 2,300 marks each months. The 
refugees live in fear ... 24 hours after this attack another Molotov 
cocktail is thrown against the door of a residential project at the out- 
skirts of Bamberg. This former shelter for the homeless also houses 
refugees, primarily from eastern Europe ... The police, after the last 
arson attack, ... refuse to talk about a right-wing movement in and 
around the city of Bamberg ... (Instead) Police even consider a family 
quarrel as a possible motive. A policeman, delegated to protect the 
homes, does not want to exclude the probability that the refugees 
started the fire themselves in order to gain public attention.(( (Siegler 
and Ennsle 1989, 5) 
In Eecember 1988, the nineteen-year old Josef S. was arrested in 
connection with the firebombing of a residence in Schwanndorf, 
northern Bavaria: the inhabitants, three Turks and one German, were 
killed by the fire. Josef S. confessed and admitted to the act of arson 
))out of rage against foreigners.(( The man was known to local law 
enforcement officials because of his previous involvements with the 
rightist organization Nationalist Front. Several thousand mourners 
march in silent protest. According to news reports, ))Schwanndorfs 
mayor does not see it necessary to attend the demonstration. For him, 
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there is )no reason for such a declaration.( He does not participate for 
fear of giving the impressiotl that )here in our town is a stronghold of 
neo-Naziism and that one has to fight against such tendencies.( 
...There is, according to the judicial press secretary Guerrein, no evi- 
dence that links Josef S. )to the members of a rightwing radical group 
or youth organization.( ... Police and the prosecution cultivate their 
version of the perpetrator as )a loner without political affiliation.((( 
(Siegler 1989, 5) 
Acts of violence against immigrants are sometimes enhanced by 
the actions of law enforcewment officials. For instance, in late Au- 
gust 1993, in the town of Lotte, near Osnabriick in northern Ger- 
many, a twenty-four year-old Turkish man was attacked and savagely 
beaten by rightist militants. After the Turkish man lost conscious- 
ness, a black swastika was painted on his forehead. The severely 
injured young Turk was hospitalized. Four days after the incident, 
police and prosecutors could not confirm that the Turkish man was a 
victim of rightist violence. On the contrary, they charged him with 
conspiracy and participation in ))the fabrication of an unlawful act((. 
The results of the investigation remain inconclusive (Archiv fur 
Sozialpolitik 1993b, 32). 
The resurgence of violent nationalism can be documented in other 
contexts. Reporters for the German weekly Die Zeit describe a cele- 
bration of election results by right-wing Republicans at their party 
headquarters in Cham, Bavaria: ))There they hovered with their obese 
bodies in their folk costumes, red-faced with rage and fixated eyes 
and shouted ... When the reporter blocks the view of the guru (party 
leader), someone in the back calls out )Beat it or else you'll end up in 
Dachauc. Similar outbursts were directed against the small crowd of 
brave protesters outside the beer hall. )Parasites!( )Gold-bricks!( 
)Pollack lovers!( they are called ... )To the gas with them. The can- 
cerous growth must be gassed(, a man hisses in passing.(( (Grill et al. 
1989, 17) 
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In late October 1992, an arson attack destroyed an unoccupied 
building in the town of Dolgenbrodt, near Berlin; the building was 
scheduled to become a shelter for political refugees. Now prosecutors 
are investigating reports that the residents of this German town raised 
money to pay rightist youths for burning the shelter. The investiga- 
tion, as reported by The New York Times, reveals that just before the 
incident, ))(S)everal dozen Dolgenbrodt residents met in a local tav- 
ern to discuss the pending arrival of asylum-seekers. According to 
press reports, some of them expressed fear that the refugees would be 
Gypsies who, having nothing to do in the placid village, would turn 
to house-breaking and other crimes. 
Several nights later a group of youths on motorcycles ... drove by 
the hostel. One youth threw a firebomb, and the hostel burst into 
flames ... 
(Almost 6 months later, police finally detained a suspect) He later 
confessed and told them that he had been paid for his participation ... 
The money (for the firebombing) is said to have been secretly col- 
lected from the 250 townspeople.(( (Kinzer 1993, Al ,  A6) 
By August 1993, almost a year after the incident, the nineteen 
year-old suspect begins to deny his participation in the firebombing, 
but admits that others - having received ))logistic supportcc from the 
village population - had taken the money. While rejecting the accu- 
sation of popular conspiracy, the mayor of Dolgenbrodt, Ute Pre- 
issler, cofesses: ))We were not particularly sad when our problem was 
temporarily resolved (by the fire)(( (Archiv fur Sozialpolitik 1993c, 
32). 
R e p r o d u c t i o n  
In Berlin, leftist and alternative protesters, voicing their opposition to 
the nationalist resurgence, tend to conjure the following formulaic 
slogans (Der Spiegel1989,30): 
))Turks in, Nazis outcc 
))We rip openttear up the Republican's assescc 
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Immediately after the January 1989 elections in Berlin, anti-es- 
tablishment activists and members of the GreenJAlternative party 
assembled in protest. Their anger was directed against the militant 
right-wing party of Republicans, which had unexpectedly gained 
eleven seats in the Berlin Senate. Alternative protesters organized 
nightly demonstrations, where they diplayed banners expressing their 
political sentiments: One banner showed a clenched human fist 
smashing a swastika (hitting it dead center, fragmenting it). Another 
banner displayed a human skeleton made of cloth and paint. It was 
accompanied by the written slogan ))hit/smash awaytannihilate (hack) 
the brown filth(( (Linke 1989, fieldnotes). Variants of this slogan ap- 
peared in protest chants, on stickers, and as graffiti (ibid.). Other ex- 
amples included such catch-phrases as ))Death to fascism((; below the 
text were painted two gallows from which dangled the SS sign and a 
swastika. Similar fantasies of violence appeared in formulaic state- 
ments like ))Smash the Reps to bits!(( ))Hack the Nazi's heads with 
shovels, until they crack((. ))Hit the Nazis on the neck, until their 
throats crack((. 
One Saturday evening, in January 1988, in Schriesheim near 
Heidelberg, six young men (four of them skinheads) entered a shelter 
for political refugees and savagely beat two Indian men with wooden 
sticks, insulted and threatened the other residents, and then left un- 
recognized. Police arrested them several days later. 
))Days before the beginning of the trial (almost a year later), a 
flyer by an ,)anti-fascist action group( circulated at the universities in 
Mannheim and Heidelberg. It encouraged )attendance at the Nazi 
trial(: )Don't give an inch to the fascists!( )Hit themlbeat them where 
ever you meet them(. )Foreigners stay, drive the Nazis away!((( 
(Reuss 1988, 16) 
M e m o r y  
In Troschenreuth, a village in Upper Franconia, the nationalist Re- 
publican party received more than half of the electoral votes. Here, 
the far right has a simple majority. 
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Yet in February 1989, as reported by Die Zeit, ))After the Berlin 
elections, the (spray-painted) slogans: )Nazis out!( and )Thwart the 
early beginnings!( were clearly displayed on a wall in the center of 
the village. They have remained there until today and provoked Det- 
tenhoefer's son (the son of the nationalist village leader) to draw 
oblique historical comparisons. )That's just how it got started back 
then, when people began to defile the synagogues(. (According to the 
reporter) He says this in all innocence, an open, good-natured young 
man, nevertheless a rabid neo-Nazi.(( (Grill 1989, 15) 
T h e  I n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  N a r r a t i v e  V i o l e n c e  
Anthropological interpretations of the coercive mechanisms of power 
have tended to regard the occurence of violence as a-typical, abnor- 
mal events, as a form of action or behavior that inevitably disrupts 
the continuity of intentions, the regularity of behavior, on which 
causal, historical or structural accounts are based. However, in some 
cultural contexts ))violence is constitutive of social order and social 
identities through the elaboration of narratives and political symbols 
that provision the ongoing political processcc (Thornton 1988, 3-4). It 
is precisely because people routinely represent violence to them- 
selves in terms of causal schemas that politics can appear to use vio- 
lence instrumentally. What it uses, however, are the rhetorical sche- 
mas which people construct in order to understand violence and give 
it meaning (Feldman 199 1 ;Thornton 1990a, 1990b). 
But it is not only the interpretation of violence that is intrinsically 
cognitive and symbolic. Although violence relies on the use of im- 
plements, as Hannah Arendt (1990) observed, and acts of violence 
are perpetrated on others by the use of such implements, these tools 
of violence are not necessarily physical. Violence, as suggested re- 
cently by Pierre Bourdieu (1989), can also be symbolic and narrative. 
Acting below the level of consciousness, narrative violence may be 
concealed, sometimes invisible or undetected, but makes its presence 
felt in quasi physical form. 
As a symbolic medium, violence plays an important part in the 
formation of contemporary German identity. If we take Anderson's 
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notion of the nation as an ))imagined political communitycc (1992), 
then images of violence are among the principal themes which 
structure the German imagination. Common to all discourses about 
being German is the centrality of narrative violence. Violent fantasies 
memorialize German history as an agent of political identity. Among 
rightist nationalists, violent images and practices reaffirm German 
self-identity by invoking partial memories of a once negated past to 
restore its promise of power and racial supremacy. Among leftist 
activists, narrative violence is an equally important vehicle in the 
construction of political identity. Through their fantasies of violence, 
members of anti-establishment/alternative movements have con-
structed patterns of linkages - genealogies - of events and roles that 
link their interpretation of a contested present to cultural memories of 
a contested past. 
I intend to explore this assertion and then broaden the discussion 
of German political identity to include processes of national identity 
formation. I will examine German notions of selfhood and alterity in 
the post-cold war era by exploring the violent imagination of German 
popular culture. 
S c h e m a t a  o f  V i o l e n c e  
When analyzing the rhetorical schemata or narratives of violence 
which incite the imagination of the political left, the following as- 
sessments can be made. German anti-establishment activists tend to 
promote the use of fantasized violence as a medium for political 
contestation. A range of highly charged image schemata, focused on 
death, silencing, and physical brutality, typified by the swastika, SS 
sign, gallows, Nazi rhetoric, and death camps, are appropriated as 
anti-symbols and are transformed into a language of resistance 
against the German state. 
These fantasies of violence, marked by a language of death and 
annihilation, with its evocation of simple brutality, ranging from an 
advocacy of expulsion to murder by strangulation and bludgeoning, 
permeated all levels of GreenIAlternative politics in Berlin. In the 
course of my research in 1988 to 1989, and again in 1990, I uncov- 
ered such fantasies in the domain of political agitation, in the rhetori- 
cal speech-styles of propaganda and campaigning, in the contexts of 
organized protest, in the articulation of conflict at the party's grass- 
roots level and in committee meetings. Never, however, did I observe 
the use of such fantasy material at the level of public ideology or 
parliamentary representation, where instead the global goals of de- 
mocracy, peace, women's rights, and environmental protection were 
promulgated. How can we explain the prevalence of such fascistoid 
fantasy material at the local level? And how does it contribute to the 
formation of political identity among anti-establishment activists? 
How does the violent content of the German popular imagination af- 
fect Germans' self-image and their perception of the Other? To what 
extent do such images affect German notions of post-cold war peace 
efforts? 
The most prominent image schemata appeared in the form of the 
swastika, SS sign, gallows, and the color black. The political mobili- 
zation of these symbols permits the evocation of the past: the swas- 
tika, for instance, is appropriated as an icon of German history. It 
stands as a sign for the Nazi regime: the totalitarian state, the party, 
the police and military as well as other administrative agencies of the 
fascist state. The icons of German history stand for institutional vio- 
lence and institutionally enforced violence: the dehumanized, face- 
less, sanitized perpetration of brutality. 
In the oppositional rhetoric of the GreenIAlternatives, the swas- 
tika, as the other icons, is mobilized as a metonym, signifying the 
congruence of the fascist regime and the contemporary German state 
with its enormous police force and right-wing political spectrum. 
Fantasies of violence, directed against the political ))other((, are 
thereby not merely historicized, but reproduced as templates for ac- 
tion and identity. Transformed into an anti-symbol, the swastika is 
integrated into a key scenario (Ortner 1973), in which the use of vio- 
lence is legitimated and tangibly ))embodied((: the clenched fist, sig- 
nifying the ))muscle(( of the GreenIAlternative membership, resists 
and crushes the iconographic emblems of Nazi institutions. 
Through a reversal of these depictions of ))embodiment((, the vio- 
lent content of the key scenario, with its message of death and bru- 
talization, is intensified. The use of a generalized social category, 
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such as ))Nazis((, unlike the iconographic evocation of the past, pro- 
motes recognition of membership and agency. The term ))Nazi((, un- 
like the swastika, stands for the human (rather than the institutional) 
perpetrator of genocidal cruelty. It thereby permitslinvites the equa- 
tion with other contemporary agents: the ))bulls(( (i.e. police officers), 
the ))Reps(( (i.e. Repulican party members), ))fascists((, ))n.eo-Naziscc, 
and so on. In the political slogan, the social and historical reality of 
the ))Nazi(( is made tangible by his physicality of presence -- he is 
))embodied((: the textual references envision ))Nazis(( with heads, 
necks, throats or mouths, sometimes genitalia, to which acts of vio- 
lence can be applied. In these key scenarios, the fantasizer assumes a 
disembodied presence: violence is inflicted through technical con-
traptions or instruments (e.g. Arendt 1990): the gallows, the shovel, 
the clenched fist. The fantasy is focused on the act and consequences 
of violent behavior: crush, crack, croak, smash, hack, kill. The im- 
plied brutality of Green political fantasy is shocking because of the 
casual invocation of murder (and the rhetorical absence of emotional 
affect). 
M e m o r y  a n d  N a t i o n a l  I d e n t i t y  
Although such fantasies of violence appear to be at odds with the 
pacifist ideology of the Greens, the narrative vehicle by which they 
are expressed - a combination of invocation and dissociation - is a 
pervasive one in contemporary German culture. Since World War I1 
the construction of a German national identity has been mediated by 
the reconstitution of collective memory. The legitimacy of: the West 
German state (Federal Republic) was built upon a dual consensus: 
the rejection of fascism and the rejection of a socialist solution 
(Maier 1989). The regime was defined by what it was not. Reunifi- 
cation in 1990 further exacerbated this pattern of historical amnesia 
and remembrance. The thematic focus of German political identity 
was (and is) therefore one of dissociation from the past. German 
collective identity relied on motifs of negation and opposition. Yet 
while historical contiguities were officially denied, images and 
events from the past continue to be invoked culturally. 
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The resiliance of fascistoid material was mentioned by the linguist 
Victor Klemperer in 1946, who was disturbed to see the unselfcon- 
scious and uncritical reproduction of Nazi thinking by means of ver- 
bal templates: ))The language of the Third Reich seems destined to 
survive in several characteristic idioms; these have burried them- 
selves so deeply that they seem to become a permanent property of 
the German languagecc (1946, 2). Klemperer's appears to have been 
correct, and anti-Semitism and the fantasized brutalization of others 
are inextricably rooted in German ways of speaking. 
References to the death camps permeate everyday language: a 
boring situation or event elicits the formulaic response ))it ought to be 
gassedcc - made extinct (e.g. DES ist zum Vergasencc). Another variant 
of this gruesome idiom, in common use in contemporary Germany, 
describes the consequences (the endurance) of an exhausting, repeti- 
tive task, executed ))up to the moment of gasificationcc (e.g. ))his zur 
Vergasungcc). The utterance refers to someone carrying out an action 
to the point of extinction or utter futility (Dundes 1987,27, n. 12). 
The imagery of genocide also surfaces as a metaphor: a smoke- 
filled, crowded pub is termed ))a densely packed gas chambercc (e.g. 
))Gaskammervollcc) by a reporter for the Berlin daily Die Tageszei- 
lung (Kapielski 1988). The news editor, accused of carelessness by 
the rest of the staff, responds: ))I really don't feel like defending this 
man's infantile garbage. I don't know whether I would have deleted 
the word from the text, because I don't know whether it is good or 
evil, and I don't have any associations there. I don't concern myself 
with German historycc (Riedle 1988, 8). 
The ensuing editorial debate about the abuse of metaphoric lan- 
guage is sarcastically dismissed by another staff member (Droste 
1988, 9) who calls such inquiries the ))final solution of the Duden 
questioncc (e.g. ))Endlosung der Dudenfvagecc): Duden is the German 
word for ))dictionary(( and it rhymes with Juden which is the German 
term for ))Jews((. In this instance, historic memory in an attempt to 
oppose the editorial board's decision to impose greater restrictions on 
the writers' ))verbal spontaneity and humorcc (Jhering 1988, 79). Me- 
dia images of genocide are thereby not only invoked as figures of 
speech, but used instrumentally as commodities. 
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In a similar case, in 1989, a leftist news magazine reports the his- 
torical movement to purify or cleanse the German language from 
words'of foreign origin (Konkret 1989), which led to the publication 
of the Germanistics dictionary, the so-called Duden. The critical de- 
bate about this nationalist publication (owned by every German 
household) entered the revisionist currents of German popular culture 
under the heading ))Dudenreincc - literally ))dictionary cleansingcc. 
Here the word play alludes to the gruesome attempt by National So- 
cialists to make Germany ))Jew freecc. The verbal reference reminds 
us that Jews in Germany were treated not as humans but as a dirty 
problem to be solved or eliminated. In this instance, ethnic cleansing 
is metaphorically equated with the purification of language. In such 
rhetorical instances, the memory of the Holocaust is diffused and 
trivialized by the routinized verbal encounter. Inserted into the cul- 
tural vocabulary, the language of violence has become part of the 
German repertoire of speaking. 
Fantasies of extermination and Nazi violence are also projected 
onto narrative encounters which dramatize acts of genocide through 
the symbolic medium of play-acting. One such event took place dur- 
ing an air show at a U.S. military base in the Rhine Palatinate in 
Germany (e.g. Schrep 1983, 72-73; Lange-Feldhahn et. al. 1983, 207, 
209). Anti-establishment protesters staged the occurence of a nuclear 
holocaust by simulating mass-death. When the U.S. military police 
finally intervened, the event turned into a form of dramatic poetry in 
which members of the German audience played out familiar roles, 
becoming participants in the physical brutalization of their political 
opponents. One spectator, a man with a small son, proclaimed that he 
wanted to ))rip the heartcc from one of the protester's bodies. Another 
shouted that the activists ))should be run over with a tractorcc. A man 
to his left, who until then had been contentedly chewing on a hot dog, 
suddenly poured his cup of beer over a young woman lying on the 
ground, and began to shout ))Blood! Blood! Blood! while rythmically 
stomping his foot up and down. A female spectator, while kicking 
and spitting at the protestors, screamed: ))Beat them to death, beat 
them all to death!(( As the peace protesters were loaded onto the 
waiting military trucks, another man proclaimed: ))And now into the 
gas with them!(( In this collectively sustained performance, fantasies 
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of violence are used for cognitive ends: The symbolism of the event 
renders explicit cultural memories of genocide and,'at the same time, 
deflects the historicity of violence which it attempts to legitimate. 
The same patterns of invocation and displacement are revealed by 
so-called ))Auschwitzcc jokes and video games. In these narrative 
contexts, the sordid and vicious details of the extermination of Jews 
in such concentration camps as Dachau, Buchenwald, and Auschwitz 
are remembered and made the subject of humor and entertainment. In 
several of the jokes and games, the death camp reality is appropriated 
as a key scenario with contemporary humali targets: Turkish inimi- 
grants (who symbolize the ethnic ))Othercc in post-war Germany) are 
incorporated into the German repertoire of violent fantasy. Thereby, 
the annihilation of Jews is historicized, whereas the threat of victimi- 
zation is directed against Turks (Albrecht 1982; Linke and Dundes 
1988; Nierenberg 1984). The same fantasy is promoted by concen- 
tration camp video games: ))The player must manage the camp, sell- 
ing gold fillings, lampshades and labor to earn enough money to buy 
gas and add gas chambers to kill Turkscc (New York Times 1991, A 
10). According to one version of this game, called The Arien test, the 
players' racial purity is established by killing Jews in concentration 
camps and by eliminating others of mixed ancestry in combat at the 
eastern front. The successful conclusion of the game produces the 
text: ))Sieg Heil. The state needs men like youcc (Freudenreich 1989, 
13). In each of these cases, the violent content of the fantasy is ob- 
jectified through its historicity, and German self-identity is con-
structed through the fantasized annihilation of the ))Other((. 
V i o l e n c e  a s  a K e y  S c e n a r i o  
Such racist templates constitute the broader context of cultural atti- 
tudes within which German political identity is formulated. As John 
Borneman (1992) recently suggested, the concentration camps, par- 
ticularly Auschwitz, have become a key symbol around which guilt, 
Germanness, and identity cohere in the national imagination of the 
post-war German state. I argue, moreover, that such violent templates 
exist not merely as representational or summarizing symbols; they 
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function more dangerously as key scenarios: through the invocation 
of historical brutalities from a contested past (as by the left) and the 
use of narrative violence as an element of cultural memory (as by the 
right), political activists assert their cultural identity, while at the 
same time re-enacting (according to unarticulated formulae) the cul- 
tural sequences of fantasized violence aimed at annihilating the cul- 
tural or political Other. In contemporary Germany, where such fan- 
tasies are once again acted out literally, and where immigrants, refu- 
gees, tourists, and even foreign athletes have increasingly become 
targets of racist violence, we witness the transformative power of 
such key scenarios: symbolic (narrative) violence has become ritual- 
ized practice and continues to reproduce templates of violence that 
are incorporated into the German popular imagination to replenish its 
repertoire of violent fantasy. 
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I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Violence and aggression are frequently seen as stemming from bio- 
logical, natural causes, shared by humans with many other non-hu- 
man primates and mammalian species in general. Aggression among 
members of non-human primate species in the wild has become in- 
creasingly well documented; Jane Goodall's observations of chim- 
panzees at Gombe Stream, Tanzania, in the 1980s led her to rethink 
some of her earlier assumptions about aggression among chimpan- 
zees living there, not only that of males, commonly thought more 
prone to aggression than females, but also of mother-daughter pairs, 
observed killing infant chimpanzees. Recently, Wrangham has de- 
scribed social behavior of juvenile male chimpanzees which seems to 
closely resemble that of gangs of juvenile human city dwellers, out 
for a night, surveying the territory, and attacking when the opportu- 
nities seem right. Baboons, as described by Strum and others, are 
known for their aggressive ways. Gorillas, on the other hand, despite 
their size, strength, and teeth, may be less inclined to aggression than 
their chimpanzee relatives, although this may be due to their particu- 
lar social relationships. Recently, Margaret Power (1991) has con- 
tested the view of chimpanzees as aggressive, dominance-seeking 
animals, arguing that Goodall's and other observations of aggression 
were- caused by artificial feeding situations; both chimpanzees and 
human beings living in ))immediate returncc foraging situations are, 
according to Power, egalitarian and non-aggressive. There is still a 
great deal to be learned about the connection between violence and 
social order among both humans and non-human primates. It appears, 
however, that humans share much behaviorally with many of their 
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primate relatives. The question still remains: how much of this vio- 
lence is due to nature, how much to nurture? 
If the literature on the anthropology of war is correct, violence 
and aggression among humans may be learned behaviors (see Fry 
1992). Aggression and warfare, it has been argued, seems to be corre- 
lated with social formations such as states, and according to Robert 
Carneiro, may indeed lead to state formation. Douglas Fry describes 
the situations among the Mexican Zapotec in which aggression is 
enculturated in one town, but is not enculturated in another town. 
Aside from any particular natural causes of violence (hormonal 
reactions, testosterone levels, if these indeed are sufficient causes), it 
appears that violence has a cultural, symbolic, component, particu- 
larly when choices are made about the particular category of person 
against whom that violence is directed. Particular persons, or catego- 
ries of person become targets of violent attacks. In the United States, 
domestic violence, violence directed at someone within the house- 
hold, is frequently directed towards women; racial violence has been 
directed toward people of African, Chinese, and Korean origin, 
among others; whites get attacked; there are attacks specifically di- 
rected toward gays and lesbians. Each of these types of victim reflect 
some form of difference from the attacker. How do the attackers 
perceive their targets? What sort of model or category might be used 
for such designation? 
In France, as elsewhere in Europe, violence against the person has 
been directed against ))foreigners((. These people, often referred to as 
))immigrants((, some of them recent arrivals, some not, reflect their 
difference from citizens of the ))hostcc state through skin color, 
clothing, religion, andlor language (see R.D. Grillo 1985, for a dis- 
cussion of the differences in meaning between ))immigrCscc and 
))Ctrangerscc). These cultural differences serve as symbolic markers of 
otherness. Cultural markers become symbols of difference and the 
bearers of those symbols the targets of violence. It is these targets to 
which one speaker referred when she said that she was ras le bol, fed 
up, with the immigrants (M.C., personal communication, May 1989). 
The metaphor is actually one of a bowl, full to over-flowing, which 
has lead to over-consumption. No more can be admitted, whether to 
the stomach or to the state. 
Race, Racism, and Culture in France 
Membership in states is maintained and constructed through in- 
clusion and exclusion. While the French state claims to promote con- 
cepts of tolerance of difference, the political and legal system, the 
broadcast and print media, mediate membership and transmit con- 
cepts of who belongs in the state, and who does not. In what follows, 
violence is seen as a form of communication taking place in a context 
of symbolic construction linked with aggressive interaction. This 
violence, then, intersects both nature and culture. 
In order to pursue this line of argument, I turn to some of the work 
done by Geertz (1973), Victor Turner (1974), Ortner (1973) on 
models, root metaphors, and key symbols respectively, and more re- 
cently by Fernandez, et al. in: Beyond Metaphor. The Theory of 
Tropes in Anthropology. My argument then moves to a discussion of 
metaphor and action, the formation of violence, its production and 
reproduction, and the meaning of these violent acts. 
S y m b o l  a n d  M e t a p h o r  in  H u m a n  T h o u g h t  
The late 1960s and early 1970s were a heady period in American 
linguistic, structural and symbolic anthropology. Folk categories, 
such as those for firewood and animals, were being analyzed and 
described (see Tambiah 1969); dialectical opposites, both raw and 
cooked, natural and cultural, were discussed and digested, albeit a bit 
later than they were in France (Levi-Strauss 1969'); Victor Turner 
was working on ))root metaphorscc (1974) and Sheny Ortner on ))key 
symbolscc and ))key metaphorscc (1974); Clifford Geertz, meanwhile, 
brought to our attention the concept of ))models of(( and ))models forcc 
action which we and all actors carry in our heads. From this work 
came the concepts of ))performativecc symbols which Turner dis- 
cusses so well in Dramas, Fields and Metaphors (1974), for instance 
in his analysis of the events leading up to the martyrdom of Thomas 
Becket. 
More recently, Thomas K. Fitzgerald (1993) has combined the in- 
sights of anthropology, psychology, communication theory, to ana- 
lyze the metaphors of personal identity; Anthony D. Smith of the 
London School of Economics has explored the construction and 
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symbolism of national identity; in which he discusses ways in which 
ethnic origins, religion, language, and shared symbols, all constructs 
of culture, are combined to provide a sense of nationhood. 
S y m b o l  a n d  M e t a p h o r  in H u m a n  A c t i o n  
It is this performative concept, as well as Clifford Geertz's models of 
and models for action, which have led to subsequent works, such as 
those published in the Fernandez volume (1991) Beyond Metaphor. 
The Theory of Tropes in Anthropology. Metaphors and metonymy, 
using comparisons or parts-for wholes, aid us in a formation of cate- 
gories. Stating that ))You are an brick((, or ))You are my right hand(( 
help us to identify the position or role which people play. Similarly, 
stating that >)They are all animals(( (metaphor) or ))They don't eat 
pork(( (metonymy) help us to place people in cultural categories, im- 
plying style of living and food taboos which are symbols of religious 
beliefs. 
The argument over the wearing of the foulard by Muslim school- 
girls is an example of such use of symbol and metaphor. The foulard, 
the headscarf worn by Muslim girls, became a symbol of the Muslim 
way of life. It was a metonymic symbol, one which stood for a whole 
religious and cultural group, living in France, a nation which several 
hundred years before had formalized the distinction between church 
and state, which distinction then, according to French logic, meant 
that religious symbols should not appear in a branch of the state, the 
school. Furthermore, the state itself creates the categories for inclu- 
sion and exclusion, in legal construction of the rights to citizenship, 
primarily on the basis of citizenship by blood jus sanguinis, due to 
birth to people themselves French citizens; and birth on French soil, 
jus soli. As with most nation-states, those who live on French soil 
without the proper proof of citizenship according to one or another of 
these principles runs the risk, eventually, be being deported, unless 
the proper waivers and paperwork are acquired. Citizenship acquired 
by virtue of blood and soil is itself citizenship acquired through sym- 
bolic production; for what is the relationship between blood and 
rights to citizenship? 
Race, Racism, and Culture in France 
Symbols are powerful as rallying points for action; they can gal- 
vanize a crowd, they can be good to think about and good to act on, 
they provide something to fight and die for. The tattered flags in the 
church of Saint-Louis-des-Invalides,not far from Napoleon's Tomb, 
are touching evidence of this sentiment. 
Robert Darnton (1985) describes in The Great Cat Massacre the 
meaning of the killing of the cats by printers' apprentices in Paris 
during the late 1730s. This massacre of cats reflected the mentalite of 
the workers, angered at their conditions. They turned to torturing 
cats, a practice found throughout France during the medieval and 
early modem period; this practice embodied ideas of revenge on 
masters who could afford to feed household pets better than the 
workers were; (it also embodied ideas about women and their sen- 
suality, less germane to Darnton's subject at hand, a workers' revolt, 
but saying much about ways in which women were viewed in early 
modern France). The cat was, in Victor Turner's term, a multivocalic 
symbol, or a metaphor for the many things to which cat-torturers 
were opposed; authority, females, masters, mistresses, wealth; and 
the cries of dying cats let this opposition be heard by the true targets 
of the workers frustration and anger. 
F o r m a t i o n s  a n  P r o d u c t i o n  o f  V i o l e n c e  
As Feldman (1991, 5) says about Northern Ireland, ))though the 
conditions of this conflict can be traced in part to the relations of 
production, the reproduction of antagonism takes place in other 
spaces and materialities. In turn, as much as ethnicity symbolizes in 
part an inequitable cultural division of labor that has precipitated 
communal violence, I have found that violence can effect autono- 
mous and retroactive interventions in the construction of ethnicity.(( 
Ethnicity and race are cultural constructions. They do not flow 
naturally from the body, nor do these categories spring from the head 
of the bearer, with signs that say Muslim or Jew or Algerian. No, 
they have been created, in some cases through thousands of years of 
mediation, or self-ascription, or oppression. The oppression of Jews 
in Germany was, made horribly manifest by the imposition of the re- 
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quirement that Jews wear a symbol meant to point them out as Jews, 
on their clothing. Others choose to wear a symbol of their affiliation, 
be it religious (the foulard), or cultural (other articles of clothing, 
such as a fez). 
Signs and symbols can be placed on the body; skin color comes 
))naturally((. Yet that too varies, and the meaning we attach to skin 
color is often assigned by the beholder, not always by the bearer. 
Color, clothing, language, accent, use of dialect, religious expres- 
sions borne on the body, all provide the viewer with what they think 
are clues to identity. 
Feldman speaks of the ))politicized body((, and says that the ))body 
made into a political artifact by an embodied act of violence is no 
less a political agent than tthe author(s) of violence. The very act of 
violence invests the body with agency(( (1991, 7). The attacks on 
members of the ))other sidecc then become, in a sense, the very act of 
))writing on the body((, leaving symbolic imprints carrying meaning. 
Far from an over-intellectualization of aggressive, seemingly irra- 
tional and animalistic acts, the product of steamy hormones and pure 
bloody hate, the systematic violence perfected by groups such as the 
IRA or the Protestants, or the German neo-Nazis, or the French 
against seemingly non-French foreigners, are an expression of 
something much more complex and somewhat less biologically 
driven. These are to a large extent symbolic acts of force directed at 
some constructed other, determined through religious, land, race, 
class, or ethnic boundaries. 
I n c l u s i o n  a n d  E x c l u s i o n :  F i e l d  W o r k  
During the week, in the central shopping district of Montebkliard, a 
town in eastern France, the busy streets thin out towards noon. Last 
minute purchases of bread are made for the noon meal. The office 
workers and store employees hurry home as steel gates come rum- 
bling down over shop entrances. By 12:15 the streets are almost 
empty except for the North African factory workers and me. The 
North Africans are on their noon hour from the nearby Peugeot plant, 
but don't want to stop for expensive lunches. Nor do I, so I eat a piece 
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of bread and hide behind my newspaper. The North Africans wander 
around, or sit on the steps near the fountain, smoking and talking to- 
gether quietly. We are all strangers here. We have no apartment or 
house close by, where we can go for lunch. 
The newspaper, a regional one, has news articles about local 
towns and gatherings of the elderly, or the firemen, or of some event 
for school children. An article about permanent residents from North 
Africa catches my eye, and a recent conversation over lunch in a 
restaurant with some French friends comes back to me. A few years 
ago, said one, you never saw men with prayer rugs over their shoul- 
ders in the streets. Now you see them more and more. Now the towns 
in the outskirts of Montebeliard have many such men, he continued. 
It is the Peugeot plant that attracts them here. But why can't they be 
more French? 
These quiet scenes belie the recent experiences of immigrants 
living in Europe, in particular in France, Germany, and Spain. These 
two experiences are but two aspects of the contentious shared pool of 
experience which illustrate the complexity of the apparent ))rising 
tidecc of racism in France, the appeal of Jean Le Pen and his Front 
National, the perceived increase in immigration into France, the 
conflict and misunderstandings over the wearing of scarves by young 
Muslim schoolgirls, the beatings of North Africans in various cities 
in France, the death of a young North African while in police cus- 
tody, the desecration of Jewish cemeteries, the deportation of a Turk 
who does not have the proper papers, the difficulties of assimilating 
North Africans into the French Army. 
What are the French reacting to when they join the Front National 
in Marseille or shoot a North African in Reims? What indeed do 
North Africans mean when they shout ))racists(( in the aftermath of 
the acquittal of a store-owner from a charge of murder of a North 
African? (See Le Monde, 15-16 November, 1992, 8.) Are these ten- 
sions due to actual differences in ))race((, in perhaps their biological 
differences? Or are they due to class differences, as in their eco- 
nomic, educational, or social backgrounds? Or are they due to differ- 
ences in culture, for instance in the fact that North African women 
cover their heads, and men stop work to pray to Allah? 
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It is easy to say that the fact of this difference, that even though 
many may speak French, but they are not French, and don't look 
French, is enough to make them targets for attacks on the ))Other((. It 
is easy, too, to say that the main reason for these attacks is economic; 
that numbers of the French see these immigrants as threats to the 
economic order in that jobs as well as social services go to these 
immigrants. As with many matters of the construction of the human 
social fabric, the situation is at once more complicated, and yet ca- 
pable of being unravelled in order to understand its constituent parts. 
These are, after all, constructs of humans, who are almost endlessly 
capable of construction of shared identities and numerous boundaries 
over which others are not supposed to cross. 
The attacks on immigrants are reported in the French and foreign 
press in discussions of the rise of racism in France, and it is difficult 
to untangle issues of ))race((, from those of ))culturecc, ))classcc, ))ethnic 
relations((, and ))migration((. Mixed into this web of construction are 
issues of citizenship and nationality. What, in fact, does it mean to be 
French? Who has the right to be French? How are such issues de- 
cided? Who will remain non-French, even while living on French 
soil, and born in France? 
In this paper, ))racism(( will be seen as an aspect of what at times 
becomes, in France and elsewhere, a violent debate about national 
identity, in which physical and cultural differences, or ))racial(( and 
))cultural(( attributes are used as visible symbolic markers of differ- 
ence; of difference which connotes a threat to self-appointed protec- 
tors of the ))hostcc state either through perceived usurpation of jobs 
and opportunities or through perceived inadequacies in intelligence, 
in proper behavior or apparent inability and ineligibility to be part of 
the body national. 
In this analysis of race and culture in France, I will discuss some 
statistics on past and present migration into France, present some of 
the arguments made since the French Revolution, about construction 
of rights to French citizenship, and then proceed with an analysis 
from an anthropological, holistic, point of view, of perceptions of 
race, class, and culture as they are expressed and played out in the 
region of Montebeliard. In that discussion I will draw on several in- 
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formal interviews I had with residents of MontebCliard in January of 
1992. 
M i g r a t i o n  t o  F r a n c e  
))A great deal is learnt about a country through its treatment of for- 
eigners. The census, its definitions, the handling of the figures are 
also the image of a society and its moodscc (Singer-Kerel 1991, 281- 
282). 
The English-language literature on migration in Europe in general 
and in France in particular is large and is represented by the work of 
Castles and Kosack (1985); Freeman (1979); and more recently by 
Miles and Singer-Kerel (1991). Migration statistics, although they 
usually represent official numbers and may undercount the number of 
actual immigrants, do allow for some understanding of trends and 
flows of migration. According to Singer-Kerel (1991), France has 
been the second largest importer of foreign labor after the United 
States since the early nineteenth century. This, she suggests, is be- 
cause of the ever declining birth rate, the slower pace of the Indus- 
trial Revolution than in Great Britain, great emphasis on agricultural 
production, and continuing nationalism, in which immigrants were 
viewed as useful for such things as cannon fodder (Singer-Kerel 
1991,279). 
While the popular press leaves the impression that migration into 
France, both legal and illegal, is at higher levels than ever, migration 
statistics do not bear out this assumption. Singer-Kerel reports that in 
1931 foreigners comprised 6.58% of the total population, 7.40% of 
the labor force. In 1975, foreigners were 6.54% of the total popula- 
tion, and 7.28% of the labor force (in both instances, less than in 
1931). In 1982, foreigners comprised 6.78% of the total population 
(2% more than in 1975) and only 6.62% of the labor force (66% less 
than in 1975) (Singer-Kerel 1991,292). Therefore, according to these 
statistics, the total population of foreigners rose from 193 1 to 1982 
by only 2%, and in the labor force the percentage of foreigners has 
actually fallen, from 1931 to 1982, by 78%. These figures may well 
not reflect accurately the number of illegal immigrants (clandestins) 
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which are reportedly entering, in particular from West Africa, to live 
in crcwded rooms in areas around Marseille and elsewhere 
(reportedly 300,000 of them in 1985; Husbands 1991, 182), but the 
figures do show that, officially speaking, the portrayal of a rising tide 
of immigration is a somewhat suspect construct of reporting in the 
popular press, among members of the Front National and its adher- 
ents, and in the general consciousness of the French. 
However, in the case of North Africans, there appears to be gen- 
eral consensus that during and after the Algerian War, close to a mil- 
lion repatriates, French who had lived in Algeria, came to France. 
Another half-million harkis, Algerians who had fought side by side 
with the French, and French Muslims, also entered France during the 
early 1960s (Husbands 199 1, 172-1 73). 
W h o  h a s  T h e  R i g h t  t o  b e  F r e n c h ?  

T h e  N a t i o n a l  C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  R i g h t s  

Harlem Desir, leader of the group S-0-SAnti-Racisme, in an inter- 
view with the French journal Le Debut, quoted Napoleon as saying: 
))The children of foreigners who are established in France have the 
French spirit, French habits, the attachment which each one bears 
naturally to the country where (he) was born.(( (Harlem Desir 1990, 
53; translation mine). 
The national census of 185 1 was the first to ask specifically about 
the presence of foreigners in France (see Silverman 1991). In the 
1880s a legislative debate centered on whether a tax should be im- 
posed on foreigners in order to protect jobs of French workers. In 
1889 a Nationality Code was established, and by the end of the nine- 
teenth century the French educational system established its own 
unique way of insuring that all children attending school, either on 
the French mainland or in colonial outposts, would be instilled with a 
French identity, a system which has tended to be reproduced to this 
day (see Silverman 1991, 335-336: see also Citron 1987, for a cri- 
tique of French history texts; see Anderson 1983, for a discussion of 
the history and development of nationalism). (I was told by a Parisian 
architect of Lebanese origin that he thought the French educational 
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system was indeed the genius of the French creation of identity; 
through the education system all school children, of whatever origins, 
became French; personal communication, G.J., May 1991). 
The Evian Agreement, in 1962, gave rights of citizenship to Al- 
gerians in France, except political rights. Children of these Algerians, 
born on French soil, are considered to be French citizens (under the 
concept of ius soli), even if they are not French under the concept of 
ius sanguinis, French by ))blood(( inheritance. Children of foreign- 
born parents, after five years of residence in France, have had the 
right to become French citizens. Recent legislative proposals (1986), 
since abandoned, focused on whether the Nationality Code should be 
changed so that children of foreigners born on French soil would 
have to wait until the age of eighteen and formally ask for the right to 
become citizens (see Bernstein 1990, 104). 
R a c e ,  C l a s s  a n d  C u l t u r e  
In January of 1992 I spent two weeks in Montebeliard in order to fin- 
ish some research on census material begun two summers earlier. 
While there, I discussed ))race relationscc in America and France with 
several residents. It appeared, one person thought, that the situation 
was somewhat similar in both countries: ))There are now more North 
Africans in the area than there used to be. They seem to be different 
from the Lebanese. They are perhaps less intelligent than the Leba- 
nese. It is economic reasons that create the problems; there are not 
enough jobs. They have a different religion and habits, which make 
them different from the Poles, Italians, and former Yugoslavs, who 
are Europeans. The people of the Maghreb of North Africa have not 
risen as much as the Lebanese or American blacks.(( (M.E., personal 
communication, January, 1992). 
An acquaintance of this person has a daughter who lives with a 
North African. The North African is all right, she says, but his 
mother is impossible. However, the North African is probably living 
with the French woman, says my informant, because it will help him 
get better benefits, ultimately of citizenship. 
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A retired worker from Peugeot, living on a pension in a house in 
Montebeliard and with a second vacation house in the south of 
France, was more direct. ))The North Africans, I don't like themcc, he 
said. ))They all come here just for the benefits.(( (C.A., personal 
communication, January, 1992). 
The conversations wove together a number of reasons for their 
feelings about foreigners; they included differences in race, which 
appeared to include skin color and basic assumptions about the ori- 
gills of these people, that people from Algeria and Morocco, particu- 
larly the Maghrebiens, were of a different race; differences in culture, 
in particular because of both Arabic dress and language and because 
of the practice of Islam; as well as certain indications about their 
taking a part of the economic pie which wasn't rightly theirs, through 
laying claim to French social security benefits. 
S y m b o l i c  C o n s t r u c t i o n  o f  I d e n t i t y :  

S o c i a l  a n d  S p a t i a l  C o n s i d e r a t i o n s  

Since the 1960s, anthropologists such as LCvi-Strauss, Victor Turner, 
Fernandez, Geertz, Eva Hunt, Ortner, etc. have given much attention 
to the meaning, construction, use, and manipulation of symbols. 
While not necessarily all of the same school, their interpretations of 
meaning systems have had a wide impact on social and linguistic 
anthropology. More recently, interest in dialogue, narrative, dis-
course, textual analysis, and the problems of writing about ))The 
Othercc has permeated anthropological conferences and literature. 
Concepts of ))multivocalitycc, of ))many voicescc speaking from many 
perspectives, or of single symbols which have many voices (Turner 
1991) are utilized frequently. 
More recently, Margaret Rodman, in an article in the American 
Anthropologist ())Empowering Place: Multilocality and Multivocal- 
itycc 1992, 640-656) has pulled together an intriguing argument using 
concepts of ))voicecc and ))place((. ))Place, like voice and time, is a 
politicized social and cultural constructcc, she argues, and ))multi- 
locality as well as multivocality can empower place conceptually and 
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encourage understanding of the complex social construction of spa- 
tial meaningcc (Rodman, 640). 
In a paper I presented at the American Anthropological Associa- 
tion annual meeting in 1991 (Donahue 1991), I argued that the use of 
space in the town of Montebeliard reflects the way in which the in- 
habitants of the region think of themselves, either as owners and 
controllers of certain spaces during the celebration of Bastille Day 
(the French dancing to accordion music in the center town square) or 
as marginalized members of the society (the West and North Africans 
in the side streets, playing, listening, and dancing to West African 
music). 
The question of ))who controls this place?(( is apparent in much of 
the discourse about race, citizenship, and culture carried out in 
Montebeliard in particular and in France in general. Napoleon's view 
that somehow children born in France, on French soil, inherit a spirit 
and feeling of Frenchness is still embodied in the French education 
system. If one absorbs the concepts of Frenchness through French 
textbooks, the system helps make one French. The textbook becomes 
a mediator for the instillation of spirit of the place. However, control 
of Frenchness still corresponds approximately to control of space and 
place, and it is still the case that many North Africans are consigned 
to living in high-rise apartment blocks in the banlieue, the suburbs of 
cities and towns such as Montebeliard. It is they who walk the streets 
of the central shopping district of Montebeliard during the noon hour, 
since it is too far to get back to their apartments from the Peugeot 
plant to have a good French lunch. 
The complex social construction of spatial meaning which Rod- 
man describes is not unlike the complex social construction of re- 
gional and national identity which has been operating at least since 
the nineteenth century in Europe and in some cases earlier. 
Nation-states by the nature of their construction and inclusion of 
various peoples move through phases of incorporation and integra- 
tion of different regions, regional peoples, and languages, as was the 
case in the construction of the French nation from the seventeenth 
century, during which Louis XIV moved to extend and reinforce the 
boundaries of France as he saw it. Various attempts since then by 
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regions to detach themselves from France have never been very suc- 
cessful (Brittany, Besancon, for instance). 
By the early nineteenth century both romanticism and nationalism 
served to create concepts of the spiritual quality of ))Frenchnesscc of 
which Napoleon spoke earlier in this paper; that there was something 
in the French soil and the French air which, breathed in, made one 
French. This quality, this je ne sais quoi, cuts across class boundaries 
but creates a French culture in the minds of those who partake in it; 
and perhaps those who observe it. Until fairly recently, it was the 
French educational system which helped to create this common cul- 
ture, which for a while could even cut across ))racial(( divisions too. 
But now that the French are feeling pressed, the observable symbolic 
markers which help to differentiate those who are not ))French((, such 
as color and cultural appartenances such as dress, including girls' 
headscarves, help to identify those who are not as closely connected 
to the French national corporate body. 
The state which extended its borders during a colonial period, and 
which declared many of those subject peoples to be French, has 
helped to create the situation now in hand. With ))decolonizationcc, 
former colonial peoples have come to the metropole, and the French 
state now tries to regulate Frenchness through legal battles over such 
symbolic issues as the headscarves, or the attempt to impose the re- 
quirement to declare that you do indeed want to become a French 
citizen at the age of majority. 
It is necessary to say that the state is a construct of people, and it 
is people who manage the affairs of state. Much as has happened in 
America in the last hundred years, and in South Africa, residents of 
France are drawn into the debate about being French, or foreign, and 
all who live there, and who create public policy, begin to define 
themselves in terms of who they are, or are not. This construction of 
identity is, at base, just that; a construction, linked through language 
and thought to the symbolling and imaging powers which we all pos- 
sess, and worked out in various areas of human life, in economic re- 
lations and class divisions, through conflict and negotiation. 
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C o n c l u s i o n s  
Rather than argue that violence stems from our animal instincts, 
separated from reason, the result of some atavistic sense and emotion, 
I have argued that instead it is useful to turn this concept on its head. 
What if, instead, violence is actually a cultural construct, determined 
and directed by cultural categories, boundaries, and symbolling ac- 
tivities? There is increasing evidence that animals, both non-human 
primates and other mammals, indeed other non-mammals such as 
birds, may be capable of far more symbolic activity than Western- 
trained scientists had ever thought possible. Since not all animals are 
uniformly violent or aggressive, it is possible that such violence 
arises in particular situations. Economic constraints or overcrowding 
have been suggested, yet even such situations do not always lead to 
violence. State societies do seem to produce and reproduce violence 
in defence and maintenance of boundaries, in creation of nation- 
states. The creation of others, such as ethnic groups leads to such 
boundary creation, and to exclusion from participation. Violence 
leads to such creation of ethnicity and difference, and helps to insure 
separation. Violence leads to the construction, production, and repro- 
duction of cultural categories. 
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Roger Hewitt 
A d o l e s c e n c e ,  R a c i s m  a n d  V i o l e n c e  
i n  S o u t h  L o n d o n  
Background  
The course of adolescent racism in London over the past twenty 
years has been characterised by (1) a sharpening of the distinction 
between ethnically mixed urban locations on the one hand and very 
predominantly white urban locations on the other; (2) a sustained but 
limited influence from neo-fascist organisations; (3) a gradually ar- 
ticulated hostile response to anti-racist policies in schools and other 
contexts; (4) a sustained participation in racial violence; ( 5 ) a contin- 
ued sense of loss of sources of cultural identity amongst white 
working-class youth. This ad hoc collection of features is less unsys- 
tematic than it may seem. 
The sharp rise, during the late 1970's and early 1980s, in the per- 
centage of the population of African-Caribbean origin that was under 
the age of twenty, plus a particularly effervescent period of Carib- 
bean popular cultural production, provided one of the bases of black/ 
white youth solidarity in certain working-class areas of the capital, as 
well as in other cities in the U.K.. A localised, community-based anti- 
racism grew up amongst young people in many urban areas at that 
time, and inter-racial friendship, together with much conscious and 
unconscious cultural cross-influencing, became commonplace. As 
Gilroy and Lawrence put it, ))In many areas the culture and politics of 
working-class youth exhibits a seamless and organic fusion of Black 
and White sensibilities(( (1988, 141). This was culturally evident in 
the realms of musical affiliation, dress and language use, where both 
the direct and indirect impact of black adolescent speech forms was 
evident amongst working-class whites. Neither was this restricted to 
the mixing of white and African-Caribbean influences. In areas 
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where Turkish and Asian families had settled, similar, if less spec- 
tacular influences could be seen (Hewitt 1986; Jones 1988; Sebba 
1994; Rampton 1995). 
In these predominantly inner-city areas, the older, strong lines of 
insulation between cultures became eroded and transformed, creating 
an urban sociocultural landscape that was quite different from that of 
previous generations, of whatever ethnicity (Hewitt 1991; Hewitt 
1995). While the inner city was still being characterised by some 
policy makers, academics and journalists as a location of ))racial ten- 
sion((, it was in fact being transformed, so that while it was still true 
that many older white people, especially in the traditional working- 
class neighbourhoods, clung on to many of the ancient hostilities, the 
younger generations of whites found themselves increasingly at odds 
with their parents' generation. They had different social experiences 
from their parents, and partook in a different, vigorous and rapidly- 
developing multi-ethnic urban culture. 
Where this was not so was within white enclave areas in the inner 
city, particularly those parts of London, such as the docklands, where 
traditional white working-class communities had lost their economic 
base. Here, conununity closure, sometimes exacerbated by insensitive 
local authority housing policies, continued to be articulated around 
discourses of race and nation. Violent assaults on minorities and 
various forms of racial harassment were, and continue to be, endemic 
in the vicinity of such enclaves. 
Similarly, from the late 1960s onwards, suburban areas, tradi- 
tionally a site of middle-class settlement, became, along with the 
))new towncc developments in many parts of the country, a site of 
white working-class relocation from the inner city areas, and a sign 
of new social mobility. As ethnic minority families came to settle in 
what had previously been exclusively white inner city neighbour- 
hoods, suburbs and new towns became the destinations of ))white 
flightcc where working-class and middle-class racial discourses 
merged. Thus by the 1980s, although levels of racial harassment in 
ethnically mixed areas were numerically higher than elsewhere, it 
was often the predominantly white areas - enclaves, suburbs and 
))new townscc that were experienced as the most dangerous for mi- 
norities and proportionately the level of harassment and assault were 
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extremely high (wrench, Brar and Martin 1993; Hewitt 1992, 1996; 
Gordon 1990). 
If these demographic and cultural trends were one relevant di- 
mension of the racism that effected adolescents over this period, the 
politics of the racist political organisations was another. Neo-Fascist 
activism in the U.K. has been constant, if always limited in scale, 
since the 1930s. However, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, both the 
National Front and the openly Nazi ))British Movementcc made suc- 
cessful attempts to link racist politics to a skinhead youth cultural 
style, and to enlist the support of white youth. South London was es- 
pecially prominent with respect to recruitment to racist parties and 
groups during this period, including suburban areas. One strategy that 
was used by racist activists was to simply state the connection in 
stickers reading ))Skins Hate Wogs((. Another was to appeal to white 
male adolescents as victims of police unfairness. Thus, at a time 
when skinhead gang violence was at a peak, one leaflet distributed on 
the streets in the south east of the capital in 1979 showed a white boy 
being arrested by the police. It read: ))This boy wishes he was black(( 
and went on to assert that police gave preferential treatment to black 
youth. Such deliberate attempts at forging a necessary association 
between the skinheads and the far right were successful and racist 
political marches into the 1980s were characterised by a strong skin- 
head presence. Earlier phases of skinhead youth culture had not only 
been far less directly associated with racist politics but had actually 
been developed through a strong relation to the new urban black 
presence in music and dress codes (Hebdidge 1979). The early 1980s 
mark the high tide of the powerful symbolic association of skinhead 
style with racism and racist violence in the U.K. which was later to 
become part of the ))natural(( symbology of neo-fascism across 
Europe. 
A third strand in the context of adolescent racism, was the gradual 
articulation of a white ))backlash(( to anti-racist and multicultural 
policies as articulated through local government. This was evident 
primarily through the adult white population, but also had resonances 
amongst the young, From the 1970s onwards, local government 
gradually came to reflect the presence of ethnic minorities through 
the implementation of multicultural, anti-racist and equal opportuni- 
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ties policies in schools, housing, leisure services and other depart- 
ments, the creation of special units for racial equality, and the elabo- 
ration of various committees and posts having as their brief the inter- 
ests of the different minorities. Developments of these kinds were 
occurring over the same period in many parts of London and in other 
cities in the U.K. (Ball and Solomos 1990; Gilroy 1992; Solomos 
1993). These developments were both established and contested 
within a local politics transected not only by party lines, but also by 
the emergent political formations within the various ethnic commu- 
nities. 
There were two distinct phases to the backlash to these processes. 
The first was part of an onslaught by the Conservatives on left-wing 
local government, where resistance to the policies of central govern- 
ment during the Thatcher years were often most evident. In a conver- 
gence of different sets of political interests, during the 1980s many 
Labour local authorities were attacked through the right wing press 
and other channels, for a ))loony leftismcc that anti-racism in particu- 
lar came to symbolize. The budgets of politically active local au- 
thorities were cut and gradually the number of local authority units 
specifically dedicated to ethnic minority community issues, including 
racial harassment, dwindled almost to zero. 
While ))town hall anti-racism(( was also not without its critics on 
the left and from within an anti-racist perspective (Macdonald; Gil- 
roy), a second wave of popular white ))backlash(( has also become 
evident in some areas, which takes as its concern not only local gov- 
ernment equal opportunities policies, for example, but also putative 
police and media over-attention to racial incidents including racist 
assault. Events in the London Borough of Greenwich, in the south 
east, are characteristic of this trend. In 1991 a sixteen year old black 
boy was murdered by a gang of white youths in Thamesmead, a 
large, predominantly white housing estate bordering the river 
Thames. Following the murder a march was held organised by local 
black and anti-racist groups particularly concerned with the activities 
of the British National Party (BNP), the most prominent of the racist 
political groups currently active in the U.K., which had established a 
headquarters and ))bookshopcc in the London Borough of Bexley, just 
beyond the Greenwich border. The media attention received by these 
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events, including a television programme and a number of features in 
national newspapers, generated a great deal of resentment amongst 
whites in Thamesmead, who believed they were being characterised 
as extreme racists by association. At the same time the claim was 
repeatedly made that assaults on whites by blacks were ignored by 
the police and the media whilst those by whites on blacks were al- 
ways characterized as racist regardless of their nature (Hewitt 1992). 
This apparently trivial and local belief is in fact widely articulated 
and takes a variety of forms. It is interesting to note that it is also a 
version of the ))unfairness to whitescc theme evident in the British 
Movement leaflet of the late 1970s cited above. 
The ))unfairnesscc theme functions especially to deflect the need to 
address the issue of racial harassment and assault, especially in those 
parts of London where levels of racial attack are highest. According 
to police statistics, the London Boroughs of Tower Hamlets and 
Newham in the east end, and Greenwich in the south east have the 
highest levels of racial incidents in the capital (Metropolitan Police 
Performance Information Bureau). In each of these areas the theme of 
))unfairness(( to whites is commonly articulated across social class 
lines. The case of Greenwich, dubbed by the press ))the racist murder 
capital of the UKN, is particularly illuminating. 
G r e e n w i c h  - A C a s e  S t u d y  
Lying in the south east of the capital, the London Borough of Green- 
wich (LBG) extends from the inner city districts on the south side of 
the Thames, opposite the east-end docklands, southwards and east- 
ward to the more affluent suburbs. Of the total population of 
208.000, 117.000 inhabitants live within the waterfront wards, some 
of which have male unemployment levels of above 30%, reaching 
over 40% in some months. Overall unemployment stands at 14.9%, 
and over the last thirty years the area has seen a dramatic decline in 
manufacturing jobs available, from 33.000 in 1966 to just over 6.000 
today (Source: Department of Employment). The local economy is 
severely depressed. Average earnings in Greenwich are low even for 
those in employment. In April 1993 average male earnings were £90. 
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per week lower in Greenwich than in its neighbouring inner city bor- 
oughs to the west. (Source: New Earnings Survey 1990 - 1993) A 
recent study, Breadline Greenwich 1994, showed that 26% of Green- 
wich residents lived in households with an income of less than 
£5.000 pa. in 1993. 
Immigrants from what was then called the British Commonwealth 
began to arrive in the early 1950s when people from south Asia -
mainly Jat Sikhs - also began to settle in small communities in parts 
of the borough. Gujerati small traders and Sikh artisans from East 
Africa followed in the late 1960s. According to the 1991 census, 
4.2% of the population (32.1% of the ethnic minority population) de- 
scribe their ethnic origin as Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi. By the 
early 1980s people from the Caribbean constituted another distinct 
minority and now comprise 2.5% of the population (19.7% of the 
ethnic minority population). Other groups, from Vietnam and So- 
malia and other parts of Africa, also make up the borough's 12.8% 
ethnic minority population. The remaining 87.2% are white. 
Today the ethnic minority population is most strongly represented 
in the wards to the north and north east of the borough, where the 
percentage of minorities ranges from 20% to above 30%. These fig- 
ures (drawn from 1991 census data) do not include many of the 8.000 
refugees living in Greenwich, since the number of refugees, espe- 
cially those from Somalia, has grown considerably over the past four 
years. The wards in the south and in parts of the west are very pre- 
dominantly white, with ethnic minority populations as small as 2.5% 
- 5%. Many of these white majority neighbourhoods contain low-rent 
housing estates that were developed by the ,council during the 1920s, 
1930s and 50s. An initially well-meant but ultimately discriminatory 
housing allocation policy designed to nurture community through 
kinship - the ))sons and daughterscc policy - which continued until 
very recently, resulted, however, in such estates remaining almost 
exclusively white. The distinctly ))whitecc areas constitute a social 
mixture of redbrick, working-class homes and suburban mock-Tudor 
middle-class residences. The appearance is often pure suburban, the 
reality more complex. These areas have been the site of some of the 
worst instances of racial violence in the borough. 
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While the precise breakdown of racial incidents varies from year 
to year, the 199415 annual report of the Greenwich Action Committee 
Against Racial Attacks (GACARA), a monitoring group sponsored 
by the borough Council, provides tables showing that in the year 
from June 1994 to May 1995 there were a total of 265 racial attacks 
within the borough, 39.6% of these being against African Caribbeans 
and 32.8% against people of Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi ori- 
gin, with the remainder divided mainly between the various refugee 
groups such as the Vietnamese and Somali communities. Approxi- 
mately 75% of all racial assaults took place on or near to the low-rent 
public housing estates provided by the local housing authority. These 
assaults were in addition to other racial incidents such as threats of 
violence, racist abuse, graffiti, damage to property, etc. Even the 
monitoring unit of the police division serving that part of the borough 
containing the highest number of ethnic minority people recorded 
and investigated four hundred racial incidents of varying degrees of 
seriousness during 1994. 
While the largest number of racial attacks in Greenwich occur in 
those neighbourhoods with the largest ethnic minority population, 
proportional to the size of the minority populations in particular 
wards, neighbourhoods which are very predominantly white but with 
high levels of deprivation also feature conspicuously. These white 
majority areas were also the location of the most serious cases of 
violent racial assault. The murder, by stabbing, of the black teenager 
Rolan Adams 1991 mentioned above was followed by two more, 
those of Rohit Dugal in 1992 and Steven Lawrence 1993, in each 
case by gangs of white male adolescents in the age range 16 - 23 
years. Indeed the ward in which the last two of these murders were 
committed ranks amongst the highest on the Poverty and Social Dep- 
rivation Index for Greenwich but is flanked on several sides by other 
predominantly white wards ranking the lowest. 
Despite the above average levels of unemployment, low earnings 
amongst some groups, and poor housing quality in some wards, so- 
cial and economic conditions in the borough as a whole are by no 
means the worst in London and can not be equated in any simple or 
direct way with the borough's high levels of racial assault and har- 
assment. A number of London boroughs have far worse profiles in all 
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of these respects but without such high levels of racial harassment. 
Neither can the correlation be made on the smaller scale of ward and 
sub-ward level. A number of factors are likely to be at work against 
the backdrop of social and economic conditions. These may include, 
for example, community relations derived from the specific demo- 
graphic and historical features of the white and minority communi- 
ties, promoting racism differentially across a range of social bases 
family, adolescent peer-group, work place, school etc. They may also 
include the processes by which wider ideological issues become arti- 
culated within the local political order. 
In addition to these features, it is also of significance that the 
headquarters of the extreme racist organisation, the British National 
Party (BNP), is located just a mile or two beyond the Greenwich bor- 
der. This organisation has links with other European white suprema- 
cist political groups and with similar groups in the U.S.A.. Race-hate 
stickers and posters produced by the U.S.-based ))White Aryan Resis- 
tancecc and by an openly Nazi group based in Lincoln, Nebraska, have 
appeared in recent times on the streets of Greenwich. The BNP also 
has strong links, and to some extent an overlapping membership, with 
terrorist organisations in the U.K., particularly with a British terrorist 
organisation, ))Combat 18cc, which has been responsible for a number 
of vicious attacks on ethnic minorities, on academics and profes- 
sionals working in the race field, and on various political opponents. 
The BNP has been publicly active in Greenwich since establishing its 
headquarters in 1991 and has put up candidates for election in local 
Council elections in Greenwich and elsewhere in London - including 
once successfully, if only temporarily, just over the Thames in Tower 
Hamlets in 1993. 
R a c i s m  a m o n g s t  W h i t e  A d o l e s c e n t s  
Adolescent racism in the LBG has been recorded since at least the 
early 1970s when immigrants from the New Commonwealth were 
even fewer in number. By the late 1970s recruitment to racist politi- 
cal organisations, such as the National Front and the British Move- 
ment, and informal affiliation to those groups, was particularly 
Adolescence, Racism and Violence in South London 
prominent amongst young people in the borough and was closely as- 
sociated with skinhead youth-cultural style. There were many skin- 
head gangs in the area at that time and the LBG was the site of the 
most successful national recruitment to the neo-nazi British Move- 
ment. In addition to skinhead racist politics, there was also a strong 
strand of quotidian racism that eschewed both political association 
with racist political groups and skinhead stylisties. This was less 
visible but may constitute the more enduring type of racism in the 
borough, growing, as it appeared to do, out of working-class co-
nununity closure and embedded within a long history of local class 
identity formation (Roediger 1991; 1994). Woolwich, the adminis- 
trative centre of the borough, was an important town in the early de- 
velopment of the co-operative and labour movements in the south of 
England around the turn of the century and subsequently (Crossick 
1979; Hewitt 1986). 
The recent upsurge in racist activity in the borough bears traces of 
both of these histories, although skinhead style per se is for the most 
part absent. Racist graffiti in the borough commonly demonstrates a 
symbolic allegiance to the BNP, although actual membership and ac- 
tivism amongst young people is low. In the predominantly white ar- 
eas recent graffiti includes ))Kill All Blacks((, as well as the insignia 
of political groups, ))BNP(c, nNF((, ))KKK(( and on defiled grave- 
stones in the parish church-yard, a drawing of a masked skinhead in 
Nazi salute beside the inscription: ))BRITISH ARIAN RACE AND 
NATION((. Other inscriptions give a less ideologized message: 
))WATCH OUT COONS, your now ENTERING ELTHAMN. 
Other public evidence of popular racism resides in the large num- 
ber of racist jokes that are in circulation amongst young people, as 
well as school-yard rhymes, particularly about Pakistani and Indian 
shopkeepers. There is also a virulent strain of ))nigger jokes(( similar 
in kind to those still circulating on the internet and emanating from 
Michigan (The Guardian: April 30th, 1994) There is no evidence of 
any direct connection to the internet source, but the kind of humour is 
certainly recognisable. It serves to project black people as cultural 
anti-matter and appears to link into the crediting of black people with 
bestiality and the origins of AIDS. 
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While formal recruitment of the young to racist political groups 
very low, in certain parts of the borough the initials of racist political 
groups, such as the BNP and the NF, are consistently used by young 
people to map out a territory as distinctly a ))white areacc. While it 
would be a mistake to account for adolescent racism by reducing it to 
the expression of some form of territorialism, either innate or 
learned, very clear articulations of territoriality are evident in both 
what young people say about issues of race and ethnicity, and of how 
certain neighbourhoods are marked out with graffiti of different 
kinds. Although this may seem to share something of the characteris- 
tics of, say, football club fan tribalisms which are also often mapped 
onto a territorial base, to reduce it to just another manifestation of 
this aspect would be to misconceive the nature of racism and its abil- 
ity to integrate with various sociocultural processes. Probably of far 
wider significance is the way in which local community itself has 
been eroded in recent years, especially insofar as this has a bearing 
on the life trajectories of young men - the primary perpetrators of 
racial violence. 
Locality, community, neighbourhood combine geographical, so-
cial and imaginary elements in ways which function differently for 
different groups. For young men from working-class areas in particu- 
lar, and to a lesser extent for young women also, conununity has 
meant something very specific at the economic level: a network of 
kinship and friendship associations that can provide an informational 
resource with resect to jobs, training, housing, buying and selling, 
and other activities within the ))black economy((. This informal econ- 
omy, particularly with regard to employment and training - with fa- 
thers, uncles, brothers etc. - within a relatively stable ecology of 
small businesses in such domains as the construction and transport 
industries, has been drastically eroded, particularly since the near 
collapse of the housing market. Where once formal and informal ap- 
prenticeships would have come on-stream for boys even from their 
early teens onwards, now not only has the old formal apprenticeship 
system been abandoned but the web of contacts and associations that 
provided the basis for informal tutelage has been decimated. Where 
once negative attitudes to schooling and to the ))need to prepare for 
the world of employment(( as it was characterised within secondary 
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education, were regularly vindicated by the ability of young men to 
find jobs and training through their own informal associations, now 
the old ))school refusingcc attitudes persist but are no longer supported 
by any independently-fuelled material success. Male adolescents are 
left with the rhetories and attitudes of previous generations, but time, 
and the economy, has moved on leaving' them stranded. 
))Communitycc has let them down as material provider and exists now 
as ))localitycc, with boundaries but with little internal social coher- 
ence. These boundaries are, of course, readily racialized. 
It is here in particular that the ))white backlashcc evident in middle- 
class discourses as much as working-class ones becomes especially 
salient. Here, the voice of white working-class adolescents seeking to 
drown out the protests of the black minorities with regard to the ra- 
cism they experience, articulates with the racialized struggles over 
the local political order conducted by parts of the middleclass local 
electorate. Both a party-based and non-party articulation of the view 
that ))too much attentioncc is given to minority issues, serves to com- 
bine with other voices in the discourse of unfairness that forms a 
serious obstacle to the redress of racial harassment and assault. 
A11 of these local processes have been particularly relevant to the 
bifurcation of adolescent ))race relationscc in south London in general 
in recent years. On the one hand white enclaves have developed a 
consistent and sometimes virulent strain of racism that is especially 
focused amongst the young. On the other hand a newly emergent, 
multicultural and commonly evident cultural hybridity have come to 
dominate the inner city socio-scape, infusing social relationships, es- 
pecially amongst the young, with a new flexibility and potential 
creativity. To the latter may be attributed a kind of spontaneous and 
culturally encoded anti-racism inherent in the very lack of vigilance 
along potential cultural and social boundaries. To the former mnay be 
attributed its reverse: an obstinate racialization of social and geo- 
graphical boundaries, a forlorn re-iteration of moribund attitudes and 
rhetories. Both exist within the same set of crude economic indicators 
unemployment and wage levels, etc. - and both suffer from much the 
same degree of social insecurity. But while the cultural and social 
mixing of inner city life both reflects and contributes to the global 
trend towards flexibility, change and the flowing distribution of cul- 
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tural elements through numerous diasporas, the boundary vigilance of 
the enclave cultures reflect a hopeless, backward-looking order that is 
imprisoning the young in a spiral of cultural vacuity. Violence in 
general and racial violence in particular is one of the most obvious 
manifestations of this condition. 
Thus although racial violence amongst adolescents in south Lon- 
don has maintained consistently high levels over the past twenty 
years, the social, economic and cultural conditions that have pro- 
duced these have not remained the same. Furthermore, as the severity 
of racial attacks has worsened in some areas, elsewhere good ))race 
relations(( have developed in parallel, creating an implicit critique of 
purely economistic accounts of racism and its spread. (The ))riotscc in 
many British cities in the early 1980s, it will be remembered, wit- 
nessed, in a way quite unanticipated by the sociologies of both race 
and youth, black and white adolescents side by side against the po- 
lice. This black and white ))brotherhood of despaircc was attributed to 
))unemployment(( with the same readiness that ))unemployment(( is 
also trundled in to simplistically explain racism itself.) Hope, in this 
situation, resides, therefore, not in structural miracles but in super- 
structural energy. The very fact of cultural variation in the manifes- 
tations of racism and racial violence lend a certain urgency and op- 
timism to new strategies for countering adolescent racism through 
mass youth anti-racist movements, through imaginative youth work 
programmes, and through a relentless commitment to inter-cultural 
and anti-racist educational programmes. 
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> ) E p i s o d i c a l  C o m m u n i t y  o f  F a t e < <  

a n d  Y o u t h  V i o l e n c e :  

A  Q u a l i t a t i v e  A n a l y s i s  o f  H o o l i g a n  G r o u p s  

Since sociologists began taking deviant and violent behavior of 
young people as a topic of empirical research (Thrasher 1927, Shaw 
1930), two features have always been emphasized: the episodic char- 
acter of juvenile delinquency (among others: Matza 1964) and the 
importance of the peer group in this context. There exist nonetheless, 
as has been commented upon in past years, no theoretical models 
explaining the episodic character1. 
As we were able to show in our study this is dependent mainly on 
the fact that the specific problem of the adolescent development in 
young workers, the group appearing most often in the crime statistics, 
has until now hardly been taken into consideration. The reason for 
this in the area of criminology, is that the labeling-approach, which 
can be very fruitful when taken on a paradigmatic-theoretical level, 
limits itself in the discussion in Germany to an analysis of the agen- 
cies of social control2. A remarkable gap is also to be seen in social 
research on juveniles in the area concerning adolescent development 
of either young workers or young adults from ))less well educated(( 
population groups. This is true too for those studies specializing in 
the phenomenona of youth violence3. Also to be seen in this regard is 
the central role played by the peer group in the emergence of deviant 
behavior in young people and more importantly, in the readiness to 
commit violence. This has been empirically verified but remains 
theoretically poorly explained. 
These particular theoretical weaknesses are due primarily to the 
fact that the importance of the practice of collective behavior in re- 
gards to the process of socialisatoric interaction has, until1 now, 
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hardly been taken into consideration. Howard S. Becker already had 
put the practice of collective behavior in to the center of empirical 
analysis in his study ))Outsiders((. He emphasized, ))Instead of the 
deviant motives leading to the deviant behaviour, it is the other way 
around, the deviant behaviour in time produces the deviant motiva- 
tion(( (Becker 1963,42). 
The practical accomplishment of everyday activities beyond or 
below utilitarian motives and intentions has gained a new and central 
importance in the current theoretical discussion (from the ))praxeo- 
logical epistemology(( of Bourdieu to the category of ))practical con- 
sciousnesscc according to Giddens 1984). A valid methodical access 
to the practice of activity accomplishment is required for a successful 
application of these concepts. This access can be gained through the 
methodologically based procedures of the qualitative or ))reconstruc- 
tivecc social research (see Bohnsack 1993). 
Using the concepts of ))habitual activity(( and ))habitual concor- 
dance((, which we have been developed in our empirical analysis, we 
worked out processes of socialization and of the emergence of 
))habitual elements of stylecc in peer groups. 
Central to our study are groups of Hooligans from the former East 
and West Berlins, which were compared with rockbands, with an 
inconspicuous group, and with a group of potentially violent leftist 
youth from the former East Berlin4. One of the reasons for doing this 
was to avoid the premature identification of the peculiarities in orien- 
tation and conspicuous biographical features of the young workers as 
being constitutive elements of a ))criminal career((, but rather to es- 
tablish them in general theoretical design of socialization in peer 
groups of young workers. 
It is then possible to work out in comparative analysis the unique 
biographical conditions which lead to specific practical actions in the 
adolescent development, such as violent behavior. It can be shown 
that, the much discussed thesis of milieu-specific desintegration, al- 
though not false, is too general and one dimensional. 
As our results show, experiences of milieu-specific desintegration 
or of ))habitual insecurity(( are dealt with in very different ways. Of 
great importance here is, among other things, how far communication 
within the family goes toward provision of conditions for (meta-) 
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communicative coping with orientation problems and for the devel- 
opment of personal identity. 
T h e o r e t i c a l  Founda t ions ,  Me thodo logy  and Me thods  
According to Becker, one of the founders of the labeling-approach, 
the analysis of the definition processes of the agencies of social con- 
trol was still connected with the analysis of the daily practices of 
those, whose activities these definitions are focused on5. These areas 
are currently dealt with in isolation without sufficient reference to 
each other. Criminology in Germany deals, as mentioned earlier, 
mainly with the analysis of the everyday activities of the agencies 
involved in social control. 
In prominent german studies about youth violence on the other 
hand, the systemic importance of the potential for deviance and vio- 
lence due to the intervention through these agencies and through 
isolation pressure from the general public is given insufficient con- 
sideration. Generally one finds an ))objectivisticcc access to social 
reality in these studies. This means that ))objectivecc social reality is 
dealt with as a phenomenon analysed seperately from the ))sub- 
jective(( experience. So, for example, Heitmeyer (1992) differentiates 
))potentials of desintegrationcc from ))experiences of desintegrationcc 
whereby the former are considered objective and thus not open to 
empirical examination, which is only applied to the latter, the 
))experiences of desintegrationcc. It is also found in studies like those 
by Heitmeyer et al. (1992), which represent themselves as ))quali- 
tativecc, that this aspect, qualitative analysis, is often equated with the 
analysis of the ))subjective((. Here we find that, through this ))key 
epistemological differencecc (Matthes 1992) between ))objective re- 
ality(( and ))subjective experiencecc in the process of empirical re- 
search, a tacit presupposal takes place concerning what those being 
studied can experience or in which framework an empirical analysis 
of these experiences is to take place. This categorical framework is 
then not thoroughly theoretically explicated and, more importantly, 
the milieu-specific preconceptions of the researchers themselves be- 
come integrated in its conceptualization of that framework. In doing 
so a privileged access to social reality is claimed without it having 
been methodologically legitimated. 
In the sociology of knowledge developed by Karl Mannheim, in 
discourse with among others, Marx and Durkheim, this ))key episte- 
mological differencecc (and the objectivism attached to it) has become 
obsolete. This is due to the fact that social ))existencecc, social posi- 
tioning finds its place not outside of the experience of those being 
studied, but from the onset can only be constituted through the mu- 
tual aspects of the biographical experience of the practical actions, of 
the socialization history, and in general of common fate. And it can 
only then become empirically tangible. Mannheim (1982) was espe- 
cially interested in not limiting the analysis of collectivity, of collec- 
tive representations to its being done in terms of their ))reificationcc as 
in the sense of Durkheim. Belonging to the same milieu, to the same 
generation for example, means then integration in a common nexus 
of experiences, in a))conjunctive experiential communitiycc or in a 
))conjunctive experiential spacecc (Mannheim 1982, 194). An analysis 
of social environment in this sense always means an analysis of (col- 
lective) biographies, of common ))sediments of experiencecc (for this 
conception of milieu see also Bohnsack 1993). 
Those sharing conjunctive experience need not neccessarily live 
together as a group. Using the ))nexus of generationcc as a conjunctive 
experiential space as an example, Mannheim has shown, that it is 
formed by a common sediment of experience, based on common ex- 
periences of particular historical events and developments in the 
practical action. And this without direct communication between 
those connected through these common experiences and belonging 
thusly to the same generation. But these generation- and milieu-spe- 
cific collective experiences and orientations are articulated in a 
comprehensive manner only when those having these experiences in 
common come together, for instance, in peer groups. 
The empirical access to the process of coming to terms with ex- 
periences and problems and to the process of socialization in the peer 
group presupposes a detailed reconstruction of the discourses during 
which the articulations took place. Because of this we prefer the 
method of group discussion (see Bohnsack 1996) in addition to that 
of the ))narrative interviewcc and participant observation. The analysis 
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is based on new methods of text interpretation (see Bohnsack et al. 
1995 and Bohnsack 1993). 
In our study, which was financed by the DFG (Deutsche For- 
schungsgerneins~haft)~,we dealt with intensive case analysis of more 
than 60 peer groups. The results reported here are based mainly on 
four cases from the Hooligan Scene in Berlin. These cases were 
submitted to a comparative analysis as follows; one group belonging 
to the Hooligan hardcore in the former East Berlin, one consisting of 
peripheral members of this group, one consisting of the girlfriends of 
the hardcore members, and one consisting of Hooligans from the 
former West Berlin. The hardcore group from a satellite town on the 
edge of the former East Berlin was, as mentioned earlier, compared 
with other groups of young workers from the same district7. 
In favor of a presentation of our results, I will now go no further 
into the explication of the theoretical and methodological backrounds 
of our research, which are based in the Chicago School, the labeling- 
approach and the sociology of knowledge by Mannheim, particularly 
the ))documentary method(( (see Mannheim 1952a, Bohnsack 1992 
and 1995)g. 
First some general remarks on the adolescent development in 
young workers. In so doing I would also like to refer to the results of 
an earlier studyg. 
Gene ra l  Fea tu re s  o f  Ado le scen t  Deve lopmen t  in 
Young  Worke r s  
There appear with the passage from school to job and the first expe- 
riences relating to working life problems concerning orientation and 
the meaning of life. This causes the young people to experience more 
or less a crisis, mainly because they are so little prepared for this 
transition. In order to understand this it is necessary to look more 
carefully at the specific structure and temporal character of young 
workers biographical orientations and prospects in life. These are 
little influenced through a practical orientation in regards to an insti- 
tutionalized pattern of training and career. Of much more importance 
is an orientation in reference to the more intimate aspects of envi- 
ronment-specific life, such as the neighborhood, the quarter, the af- 
finity with their experiential spaces of a common daily life and the 
cyclic activities connected with them. 
The challenge of the search for habitual concordance presents it- 
self everywhere where an uninterrupted integration into such com- 
munities, such ))habitual concordancescc, into the milieuspecific eve- 
ryday activities is missing. The search is not primarily theoretical or 
reflexive, but is realized, and this is crucial to understanding it, 
through spontaneous practical actions, in other words through action-
isms.There where a commonality of the history of socialization is 
only partially present, it is, so to speak, produced. Commonality pro- 
duced in this way, be it that of making of music, or that of fighting, 
connects through its development of a history of social interaction, 
even if this is episodical. This is due to the common experiences of 
depending on each other, of confronting danger, and of a c collective 
effervescencecc in the sense of Durkheim. 
An understanding of these processes of socialization based in 
collective actionisms presupposes an ambitious theoretical concep- 
tion of the practice of action, which altliough it is not to be under- 
stood as primarily intentional and therefore rule or norm oriented, is 
none the less regulari0. 
The socialisatoric interaction is grounded in the practice of and 
the search for habitual concordance, through the means of actionism. 
The rock groups in the study serve as an example of a specific type of 
collective actionism. 1 would like to now refer to them before later 
taking up the Hooligans. 
S e e k i n g  fo r  Hab i tua l  C o n c o r d a n c e  

The  Rock Groups  

In regards to the rock groups we can speak of an ))aesthetic action- 
ismcc. The attempt at the development of collective elements of style, 
sometimes with a minimum of musical or technical training, is not a 
product of intention or one resulting from theoretical ideas or de- 
signs. Researchers questions concerning theoretical or reflexive in- 
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tentions in their own music productions were always firmly denied or 
answered ironically. 
Habitual concordance results from the process of ))makingcc itself, 
and leads, if hindered, to a new constellation within the group or to a 
move to another group. The change in groups is in this respect not 
accidental or chaotic but rather one that follows the inherent laws of 
development through trial and the development of a collective habi- 
tus. Collective actionism is the medium which allows for testing how 
far and in what respect the personal elements of style may be con- 
densed and intensified into a collective style. This creats an orienta- 
tion framework and thereby security regarding decisions in daily life, 
for instance in the search for a partner. This environment-specific 
way of dealing with the problems of adolescence appears, therefore, 
to be immanently ))rational(( and can not be characterized, for exam- 
ple, as a ))magiccc solution, even though ritually produced and thusly 
far removed from any intentional rationalisml1. 
The concern here is much more one of establishing a positive un- 
derstanding and concept of ritual action, which is missing in sociol- 
ogy (see criticism by Douglas 1970). This again is due to weaknesses 
in the theoretical and methodological conceptualization of practical 
action. 
The collective and ritually produced actionism of music produc- 
tion as a medium for the search for aesthetic-stylistic orientation pre- 
supposes a relatively high level of organization and communicative 
coordination, these being based on a trusting reciprocity of perspec- 
tives. 
This though appears precarious in the Hooligans, the other groups 
that we intensively studied. 
Ep i sod ica l  Communi ty  o f  Fa t e :  The  Hoo l igans  
Collective actionism as observable by the hooligans assumes hat 
might be called planlessness, this being not the organizational form 
seen with the band but rather one of the ))mob((, as the youths them- 
selves put it. The football riot is paradigmatic for the mobilization of 
the ))mob((. The activities of the ))mob(( are organised in a rudimen- 
Ralf Bohnsack 
tary, hierarchical way by well known and ))fight provencc identifica- 
tion figures, who are always looking for the ))fightcc (the english term 
is used by the german youth) and this preferably with other hooli- 
gans. The fight has primarily the function of entanglement in the 
compulsions of a ))situative actionismcc. It is the self initiating and 
unanticipatable dramaturgy in the fight situation, with its trajectory 
like nature, and the resulting dependence of the fighters that consti- 
tute an elementary form of collectivity, an episodal community of 
fate. We find similar phenomenons, though under other conditions, in 
sports or among combatants at the front. 
The personal identity, with its premise of freedom from bodily 
harm, retreats behind the focus on collective actionism and becomes 
reconstituted, also in its group specific attributes, through this and 
through the resulting episodical community of fate. The momentum 
of the process defies utilitaristic control and produces ))secondary 
motivescc12. 
The subordination of personal identity as well as its newly pro- 
duced form in relation to the group point out the precarious nature of 
the previous biography and identity. 
The aim at the same time is that of severing the ties to the every- 
day existence, to be somehow catapulted, at least on the weekend, out 
of the everyday and the workaday. ))To switch off from lifecc, ))to 
break the rythmcc are the metaphors that the youths use to describe 
what we call ))episodical negation of everyday existencecc13. The ac- 
tionism gains its function through the emergence of an episodical 
community of fate while at the same time serving as an episodical 
negation of everyday existence. A utilitaristic orientation towards 
victory over the opponent or even to his destruction takes it place at 
the rear. It is rather, at least among Hooligans, a readiness for 
gradually formed and lasting friendship ())Freundschaftsbereit-
schaftcc), formed through the fight and through beating on each other 
0)Sich Klatschencc), that is the aimed for, as paradox as it may seem. 
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T h e  P r e c a r i o u s  C h a r a c t e r  o f  R u l e s  and  t h e  

Rec ip roc i ty  o f  Pe r spec t ives  

It is based on this understanding of the fight, of the rules of fairness 
(the ))fair fight(() then that the rules of reciprocity are gradually es- 
tablished. They are extracted from the narrations and descriptions by 
the Hooligans and formulated finally in an comprehensible fashion. It 
is through these rules of fairness, their own fightworthiness and the 
resulting comradeship ())Kameradschaftcc), that the hardcore mem- 
bers; i.e. identification figures, of the group distinguish themselves 
from the ))mob(( and establish their claim to leadership over it. 
Therein lies the importance of the initiation of learning processes re- 
garding rules and reciprocity for this particular peer group. The rules 
of reciprocity remain precarious when the encounters involve other 
than Hooligans. In contacts for instance, with ))leftists((, the rules of 
fairness are paid little attention. The youths are well aware of this 
discrepancy. 
The precarious nature of the reciprocity of perspectives14 can also 
be observed in the establishment of intimate relationships between 
the Hooligans and their girlfriends, with whom we also carried out a 
group discussion. A habitual concordance on the level of situative 
actionisms is here too the precarious basis, which shows itself in 
))getting a crush(( or being ))randycc. If this basis no longer exists then 
there occurs a radical reversal into ))disgust((. 
Communica t ion  With in  t h e  Fami ly  
The, analysis of biographical interviews allows for insights into the 
background of the history of socialization. Firstly regarding the fam- 
ily; the difficulty as regards the history of socialization does not lie in 
the fact that the families, seen from the outside, are no longer intact. 
This particular problem is observable not only with the Hooligans but 
in the other groups as well. It is not for example the suicide of the 
father or the divorce of the parents as such which present a problem. 
It lies much more in the silence surrounding the father's suicide or the 
divorce that has already taken place. Assurance of continuity on the 
reflexive level is needed where there has been a break, often related 
to the loss of milieu-specific security, in the continuity of family life. 
This can take place on the level of a communication in particular 
about the individuals childhood history in relation to the family. It is 
significant that references to this type of communication are missing 
from the biographical interviews with the Hooligans. Such an ))eli- 
mination of the family-related childhood historycc becomes especially 
apparent in a comparative analysis with the rock groups where 
detailed narratives about childhood are to be found. This loss of com- 
municative understanding in the families. of the Hooligans is found 
not only in cases of compulsory authoritarian interaction ())the total 
pressurecc) but also the socialization mode of ))unconditional per- 
missivenesscc ())everything was served to me on a silver plattercc). An 
experiential space for communicative bargaining about principles and 
borders is unlikely to develop in either case. 
P rovoca t ion  and the  Expe r i ence  o f  Soc i e ty  
a s  a To ta l  In s t i t u t i on  
It is the non-open communication that has become a problem for the 
young people. And the provocation in public is a reaction to the ex- 
perience of such non-open communication. The aim of provocation is 
to establish which (moral) principles and destinctions ))actually(( or 
))reallycc are behind the actions of others. This does not occur though 
through some sort of understanding concerning rules and principles 
but rather through the use of actionism to force the other to take a 
position. It concerns a ))character contestcc as Goffman (1972) has 
called it. 
Emblems and stylistic presentations are also chosen for their pro- 
vocative nature. The young people during the ))GDR(( times for ex- 
ample presented themselves as fans of the Berlin Football Club 
(BFC), which in those days was known as a ))Stasi Clubcc 
(Stasi=State Security Police), in order to provoke those opposed to 
the Stasi. At the same time they had adopted the Skinhead outfit in 
order to shock the real fans of BSc or as it was, the Stasi itself. Dur- 
ing ))GDR(( times the young people from ))East Berlincc concentrated 
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their provocations on testing those who they considered to have a 
))double standard((, on testing the the ))squarescc (SpieRer) and the 
))narrow minded(( (Schichtler). Double standard here means among 
other things, that hidden behind an emphasis on efficiency and dis- 
cipline there lies political conformity (in school for instance). This is 
an essential part of of the ))total pressurecc experienced by the youth. 
Society appears then as completely institutionalized. ))Society is like 
the army(( is what is said in the group discussion, with the english 
term ))army (( being used. 
D o u b l e  S t i g m a t i z a t i o n  - I m p r i s o n m e n t  a n d  t h e  

C o n s o l i d a t i o n  o f  t h e  H o o l i g a n  C a r e e r  

It was just this double standard that was used to strike back against 
the youth and their provocative reaction to the double standard and 
the ))total pressure((. The provocation was not only disciplinarily 
stigmatized and criminalized but simultaneously politicized in a way 
that was at the time unpenetrable. This double stigmatization created 
alienation and a trajectory of marginalization. As in the case of Arno, 
one of the hard core members of the East Berlin Hooligan scene, 
who, as a consequence of having been involved in a village brawl at 
the age of 16, not only was labeled a ))youthful violent offendercc but 
also as ))an opponent of the state((. As a result he was sent to a maxi- 
mum security prison rather than a juvenile hall of detention. In con- 
nection with further provocative confrontations with the authorities 
he took the description ))rightistcc and eventually ))nazicc as used by 
others and used them as a stylistic reference to himself. As he says in 
the biographical interview; ))at the time of the second trial at the lat- 
est you say to yourself: )okay so you're calling me a nazi, then I am 
one, so what do you expect, anyway?( Yeah, to shock all those peo- 
ple, just sitting therecc. 
At a certain point of alienation there appears a provocative self 
incrimination. It is here the last remaining possibility to preserve 
elements of autonomy and self determination, and also therefore of 
dignity. This has already been recognized by David Matza (1964). 
The ))turning pointcc or tearing down of the wall ())Wendecc) was not 
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seen as a trigger for orientation crises but as an opening of the way 
for the potential enactment of already existing orientation crises. This 
potential occurred because of the temporary paralysis on the part of 
the agencies of social control, because of the so called ))control vac- 
uum(( and because of the new legal situation. 
The situational actionisms and provocations of the Hooligans are 
hardly understandable within the framework of political conviction, 
ideologies, or theories. They are much more, as we have seen, politi- 
cal self presentations and emblems in the service of provocation and 
situational actionism, and the resulting episodal community of fate. 
This means then, that when the situational actionism loses its funtion 
due to progress in the adolescent development ,it suddenly appears 
))totally senselesscc to have been such a ))rightest idiot((. That is what 
is heard at the age of 19 in a group on the fringes of the Hooligan 
scene; at the end therefore of a crisis filled phase of adolesent devel- 
opment, a phase that we found in various forms in all groups of 
young workers. We labeled it the ))phase of negation((. The Hooligans 
in the hardcore, on the other hand, although older, have still not 
completed this phase. The reasons for this become clear when the 
two groups are compared in respect to their socialization histories. 
Although reports about delinquent behavior are similar in both 
groups, only members of the hardcore have prison experience. These 
experiences of inprisonment, in particular those of coerced sexual 
relations with other inmates, are characterized in group discussions 
as an extreme loss of personal integrity and identity. These experi- 
ences become even more important when considered in regard to the 
socialization history in that they consolidate the attitude that fighting 
is the basis for development of sociality and belonging rather than 
communication based on the acknowledgement of perspective, of 
personal identity, and of the uniqueness of the person. At the same 
time in the group discussions the prison stay becomes a central proof, 
a privileged experience with which the hardcore members explicitly 
legitimize their claim to leadership. All of this binds them to a Hooli- 
gan career. 
It is thusly the official stigmatization, taken over as provocative 
self identification as rightist or as nazi, and also the consequences of 
imprisonment that are decisive, not only in the intensity of the Hooli- 
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gan career, but also in the hinderance or prevention of its discon- 
tinuation. 
Notes 
1 	 See critically: Mariak and Schumann (1992), also Peters (1985) The ))episodal(c 
character of juvenile delinquency also has been pointed out with respect to GDR 
society by Lekschas et al. (1983) Young males, especially working ones, are 
overrepresented in a specific age-group 0)Heranwachsendecc: late adolescence, 
18-21 yrs.) in the statistics of the police and justice. They are convicted 2 112 
times more often than the average population. 
2 Schumann (1994, 242) remarks: ))When critical criminologists deal with vio- 

lence, then preferably with the discourse about it, not with the activity itselfi(. 

3 98.8% of criminal offences and violent offences against foreigners were catego- 

rized as group-offences (in the representative study of Willems et al. (1993) ). 

4 	 The groups of young female workers are not in themselves a topic of research in 
our study on Berlin. Integrated in our research, however, there was a group of 
Hooligan girlfriends. One of the rock groups and one group with strong family 
ties had in each case a young female member. 
5 The access to the level of practical action was dealt with by Becker in a convinc- 
ing way but there was some confusion concerning the theoretical-categorical 
definition. In a later edition of ))Outsiderscc an added chapter 10 could still only 
insufficiently clarify the issue. It is necessary to differentiate fundamentally be- 
tween communicative (intentional) and habitutal action. 
6 The precise title of the project is: ))Entwicklungs- and milieutypische Ausgren- 
zungs- und Kriminalisierungserfahrungen in Gruppen Jugendlichercc. For a more 
comprehensive report of the results see: Bohnsack~Loos/Schaeffer/St5idtlerlWild 
(1995). 
7 Comparative analysis gains in importance when seen in terms of our method not 
only on the basis of its production of concepts of typification, but also in the 
sense of a methodical control of the ))bonds of standpointcc concerning the (social 
environment- specific) perspective of our own interpretations. 
The ))positions bondscc ())Standortgebundenheitcc)of interpretation in the sense of 
Karl Mannheim (1991) means, seen methodologically, the dependence of inter- 
pretation from the (experiential bonds) comparative horizons of the interpreter. 
Methodical controls of these horizons can be accomplished by empirically 
grounded and thus controllable comparative analysis of different (empirical) 
cases (see also GlaserIStrauss 1967). 
8 On the methodological and methodical background of our research; the 
))documentary method(< in: Bohnsack (1993), about the theoretical framework: 
Bohnsack ( l  995). 
9 These results from our research about juvenile peer groups in the small city and 
town are also part of the compartive analysis; in the sense of a ))maximum con- 
trastcc. 
10 So the categories of ))practical consciousnesscc as in Giddens and the category of 
))habituscc as in Bourdieu, although we do not fully agree with these conceptions. 
For a critical review of the conception of habitus in the sense of Bourdieu see 
Bohnsack (1993). 
I1 	 In this respect our analysis taken in the framework of the sociology of knowledge 
is different from that of the Birmingham School (CCCS) or from the concepts of 
some of its representatives. Productions of style have been characterized by some 
representatives of the Birmingham School as ))magic solutionscc, comparing them 
with the horizons of a historical solution of contradictions in society in a func- 
tionalistic perspective (see Clark 1976). The empirical reconstructive research of 
Willis (1977) in comparison appear immanently rational, as does Giddens' (1984) 
reinterpretation of the works of Willis. 
12 What Neidhardt (1981) worked out concerning the self-dynamics of the ))absurd 
processescc using the example of a terrorist group is also relevant here, although 
under different circumstances. 
13 Elements of such an ))episodal negation of everyday existencecc have also been 
described by Buford (1 991). 
14 Here every case of the taking over of perspectives of others is precarious in the 
sense of ))universe of discoursecc as in Mead (1934) and of the ))constitutive 
rulescc as in Piaget (1984). Though even the ))cooperative reciprocitycc in the 
sense of of Youniss (1984) in interaction with strangers appears precarious (in 
the sense of Piaget: ))the rules of coordination((). 
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Meredith W.  WattsJJiirgen Zinnecker 
V a r i e t i e s  o f  V i o l e n c e - P r o n e n e s s  

A m o n g  M a l e  Y o u t h  

We hope, using a recently-conducted survey of German youth, to 
make a contribution to the contemporary discussion of politically mo- 
tivated aggressiveness in the younger generation. Although the study 
was not designed to study right-wing extremism per se, it contains a 
variety of information on pre-ideological forms of violence-readiness 
among German youth (a significant portion of which is nourished by 
right-wing, conservatively-oriented protest). We will argue that an 
understanding of such aggression among youth cannot be understood 
by means of a simple transfer of adult-oriented theories of authori- 
tarianism or party preference, but must additionally take into account 
the character of adolescent aggression. 
In light of the political controversial and scientifically uncertain 
nature of the discussion of ))youth and right-wing violence,(( we be- 
lieve it necessary before the presentation and interpretation of the 
research results, to describe as clearly as possible the theoretical 
background against which the investigation should be viewed. In this 
discussion, we do not focus on ideological or political goals, but 
rather on the general nature of youthful male aggression. This ap- 
proach is not intended to diminish the political relevance of the vio- 
lence, but simply, for the moment, to invert the nature of the ques- 
tion. We ask what types of aggression there are, and how ))political(( 
each seems to be. 
Taking for the moment the perspective of the broader concerns of 
youth sociology, we point to the fact that at least a portion of recent 
manifestations of violence should be seen as an aspect of public 
street violence in general. This street violence has to do with a his- 
torically long-lived means of expression of male adolescence, though 
its actual form of expression is stimulated and given ))political(( con- 
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tent by specific social conditions and opportunity structures. But be- 
cause youth has a history of violence qua violence, the possible po- 
litical content of such behavior should not be assumed, but rather be 
made the object of the investigation. 
T h e o r y  
Modern industrial societies of the western variety generally under- 
stand themselves as internally pacified societies. The nationstate pos- 
sesses the monopoly of power and citizens are disarmed.' The most 
important internal conflicts are carried out in the judicial system 
where agencies of the nation-state possess a monopoly; ))selfjusticecc 
is for the most part specifically excluded from the citizens' options. 
However, the monopoly on force and on law is never complete. In 
everyday community life, as well in moments of historical crisis, 
both monopolies can be seriously challenged. The nation-state's man- 
agement of public order, and the associated public discussion of that 
issue are, in that sense, continuously concerned - sometimes more, 
sometimes less - with the material and symbolic maintenance of these 
two monopolies (Elias 1989). 
Male youth and young adult males have from the beginning been 
prominent among the social groups that threatened the legal nionop- 
oly of force and placed it in question. While youth may claim for it- 
self a certain right to public, territorial street violence and selfjustice, 
the state seeks to contain and direct physical violence through peda- 
gogical and police measures (see Gillis 1980; Shorter 1988). The 
conflict is by no means just a problem of contemporary society, or 
even of urban society in particular; the particular proclivity of young 
men for the direct use of physical force is multiply anchored in the 
social history of patriarchal, western industrial soc ie t i e~ .~  
Young men served - and continue to serve for a certain age- 
bounded period of their life-history - as a warrior caste, when the 
maintenance of individual national societies were threatened by war- 
like conflicts. In patriarchal societies adult males enjoyed certain pri- 
vate authority for the physical use of force over women and youth; 
young men could aspire to this form of sex-based domination, often 
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through their comparatively privileged opportunities to display 
physical strength and aggression. For males that lacked other re-
sources for the acquisition of social power and recognition, use of 
violence offered - at least potentially - an alternative source of power 
in social relationships. This social tactic can have a compensatory 
aspect - promoting a need for recognition, identity and power where 
it may be denied in the currently dominant social systems. In some 
historical epochs a closed class or economic system may have pre- 
sented insurmountable barriers; in others (as in contemporary west- 
ern industrial society), real, imagined or threatened failure in the 
educational and occupational systems may be the major threat to 
violence-prone young males. It might even be argued that most dis- 
plays of such aggression in modern society serve compensatory needs 
not met by modern institutions of employment and achievement of 
recognition/status. The social nsublimationcr of adolescent male ag- 
gression into productive channels is particularly problematic where 
conventional ())legitimate(() access to employment, housing and part- 
ner markets are blocked. 
Of particular meaning for the intimate relationship between young 
men and direct physical force is masculine socialization. Under cur- 
rent conditions this still implies a widespread basic rule that young 
males can attain sex-related identity through their readiness to engage 
in physical confrontation. This assumes that such tactics will be more 
or less successful as a form of selfassertion (e.g., that it will be re- 
warded in some fashion). This is not universally true for all young 
males, but it exists as a potential in a variety of micro-environments 
(e.g., among peer groups and gangs) and may in some era enjoy a 
macro-legitimation (as in state-sponsored militant youth groups or, 
more diffusely, when political and social leaders tolerate or encour- 
age aggression against internal minorities). In this way fighting and 
physical force find a firm place - first in the repertoire of male-spe- 
cific play interests (see Maccoby and Jacklin 1974), and potentially 
on the ))political(( level if such tactics are generalized to broader so- 
cial relations. 
We assume that in socialization to ))masculinity(( a body-theme is 
developed that is oriented toward fighting and physical confronta- 
tion.3 It is not necessary to argue that this process deterministically 
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produces aggressiveness in every male; such an overgeneralization 
ignores obvious differences among individuals, socialization circum- 
stances, and the diverse incentive/oppoflunity structures in which ag- 
gression might be displayed. The only theoretical assumption neces- 
sary is that there exists a gradient of aggressive potential in which 
some are more actively predisposed to physical assertion than others, 
and all (or most) have a latent repertoire of aggressive behavior that 
can be elicited under certain circumstances. The immediate ))micro-cc 
field of interactions and incentives, as well as the ))macro-legitima- 
tioncc provided by the political culture (e.g., widespread xenophobia 
and cognitive targeting of ))outsiderscc) both serve as immediate and 
diffuse ))triggers(( for the actual behavior. 
However, we do not for the moment wish to focus on the histori- 
cal specifics of German politics, nor on the rnore diffuse issue of 
gender-related socialization. At issue here is the relationship between 
adolescent male aggression and what was referred to above as the 
incolnplete establishment of the state's monopoly on the use of force 
and the administration of law. The principle of nonviolent commu- 
nity coexistence has never been equally binding on all age groups in 
society. It is part of a set of differential age norms: the strongest ta- 
boos and sanctions are applied to the physical use of force by adult 
.citizens. Children have greater freedom; adolescents are somewhere 
between the two norms. The older young people become, the more 
they acquire individual standing under the law and the stronger be- 
come the pressures to relinquish this ))privilegecc of ~h i ldhood .~  
When viewed from the point of view of age-specific norms for the 
renunciation of violence, confrontations between male youth and the 
adult society show an interesting social peculiarity: Young men - or 
specific subgroups of them - claim the right to be excluded for a 
relatively long period of time from the strict commandment of vio- 
lence-renunciation that applies to adults. The state answers this de- 
mand with ambivalence. On the one hand it provides and encourages 
the violence of young males in specific, socially-prescribed roles (as 
members of internal or external uniformed forced for order or de- 
fense), and therefore cannot fully deny or suppress violence-prone- 
ness. On the other hand, governmental and private representatives of 
the adult society attempt to set narrow limits to the particular phase 
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in the life course of young men during which direct physical force 
will be tolerated. It establishes, in other words, an age-related differ- 
entiation for the use of aggression; this differentiation is based on a 
societal ambivalence toward male violence. Not surprisingly, public 
policy and public opinion vary in their views of violence, seeing it at 
times as a social problem (e.g., as ))criminal(() and at others as a rude, 
but understandable expression of sentiments found elsewhere in so- 
ciety (as when the Chinese Red Guards were eventually criticized for 
being too zealous, young Iranian males as too brutal in enforcing Is- 
lamic order, or when conservative German politicians find attacks on 
foreigners to be ))understandable,(( but extreme). 
There is no simple relationship between adolescent male violence 
and the broader political order; it varies with historical period and 
with the sources of legitimation (and de-legitimation) in the broader 
political culture. The aggressive potential of young males can be a 
threat to social order, but it can also be a useful tool for carrying out 
))order-maintaining(( activities that are outside the conventional limits 
of the adult-managed administration of the law. The legitimation and 
political content of violence therefore take place within the broader 
context of the society's political culture and, more specifically, the 
role it wishes its young males to play. Where the messages are am- 
bivalent, or undecipherable, or where they point to goals that are 
virtually unattainable for many, regression to the ))simpler(( tactics of 
aggression may be the result. If the society also provides concrete 
models and forms of legitimation (in its identification of appropriate 
targets of aggression, e.g., particular social groups, such as indige- 
nous minorities, foreigners, or refugees), the cognitive link between 
aggressive potential on the one hand, and specifically politically 
relevant targets on the other, can be established. This is not necessar- 
ily an ideological process requiring a high level of political sophisti- 
cation; rather, it is a process of ))cognitive targeting(( that becomes 
political through its selection of targets for aggression. The actual 
perpetrators may have an elaborate ideology of inequality and vio- 
lence, but as a bare minimum only a ))temperamental(( bias toward 
aggression, a set of plausible targets, an opportunity to attack without 
major risk, and some degree of justification ())legitimation,(( whether 
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provided by the immediate micro-sphere of interpersonal relations or 
by higher levels of political authority). 
We do not mean to imply that adolescent male aggression is a 
constant, and that the choice of targets is arbitrary (and therefore of 
doubtfill or minimal political content). On the contrary, some targets 
of aggression are more likely to be chosen than others. Contemporary 
right-wing extremism has a set of sometimes interchangeable, but 
nonetheless finite, victims. Specific contemporary conditions (e.g., 
urbanization, cotnpetitive employment and housing markets) combine 
with specific ideological currents in the society, to provide a greater 
))opportunity(( for expression of particular forms of aggression. In the 
early 1990ts, those conditions favor, in many western industrial so- 
cieties, the expression violence against ))outsiders.(( The outsiders 
may, of course be social (foreigners and minorities, but also the so- 
ciallymarginal such as the homeless and the handicapped), or politi- 
cal/cultural antagonists (e.g., members of the ))pitnk(c youth style, or 
leftist youth gangs). 
A related issue concerns the social location of masculine street 
violence, which can generally be localized in the urban underclass. In 
Europe, youth violence followed in the process of urbanization. Be- 
fore it became a phenomenon of the large cities, it had expressed 
itself as traditional group violence in rural regions - for example as 
censure of undesired competitors in the local market for sexual part- 
ners and mates (Mitterauer 1986; Gillis 1980). In the urban context 
violence became more highly territorial, transforming itself into 
group struggles for control of the streets in urban neighborhoods.5 
From the beginning one of the central goals of urban youth edu- 
cation in Germany was to contain the violence associated with male 
youth (which expressed itself above all in the formation of territorial 
groups), and to direct it into socially-acceptable paths. The German 
youth policy ())Jugendpflegecc), which was formed around 1900, was 
particularly committed to this goal. The primary target group of this 
policy development were the fourteen-year old cohorts who fell into 
a care- and control-gap between graduation from primary education 
())Volksschulecc) and entry into military service. 
Of course, it is also possible to trace back to the middle ages the 
struggle of the schools and the universities for the ))disarmament(( of 
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their pupils and students.6 In this process the educational system 
played a contradictory role. While the institutionalized education of 
male youth promoted a pedagogically controlled ))pacificationcc of 
male youth, the very institutionalization of this group provided new 
opportunities for them to organize themselves into potentially violent 
groups beyond neighborhood territories. This had the effect of gen- 
eralizing male aggression beyond physical territories (e.g., neighbor- 
hoods) into symbolic and cultural territories. In  general, this social 
process represents the transition from local conflict to ))political(c 
conflict. 
The process of pacification had differential effects by social class 
and educational level. With respect to the present, it is clear that the 
pacification of educationally privileged youth in high schools and 
universities has been fairly successful - at least in comparison to male 
street violence in metropolitan areas.7 The relative pacification of the 
educationally privileged male youth in high schools and universities, 
however, contrasts with those male adolescents that are not inte-
grated in either educational or occupational systems. These less-inte- 
grated individuals are more likely to express their potential aggres- 
siveness through various subcultural forms (e.g., as in skinhead 
groups, or as soccer hooligans), everyday behavioral action (e.g., in 
neighborhood gangs, or in everyday aggression against peers or 
adults). In the former case the physical locations are likely to be 
))cultural spacescc such as youth centers, temporary action sites (such 
as a demonstration at a refugee hostel), or large sport centers (usually 
soccer stadiums); in the latter, locations are more likely to be territo- 
rially-defined neighborhoods, or the everyday ambient of young 
people such as the family, school, and ordinary public spaces where 
aggressive behavior occurs more or less spontaneously in response to 
an opportunity to test strength against peers or to provoke adults. 
Each of the above forms of expression can have a ))political(( 
component depending on the targets of aggression and the response 
of governmental agencies. But a third form of aggressive expression 
is by its nature political in that its targets are quasi-ideologically de- 
fined and its goals, however inchoate they may sometimes appear, are 
aimed toward a change in the distribution of political power ())sen- 
ding a message to the politicianscc), an alteration in the distribution of 
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piiblic goods and services (e.g., jobs, housing, construction of nuclear 
power plants), or a change in the material and symbolic status of 
some groups (e.g., foreigners, asylum seekers). This class of political 
aggression assumed new meaning through the ))participatory 
revolutioncc of recent decades (Barnes and Kaase 1979; Jennings and 
van Deth 1990; Watts 1992; Watts forthcoming). 
A significant growth in the prevalence and legitimacy of wncon- 
ventionalcc (noninstitutional) political action forms has had a signifi- 
cant impact on the creation of actionistic opportunity structures for 
young males. The increase of expressive outlets for politically-orien- 
ted protest behavior in the streets and in the media gives adolescents 
new opportunities for forceful or even violent action. The social loca- 
tion of such activity is likely to be less restricted and clearly fixated 
as, for example, in the case of soccer-hooligans or of multiethnic 
street gangs. One thinks of the relatively widespread participation of 
young people in the left-wing ))autonomic scenecc or of potentially 
violent social protest movements. In this generally left-oriented 
scene, the participants tend to be educationally privileged high school 
and university students. Though their educational institutions were 
more or less ))pacified(( after the late 1960's and early 1970's (and 
therefore no longer provide as extensive an opportunity structure for 
actionism), the open, streetoriented nature of noninstiti~tional poli- 
tical action creates a ))movablecc opportunity structure in which esca- 
lation to violence can occur. 
Since the public opportunities and occasions in which male vio- 
lence can be expressed are so differentiated, the question presents 
itself whether there is a relationship between the ))choicecc of a public 
form and social location of violence on the one hand, and character- 
istics of youth on the other hand. Are there different paths to the 
emergence of violence on the part of skinheads or hooligan groups, in 
the emergence of aggressive relationships among peers to one an- 
other (and between youth and adults), and in the choice of specifi- 
cally political forms of action? 
To reiterate the general theoretical perspective that i~nderlies our 
analysis: We believe it useful to discuss violence-proneness in the 
historical and structural context of male adolescence (we deal with 
gender differences in a separate analysis). By viewing this ))mascu- 
Varieries of Violence-Proneness Among Male Yourh 
linecc action field we can reach a more meaningful judgment about 
the political character of violence-proneness articulated by this 
group. In the contemporary mass-media discourse there is character- 
istically a double misunderstanding: Politically-relevant action of 
young males is often prematurely declared to be specifically ))poli- 
tical(( in the sense of ideologically focused, policy-relevant behavior. 
This may or may not be a mistaken attribution - since actionistic 
groups (e.g., skinheads) may choose opportunistic targets, the like- 
lihood of the behavior being labelled ))political(( is quite variabie. If 
the target is a homeless urban dweller or member of a ))punk(( group, 
the behavior will be normally be interpreted as nonpolitical; if the 
target is a foreigner (particularly an asylum-seeker), the behavior will 
normally be labelled political. In these examples, the behavior and 
targets may be more or less interchangeable, though both result from 
adolescent aggressiveness and actionism. When cognitive targeting 
of ethnic or political groups takes place, then adolescent violence- 
proneness is combined with ideological content (however inchoate 
and superficial) and takes on a particular political character. But even 
here it does not lose its other face - that of adolescent male aggres- 
sion. 
Since both aspects are present - adolescent violence and political 
content - in varying degrees, a complex ))recodingcc and labelling 
takes place on the part of public officials and the media. For exam- 
ple, when the political protest of youth deviates from the officially 
legitimated framework of political action, it may be recoded as 
youth-delinquent behavior. That renders it less ))dangerouscc to the 
system, attributes it to social deficits on the part of youth, and ))per- 
sonalizes(( it by assigning it as a pathology to individuals (who may 
or may not act in groups). This depoliticizes the behavior, and directs 
attention away from structural problems in the political, economic 
and cultural environment. 
The opposite case presents itself as well. Often, youth ))playcc with 
political symbols as a means of expression, though their explicit 
ideological commitment may be minimal. If those symbolic elements 
recall the political past of Germany (e.g., the Third Reich), the be- 
havior will generally be reinterpreted as having explicit political con- 
tent. Some have even argued that this process of attribution and sym- 
Mereditlr W. Warts / Jiirgen Zinnecker 
bolic labelling is itself the cause for youthful groups becoming ))idea-
logical(( - the label provides what they wanted all along; namely, 
attention and recognition. This, however, causes the ))political(( to 
vanish theoretically and denigrates it to the level of ))just anothercc 
mode of adolescent expression or, even more problematically, of ))re- 
bellion.(( 
Though rebellion is an important element, youth-cultural styles do 
have a de facto ideological component. This is often shown most 
clearly in the language games of these styles which typically demon- 
strate a provocative recombination ())bricolagecc) of elements from a 
the broader social and political culture. The symbolic elements are 
not unique, but exaggerated and recombined versions of the broader 
cultural symbol set. Right-wing extremist ideas have less ))toxiccc 
forms among conservative politicians who fret over ))~berfremdun~cc, 
the ))flood(( of asylum-seekers, a tight employment market, and short- 
ages in housing. The expression of these broader forms of concern in 
the political culture provide a ))macrolegitimationc( for cognitive tar- 
geting. The right-wing form can become virulent when it is further 
intensified by incorporation of symbolic elements from the ))browncc 
past, or from contelnporary forms of political racism and neo-
Nazism. 
Within the context of a survey project we unfortunately cannot 
deal satisfactorily with the dynamic of this macro-legitimation, nor 
with the behavioral dynamics that link neo-Nazi organizations with 
broader circles of adolescent male aggression. However, within the 
framework of the available date base we do have the opportunity to 
view more closely the potential political content of youthful mascu- 
line violence-proneness on an individual basis. We ask whether the 
youth who show a certain type of violence-readiness also denion- 
strate certain characteristic social values, orientations and political 
preferences. Though this approach does not deal with the explicit 
political content of violence acceptance as much as we might wish, it 
does allow us to test whether male youth, who report ( l )  identifica-
tion with aggressive youth styles, or (2) frequent use of physical 
force against others in their daily lives, or (3)  show a high level of 
approval for violent political tactics, are more likely to show a pref- 
erence for particular values, particular political preferences and ori- 
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entations toward (the self in) society. We not only expect that there 
will be different types of aggressiveness, but also that a specific 
youth variant will show a superficial ))antiauthoritarianismcc that is 
associated with a particular, youthspecific variety of hedonistic, re- 
bellious self-assertion. 
V a r i a b l e s  
By the selection of politically-relevant variables, with whose help we 
wish to characterize various groups of violence-prone male youth, we 
draw upon a variety of measures that were employed in an interdis- 
ciplinary study of German youth. Among those measures are: 
- Basic value orientations (e.g., so-called materialistic values) 
- Orientation to the social future 
- Evaluation of one's personal future 
- Orientation toward the present (hedonism) 
- Youth centrism ())ethnocentriccc perception of youth as a socially- 
discriminated minority) 
- Attitude of the individual toward social demands and expectations 
(willingness to adapt, self-assertion) 
- Approval of particular political action forms (e.g., demonstrations, 
))hardercc methods such as property damage and physical confron- 
tation) 
- Party preferences (e.g., Republikaner), and placement on a left-
right party spectrum 
- Attitudes toward social movements ())new social movements(( = 
environment, peace, anti-nuclear power) 
- Political Alienation. 
Composition of the actual instruments is described in more detail 
in the Appendix. 
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A S u b i s s u e :  T y p o l o g y  C o n s t r u c t i o n  
f r o m  S u r v e y  D a t a  
There remains a technicalltheoretical issue to be discussed before 
presenting the actual data - that of using broad sample surveys to 
study specialized phenomena that occur only in intensified form in a 
small portion of the population. Such features mays be ))crystallized(( 
in the target groups, but are likely to occur in the general population 
only in attenuated form. In the case of violence-acceptance and the 
willingness to use force, a sample of the general youth population 
will show relationships that are likely to be only weakened reflec- 
tions of the actual relationships that exist in the active target groups. 
Since we know that age and gender have an association with violence 
acceptance, we can achieve some clarity by focusing on the most 
actionistic group - males in their late teens and early twenties.8 
Within that general population, there is a further methodological 
problem of separating an appropriate ))targetcc group of likely activ- 
ists (or actionists) from the broader population. They may be opera- 
tionally defined either by self-reported identification with, or mem- 
bership in, the appropriate target group(s), or they can be defined by 
the construction of an empirical typology. Such a typology employs 
concepts that are theoretically central to the target group as we un- 
derstand them conceptually (e.g., high ))a~~thoritarianismc(). 
The success of such a typology depends on the theory underlying 
it; we must take care that the operational definition of the typology 
does not already contain within it a tautological conclusion about 
who is violent. For example, if we identify ))violence-acceptors(( 
prima facie as skinheads (or neo-nazis, or leftist actionists, or con- 
victed juvenile delinquents, etc.) we have implicitly located the vio- 
lence in a specific group and may easily neglect other contributing 
groups or motivating factors. Furthermore, if we define violence-ac- 
ceptors as those with a particular set of attitudes (e.g., rebellious, 
peer- group-oriented, prone to street violence), the target group'may 
indeed by prone to socially problematic, aggressive behavior, but the 
objects of their aggression may or may not be ))political(( (and they 
may, or niay not, be associated with right-extremist thinking). Lastly, 
identification of a target group according to political tactics is a pos- 
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sibility, but it does not distinguish between forms of motivation - ac-
ceptors of aggressive political behavior may come from anywhere in 
the political spectrum. 
Obviously the problem of defining violence-acceptance, and of 
identifying potentially aggressive youth, is not simply a matter of 
empirical definition; it is closely related to our theoretical under-
standing of the sources and consequences of violence acceptance. 
Our approach to this problem follows from our theoretical position 
that there are multiple paths or basic models that can lead to right- 
extremist identification. These forms flow into each other, and they 
interact with right- extremist political groups and messages in a dy- 
namic fashion. But we believe it is conceptually useful for youth to 
differentiate the types into ( l )  subcultural (group) identification with 
aggressive styles, (2) everyday aggressive behavior, and (3) approval 
of aggressive political tactics. The results of these definitions are dis- 
cussed below; first, however the data base requires a brief descrip- 
tion. 
D a t a  
A youth survey generally known under the title ))Shell Youth Studycc 
serves as our data foundation (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 
1992). The data provide a quota sample of sufficient quality to pro- 
vide an appropriate portrayal of the German population between 13 
and 29 years of age for West and East Germany. Some 4005 youth 
and young adults were questioned in standardized oral interviews 
lasting about one and one-half hours. The field research extended 
through summer months of 1991. For comparative purposes, the re- 
gion of the former East Germany was oversampled compared to the 
total (West Germany : East Germany = 2: I). For the current analysis 
a subsample was selected that included all 15 to 20 year-old male 
respondents. This produced an analyses group of 704 respondents, 
456 from West Germany and 248 from East Germany. 
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Table 1 shows the results of the three operational definitions used to 
develop typologies of aggressive youth groups. The first typology 
fortns a target group of those who identify with or generally approve 
of the skinheads and soccer-hooligans. This type numbers 25, and is 
contrasted with the 184 male youth who most strongly reject both 
subcultural groups. 
Table I :  	Alternative Definitions and Measurement of Violence-Acceptance 
Gernian Males, 15-20 
Operational Target Group n Contrast Group n 
Definition 
Aggressive Skins ( l  ,2) + Skins (5) + 
Subcultures Hooligans (l  ,2) 25 Hooligans (5) 184 
Everyday Youth Provoke (2,3) + Provoke ( l )  + 
Aggression Fight (2,3) 67 Fight ( l )  434 
Political 
Apqression Hard (5-7) 21 Hard(1) 490 
Notc: for Skins + I-looligans scores 1 = belong tollive like them, 2 = do not belong to 
them. but find then) good, for political aggression, the contrast group consists of 
respondents scoring ))l((, or rejection of both damage to property and violence 
against persons, scores 5-7 are combinations of strongly approve or approve of the 
two tactics; for ))everyday youth aggression(( scores 2 and 3 are ))oftencc or 
))occasionallycc,I = ))never((. 
Data Source: Jugend '92 (Fischer and Zinnecker, 1992) 
The second typology is based on a set of questions about everyday 
expressive behavior and includes incidence of fighting with peers and 
deliberate provocation of older people. The typology identifies 21 
male adolescents who ))oftencc provoke older people, and who report 
engaging often in fights. A large contrast group (490) reported 
))nevercc engaging in either behavior. 
The third typology is based on aggressive political tactics; the 
))targetcc group contains 67 respondents who express strong or mod- 
erate approval for aggressive political tactics (causing damage to 
property; and engaging in physical confrontatiotl with other persons, 
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including police). A large contrast group of 434 respondents strongly 
rejected both. 
Before we examine the regression analysis, it is useful to look at 
the amount of overlap among the three typologies. The first tech- 
nique for such a comparison is to look at the correlations among the 
measures from which the typologies were constructed; the second is 
to directly examine the overlap in the violence-prone identified in 
each way. Identification with aggressive subcultural styles correlated 
. l  1 with the behavioral and . l6  with the political measures; the be- 
havioral and political measures together correlated at .38. This sug- 
gests that ))hardcc political tactics are more appealing to those for 
whom everyday behavioral aggression is also a common occurrence. 
Political aggression is, on the other hand, less closely associated with 
aggressively-styled subcultures such as skinheads and soccer hooli- 
gans. The actual numerical overlap of the ))targetcc groups from the 
three procedures shows the subcultural group sharing eight individu- 
als with the behavioral and three with the political groups; the behav- 
ioral and political groups shared seventeen. Again, though it is diffi- 
cult to say anything conclusive because of the small numbers in- 
volved, the evidence points to a closer relationship between the be- 
havioral and political dimensions, than between any other pairing of 
types. 
These results support in part the thesis (e.g., Heitmeyer 1987) that 
political ))acting outcc is essentially a generalization of violence ex- 
perienced in everyday life. However, we find, as hypothesized, that 
all types of aggression are not identical. Not only is it noteworthy 
that the ))behavioralcc and ))politicalcc forms show a moderate level of 
intercorrelation, but also that the subcultural form is only marginally 
related to approval of political violence. 
A last comment on the regional distribution of the types: If they 
are similarly distributed in East and West, we would expect them to 
exist in our sample in a 2: 1 relationship; that is roughly the case with 
65% and 62% for the behavioral and political types, respectively. 
The subcultural type shows signs of a higher East German identifica- 
tion with skinheads/hooligans (56% West versus 44% East), though 
the numbers are too small to draw any serious conclusions. 
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The next stage of the analysis utilizes logistic regression analysis 
(e.g., Norusis 1990) to differentiate between the pre-identified in our 
three typologies. The method is preferable to discriminant analysis in 
cases such as this one where the dependent variable is dichotomous 
and where it is inappropriate to assume that the underlying variable is 
normally distributed. This is, of course, the case with each of our 
three typologies. 
As an orienting hypothesis, we expect that if there are different 
forms of aggression represented by the three typologies, the regres- 
sion of a set of criterion variables on each of the typologies should 
produce somewhat different results. Table 2 presents an overview of 
the three logistic regression analyses that test this proposition. To test 
that the variables have different priorities for the three types of ag- 
gression, the statistical algorithm was a stepwise regression whereby 
only those variables contributing to the prediction were included in 
the equation (according to a maximum likelihood criterion). 
As expected, the logistic regressions produced somewhat different 
results for each form of aggression, Identification with aggressive 
youth subculti~res (skinheads and hooligans) was associated with two 
value orientations: the target group was more strongly inclined to 
value ))order and national security(( than the nonaggressive contrast 
group, but they were lower in their attachment to ))power and author- 
ity.(( This is the opposite of what classic authoritarianism theory 
might predict, and reflects what we argue above is the ambivalent 
relationship between youth and the authority of the state. This sub- 
cultural group, though perhaps ))authoritariancc in its views of out- 
groups nevertlieless sees itself as being in rebellion against estab- 
lished (adult) power and authority. While skinheads and football 
hooligans may be internally hierarchical or oriented toward a strong 
leader (see Farin and Seidel-Pielen 1993; Schumann 1990; Stock and 
Miihlberg 1990), they tend to reject outside authority that limits their 
range of action (see Willis 1981). This produces among some youth a 
special blend of authoritarianism and rebellion. 
Varieties of Violence-Proneness Among Male Youth 
Table 2: Summary of Logistic Regression (Males 15-20) 
Note: n+(( indicates a positive relationship with violence acceptance; ))-(( indicates the 
factor is negatively associated (coefficients based on logistic regression). The factors 
are order to illustrate differences among violence-acceptance dimensions. See Ap- 
pendix for description of measures. 
The subcultural form of violence-proneness is generally associ- 
ated with lower educational attainment, as well as with identification 
with the right-wing Republikaner (REP) party. Though the skinheads 
may not necessarily display an integrated ideology, the xenophobic 
program of the REPS obviously provides some of the 
))macrolegitimationcc for skinhead aggression against foreigners. The 
negative correlation with education confirms the general perception 
of the skinheads as underclass, xenophobic brawlers. 
The second type of violence-acceptance ())everydaycc/behavioral) 
is associated with lower educational attainment and with REP identi-
fication as well, but its antecedents have a different accent. Here the 
emphasis is on rebellion in the sense of an ))ethnocentriccc view of 
youth as a pseudo-social class that is in opposition to the ))classcc of 
adults. This self-other conceptualization sets youth apart, and deni- 
grates the wisdom and nurturance of adults in general (see the com- 
position of the scale in the Appendix). The target group - which re- 
ports engaging often in ))provoking adults(( and ))fighting(( - differs 
from the first group in its positive evaluation of the ))power and 
authority.(( This comes closer to the classic notion of authoritarian- 
Meredith W. Watts /Jiirgen Zinnecker 
ism, and is consistent wit11 the thesis (Heitmeyer 1987) that accep- 
tance of hierarchic thinking predisposes youth toward rightist ideol- 
ogy and behavior. 
In this case, it seems likely that youthful aggression and ethnocen- 
trism are associated, at least for rebellious male adolescents, with 
power and authority in the ))micro-(c sphere of social relations. Al- 
though we cannot directly demonstrate this proposition with the cur- 
rent data, we suspect that this micro-power (within gro~~ps)  differs 
from the ))macro-cc power (official agencies) that is rejected by the 
subcultural groups in the first typology.9 What in any case is clear is 
that there is not a single syndrome of everyday violence, values and 
sociopolitical orientations that is associated with rightist identitjca- 
tion. Rather, there seem to be multiple paths, some more 
))authoritariancc than others. 
'rhe third typology differs still further. This target group is not 
strongly associated with Republikaner identification, but it does 
show, surprisingly, a negative relationship with New Social Move- 
ments. Through the ))participatory revolutioncc of the 1970's we have 
colile to expect approval of political aggression (damage to property, 
physical confrontation with persons) to be associated with the left- 
progressive activism. Here, of course, Hausbesetzer (urban squat- 
ters), masked anti-nuclear power demonstrators, and militant ecolo- 
gists come to mind. This association may still hold for the broader 
population, and perhaps even with the youth population in general. 
But for our saniple of adolescent males the association is rnoderately 
negative - indicating that for this agelsex group political aggression is 
increasingly associated with the right. 
This shift of political aggression to the right is, to be sure, one that 
occurred during the 1980's in many nations; in the United States, for 
example, many of the most visibly violent demonstrations were con- 
ducted by conservative anti-abortion groups (often involving physical 
confrontation with the opposition and the police, property damage, 
and in at least one case the fatal shooting of a doctor). Thus, our data 
show concretely what has been increasingly the case in practical 
politics - that the participatory tactics of the left have been adopted 
by groups on the right, and that politically aggressive tactics which 
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appealed to young leftists of the 1970's are appealing to male adoles- 
cents on the right in the 1990's. 
Thus far our overview supports our basic contention that there are 
(among male adolescents at least) different paths to political aggres- 
sion and right-extremism, Beyond this is the somewhat unexpected 
finding that the most expressly political form is not primarily associ- 
ated with left progressivism for this population group. The logistic 
regression allowed a comparison of the empirical priority of a set of 
variables and a test of the central thesis that the three aggressive 
forms had different antecedents. A related and more extended ques- 
tion concerns a broader set of connections between our typologies 
and a variety of factors. For this, we display in Table 3 a set of t-tests 
that compare the mean scores of a set of variables according the three 
typologies. This no longer shows the specific priority of predictors, 
but simply presents a broad view of the associated factors. 
The table is divided with by horizontal lines according to the fac- 
tors that accent differences among the three typologies. The table 
includes the factors identified in the logistic regression, but addi- 
tional variables have been added to enrich the picture somewhat. 
Horizontal lines separate groups of variables roughly according their 
ability to discriminate one form of aggression from another. 
As before, educational achievement and ))power and authority(( 
discriminate well for the first two groups. It is clear here that the sub- 
cultural type is the least attracted to power and authority (mean = 
6.0) while the aggressive youth group is the most attracted (mean = 
7.8). 
In the second group of comparisons, Youth Centrism is clearly the 
highest for the youth in favor of hard political tactics. As a further 
collateral test we examined a modified version of Zimbardo's scales 
(Kohr 1992; Zimbardo; Gonzalez and Zimbardo 1985) scale 
))hedonistic view of the present.(( This scale, which measures the 
orientation toward excitement, risk, unpredictability, and immediate 
everyday experience (as opposed to future planning), shows the same 
pattern as Youth Centrism - the politically aggressive are the highest, 
followed by those identified as everyday youth aggression. 
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Table 3: Summary of T-Test Analysis (T = ))targetcc group; C = ))contrastcc 
grozrp). See Appendix for description of measures 0)*(c = statistical sign$- 
cance at the .05 level, ))**(( = beyond the .01 level). 
Group Definition 
Subcultural Everyday Political 
Behavioral Behavioral Behavioral 
Educational 









Present 11.8 11.8 12.1 11.1 (**) 13.1 11.3 (**) 





Security 11.4 10.0 (*) 10.3 10.5 8.0 10.1 (**) 





Adept 13.4 13.4 13.0 13.6 1 1 . 1  13.8 (**) 

Self Assertion 14.0 14.1 14.4 13.5 (**) 15.5 13.5 (**) 

Political Party 1.9 3.9 (**) 2.7 3.7 (**) 2.6 3.5 









Society 1.9 1.6 (**) 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.8 

Personal Future 2.4 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.1 2.6 (*) 





Alienation 15.2 15.4 14.9 14.5 15.1 14.7 
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Figures in the third group of rows show that the aggressive sub- 
cultural youth are more oriented toward order and national security, 
the politically aggressive the least so. The politically aggressive are 
also more favorable toward ))demonstrations(( (both approved and 
non-approved); aggressive youth also displayed higher approval to- 
ward demonstrations than their contrast group, but the aggressive 
subcultural youth showed less approval. 
Comparisons in the fourth group of rows confirm that the first two 
types are more associated with parties of the right, and more specifi- 
cally with the REPS. The last group shows some association with the 
REPS, but the association is not significant. This is because, we be- 
lieve, the politically aggressive groups contain some members of both 
right and left. Because of the particular composition of this group of 
adolescent males however, those on the right are more strongly repre- 
sented than would be the case for youth as a whole or for the adult 
population. All types are less oriented toward New Social Move- 
ments than their respective contrast groups, and all target (aggres- 
sive) groups place a higher value on personal self-assertion. The most 
assertive of all are those leaning toward political aggression. 
Lastly, an interesting difference emerges in the respective views 
of the three types toward the future. The most significant difference 
is for those identifying with aggressive subcultures -they have the 
most positive view of the ))future of society((. They are only average 
in their views of their personal futures, though. The most negative 
personal futures are expected by the politically aggressive. 
P r e d i c t i n g  R i g h t - W i n g  P a r t y  P r e f e r e n c e  
In the previous section we used the Republikaner party as a factor to 
test the right-wing nature of the various aggressive types. The num- 
ber of REP identifiers in the sample was not large, but we found them 
nevertheless to be of some intrinsic interest. Therefore, we asked the 
reverse question - what variables best distinguish REPidentifiers 
from all others. To answer the question we used logistic regression 
once again to ))predictcc what young males were most likely to show 
an identification with the Republikaner Party. 
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The best predictors are the indexes ))youth violence 
(subcultural)[+],(c ))youth aggression[+],(( and ))new social move-
ments[-](( (we used the continuous forms of the indexes rather than 
the dichotomous forms that were used in the previous analysis to 
form the typologies). This means that, for the adolescent male youth 
in our data set, the most closely associated factors with REP identifi- 
cation are the first two measures of aggression (the more aggressive 
the youth, the more likely to identify with the REPS), and with rejec- 
tion of New Social Movements (the greater the identification with the 
Peace, Anti-Nuclear and Ecological Movements, the less the identifi- 
cation with the REPS). The latter association is not surprising, but it 
is a significant factor that the REPS are favorably received by ado- 
lescent males who identify with subcultural and everyday aggressive 
styles. 
D i s c u s s i o n  
We have tried to approach the question of political content empiri- 
cally without presupposing any specific relationship with the hy- 
pothesized ))patliscc to violence-proneness. This does not mean that 
we take less seriously the political content, and the political impact, 
of adolescent male violence. Rather, we wished to test whether there 
were alternative paths to aggression (and to right-wing identifica- 
tion). This means, at least for the moment, focusing on that aspect of 
aggression which has the distinct stamp of adolescent male aggres- 
sion. 
However, we do not wish to leave the impression that political 
aggression is ))merelycc another form in which adolescent violence- 
proneness can be expressed. On the other hand, when the perpetrators 
and sympathizers are in that agelsex group, it is worth remembering 
that such behavior is not just ))politicalcc in the cognitive and ideo- 
logical sense. With this age group, violence-proneness has elements 
of both. We look at this research as at least a first attempt to ap- 
proach the association between the ))political(( and the ))adolescentcc 
components. 
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How can the three masculine-adolescent forms of violence-prone- 
ness be characterized with respect to values and orientations? The 
first type, which signals violence-proneness in the context of publicly 
visible expressive subcultures - skinhead, hooligans - is anchored in a 
particular social location. These youth embody, with their emphasis 
on order and national security, traditional insecurity values. Corre- 
spondingly, their protest readiness is clearly located with the right- 
extremist ))Republikanercc party. The traditional, milieu-connected 
orientation goes along with a decided disadvantage in the area of 
education - a sign of social immobility during adolescence. 
We also found that male adolescents in this group place great 
value on nonconformity and resistance against conventional social 
hierarchy in a way that seems to differ from adult authoritarians (for 
whom clear power and authority relationships with the state may be 
more highly valued). This reflects the endemic conflict between 
adolescent male aggressiveness and the desire of the state to maintain 
its monopoly on force and the administration of law. 
The second type of violence-prone adolescents shows the strong- 
est trademark in the area of personal efficacy and selfassertion. Ob-
viously this is a concentration of violence-prone male youth for 
whom physical force represents a means for gaining personal control 
over the immediate environment. Their need for control is oriented to 
the here and now (the hedonistic present), and is directed both toward 
peers and the older generation. In the political realm they are rather 
unremarkable and average in comparison to the contrast group. We 
are apparently dealing here with a behavioral option: (physical and 
verbal) violence-proneness suits them - for reasons that deserve 
closer investigation - for the satisfaction of their specific social, eve- 
ryday needs for control. 
The third type shows a more definite political framework than the 
first two. Here we find male adolescents whose readiness to use force 
against persons and property is expressed in the broader context of 
))politics of the street.(( Their trademark is their low willingness to 
adapt to social demands and expectations. This includes a high de- 
gree of ))youth centrism((, an ethnocentric demarcation from the adult 
world. That occurs in a strongly hedonistic orientation toward the 
present. Recognizable in this profile is its proximity to both the leftist 
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scene of ))autonomic violence((, but also with elements of attractive- 
ness to the right. 
The negative association with New Social Movements may indi- 
cate not only the rejection of these groups by the right, but also a lack 
of interest in them among actionistic leftist youth (for whom these 
older movements may now be too tame). At the same time, these 
movements have consistently attracted a high proportion of females 
who have for more than a decade showed a ))progressive bonuscc 
compared to their male counterparts (this bonus increases with edu- 
cational level). This ))feminizationcc points to an obvious counter- 
program to the masculine actionism to which young males pay hom- 
age. As a practical consequence, it is likely to be difficult to activate 
any ))peacecc potential among the violence-prone young men. The 
negative association of New Social Movements with the political 
form of violence-acceptance attests to this phenomenon. 
Two political orientations that belong to all three types of vio- 
lence-proneness deserve particular attention - the relatively frequent 
sympathy for the right-wing Republikaner party (whereby there rests 
a strong affinity with the subcultural violence-type )skinheads(, and 
on the other side the relative distance from new social movements 
)peace, environment, antiinuclear power(. Within the ))legitimatecc 
spectrum of the German party system, the Republikaner Party clearly 
has an appeal for violence-prone young males. This is quite consis- 
tent with electoral research which has repeated pointed to a dispro-
portional appeal to males among voters for the right-wing Repub- 
likaner party (see Hoffmann-Giittig 1989; Roth 1989), it is different, 
however, in the link we believe to have established with various 
forms of adolescent aggressiveness. 
We point lastly to several questions that have remained open in 
this paper and which require further investigation. We were con-
cerned with testing for the existence of the three hypothetical forms 
of violence-proneness among young males. As demonstration of the 
need for such a differentiation, we found that, apart from their com- 
monalities, each type of violence-acceptance was associated with 
different social-political values and orientations. Neglected in this 
analysis were differences in socialization and life histo~y. Here of 
course we would also expect to find commonalities, but an important 
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area of qualitative research would be to examine differences in bio- 
graphical paths that lead to the various forms of violence-proneness. 
An additional factor that has not been dealt with here is the diffi- 
cult and politically divisive question if, and in which respect we have 
to distinguish between a deft-progressivecc and a ))rightconservative(( 
readiness to use violence. In order to make a contribution here the 
left-right scheme would have to be built into the typology construc- 
tion (see Hoffmann-Lange et al. 1993). Because of the complexity of 
that analysis, we hope to pursue that question further with the current 
data base and in the design of subsequent research. 
Lastly, we point to an question that needs further clarification -
whether the values and orientations that we found in the group of 
violent-prone young males also appear among other age and gender 
groups. We hope to turn our attention to this question in a future 
analysis. 
Notes 
1 	This varies in practice, of course, with the Federal Republic of Germany more 
))disarmed,(( while the citizens - and youth - of the United States have much 
broader access to firearms. 
2 The conditions of this phenomenon are decidedly overdetermined. That allows us 
to leave undiscussed (for the moment), the extent to which this is an anthropologi- 
cal or biosocial constant. Though there is certainly evidence for such a position, it 
is remarkable how little youth-theoretical models have made use of this perspec- 
tive. 
3 This is not to deny the extent to which combative body images are increasingly 
demonstrable among young girls (Zinnecker 1989). 
4 	Naturally these age norms are subject to historical change and are constantly in 
flux (It would be worthwhile to analyze the history of youth law within the frame- 
work of this confrontation.). Here we can see as regulative the pedagogical guide- 
lines that are formulated for the behavior of children together and for their rela- 
tionship with adults. It appears that the norms of family pedagogy are increasingly 
oriented toward an early acquisition of npeacefulnesscc on the part of children (at 
least for young males). 
5 See Trasher as the classic case study for Chicago at the beginning of the 20th cen- 
tury (Trasher 1927). 
6 See, for example, accounts of student and pupil unrest in Germany, England, and 
the United States by Dunning 1977; Kett 1977 and Gillis 1980. 
7 This statement must in any event be revised with respect to the mandatory school 
system in childhood and early adolescence. These pedagogical institutions suffer 
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now as before - possibly increasingly - from a pupil violence that is difficult for 
instructors to control (see Grauer and Zinnecker 1978). However, unlike the 
United States where the question of violence in the schools is more closely related 
to questions of criminality, weapons and drugs, in Germany there is currently a 
closer link with the debate over xenophobic violence. 
8 The figures for 1992 illustrate the situation. Of the roughly 2000 acts of violence 
counted in 1992, 70 percent of the perpetrators were males between sixteen and 
twenty-one years of age. (Bundesministerium des lnnern 1991; Deutsche Jugend 
1992, 503-4). 
9 This difference between micro- and macro- authority is significant for measuring 
the alleged relationship between ))authoritarianismcc and radical-right political ori- 
entation~. At least for youth, it seems important to distinguish whether the psycho- 
logical referent ))authority(( is external to the adolescent's group (e.g., governmen- 
tal, school. parental) or internal (oneself or a friend as a strong leader). 
Appendix 
Scales and Other Items Employed in the Analysis 
Orientation toward a hedonistic present (Gonzalez and Zimbardo 1985; Zimbardo 
n.d.; Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, p. 82) [alpha = ,681 
I t  is often fun to be simply carried along/l like to take each day at a time/] do things 
impulsively, making decisions on the spur of the moment11 take risks to put excite- 
ment in my life (last two items from Gonzalez and Zimbardo,1985, 24-5) (Original: 
Manchmal macht es mir SpaR, mich einfach treiben zu lassenllch tue am liebsten 
spontan das, wozu ich gerade Lust habellch lebe gern in den Tag hineinlum etwas 
Aufregendes 211erleben, riskiere ich schon mal was]. 
Value Orientations [PowerIAuthority; OrderMational Security] (Jugendwerk der 
Deutschen Shcll 1992, vol4, 89-94; Krebs 1992) 
Willingness to Adapt (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, vol 4, 9798; Watts et 
al. 1989). [alpha = ,691 
Self Assertion (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, vol 4, 99-100; Watts et al. 
1989). [alpha = .59] 
Youth Centrism (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, vol 4, 110-1 12; Watts et al 
1989). [alpha = .67] 
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Political Measures: 
Demonstrations. Summed index of preference (each on a 1 to four scale) for ap- 
proved'and non-approved demonstrations (Kaase 1990). 
New Social Movements. Summed index of identification with ))peace,cc ))ecology,(( 
and ))anti-nuclear powercc movements (each on a scale from ))l(( representing ))belong 
to the groupllive like they docc to ~5cc ())they are enemies11 fight themcc). 
Political Alienation (Jugendwerk der Deutschen Shell 1992, vol 4, 101 102; Fischer 
and Kohr 1980) [alpha = ,801 
Political Interest. Single item: Are you interested in politics? (recoded 2 = nyescc, 1 = 
))no(() 
Typologies of Violence Acceptance: 
Subcultural [Aggressive Youth Groups]. Summed index of identification with 
))skinheads,cc and ))soccer hooliganscc (each on a scale from )) 1 cc representing ))belong 
to the groupllive like they docc to ))5cc, ))they are enemies11 fight themcc. For typology 
construction see Note, Table 2. 
Behavioral [Youth Aggression]. Summed index of items ))provoke older people, 
frighten them,(( and ))get into a serious fight with another personcc (on a three-point 
scale from ))often,(( to ))nevercc). For typology construction, see Note, Table 2. 
Political [Hard Political Tactics]. Summed index of preference (each on a 1 to four 
scale) for ))causing property damagecc and ))use of violence against persons, including 
policecc (Kaase 1990). For typology construction, see Note, Table 2. 
Political Party. Six-point index created by ranking parties from right to left, each 
number corresponding to the following: Republikaner, Christian Democratic Un- 
ionlchristian Social Union, Free Democratic Party, Social Democratic Party, Greens, 
Party of Democratic Socialism. 
Republikaner. Simple dichotomous measure indicating preference for the Repub- 
likaner Party (REPS) or not. 
View of the Future: 
))Future of Societycc. One can look at the future, at the way things will go in our 
society, more pessimistically or more optimistically. How is that with you? [Original: 
Man kann ja in die Zukunft, wie das Leben in unserer Gesellschaft weitergehen wird, 
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eher diister oder eher zuversichtlich sehen. Wic ist das bei Dir?] (recoded to 1 = 
))more optimisticcc, 2 = ))more pessimisticcc) 
))Personal Futurecc. One can look at one's own future, the way things will go in one's 
own life, more pessimistically or more optimistically. How is that with you? [Man 
kann die eigene Zukunfi, wie das eigene Leben weitergehen wird, eher duster oder 
eher zuversichtlich sehen. Wie ist das bei Dir?])) (recoded to 1 = ))more optimisticcc, 
2 = m i x e d  ...cc, 3 = ))more pessimisticcc). 
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Metin Alkan 
R a c i s m  a n d  S c h o o l i n g  E x p e r i e n c e s  
o f  T u r k i s h  S t u d e n t s  i n  S e c o n d a r y  
E d u c a t i o n  in  t h e  N e t h e r l a n d s  
Since the Dutch government formulated for the first time in 1980 in- 
tegrated policies directed towards migrants and the improvement of 
their social position, there has been a great deal of both academic and 
popular interest concerning the performance of children from a vari- 
ety of ethnic minority groups within the educational system. In many 
studies and reports, the trend has been to suggest that ethnic minori- 
ties have been underachieving in education. Attempts to identify and 
explain factors contributing to underachievement have often been set 
within a social pathology research model. The focus has been on a set 
of real or supposed individual characteristics, searching for deficien- 
cies and shortcomings of ethnic minority children and their back- 
grounds. In essence, a large majority of research has been centered 
around questions relating to the educability of minority children 
within the context of the demands and expectations of the Dutch 
school programs. Among the most popular models of explanation of 
underachievement have been the social disadvantage, limited profi- 
ciency in Dutch language, and ethnic-cultural backgrounds and char- 
acteristics of various groups under consideration. The social disad- 
vantage view is based on the assumtion that children from ethnic mi- 
nority groups and those of indigenious working-class families are to a 
high degree comparable with respect to their educational chances. 
According to this view, the underachievement of ethnic minority 
children in education has nothing to do with their ethnicity; it is a 
logical consequence of the fact that their parents belong to the lowest 
socio-economic class (De Jong 1987; Kerkhoff 1988, 1989; Van 
Langen and Jungbluth 1990). This assumed similarity between ethnic 
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minority and lower-class Dutch children has been the main reason for 
developing an educational policy for all underpriviliged children in 
1980's (Eldering 1989). Language problems and linguistic depriva- 
tion have also received attention. In this context, the underachieve- 
ment of minority children in education has been related to their lim- 
ited proficiency in the Dutch language in meeting the requirements of 
the abstract and cognitively demanding school language. Since the 
late 1980ts, the educational policy has concentrated primarily on the 
teaching of Dutch as a second language (Appel 1984, 1994; Extra 
and Vallen 1989; Driessen 1992). Within the framework of ethnic- 
cultural backgrounds and characteristics, the focus of research stud- 
ies has been on the problems of adjustment to Dutch school practices, 
differences between home and school, parents' educational back-
ground, pupils' early childhood development, family structure and 
pedagogy, and identity problems (Driessen 1992; Ledoux et.al. 1992; 
Verkuyten 1988; for a review of educational research on under-
achievement of ethnic minority children, see Eldering 1989; Teunis- 
sen 1990; Alkan and Kabdan 1995). Structural factors such as the 
distribution and selection mechanisms, and other organizational and 
conceptual strategies within the school system have been largely ne- 
glegted in these explanations of differential outcomes for ethnic mi- 
nority and white majority children. 
The focus on the characteristics of learners from ethnic minority 
groups in the majority of studies is connected with a particular appli- 
cation of the concept of ethnicity in the formulation of research 
questions and methodological approaches. Similar to such factors as 
the parents' educational background or the length of stay in the Neth- 
erlands, the so-called )ethnic-factor( is often treated in these studies 
as isolable and as functioning independently, rather than in an inter- 
active way. Or, it is viewed as subjective, ascriptive descriptions, 
shaping the specific personal characteristics of pupils from ethnic 
minority communities. Matthijssen (1993) suggested, for example, 
that a combination of the following ))ethnic-specific(( characteristics 
of minority children in schools makes them a group at risk: an ex- 
treme importance attached to receiving a diploma ())eagerness and 
tenacity in processing learning tasks as if their lives depend on it((), 
an i~ndisputed authority of the teacher ())an intense obedience and 
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servility, a limiteless submission to the authority of the teacher((), 
social isolation experienced with teachers and students ())feelings of 
being excluded, lack of self-confidence and social skills, and fear of 
making mistakes((), an isolation to a certain extent from parents ())as 
a result of parents' lack of understanding of school tasks and prob- 
lems((), specific sorts of language problems ())they miss lots of in- 
formation, because the teacher speaks too fast((), and ))light and un- 
conscious forms of discrimination, with which the most students do 
not seem to be having trouble(( (pp. 51-52). 
While the main thrust of the majority of research studies has been 
concerned with the ethnic minority children as the problem within 
the education system, there has been a small number of studies, con- 
cerned specifically with the analysis of the process of schooling itself 
and the practices which place these children at a disadvantage. In 
these studies, the problem is posed with respect to the question of 
how the structures and processes of the educational system and of 
individual schools might be failing to facilitate the full academic de- 
velopment of minority pupils. Coenen and Vallen (1991), for in- 
stance, revealed that national tests administered in the last year of the 
primary school tend to be culturally and linguistically biased to the 
disadvantage of ethnic minority children with respect to the school 
advice that they receive for their further schooling at the secondary 
level. According to a study conducted by De Lange (1987), expecta- 
tions of teachers are clearly low for Surinamese, and especially for 
Turkish and Maroccan children in the first cycle of secondary educa- 
tion. The low expectation of teachers is reflected negatively in their 
interactions with students within the context of classroom instruc- 
tional processes (see also Bervoets, 1992; Van Erp et al., 1992). 
Studies by Van den Berg and Reinsch (1983), Van Dijk (1987) and 
Mok (1990) demonstrate the existence of subtle forms of racism in 
school textbooks. Hofman (1 993) concluded that school process vari- 
ables like parental involven~ent, degree of attention for student coun- 
selling, and the extent of integration of minority languages and cul- 
tures in the school curriculum substantially determine the career ef- 
ficiency and study perspectives of ethnic minority children. Indeed, 
as Meijnen and Riemersma (1992) revealed, there are schools in the 
Netherlands that succeed in providing ethnic minority children with 
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an academic achievement at the level of or even higher than the aver- 
age of the total school population. Similarly, Matthijssen (1993) and 
Van der Werf, Mitert and Reezigt (1994) pointed to various aspects 
of institutional realities and processes in schools to account for the 
underachievement of ethnic minority children in education. Among 
the proposals that emerge from these studies for the improvement of 
school success of these children are the creation of a positive school 
climate, a well-structured school curriculum, order and regularity in 
classroom activities, and a friendly, positive and personal approach 
by teachers to minority children. 
.Findings of these research studies into various aspects of school 
structures and processes indicate the need to move away from the 
rather narrow and one-sided focus on factors relating to minority 
pupil characteristics in explaining patterns of achievement and un-
derachievement, Inequalities and disadvantages involved in the edu- 
cation of ethnic groups need to be considered from the viewpoint of 
the structure and functioning of the school system. Inevitably within 
such a relatively new research area of the structure and workings of 
the educational system itself, much work remains to be done. One 
such area is in relation to the experience of schooling, which this ar- 
ticle is concerned with. Here, the research problem is conceptualized 
in terms of describing and analyzing the ways in which racism and 
inequality are produced and reproduced bylin schools and how stu- 
dents experience these processes (see Gillborn 1990; Mac and Ghaill 
1989; Wright 1992). The central focus here is on the actual patterns 
of interaction within the context of the school and classroom, with a 
particular attention given to the ways in which ethnicity informs the 
educational experiences and outcomes of ethnic minority students. 
Ethnicity, a dynamic and complex concept, refers to how members of 
a group perceive themselves and how, in turn, they are perceived by 
others. Ethnic relations in education relate to the nature, intensity and 
scope of a continuing interaction that take place between students 
and various dimensions of the school. 
The forces which shape this interaction need to be taken into ac- 
count. This requires an insight into the characteristics and perspec- 
tives of students as well as the structure and functioning of the school 
system, and it requires a clarity about the kinds of changes which are 
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seen as desirable and possible. The focus on interaction provides a 
more holistic, comprehensive, and dynamic view than do other ex- 
planations of differential achievement. The school attempts to shape 
and regulate this interaction through decisions, measures and teach- 
ing-learning activities that are designed and implemented in response 
to the perceived needs and characteristics of the students. This is 
reflected in the nature of teacher-student relations, decisions concern- 
ing the school careers of students, assessment and evaluation of stu- 
dent progress, and in the interactional, social, management, and or- 
ganizational aspects of classroom and school environment. Obvi- 
ously, the school occupies a powerful, but not an independent posi- 
tion in this process of structuring ethnic relations in education. The 
nature of demands, reactions and expectations of ethnic minority 
groups needs to be considered. Similarly, students develop perspec- 
tives, interpretations, coping and survival strategies, and specific 
forms of resistence and responses with respect to their school experi- 
ences. 
The data reproduced below originate from a recently completed 
study with a group of Turkish students in various types of secondary 
schools in Amsterdam (Alkan and Kabdan 1995). The initial question 
of the study was: How do Turkish students evaluate the factors that 
determine their chances of success or failure in secondary education? 
In-depth interviews were conducted with 47 Turkish students from 
four different types of schools. The students were from 27 schools 
out of the 59 secondary schools that exist in the city of Amsterdam. 
Informal interviewing method (McCracken 1988) was thought to be 
best suited to the purpose of the study. In this type of interviewing, 
the researcher starts with an agenda, or a list of general topics to 
cover, as well as an opening statement and open-ended questions 
designed to elicit the participants' perspectives without sensitizing the 
participants to any hypotheses of the researchers. In this study, the 
focus was on specific domains of interest, and the interview agenda 
was developed after a basic review of literature. The specific do- 
mains included: primary school period school advice received at the 
end of the primary school, racism and discrimination in schools and 
society, school-based friendship patterns, relations with teachers, 
counselling, parental support, and motivational factors. During the 
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interviews, students were able to provide their views on a wide range 
of issues relating to these domains within the context of their own 
experiences and personal observations. In  the following part of the 
paper, the schooling experiences of Turkish students will be reported 
in relation to three areas: school advice, relations with teachers, and 
racism in schools and society. 
S c h o o l  A d v i c e  f o r  S e c o n d a r y  E d u c a t i o n  
The type of secondary school students can follow depends on how 
well they have done atprimary school in general, and their test scores 
in the last year of the primary school. Parents have the right to choose 
a secondary school, but the school decides whether or not to admit 
the child, through a consideration of the advice given by the primary 
school. Findings of mainstream research concerning the performance 
of children from ethnic minority groups in primary education suggest 
that the Dutch language proficiency is the most important cause of 
underachievement of these children, which, in turn, plays a decisive 
role in the unequal participation in secondary education. Minority 
children tend to score poorly on tests of language proficiency, 
mathematics, social competence, and intelligence (De Jong 1987; 
Eldering 1989; Mulder and Tesser 1992; Kloprogge et.al. 1994). 
Consequently, compared with the Dutch students, the representation 
of Turkish students in the various types of secondary schools dis- 
plays enourmous inequalities. The school placement advice given at 
the end of the primary school period determines this unequal repre- 
sentation to a large extent. According to a study conducted by Mulder 
and Tesser (1992), while close to 50 % of Turkish students received 
an advice for TVBO (individualized pre-vocational education) and 
VBO (pre-vocational education), 23 % of Dutch students received the 
same advice. The percentage of Turkish students with an advice for 
HAVO (senior general secondary education) and VWO (pre-univer- 
sity education) was 7,9, and for the Dutch students 32,9. 
Against the background of such findings, we posed the Turkish 
students in the interview group questions relating to their experiences 
during the primary school period. Among the areas covered were the 
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educational opportunities provided for their learning needs, attitudes 
towards the school, learning problems that they experienced, difficult 
years or periods, and the type and duration of any specific help which 
they received. The students appeared quite positive about their expe- 
riences during the primary school period. They indicated that they 
liked their teachers, got along well with their classmates, and had lit- 
tle or no difficulty with their lessons. Except some initial difficulties 
mentioned by some students, involved primarily in learning of or 
functioning with the Dutch language, there was no indication of any 
important problem relating to their education at that level. They were 
not confronted by their teachers with a learning problem that they 
would be experiencing. And there was no special provision for help- 
ing them. What surprised some of these students was the fact that 
they came to realize only in the last year of the primaly school that 
they had not learned enough to succeed in tests at a level which they 
had expected of themselves. 
))The last year was the most difficult period. We took many tests. 
No one helped us. I thought, )why can't I do well in these tests, why 
is it so difficult, have I not learned anything so far?( 
Especially the last year was difficult. I couldn't succeed at a level I 
wanted. I felt like I was stupid. I thought also that the school advice 
was very low. I would have wanted to study at a higher level, but it 
didn't work out that way.(( 
In the interview group, almost half of the students said that they 
were not happy with the advice they had received from their primary 
schools. As the most important reason for this, they indicated the low 
expectation of teachers regarding students' abilities. In the following 
account, a fifth year HAVO student, who intends to transfer to VWO 
in order to be able to go to university, illustrates this point: 
))For the last four years, I have been the most successful student in 
my class. When they gave me a MAVO advice in the last year of the 
primary school, I couldn't believe it. ... If I had known then what I 
know now, I would have chosen for VWO. I would have said, )My 
grades are just as good as the other students, why do they get a 
HAVO/VWO advice and I get a MAVO advice?( ... 1 think that the 
teacher had no confidence in me. A year later when I passed to the 
second class, I went to see that teacher to show my report. He said he 
knew I would be successful. I asked him why he had given me a 
MAVO advice. He said he didn't know. Probably, he didn't trust me 
then.(( 
In the interview group there were other students with a compara- 
ble position to the above student. Despite the low advice of the pri- 
mary school, they succeeded to transfer to a secondary school of their 
level and choice. 
))I should have gone directly to HAVO. But they sent me to 
MAVO. 1 am now in the forth year of HAVO. This way, I lost one 
year.(( 
The school advice appeares especially problematic from the view- 
point of those students who were placed in a VBO-school. These 
students experienced this as an injustice and they were of opinion 
that they were discriminated against by their primary school teachers. 
One student described his experience as follows: 
))Until the last year of the primary school, there was no discrimi- 
nation. In the last year, the teacher gave me VBO advice. But I 
wanted to go to a higher level. Nevertheless, what the teacher wanted 
happened. We couldn't do anything about it. We went to the com- 
munity centre to ask for help. They said, )if your teacher thinks so, 
we can't do anything about it.( ... The teacher had said to me, )you 
can't even make it in the VBO(. This made me so angry and ambi- 
tious at the sametime. When I transfered from VBO to MAVO, I 
went to the school to show my report. But the teacher was sick. He 
was not at the school.cr 
Some students problematized their school advice from the view- 
point of their ethnic identity. They compared their situation with that 
of Dutch students, and believed that teachers tended to give a lower 
advice to students of ethnic minority origin. They perceived this as an 
act of discrimination, and in some cases, as a source of motivation to 
succeed and prove themselves. In the following account, it is possible 
to see the elements of low teacher expectation, comparison with 
Dutch students, the role of prejudice against the ethnic group, and the 
problematization of student's language proficiency. It should be noted 
that this student, similar to the cases mentioned above, found it im- 
portant to go back to the primary school a year later in order to con- 
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front the teacher with what she thought as an injustice done to her- 
self. 
))I wanted a school with not many minority children in it. I wanted 
to become a lawyer. I thought that a MAVOIHAVO school was 
suitable to my level. I could do HAVO. I had confidence in myself. 
But the teacher wanted to send me to VBO. I resisted to it. I insisted 
that I go to MAVO. I did this with a determined attitude of )despite 
this teacher, and for my own future(. Sometimes they say things 
about Turks. Like, we can not do it. But somebody has got to try. My 
brother supported me too. They gave me a VBO advice, because they 
thought of me as inferior. My test result were not bad at all. There 
was a Dutch girl who had the same scores. She got a MAVO advice, 
and I got VBO. I said, )How can this be?( They said, )Her Dutch is 
better than yours(. I said, )You do this only because she is Dutch, 
don't you?( But they denied it. Against their wish, I went to a MAVO 
school. In my second year I made it to the MAVOIHAVO. I took my 
report to the school to show it to that teacher. He said to me, ))well 
done((. 
Among the students interviewed, the feeling was shared that pri- 
mary schools generally discriminate against students of ethnic mi- 
nority origin by giving them a lower advice. Thus, they tended to 
perceive their own school advice also within the context of the expe- 
riences of other Turkish students in their environment. 
))After the primary school they wanted to send me to MAVO. My 
older sister had gonethrough the same experience. Therefore, she 
made it sure that I could go to VWO. They said in the school that I 
could not make it in the VWO. They said, )It is for your own good. 
You can't do it(. But they knew very well that I didn't have bad 
grades. Although my sister had also very good grades, they sent her 
to VBO. That is very bad.(( 
Several students in the interview group found it important, there- 
fore, that the coming generations of Turkish students their families 
should be suspicious of the correctness of the advice which they will 
receive. They pointed out that the given school advice was influenced 
by the stereotyped attitudes of teachers against ethnic minority 
groups in general, and the Turkish minority in particular. 
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))I didn't do any test in the last year of the primary school. They 
adviced me to go to VBO. My mother was against it. ... They thought 
that, because I am Turkish, I was going to getmarried and drop out of 
school anyway. ... I am now in the second class of MBO. When I am 
finished I'll go on to higher education. ... If we hadn't objected it, I 
wouldn't have been here at this level now. I would still continue with 
my education. But, to get to the level where 1 am now, it would have 
taken me a longer time. Much longer. You have to make all kinds of 
turns.(( 
As can be expected, the majority of the students follows their 
school advice, even though they may think that they could have 
studied at a higher level. Within the interview group, the students that 
fall into this category pointed out that they were unhappy and regret- 
ful, and they lacked a feeling of personal attachment to the school, 
and found the lessons rather easy. 
As mentioned earlier, the school advice given at the end of the 
primary school plays a critical role with respect to the position and 
the level of success of the Turkish students at the secondary school 
level. Despite the research evidence indicating problems of under- 
achievement at the primary school level, there seems to be institu- 
tional factors at work influencing these processes in a negative way. 
Taking the student experiences as a basis, the biased assessment and 
testing procedures and the stereotyped attitudes and low expectations 
of ethnic minorities among the teachers should be considered among 
these factors. As the above data suggest, there exists a discrepancy 
between the given school advice and the actual position and 
achievement level of the students. Similarly, a discrepancy exists 
between student expectations and the given school advice (for similar 
findings, see Nelissen and Bilgin 1995). 
S t u d e n t - T e a c h e r  R e l a t i o n s  
A particular problem of ethnic relations in education is the ways in 
which ethno-cultural differences are perceived and acted upon by 
teachers in their interactions with students. Several studies substan- 
tiate the influence of teacher bias and expectancy on student per- 
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formance. These biases or preconceived judgments may lead to spe- 
cific teacher behaviors, which create interpersonal barriers for the 
involvement of these students in learning. Exclusion, stereotyping, 
fragmentation, imbalance and linguistic bias are processes, indicative 
of biased teacher behavior that adversely affects the potential success 
of students. It may be safe to assume, therefore, as Cummins (1988) 
emphasized, that the most direct determinant of minority student 
outcomes is the type of interaction students experience with teachers. 
Minority students are empowered or disabled as a direct result of 
their interactions with teachers. These interactions are mediated by 
the role definitions of teachers which are moulded by a variety of 
influences. 
With respect to their interaction with teachers, all the students in 
the interview group spoke of the importance of having a positive and 
close relation with their teachers. They expected that teachers show 
respect, understanding, support en encouragement, and equal treat- 
ment. In general, the students appeared highly sensitive and ex-
tremely perceptive of teacher behavior and attitudes. 
))It is very important for me to have a warm relationship with the 
teachers. When my teachers don't help me, I feel very lonesome. ... I 
don't want that teachers give me a special sort of attention. I don't 
want that. They should treat us in an equal way. ... To me, a teacher 
should understand the special circumstances of a student. He should 
be considerate. 
I like my teachers very much. Some of them teach very well, and 
some are very helpful. When you have a problem with your lessons 
or another problem, they help you. 
I can speak about everything with my teachers. I have good rela- 
tions with them. This has a positive influence on my success. They 
give me confidence, they say I can do it. Then I work harder and do 
better.(( 
Besides a friendly and close personal relationship, a certain 
amount of stress in the form of high expectations serves to improve 
performance. The students mentioned positive experiences with tea- 
chers who related their high expectations to them directly and in an 
encouraging way. 
))Some of my teachers say, if I don't do something well, )Is this 
really you? First you had a nine, and now two. How is this possible?( 
I am pleased with this type of interest. 
In this school, the interest that teachers have in us is very good. 
For instance, the math teacher has been very supportive of me. When 
I think sometimes that I won't be able to do well, he says, )You can 
do it, come on, we'll work together(. 
The teacher says, )You didn't do well in your exam, how could 
this happen?( Such an interest from a teacher gives me confidence. I 
feel stronger and try to improve my performance.(( 
The students want to be treated equally by their teachers, and 
they find it unacceptable that some teachers appear to make a dis- 
tinction between minority and Dutch students. In the mean time, they 
expect that teachers display certain attitudes and sensitivities towards 
ethnic minority students. 
))Teachers should be considerate of the background of a minority 
student. They should respecthis culture. They should know their way 
with him and speak with him. 
'Teachers should behave friendly to minority students. They 
should help them. Dutch students feel generally at ease. That is not 
always the case with minority students.(( 
The students talked also about their experiences with prejudiced 
and discriminatory teachers. As they did so, they referred essentially 
to a particular teacher and in some cases they used the term ))some 
teachers((. They also made statements referring to teachers in general. 
The remarks of the students about the problematic aspects of their 
interactions with teachers were concerned with open discriminatory 
acts, prejudice over ethnic groups, differential treatment of minority 
and majority students, and discriminatory assessment of learning out- 
comes. Below, a selection of specific accounts of these interactions is 
described and analyzed. 
In the experiences of some student, it is possible to detect teacher 
attitudes which take the form of an explicitely prejudiced interaction 
with students and discriminatory practices. Among the negative re- 
sponses to Turkish students expressed by teachers, within or outside 
the classroom context, were also an open disapproval of the customs 
and traditions. Such teacher behavior added to the negative experi- 
Racism and Schooling Ekperiences 
ences of school of some of these students. In some cases, the students 
mentioned experiences in which some teachers were even involved in 
the use of direct forms of racist and ethnicist verbal abuse. As the 
following accounts make it clear, these attacks include accusation of 
theft, cursing of religious and cultural practices, and degrading re- 
marks over the ethnic identity of the students. 
))There is a teacher who gives English and sale practice. I don't 
trust him. He hates minorities. If a Turkish or Moroccan boy comes 
into the class with something new, he asks always where he lifted it. 
... There is no problem among the students in this school. If there is 
racism, it comes from the teachers.(( 
))One of the teachers says things in the form of a joke. He calls 
Turks, for example, because they fast during the Ramadan, )hungery 
apes( and Moroccans )camels(. 
They [teachers] say that Turks should be ashamed of themselves. 
There is this teacher who often says in a degrading tone, )you 
Turks, you Moroccans(, when we make a mistake. He makes me so 
angry. 
A teacher in this school said to a student that he stank, and that he 
had to wash himself first and then come back. He would never say 
something like that to a Dutch student.(( 
The above accounts relate to the observable, clear-cut instances of 
racist discriminatory acts by some teacher. The students mentioned 
also experiences in which stereotypical views of some teachers over 
the ethnic group are revealed. 
))Teachers have certain ideas over us, because we are Turkish or 
Moroccan. In the first place, they should get rid of these ideas. ... 
Some teachers have reacted to me in a very strange manner. Like, 
)Are you really so free, can you do this all, do you really think so, are 
you not going to get married?(. When I hear such things from them, I 
feel like saying, )Who do you think you are(. There exists so much 
ignorance, so many stereotypes. When they get to know you better, it 
disappears. But that doesn't mean that they will not do the same thing 
again with others.(( 
In their talks with the students, teachers relate their prejudice and 
low expectations of the ethnic group in a variety of ways. Even when 
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a teacher praises a student for his success, this could be perceived by 
the student as an act of humiliation towards his own ethnic group. 
))One of the teachers said to me that 1 was exceptional. He said 
that there were not many others like me. Among the Turks, of course. 
Only I was so. ... The fact that I am successful amazes them.(( 
In relation to teacher prejudice and discrimination, the students 
mentioned also that they could see a difference in the way in which 
teachers behave towards Dutch students and students of ethnic mi-
nority origin. 
))The teachers show more interest in the Dutch students and they 
discriminate against us. We are all their students. They shouldn't do 
something like that. 
There are some teachers that act cool and distant to minority stu- 
dents, simply because they are foreigners. 
Some teachers are nicer to the Dutch students. I see that. I just feel 
it.(( 
According to some students, teachers' differential treatment of 
minority and majority students results in discriminatory assessment 
practices. 
))In the assessment of our homeworks and exams, teachers dis- 
criminate sometimes between us and the Dutch students. This is very 
bad. 
For example, there is a Dutch girl and a Turkish girl. For the same 
work, she gets an eight and the Turkish girl a five. To me, this is dis- 
crimination. 
There are teachers in this school that discriminate. ... For exam- 
ple, we make a presentation in the class. You see that a Dutch student 
doesn't do well. But you prepare yourself at home very well before 
you.come to school. The Dutch student says that he did not prepare at 
all. He gets a nine and you get a six. Perhaps the Dutch student 
speaks a bit clearer, but the teacher doesn't want to see that you have 
worked much harder. Teachers are nicer to Dutch students.(( 
Asked about how they react to teacher prejudice and discrimina- 
tion, some students said that they confronted the teacher with it. 
Those students who said that they had not had a direct experience 
with discrimination by teachers indicated that, in case it would hap- 
pen, they would relate the matter to the school director. The students 
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thought in general that there was little that could be done about the 
subtle and indirect forms of teacher discrimination. In taking a stance 
against teacher discrimination, some students seemed to calculate the 
formal power the teachers have over themselves. 
R a c i s m  in S c h o o l s  a n d  S o c i e t y  
During the interviews, the students reflected their views on the nature 
of ethnic relations within their schools and in their environment. As 
institutions, schools operate within a larger society, which has pow- 
erful and dynamic forces that affect teachers and students directly 
and indirectly. Recent attitudinal surveys indicate a widespread racist 
sentiment among the different layers of the Dutch society. According 
to a study conducted by the Dutch Interdisciplinary Institute for 
Demographic Research, more than 50 % of the sample surveyed 
expressed the wish that migrants, who are unemployed for more than 
a year, should returr. to their countries of origin. Also the majority of 
the respondants found that the government should stimulate migrants 
to return back to their countries with some financial help. Compared 
with the results of a similar survey in 1990, the attitudes of the Dutch 
people towards migrants became more negative (Van Leusten and 
Moors 1995). According to another study, the majority of the Dutch 
population still would like to consider the Netherlands a white man's 
country (Van Leusden and Moors 1988). In a survey of youth atti- 
tudes, two-third of the sample expressed the opinion that there should 
be no more foreigners permitted into the Netherlands and almost 20 
% of the sample defined ethnic minority groups as a ))threat((. There 
is a growing group among the youngsters, holding ))biological racist 
ideas((; 7.8 % of the sample found that migrants were less intelligent 
than the Dutch and expressed the opinion that they must be sent back 
to their homelands (Kleinpenning 1993). 
In the interviews, the students spoke of their concern about the 
deteriorating racial climate in the Dutch society. 
))I don't like it here anymore like I used to. In the past, I didn't 
want to be anywhere else. But now, I feel less so. They look down at 
Turkish people in the Netherlands. I never used to think about dis- 
Metin Allcan 
crimination or so. The other day I read in the newspaper that one 
third of the Dutch people don't want any foreigners here. That sur- 
prised me. One third or two third, I don't remember. I try to be careful 
now. 
When you say racism, I think of things like )Get out of our city, 
what are you doing herec.Then I feel like a tourist. I mean, an illegal 
person. I become very angry. I want to hit that person. 
I am really angry about racism. When they say, )Go back to your 
country(, 1 say, )What would have happened in this country if we 
hadn't come. We did the dirty work while you were sitting at home. 
You say to us now that we live on your tax money. ... In order to 
prevent racism, they must talk about it in schools. We did not come 
here with bad intentions(. 
They throw bombs to mosques. In Germany, they attact Turkish 
people. I see such things on television. It is really absurd.(( 
Problems involved in ethnic relations in the larger society affect 
the schools system in a variety of ways. In the large cities where 
minority populations are concentrated, school segregation has be- 
come a serious problem not only at the primary but also at the secon- 
dary level. As a result of the combination of discriminatory housing 
policies and White-flight, the majority of children from ethnic groups 
receive their education in the so-called black schools. During the in- 
terviews, the students indicated the negative consequences of this 
development with respect to the quality of education, school climate, 
the quality of physical environment of the schools, the discipline in 
the classroom and contacts with Dutch students. 
))The first three years, I was happy with my school. But, not any 
more. Everything is changed. There are other teachers and students. 
The climate in the school is changed. They used to treat us better. 
There are big differences between this school and other schools: 
outside, canteen, the way in which teachers deal with the homework. 
In this school they don't look at our homeworks. 
This school used to be good. But, as the number of minority stu- 
dents increased, the discipline faded away. ... I would like a school in 
which there is discipline and there are more Dutch students. Speaking 
with them would help us learn Dutch better.(( 
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Especially, the lack of discipline was problematized by the stu- 
dents in schools with a large minority student representation. They 
spoke of their preference for a school in which the composition of 
student population is multi-ethnic, the administration and teachers 
have authority over the students, classroom activities take place in an 
harmonious and orderly manner, the teachers take their jobs seri- 
ously, control homework, and follow student progress. 
Many of the students who attended schools with a high concen- 
tration of ethnic minority students pointed out that they did not ex- 
perience racism within the school. Those students who mentioned 
some specific incidents of racism expressed their disappointment in 
the lack of attention from their their teachers and school administra- 
tion in confronting such acts. In other words, teachers, although 
aware of the racial harrassment experienced by Turkish students, 
seem reluctant to formally address to this issue. 
))There is no racism in the school. We are all foreigners anyway. 
Sometimes, teachers discriminate. But, it is not really obvious. 
In my second year here, I met racism. The Dutch students said to 
me things like Stupid Turk, go back to your country.( I went to talk 
with the school director about it. He told me not to pay attention to 
such things. The school administration doesn't take such things seri- 
ously. 
If someone says something racist to me, I tell my teacher about it. 
But he doesn't bring us together to talk it out.(( 
Independent of the fact whether they have had a direct experience 
with racist discrimination, the students appeared highly concerned 
with racism in schools and in the society. They emphasized that 
schools should take an active role in dealing with these processes. 
Among the points which they mentioned were a clear school policy 
on anti-racism, disciplinary measures against racist acts, teaching 
about racism and discrimination, and clearly stated guidelines for the 
selection and appointment of teachers. 
Another issue here is the actual patterns of interaction between 
students and their relationship to ethnicity, that is, how far ethnicity 
informs the formation and structure of school-based frienship group- 
ings. There was not a single student in the interview group who had a 
close Dutch friend in hislher friendship group. For some students, the 
reason for this was the absence of Dutch students in the school or in 
the environment. Yet, in scliools with a multi-ethnic student popula- 
tion, the friendship relations between the Dutch and Turkish students 
leave much to be desired. The Turkish students prefer as friends stu- 
dents from their own group or from other ethnic minority groups. 
Among the reasons given for this preference were the lack of soli- 
darity, stereotypical attitudes and discriminatory acts which they ex- 
perienced with the Dutch students. 
C o n c l u s i o n  
The interview material reported above illuminates the point that 
characteristics of ethnic minority student populations are not suffi- 
cient to explain or predict academic achievement. School variables 
must be taken into account. An important factor which contributes 
potentially to underachievement and unequal representation of the 
Turkish students is stereotyped attitudes of teachers which take the 
form of an explicitely prejudiced interaction with students and low 
expectations of students' abilities and achievement. Students are ex- 
tremely perceptive and are capable of understanding the meaning of 
these attitudes. The students' ethnicity influence their interaction with 
teachers and their experience of teacher expectations. Stereotyping of 
minority students appears to play an important part in misassessment 
and misplacement, as well as other aspects of school experiences of 
these students. A systematic monitoring and evaluation of school 
advice given at the end of the primary school period is a necessity. 
Dealing with differential achievement patterns requires the elimi- 
nation of racist discriminations, exclusion and prejudice and a greater 
appreciation of cultural diversity, both in society and in the schools. 
Improvement in educational outcomes for ethnic minority students 
depends significantly on changes in teacher attitudes toward minority 
students, adaptations in curriculum and instruction, and the use of 
culturally and linguistically unbiased testing and assessment proce- 
dures. Changing the basic attitudinal orientation and knowledge base 
of teachers is necessary. Teachers should be provided with opportu- 
nities to examine their expectations and perceptions of ethnic minor- 
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ity students. Finally, there is an urgent need for more research infor- 
mation on overt and covered racism in schools and in the education 
system, and how this relates to performance of ethnic minority pupils 
and wider educational issues. 
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W i d e r  H o r i z o n s  f o r  Y o u n g  P e o p l e :  

A C a s e  S t u d y  i n  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  in  I r e l a n d ,  

N o r t h  a n d  S o u t h  

B a c k g r o u n d  o f  C o n f l i c t  in I r e l a n d  
This paper is entitled a case-study in reconciliation. The word re-
conciliation implies estrangement, alienation and enmity between 
people who should be friends. In  other words it implies a state of 
conflict between rivals. It is important therefore to try to understand 
the underlying causes of this conflict, else how can we attempt to 
reconcile the rival parties? If people are to seek forgiveness from one 
another they must first know what sin they have committed. 
Ireland is a small island of about 100.000 square kilometres in 
area. Its people for the most part speak the same language and prac- 
tise one form or other of the Christian faith. We have a common his- 
tory of being colonised by our neighbouring island, Britain, for sev- 
eral hundred years, and have benefited or suffered from this process -
depending on which point of view you take. We share the same ma- 
terial culture and to an outsider we look alike, wear the same kind of 
clothes, eat the same kind of food, drive the same kind of cars and 
look at the same kind of television programmes - more or less. 
Yet for all that Ireland is a divided country. A political border 
winds its tortuous way over 400 kilometres, dividing fields and farms 
rivers and lakes, roads and railways, - and even in one case - so it is 
said - somebody's house. If you walk, along this border, in some 
places you are in danger of losing your way and may find yourself 
wandering from one part of the country into the other and back again 
without being aware that you have changed jurisdictions. This bor- 
der, however, is but a symbol of a deeper division - a division of 
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minds and hearts among the people who live together on the island. 
We cannot live at peace with each other, neither can we agree on the 
way the island as a whole should be governed. We are a divided 
country and a divided people. 
The reasons for these divisions have been explored at great length 
by all manner of people - politicians, church leaders, historians, so- 
ciologists, economists, psychologists, anthropologists, journalists, 
novelists, dramatists, poets and even film makers. The volume of re- 
search and scholarly publications on what is sometimes called the 
Irish question is enormous. There has been a huge outflow of schol- 
arly work since 1969, the beginning of the current phase of ))the 
Troublescc, so much so that one researcher, Professor John Whyte, 
was able to examine no fewer than 540 serious titles which had ap- 
peared mostly between 1969 and 1990, all purporting to explain the 
reasons for the conflict (White 1990). What we can we say then in a 
short paper like this without risking a distortion of the truth by an 
oversimplification of the facts? We must try nonetheless to give some 
kind of explanation, otherwise, as we said at the beginning, of the 
paper we cannot seriously talk of reconciliation. 
It is possible to distinguish three broad categories among the vari- 
ous theories on the reasons for the present troubles in lreland. The 
first would put the blame on Britain, arguing that the problem is 
chiefly caused by the British occupation of the six north-eastern 
counties of Ireland, the entity officially known as Northern Ireland. 
This view sees the solution essentially dependent on Britain with- 
drawing its forces from Northern Ireland, thereby paving the way for 
the unification of both parts of Ireland, North and South. The view in 
its extreme form is that of the IRA, a paramilitary organisation which 
up to very recently has pursued its aims through physical force. 
The second view would put the blame on the South, the Irish Re- 
public, which comprises the greater part of the island. This view, 
which is held by a large number of Unionists in Northern Ireland 
(people who owe their allegiance to Britain and who want Northern 
Ireland to remain an integral part of the United Kingdom), sees the 
main problem to be the fact that the Irish Republic lays claim to the 
whole island of Ireland, a claim which is supported by a large minor- 
ity in Northern Ireland, as well as by many people in the South. The 
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view in its extreme form is held by the Unionist paramilitary organi- 
sations, which like the IRA have up to recently promoted their aims 
through violence. 
The third view sees the problem as being chiefly within Northern 
Ireland itself because within that small entity there are two sharply 
divided communities, unionist and nationalist, the first largely Protes- 
tant, the second Catholic, the one calling itself British, the other Irish, 
with the former traditionally in a ppsition of dominance and power 
and the latter increasingly rejecting a position of subservience and 
lack of status. 
The first two explanations are variations of nationalism; the third 
can be described as a theory of inter-community conflict. All three 
lead us to conclude that there are three strands to the problem and 
therefore three related dimensions to any solution which will emerge. 
We may express it like this: the situatioli is a complex amalgam of 
three sets of relationships: 
- within Northern Ireland, between two antagonistic communities, 
who live side by side in the same jurisdiction; 
- within Ireland as a whole, between the people both North and 
South, who have to share the same small island; 
- between Ireland and Britain, who have to agree on the best way the 
island is governed. 
A last point about the conflict before we turn to possible ways of 
reconciliation, is that it would appear safe to assume from what we 
have said above that the core of the problem is essentially linked with 
the issue of identity; in other words there are different ways in which 
people in Ireland express their identity and these ways are sometimes 
in conflict with each other. Hence, the views and perceptions that 
people hold about each other are often expressed in hostile terms. 
These perceptions may or may not be grounded in reality; the impor- 
tant thing is that people hold to these views firmly, often passion- 
ately, and sometimes are prepared to kill because of them. 
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T h e  W a y  o f  ~ e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
In Ireland today, you will sometimes hear people speak in despairing 
tones of the conflict which has now persisted for a quarter of a cen- 
tury in Northern Ireland, and which has sometimes overflowed into 
the South and into Britain. The legacy of bitterness and enmity cre- 
ated by the Troubles now seems so deep that no solution seems pos- 
sible and no matter what remedy is suggested you will always find 
one group or other which will remain intransigent. The old slogans 
))no surrendercc arid ))not an inch(( are still very powerful catch-cries. 
Yet it has to be said that the conflict has also generated a wide 
variety of peace and reconciliation initiatives at all levels of society. 
It is fair to say that there is a groundswell of good will and yearning 
for peace, a readiness to come together to see if any basis can be 
found for mutual understanding and co-operation. There are many 
individuals and organisations devoted to these ideals and, in recent 
years there has been a great ferment in thinking about causes and 
possible solutions. In this paper I shall very briefly describe one par- 
ticular reconciliation initiative - not untypical of much of what is 
going on in Ireland today. 
In 1986 an organisation called the International Fund for Ireland 
was established by both the British and Irish Governments with the 
aim ))to promote economic and social advance and to encourage 
contact, dialogue and reconciliation between nationalists and union- 
ists throughout Ireland(( (Annual Report 1987188). This organisation 
is an international fund in the sense that it has attracted financial 
support from abroad - largely from the US and the European Union, 
and also from Canada and New Zealand. To date the International 
Fund for Ireland has received UKL240 million in such donations. The 
Fund comprises a series of programmes in NorthISouth co-operation 
in  areas like tourism, urban development, business enterprise, rural 
development and community regeneration. All these programmes 
regulate the giving of grants to foster initiatives as varied as building 
hotels and industrial complexes to reopening a disused canal as a 
means of communication and leisure pursuits between North and 
South. 
Wider Horizons for Young People 
One of the Fund's programmes is different from the others in that 
it is centred on people and on promoting their training and employ- 
ment opportunities. It does this by sending groups abroad for periods 
of about two months - mainly to the US, Canada and the countries of 
the European Union - to places where they can obtain relevant train- 
ing and work experience. Every group, which comprises about 15 to 
20 people, has to contain two dimensions - it must have both Catho- 
lics and Protestants from Northern Ireland, and also there must be 
participants from the South as well as the North. To ensure that each 
project group functions as a unit requires considerable preparation 
and leadership well in advance of the actual overseas experience, and 
when you consider the different backgrounds of the people who make 
up the group - Catholic and Protestant, and North as well as South -
this is a considerable achievement. 
The Programme covers a wide spectrum of people, from managers 
of businesses to young people with poor qualifications and poor 
prospects of employment. The Programme is called - appropriately 
enough - ))Wider Horizonscc and it is oriented largely towards people 
in the age range 16-28 years. It seeks to make an impact on people's 
lives by sending them into a situation very different from the one 
they are used to, and so hopefully enhance their employability and 
deepen their understanding of each other. Thus the Programme can 
be said to have a two-fold aim: to promote mutual understanding and 
reconciliation through vocational preparation and professional devel- 
opment. 
T h e  P r a c t i c e  o f  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
w i t h i n  W i d e r  I-Iorizons 
One of the most noticeable effects of the Wider Horizons experience 
is the opportunity it gives to the participants to re-evaluate their own 
situations back home. Coping with the demands of living in a strange 
environment creates a separation which for some people is as much 
psychological as physical, a space which allows them to see familiar 
situations from new points of view. One project group report de- 
scribes how the participants who travelled to the US in 1991 as part 
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of a younger managers' development programme learned much about 
their own culture as a result of their time in the US: 
))Trainee managers reported on what they felt had been a real 
widening of horizons in their approach both to Northern Ireland and 
to the Republic. For some, the project had enabled them to visit the 
other side of the Irish Border for the first time. They felt that their 
time abroad had enabled them to see their own communities in per- 
spective, and while they seldom talked amongst themselves about 
national and denominational differences, the experience of explain- 
ing such differences to Alnericans had proved valuable in clarifying 
their own minds. Some were now interested in working in the hospi- 
tality industry on the other side of the Border from their own home.(( 
(Trant and McSkeane 1994,4546) 
Contact with people from other cultures, for whom Ireland and its 
troubles are distant and even inexplicable, can challenge Wider Hori- 
zons participants to explain their own tradition not only to their over- 
seas hosts but to themselves. This is turn can lay the ground for sym- 
pathy and understanding between neighbours, who in Ireland con- 
sider each other as strangers. For the twenty young marketing stu- 
dents who trained and worked in San Francisco in 1989, the experi- 
ence revealed as much about Ireland as it did about the US: 
))The most important exploration of differences and sensitivities 
appears to have taken place across the Border as opposed to across 
the already in some senses well-explored Northern cross-community 
boundary. Many Southerners found that they had learned greatly 
about the North in the company of the Northern students. The major- 
ity had never visited the North, and confessed themselves previously 
ill-informed on the area; all were now intending to visit. One South- 
ern girl felt that finding out about the North was an )eye-opener ... an 
interesting analogy(. 
Another Southern girl who had worked in the Soviet Union thought 
that in its depth of interest and novelty talking to Northerners was 
)like finding out about Russia(. Northerners also felt that they had 
learned about the other part of Ireland. To some, the trip to Galway 
was as novel an experience as the trip to San Francisco.(( (Trant and 
McSkeane 1994,47-48) 
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It seems, therefore, that ignorance and preconceptions exist not 
only between the communities on both sides of the Northern divide, 
but on both sides of the' Border. It is revealing to know that to some 
young people on this island, Galway or Belfast may seem as exotic, 
or as alien, as San Francisco or Moscow. Conversely, young North- 
erners sometimes discover how much they have in common with 
each other as compared with their Southern counterparts. ))We have 
more to argue about((, one young Northern Protestant observed, and 
sounded pleasantly surprised (ibid.). 
A significant feature of the project reports to date is the infre- 
quency with which sectarian conflict is reported within the groups. 
Considering that Wider Horizons has brought together four and a half 
thousand people from the different traditions in Ireland, this is quite 
remarkable. It may be that the novelty and exhilaration of enjoying 
new experiences and facing unfamiliar challenges makes the partici- 
pants more inclined to put their differences aside than they would at 
home. It is possible also that there is a self-selecting process at work, 
whereby people who agree to take part in a project which promotes 
contact with an alien tradition are already less prejudiced and there- 
fore less likely to engage in ,sectarian conflict than those who do not 
participate in such projects. Or it may be that those who write the 
project reports are, understandably, less than eager to publicise un- 
pleasant behaviour. Whatever the reasons, the fact remains that in 
over a hundred reports surveyed, only a very small number document 
conflict of any kind, and this arises more often as a result of person- 
ality clashes or professional differences between the organisers than 
among the people in their care. This suggests that the very fact of 
being together may be a significant factor in helping to dissolve the 
sectarian and political barriers which divide people. 
This surmise is supported by the theory known as the ))contact hy- 
pothesis((, which was formulated in the US in the wake of World War 
I1 and sought to combat hostile perceptions of Japanese and other 
ethnic groups perceived by white Americans as ))the enemy((. The 
theory implies that bringing together individual members of conflict 
groups automatically results in a modification of attitudes and behav- 
iour which are based on ignorance and prejudice. This is the reason- 
ing underlying several contact programmes in Northern Ireland 
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among them the Holiday Schemes Project which brought Protestant 
and Catholic children together for community holidays. The Depart- 
ment of Education, Northern Ireland, which funded the Holiday 
Schemes Project, described it as a ))practical means of facilitating the 
coming together of children and young people in circumstances that 
will contribute to increased understanding between the two tradi- 
tions(( (ibid.). 
The contact theory supports the view that in order to promote 
harmony and mutual understanding among conflict groups, it is suf- 
ficient to bring about contact between them. Reconciliation ))just 
happens(( of its own accord and therefore inputs which make specific 
mention of religion, politics or prejudice reduction are neither neces- 
sary or desirable. Many Wider Horizons projects come into this cate- 
gory in that they do not include explicitly structured guidance on rec- 
onciliation issues. 
I s  C o n t a c t  E n o u g h ?  
The question however remains - is contact alone enough? To date, 
the vast majority of Wider Horizons projects have operated from the 
premise that it is, and some of the anecdotal evidence sumrnariscd 
above seems to support this. However, it must be pointed out that in 
the absence of more extensive documentation or supportive field re- 
search, this is a conclusion which cannot be drawn with certainty. 
Contact by itself may not be sufficient to ensure reconciliation. Some 
researchers now argue it is unlikely when two groups are brought 
together that harmony will necessarily ensue, unless contact is aug- 
mented by additional factors. In other words, if integration and mu- 
tual understanding are left to happen as a natural and inevitable con- 
sequence of people simply being together, reconciliation very possi- 
bly may not happen at all. And even if it does, the breaking down of 
barriers between individuals need make no difference to their per- 
ception of the alien group to which their new friends belong (Ruddle 
and O'Connor 1992, 21-25). This is not to say that contact is not im- 
portant but rather points to the conclusion that contact without the 
support of specially designed activities, which encourage growth in 
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mutual understanding, cannot be depended upon to produce the am- 
bitious effects embodied in a programme like Wider Horizons. 
It is also important to remember that conflict within any particular 
group can be exacerbated by factors which are not political or relig- 
ious in origin. This is illustrated in the case of a Wider Horizons 
group which met for the first time at a pre-departure residential semi- 
nar. By the end of the seminar all the participants were on excellent 
terms with each other. Political and religious boundaries appeared to 
have dissolved and cross-Border and cross-community friendships 
had emerged. It was nevertheless a very divided group and the most 
obvious division was that of age. While some of the participants were 
still in their teens, most were in their mid-twenties and at least two 
were approaching thirty. A divergence of attitudes and aspirations, 
which one would expect from people with such different life experi- 
ences, had begun to emerge and it was obvious that some of the 
younger people were irritated by the well-meaning advice proffered 
by their elders and would-be-mentors. 
Educational attainment and aspirations divided this group still 
further. While a few participants had completed post-primary school- 
ing and hoped to continue to further education or a professional 
career, most were interested in manual skills and had few quali- 
fications, with at least one young man having difficulties with read- 
ing. Another division was gender; the young women in the group 
were seriously out-numbered and openly admitted to feeling disre- 
garded or even occasionally threatened by the overwhelming male 
presence. Add to this the natural variations in personality and tem- 
perament, which make some people dominate a group and others 
wish to hide in it, and we get some idea of the potential tensions and 
conflicts which made up the project. In fact the group was probably 
little more divided than many other Wider Horizons groups but the 
point to be emphasised here is that when conflicts do arise in such a 
group they may be sparked by differences in age, personality, educa- 
tion and gender as much as by religious and political allegiances. 
For this reason the theoretical framework offered by Taijfel's So- 
cial Identity Theory (SIT) may be useful in unravelling the effects of 
programmes like Wider Horizons which aim to promote reconcili- 
ation among divided people. SIT locates the study of conflict and its 
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resolution in the question of identity, and specifically focuses on the 
link between group membership and the development of a positive 
self-concept. People, according to the SIT model, tend to simplify the 
complexities of their environment by creating social categories such 
as ))uscc and ))themcc - the in-group to which one ))belongs(( and the 
alien or out-group. The in-group is homogenised and differences 
between members mitigated so that everyone who belongs feels more 
or less the same in important and pre-defined ways - for example in 
religious persuasion or in the football team supported. On the other 
hand differences between the in-group and the out-group are exag- 
gerated, and this is but a short step to identifying ))themcc as ))the en- 
emy((. An important spin-off from such an over-simplification is the 
positive sense of self which derives from the belief that one's own 
group is somehow ))bettercc than the despised out-group. As Tajfel 
himself put it: 
))In order for large numbers of individuals to be able to hate or 
dislike or discriminate against other individuals seen as belonging to 
a common social category, they must first have acquired a sense of 
belonging to groups (or social categories) which are clearly distinct 
from and stand in certain relation to those they hate, dislike or dis- 
criminate against.(( (Taijfel 1978, 50) 
It is not difficult to imagine how this model can illuminate the 
Catholic/Nationalist - ProtestantAJnionist polarisation in the North- 
ern conflict. Ed Cairns, a social psychologist at the University of UI- 
ster, has assembled evidence from a number of research studies 
which indicated that the SIT theory fits the Northern Ireland situation 
in several respects (Cairns 1987). The theory can also help to explain 
the preoccupation with identity that many observers have noted in 
Northern Ireland (Whyte 1990,97). 
N e c e s s a r y  C o n d i t i o n s  f o r  R e c o n c i l i a t i o n  
A study of the research literature on reconciliation seems to indicate 
that there are five broad conditions necessary for successful work in 
this field: (1) maintaining an intergroup as well as an interpersonal 
focus in the contact situation; (2) ensuring that there is equality of 
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status among all the participants; (3) recognising differences as well 
as similarities; (4) co-operating together in the pursuit of superordi- 
nate goals; and (5) creating a safe and suitable environment (see 
Ruddle and O'Connor 1992; Falconer 1988; Hurley 1994). In describ- 
ing these five conditions we shall look at the performance of Wider 
Horizons under each heading, and in doing so we shall attempt an 
assessment of the Programme's contribution toward prejudice reduc- 
tion and mutual understanding. 
Intergroup Focus: The intergroup approach is based on the prem- 
ise that if attitudes are to change then contact must take place in a 
situation where the interaction that occurs is between individuals as 
representing the different conflicting groups rather than individuals 
as individuals. Brown and Turner argue that where intergroup contact 
leads to positive changes in attitude, this is because of basic changes 
in the attitudes of the groups towards each other rather than the out- 
come of new friendships between various individuals (Brown and 
Turner 1981). According to this view changes in interpersonal rela- 
tions are an effect rather than a cause of a more general change in 
intergroup relations. 
An intergroup as well as an interpersonal focus is a basic tenet in 
Wider Horizons and is possibly the most significant contribution the 
Programme is making in the field of reconciliation. In an overview of 
reconciliation projects in Northern Ireland, one researcher has 
pointed out that the intergroup approach is the exception rather than 
the rule and that the bulk of projects could be regarded as encourag- 
ing superficial contact only (McCartney 1985, 25). The intergroup 
approach in Wider Horizons entails lengthy periods of negotiation 
between sponsors, agreement on procedures, joint planning, organis- 
ing various preparatory, overseas and follow-up activities, and gen- 
erally ensuring that the project group develops into a cohesive and 
harmonious unit. This is no mean undertaking when one takes into 
account the several different sub-groups which can take part in a 
project. 
Equality of Status: Allport, one of the earliest researchers in the 
area of prejudice and tolerance, argued that participants in a success- 
ful reconciliation project must be of equal status, pursue equal goals, 
and be given social and institutional support (Allport 1954, 22). The 
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most obvious application of this to Wider Horizons is to ensure that 
in all its projects the proportions of cross-community and cross-Bor- 
der participation are equitable. The Programme's official policy on 
this is unambiguous: participation should be one third Northern Prot- 
estant, one third Northern Catholic and one third from the South. 
Recognition of Differences as well as Similarities: This is some- 
times described as avoiding the ))culture of politeness((, which Rud- 
dle and O'Connor, describe in the following terms: 
))When groups first meet in the contact situation, their behaviour 
initially is likely to be polite and superficial. Each side strives to es- 
tablish safe patterns of interaction and, to do so, seeks out similarities 
or common needs. This pattern is reinforced by the prevailing social 
value to be polite at all costs. While this approach of smoothing over 
differences may mean that an atmosphere of bonhomie prevails, 
however, if the contact continues in this mode it means that no con- 
troversial information is shared and unchallenged myths may be per- 
petuated.(( (Allport 1954,24) 
In order to overcome the culture of politeness and to create genu- 
ine intergroup contact, it is necessary that people acknowledge that 
differences do divide them and that these differences be discussed 
and explored in a positive manner. This implies confronting what Ed 
Cairns called the ))denial syndromecc - the frequently observed con- 
vention that politics and religion are to be avoided as topics of con- 
versation in ))mixed company(( (Cairns 1987, 161). It should be em- 
phasised that the exploration of differences and mutual suspicions in 
Wider Horizons is always carried out with great care and in a non- 
threatening manner and it is generally felt that the way forward in 
this regard is the careful preparation of leaders to handle reconcili- 
ation issues. 
Co-operating in the Pursuit of Superordinate Goals: For a recon- 
ciliation project to be successful, it is important that the group learn 
to co-operate together in the pursuit of goals which the members 
could not have achieved on their own. This is especially the situation 
in Wider Horizons, where the superordinate goal in question is for 
the entire group to have a successful training and work experience 
overseas. This is the Programme's central attraction, the factor that 
induces people of different backgrounds and traditions to overcome 
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their mutual suspicions and antipathies and allow themselves to be 
bonded into a new unity. Within this unity, however, it is important 
to recognise the distinctive contribution that each of the constituent 
subgroups makes to the common endeavour. Otherwise, there is a 
risk of hostility reasserting itself, as the subgroups feel their own 
identity to be threatened. 
Creating a Safe and Suitable Environment: Taking part in the 
process of reconciliation can be a risky exercise, where people feel 
vulnerable and exposed. It is imperative, therefore, that reconciliation 
happens within a context of safety and trust where the participants 
know they will be respected and treated in a responsible and non-
judgemental fashion. Creating a safe and suitable environment for its 
participants is the long-standing practice of Wider Horizons. At a 
practical level it means that procedures and ground-rules are thor- 
oughly worked out and clearly understood by all, and that a common 
code of acceptable conduct is agreed. 
I s  t h e r e  H o p e  f o r  t h e  F u t u r e ?  
What are we learning from the entire experience? First of all, there is 
an immense need for people and institutions North and South to get 
to know each other better and try to dispel some of the mistrust born 
of a centuries-old antagonism. We have learnt that one of the best 
ways of doing this is to identifj issues and concerns that are common 
to all sides of the divide - issues such as unemployment, the need for 
community regeneration, ways of co-operating in developing market- 
ing and trading opportunities, exploring areas like tourism, agricul- 
ture, education and training that affect everybody on the island - the 
list can be a very long one. 
The second point is to take the necessary steps, once a common 
issue has been identified,to do something co-operative about it - in 
other words to put together a common project with agreed objectives 
and procedures. This has been the preoccupation of Wider Horizons -
working out the dynamics of forming and maintaining co-operative 
groups in pursuit of common goals that have been mutually identified 
and agreed. 
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How successful have we been? Our evaluation studies so far tell 
us a number of things. In some projects, particularly those composed 
of managers, the focus has been on economic targets such as in- 
creased sales and marketing opportunities, increased turnover, greater 
awareness of the need for strategic business planning, and expansion 
of the businesses involved with a consequent rise in numbers em- 
ployed. These of course are general statements and it is not always 
possible to say precisely how far Wider Horizons has contributed. On 
the whole, however, the evidence is positive and encouraging. 
An encouraging picture also emerges from projects devoted to the 
needs of unemployed and poorly qualified young people (who inci- 
dentally are in the majority). Here the emphasis seems to be more on 
the enhancement of general skills and attitudes - such as increased 
self-confidence and growth in personal and social attributes - what 
are sometimes termed 'soft skills'. It can be argued of course that 
these so called soft skills are no less important for enhancing em- 
ployability than the hard economic targets emphasised in the manag- 
ers' projects. 
When we turn to the reconciliation aspect of Wider Horizons we 
find plenty of scope for debate. The targets here are much harder to 
measure because possibly there is a greater difficulty in defining 
them in the first place. At a general level however it can be said that 
bringing people together from different sides of the divide in a 
meaningful and non-threatening way is a very beneficial experience. 
There is plenty of evidence to show that participants on Wider Hori- 
zons projects do genuinely learn to look beyond the stereotypes they 
hold of each other, and in many cases actually form close friendships. 
How long these friendships can persist after the project is over is of 
course another matter and this is something which the Programme is 
currently addressing - the problem of follow-up. 
In the eight years of its existence so far Wider Horizons has dem- 
onstrated that it can work successfully in a variety of situations. The 
Programme has built up a considerable body of expertise on how 
projects should be planned and carried out. Many valuable lessons 
have been learnt, especially with regard to the need for a thorough 
preparation of the participants and the development of leadership 
qualities in the supervisors. On the whole we have reasonable 
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grounds to be happy with Wider Horizons: it is an idea which has 
proved itself with widely differing groups in a great variety of con- 
texts. The next stage for the Programme will be to widen its practice 
and increase the level of its activities. 
A little over a year ago, after twenty-five years of violence, peace 
has at last come to Ireland. Some people speak in hushed tones about 
it, as if afraid for its fragile nature. Others are more confident and 
agree with President Clinton's message to the White House Confer- 
ence for Trade and Investment in Ireland, in May 1995 - ))a return to 
the violence of the past quarter century would be unacceptable(( (Irish 
Times, 24 May 1995). Whatever one's views on the peace process, 
one thing, however, seems sure: people have to work hard to bring 
about peace and perhaps harder still to maintain it. The task in front 
of us is becoming clear: we must exert ourselves as never before to 
build up the peace and pass it on to future generations. This is the 
challenge now facing Wider Horizons: helping to consolidate the 
peace process in Ireland. 
Wider Horizons has no motto but a suitable one could well be 
this: ))better to light one candle than curse the darkness((. In the eight 
years of its existence the Programme has lit many candles: six thou- 
sand people in over 300 different projects have benefited from the 
experience of living, training and working overseas in structured and 
meaningful situations. It is important to recognise, however, that 
countless other candles have also been lit by various organisations 
and individuals who have laboured in the field of reconciliation, 
sometimes in isolation from each other. Perhaps the time has now 
come to make common cause in bringing all these lights together to 
ensure that the darkness of violence never again falls on our land. 
This would indeed give some hope for the future. 
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Mon'ika Reinfelder 
T h e  M i s o g y n i s t  V i o l e n c e  
o f  F o r t r e s s  E u r o p e  
The last few years have seen a tightening of control by member states 
of the European Union that has served to fortify the walls of a for- 
tress intent to keep at bay non-Europeans, in particular if they are 
Black or of so-called ethnic groups undesired by ))indigenouscc Euro- 
peans. Those already living in the fortress have experienced the 
state's legal, political and economic aggression as well as the vio- 
lence of an angry mob anxious to preserve its tribal territory. It will 
be argued here, however, that Fortress Europe is not only racist, but 
that it is also extremely misogynist. This means that racist, nationalist 
and xenophobic violence affects Black and ))ethniccc women differ- 
ently, and often worse, than men. It will be argued that gender op- 
pression compounds the danger of racist violence, that women are 
doubly at risk when their communities are under threat. Far from 
constituting a diversion, an understanding of violence against 
women, in particular against Black, refugee and migrant women, will 
contribute to the analysis of racist, nationalist and xenophobic vio- 
lence. It will also inform policy, be it legal, economic, educational or 
otherwise, required for provisions for those affected. 
In the UK a Black person is 50 times more likely to be racially 
attacked than'a white person. But in all ethnic (including white) 
groups women stand a 66% chance of being physically attacked not 
because of their ethnicity, but because they are women. In addition, 
femicide, the most extreme form of violence against women, knows 
no respect for ethnicity, nationality or race: half of all women mur- 
dered are not killed by racist thugs, but by their male partner. This 
gender specific violence is taken less seriously than racist violence, 
although it is much more widespread. For example, Germany in 1992 
showed 12 racist murders - rightly generating outrage.. The hundreds 
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of femicides were met with silence (Emma 1993). The reason for this 
is that racist and xenophobic murders are seen as a political issue, 
while femicide or misogynist murder, alongside other forms of vio- 
lence against women, is still dismissed as a private issue. The politi- 
cisation of gender specific violence is long overdue. 
While violence against women is depoliticised or even denied, 
most analyses of racist violence are gender neutral. The perpetrators 
are mostly referred to as ))youth((, again a gender neutral term. Yet in 
96.3% of racist offences the perpetrators are male. Few women are 
involved in the perpetration of racist violence; of the 3.7% cases 
where women are engaged in racist offences, most relate to propa- 
ganda rather than violence. In Germany's local elections half as many 
women than men voted for the Republicans. Women have noted the 
relationship between the racism and the misogyny so clearly ex-
pressed by right wing politics. 
There have indeed always been women who participated in vio- 
lence. Female politicians have initiated wars. During slavery white 
women colluded with, or were actively involved in, violent actions 
against slaves. Vron Ware has shown more recent involvement on the 
part of white women in the perpetuation of racism in a variety of 
forms (Ware 1992). Women have also been involved in so-called 
))terroristcc activities, although Robin Morgan argues that usually they 
were the ))bridescc of male terrorists and became involved because of . 
their attachment to a male (Morgan 1989). (This does not protect 
them from femicide as in the case of Nicole Bargenda who was raped 
and murdered by her neo-Nazi mates.) 
However, the above examples should not detract from the fact that 
violence is practiced predominantly by white men in the form of ra- 
cial attacks and men of all ethnic groups in the home. In the UK, 1 in 
4 women is battered by her male partner, and 1 million women report 
domestic violence to the police annually. According to the Metropoli- 
tan Police these figures are just the tip of the iceberg as 8 out of 10 
women do not report domestic violence to the police (Justice 1993). 
An American study showed that violence will occur at least once in 
two-thirds of all marriages (Red 1992). It is now common knowledge 
that 1 in 3 women is subjected to rape, and 1 in 2 girls will have ex- 
perienced sexual abuse by the age of eighteen. The majority of these 
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crimes are committed by men known to the women and girls. In many 
countries, including Germany, rape in marriage is still not a crime. It 
is also now commonplace that rape is an act of power, not the result 
of some uncontrolled sexual urge or temporary loss of control. Rape 
is usually premeditated by the perpetrator and has at its aim the in- 
timidation, control and humiliation of women and girls. This is 
clearly demonstrated, yet again, by the rapes of women in Bosnia. 
These rapes are often committed by neighbours or former school 
mates whose intention is to humiliate women of a different ethnic 
group. This example demonstrates how race and gender oppression 
intersect for women. The violence they are experiencing is a dual 
attack on their ethnicity and their sex. 
Even the United Nations is now pushed into an acknowledgement 
of violence against women as a human rights abuse. At the United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna an Interna- 
tional Tribunal heard women from all over the world testifying to 
their experiences of male violence. They spoke of rape, sexual abuse 
of children, sexual harassment, genital mutilation, forced sterilisa- 
tion, dowry burning and many other forms of violent abuse inflicted 
on women and girls all over the world. The perpetrators are husbands 
or other male relatives, state officials, soldiers or other men in a po- 
sition of authority over women. Amnesty International, too, testifies 
to the use of rape and sexual abuse in the torture of women in deten- 
tion, as well as women being raped by security forces in several 
countries. In Peru, for example, army officers refused investigations 
into allegations of rape by soldiers on the basis that ))rape is to be 
expected when troops are conducting counterinsurgency operations((. 
Public space, in any country, is not save for women, Pubs, streets, 
public transport, parks, in particular at night, carry a high risk. 
Women are under a permanent curfew, albeit one that is very inef- 
fective as a ))protectivecc device given that women, as we have seen 
above, are even more at risk if they stay in their homes, the most 
dangerous of all places for women whose homes are accessible to 
men. The curfew is however effective in providing exclusive territo- 
rial rights for men. Men learn to take for granted a ))natural(( right to 
territory. This is now to be defended against ))aliens((. A fortress of 
sameness is built where those who are different or do not belong are 
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objectified as the Other and kept out through immigration controls, 
legislation, and violence. 
This fortress affects men and women differently. Exposure to do- 
mestic violence is compounded by racist legislation and immigration 
controls. Women who join migrant husbands are legally defined as 
dependants and do not posses an automatic right of entry into the 
labour market. This situation puts them in an even more precarious 
position as it ties them to a man they may not necessarily be safe to 
stay with. Domestic violence against women amongst the migrant 
population occurs no more or less than in the ))hostcc population, but 
migrant women have the additional disadvantage of no longer being 
able to stay in a country when they are not linked to the legal status 
of their husbands. The choice is between staying with a violent man 
and keeping the right of residence or escaping from their violent 
situation and facing deportation. It is not unknown for survivors of 
domestic violence to have sought help from social services and as a 
result to have been deported. 
For others, as a recent study in the UK has shown, being subjected 
to more threats of violence from a racist police force will prevent 
Black women from seeking police protection (Kelkar 1985). If, as in 
some cases, women are given protection and are rehoused, the new 
housing may well be available as a result of another family having 
had to leave because of racial attacks. Therefore, the move would 
merely constitute an exchange of individual male violence for racist 
group violence. In addition, Black women in the UK are only too 
aware of the criminalisation of Black men and the false identification 
of domestic violence as a ))black crimecc, and therefore choose to 
abstain from feeding into the stereotyping of the Black community or 
from subjecting their community to further police harassment. 
Turkish women in Germany experience a similar fate. A German 
man's violence is either denied or explained away as a psychological 
disturbance, while a Turkish man is seen to be violent on the basis of 
being Turkish. Thus, male violence against Turkish women is inter- 
preted as ))culturalcc, as their ethnic characteristic, rather than as a 
patriarchal practice upheld by Turkish and German men, for that 
matter, men irrespective of any nationality. Violence in the Turkish 
family is readily acknowledged, while its existence is denied in Ger- 
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man heterosexual households. Given this identification of domestic 
violence as a Turkish (accepted) cultural practice and the denial of 
racism against the Turkish community, no refuges for Turkish 
women are provided, subjecting them to possible racism if admitted 
to a mixed refuge. 
Even less protection is available to women who arrive in Europe 
as sexual slaves. According to the United Nations, trafficking in 
women is more profitable than arms or drug smuggling. In Europe 
women are either forced to participate in the multi-billion pornogra- 
phy industry or are used as prostitutes. Some are sold into sexual 
slavery by traders in their own country, others are lured to Europe 
under the pretence of an offer for a ))goodcc job. Others arrive as mail- 
order brides. The women, who are mostly from South-East Asia, 
have no residence rights. A ))bridecc w'ho is subjected to physical 
violence and raped by her ))husbandcc will not be able to report her 
attacker to the police as separation or divorce will lead to her depor- 
tation. If she does escape her assailant little other than prostitution is 
open to her as she will not be in possession of a work permit, thereby 
subjecting herself to repeated daily rape by punters and violence by a 
pimp. A Kenyan speaker at an event organised by the Campaign 
Against Pornography in the UK reported an encounter she had with a 
woman from her country at the hairdressers. The woman broke down 
crying while her male partner quickly nipped out to get a packet of 
cigarettes, telling a saga of constant beatings, rapes and total isolation 
after she had been brought to London. In Germany, where mail order 
brides were predominantly from South-East Asia attempts are made 
to target other ethnic groups. With recent developments in Eastern 
Europe Polish women are brought into the Fortress as marketable 
commodities and expelled when the ))goods(( don't meet the buyers' 
requirements: 
))Poles are cheaper than Asians both in terms of capital investment 
and in maintenance: what is a cheap train ticket in comparison to a 
5.000DM air ticket from Bangkok or Manila? And, whereas a Thai is 
unprepared for cold German winters - one has to buy her clothes - a 
Pole brings her own boots and a fur coat. And she is as good in bed 
and industrious in the kitchencr. (Bild, 9.1.1991) 
Monika Reinfelder 
The above examples constitute some of the reasons why a number 
of Non-Governmental Organisations are demanding that ))persecution 
on the basis of sexcc is included into the definition of a refugee. At 
present the definition exclusively refers to persecution on the 
grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so- 
cial group or holding a political opinion. The 1984 resolution by the 
European Parliament calling upon states to consider women who 
have been persecuted on the basis of sex as a ))partici~lar social 
groupcc has not been given consideration by member states. The 
judges' recommendation at the Women's Tribunal in Vienna identi- 
fied rape and abuse of women as a form of torture, irrespective if it 
occurs at a police station or in a bedroom. Women subjected to such 
torture are not offered asylum, be it in the country were the offence is 
committed or elsewhere. This leads to further abuse and often culmi- 
nates in femicide. Fortress Europe, having tightened its frontiers, will 
continue to refuse to provide a sanctuary for those persecuted simply 
because they are women. 
There is however a difference in misogynist violence and racist 
violence, in the hatred of women and the hatred of ))foreigners((. 
))Racecc is, of course, a social construct and the presence of any ra- 
cially constructed group deemed inferior is only tolerated in situ- 
ations where its physical presence is perceived to bring benefits to 
the group constructing the Other. The most obvious example is slav- 
ery. Temporary cheap labour or domestic service are others. Other- 
wise any group designated inferior is not tolerated in close proximity. 
Women, in contrast, live in such proximity with perpetrators of vio- 
lence. They are the daughters, sisters, mothers, wives, lovers of those 
who subject women to violence. Women's immediate presence is 
needed for the domestic, sexual, emotional and intellectual servicing 
of men. This exposes women to far greater a danger than those who 
are ghettoised by the violence of the oppressing group. Ironically it 
often also subjects them to a greater danger of racist violence, as the 
killing of the Turkish women in Solingen demonstrated: the women 
fell victim to racist murder as well as a moral code and the gender- 
ised division of labour that keeps women in the home. 
The famous Montreal killings, like ))honour killings((, show that 
women who challenge male conventions are particularly at risk. De- 
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fiance of imposed rules, or the venturing into male territory, in par- 
ticular the showing of independence and autonomy, and the with- 
drawal of support, approval and the domestic, sexual, emotional and 
intellectual servicing of men is the worst sin a woman can commit. 
This provides also an explanation of the worldwide oppression of 
lesbians whose independence from men constitutes the ultimate af- 
front to the male ego. 
Lesbians all over the world are facing incarceration in psychiatric 
hospitals, violence, even death, or are receiving death threats. The 
International Lesbian and Gay Association received an inquiry about 
a Russian lesbian seeking asylum in Germany. The local authority 
processing the application wanted to know if there was documenta- 
tion of lesbians being incarcerated into Russian psychiatric hospitals 
as the asylum seeker had claimed. Although it is well known that this 
is the fate of Lesbians not only in Russia, but also in Rumania, Mex- 
ico and probably other countries, no documentation exists. This 
makes it very difficult for lesbians to seek asylum, or to press for 
sexual orientation to be included in the definition of a refugee. Ger- 
many can pride itself on having granted asylum to an Iranian lesbian 
in 1992 who, if deported, would have faced the death sentence. The 
execution methods in Iran are particularly cruelling, ranging from 
being hurled of a cliff or mountain to public stoning or beheading. 
To reiterate the above: far from being an irrelevant diversion, a 
discussion about violence against women does move towards an ex- 
planation of racist violence. If men are capable of physically abusing 
those who live with them in close proximity and know they can get 
away with it they are also likely to physically abuse others whom 
they want to exercise control over or, at least, condone such abuse. 
Without wanting to conflate misogynist and racist violence I would, 
however, suggest that there is a relationship between the two. I am in 
no doubt that those who commit racist violence also abuse women 
and children and have inflicted, and are continuing to inflict, violence 
on women. Further study and acknowledgement of gender violence 
will contribute to an under&anding of racist, nationalist and xeno- 
phobic violence and hopefully induce resistance to both. 
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a n d  t h e  L i b e r a t i o n  S t r u g g l e :  

T h e  I m p a c t  o n  S o u t h  A f r i c a n  E d u c a t i o n  

I n t r o d u c t i o n  
Demands for equality in education in South Africa have been central 
to the liberation struggle. In this paper, the relationship between edu- 
cation and liberationlreform is considered in terms of the tensions 
between demands for educational equality and the self-destructive 
forces of mass action centered on the schools. Observations offered 
here are from ongoing case study research in South African schools. 
Sweeping reforms to reshape South African education along non- 
racial lines aim to eradicate a legacy of entrenched racism and white 
privilege. The Education Renewal Strategy ( 1  991) includes initia- 
tives for streamlining the four racially segregated education systems 
into a single nonracial system, with initiatives for decentralization, 
comprehensive curriculum reform, community participation, equali- 
zation of educational opportunity, nine years of universal compulsory 
schooling, and a dual emphasis on general and vocational/technical 
education to meet national development needs. Undergirding the 
educational reform strategy is a commitment to developing a new 
. multiracial, democratic society and a new formulation of nationalism 
as a product of political, social, and economic transformation. 
The multisector reforms currently in early-stage implementation 
under the DeKlerk administration are accompanied by, and a function 
of, the ongoing liberation struggle in South Africa that has gathered 
momentum since 1976 and particularly from 1986 onwards when ri- 
ots in Soweto township against educational inequality spread to be- 
come a series of national crises to which the government responded 
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with policy shifts. The intersection of education and liberation-
struggle has spawned violence and wreaked havoc on African educa- 
tion; yet it has also been protest against racism and oppression in as- 
pects of schooling that has led to many of the significant changes 
undenvay in all sectors. 
Education is not the only arena impacted by violence in the lib- 
eration struggle. For instance, campaigns in the ))people's warcc of the 
African National Congress (ANC) targeted African schooling, the 
police force, and black local authorities because they were viewed as 
instruments of white domination. During the 1980s the ANC em-
barked on a strategy to make the country ungovernable with persis- 
tent attacks on these ))soft targets,(( aimed at forcing the government 
to address the injustices founded on racism and white privilege that 
permeated all sectors. African youth were mobilized in the campaign. 
They were described by Oliver Tambo, then president of the ANC, as 
))young lionscc who would assist in bringing African education to a 
standstill during the 1980s (Kane-Berman 1993). Protests and riots 
targeted education in particular and apartheid in general. A decade 
later, the mobilized youth have become a major headache, frequently 
referred to as the ))delinquent youth culturecc in the townships, and 
beyond the control of the leadership of organizations such as the 
ANC. Violence, attack and counterattack, and intimidation have 
taken on a life of their own that has created a basis for mutual con- 
cern on the part of opposition groups (ANC, Inkatha, and others) and 
the government, given the risk the violence poses to a workable new 
system. The use of coercion in consumer boycotts, work stayaways, 
and education-related protests has become a fact of life in South Af- 
rica (Pereira 1992). 
T h e  C u r r e n t  S i t u a t i o n  in E d u c a t i o n  
South Africa has four racially segregated, and grossly inequitably 
funded public education systems: for whites, Africans, ))coloredscc 
(people of mixed race), and Indians. Prior to the 1990s efforts to de- 
segregate schooling were largely confined to a small number of pro- 
gressive private schools that admitted nonwhite students' during the 
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1976 township riots, and accelerated their ))opencc admissions poli- 
cies during and after the crisis years of 1984-86 and the Soweto riots. 
Rioting in the townships was sparked by the Department of Edu- 
cation and Training (DET) policy that forced use of Afrikaans as the 
instructional medium in social studies and mathematics, a decree 
widely perceived as a blatant act of oppression and white domination 
through schooling. The rioting was fueled by already decades-old 
resentment of white privilege and African disadvantage, and by the 
expanding liberation movement. As the government lost control of 
the situation in black schools, responding to repeated outbreaks of 
violence and crises centered on the plight of black students, deregu- 
lation of all schooling began first in practice and then in legislation 
(McGurk 1993, 7). 
In the 1990s the government's commitment to non-racial educa- 
tion was announced as the Education Renewal Strategy (SADNE 
1991), an agenda for restructuring all schooling. Initial implementa- 
tion has focused on structural and administrative adjustments with 
curricular and certification reforms to follow. Under the CIase Mod- 
els implemented in 1990, formerly all-white government schools 
were allowed to change their admissions and financing policies, 
which resulted in a modest amount of change: roughly 10% of for- 
merly all-white schools opted to become ))opencc or nonracial schools 
and integration was a small-scale one-way process in which black 
student enrollments at these schools constituted only 0.6%. The de- 
cision to permit restructuring, refinancing, desegregation of white 
government schools was less an altruistic step than a result of budg- 
etary shortfalls in the House of Assembly (McGurk 1993, 8). 
In private schools the degree of racial integration was higher, with 
black enrollments as high as 24% and total non-white enrollments 
sometimes exceeding 50%. Movements of white students into non- 
white schools were almost non-existent (SAIRR 1992). In 1992 the 
government introduced a policy of ))rationalisationcc of education in 
an attempt to cope with the increasing diversity in school classifica- 
tions and management types. All public schools become semi-private 
schools and technically non-racial, with government financing only 
of teacher salaries and with heavy emphasis on local level financing. 
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By August of 1992, 2,044 of the country's 2,082 white public 
schools were operating thus as ))nonracial semi-private schoolscc, but 
with very limited non-white enrollments. In 1992, only 7,923 black 
pupils had been admitted to white government schools; by late 1993 
the number had increased to 60,000 (SAIRR 1994, 5). However, na- 
tionally there were 3.5-5 million school-age children without places 
in school, and over 150,000 places were needed for African children 
alone, there were 47,286 elementary and 82,046 secondary vacant 
places in white schools. Under the policy of ))rationalisationcc many 
white suburban schools were closed (more than 20 in 1992 alone), 
and more than 4,000 teachers were laid off due to declining white 
enrollments. Rather than allow use of these schools by the DET, or 
by other agencies, to address the overwhelming shortages of places 
for black students, underused white schools were simply closed. Only 
a small number were turned over to the DET and then this gesture 
met with violent opposition from white conservatives who wanted the 
status quo preserved. The issue of underutilized and closed white 
schools has sparked outbreaks of violence on several occasions. Op- 
position groups seeking to focus public attention on the inequitable 
use of and access to educational resources staged occupations of 
some of these schools, using schoolchildren as pawns in the process. 
Gradually, continued escalating violence and pressure for change, 
coupled with progress made in the ANCIgovernment negotiations, 
resulted in the abandonment of several educational bastions of apart- 
heid. For instance, the long standing policy of ))Christian National 
Educationcc, dating to the 1948 ))Beleidcc era of white domination and 
Afrikaner nationalism, was abandoned (McGurk 1993, 2). In a major 
reversal, beginning in 1994 Afrikaans will no longer be compulsory 
in schools. Its forced use in township schools that sparked the 1976 
Soweto riots ushered in the contemporary era of protest and reform 
(Carr 1990, 135-1 38). 
Currently, the situation is as follows. The white education system 
remains the best funded, but it is undergoing sweeping changes in the 
form of reduced government support, and in restructuring and decen- 
tralization that allow racial integration and more local control. The 
degree of racial integration (andbr~~ress ive  reform of in-school cur- 
ricula and policies) varies widely from school to school, largely de- 
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pendent on the nature of the school's leadership. Indian and colored 
schools have undergone very little change in enrollments and financ- 
ing, but more so than the complete absence of change in African 
schools. As a group, the private schools remain the most progressive, 
traditional leaders in pressing for democratic schooling opportunities. 
However, there are isolated formerly all-white government schools 
that have also taken the lead in establishing radically different 
(liberal, nonracial) programs. Urban and suburban schools have gen- 
erally experienced more change than their rural counterparts. While 
the impact of the beginning reforms has been most keenly observed 
in formerly white government schools, largely as significantly altered 
enrollments-by-race and as financingtadministrative arrangements, 
real (curricular and programmatic) efforts to eradicate the harmful 
effects of racism and prejudice have occurred in only a few pioneer 
schools. The township schools remain unchanged in enrollments, 
curricula, policies, and opportunities (or a lack thereof). In fact, in 
the township schools the politicization of schooling and the impact of 
the ))liberation before educationcc battle cry have actually kept the 
schools from exposure to the changes underway, as a result of the 
continued violence and mass action in the townships. 
A f r i c a n  E d u c a t i o n :  T h e  C r u x  o f  t h e  I s s u e  
Of the four systems, African education remains the least funded and 
most disadvantaged, administered by the Department of Education 
and Training rather than the Department of Education and Culture 
that oversees education for whites, Indians, and coloreds through the 
Houses of Assembly, Delegates, and Representatives, respectively. In 
fact, aside from the Department of National Education that oversees 
general policy, there are 18 separate education departments including 
6 departments for the self-governing territories of Gazankulu, Katig- 
wane, Kwazulu, Kwandebele, Quaqua, and Labowa, and 4 for the 
TBVC ))statescc of Transkei, Bophuthatswana, Venda, and Ciskei 
(SADNE 1992,6). A key demand of the ANC is to have all education 
administered under a single agency. The term ))own affairscc, a provi- 
sion of the 1984 Tricameral Constitution, came into usage indicating 
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these racially and territorially separate administrations of education, 
with white education disproportionately financed from the govern- 
ment's central treasury. Until the new single ))dispensation(( (one non- 
racial agency for education) announced in early 1993 is actually im- 
plemented, the splintering and segregation of education persists. The 
notion of ))own affairstr is still invoked by conservatives who want 
white schools kept white at any cost. 
The African education system exhibits several indicators of im- 
poverishment. Its disadvantage in funding is perhaps the most clear- 
cut indicator, most often juxtaposed with the differences in funding 
of white education. The ratio of funding for white education to Afri- 
can education did narrow from 18: 1 to 4: 1 in the period 1969- 1989 
(SAIRR 1992, IXXXV), and some reversal occurred in the share of 
expenditures allotted to white versus African education. In 1969-70 
white education received 70% of the education budget and African 
education 16%; in 1991-92 white education received 33% and Afri- 
can education 48%, with an additional R0.5 billion allotted to address 
African educational backlogs. However, given the size of the histori- 
cal deficits in black educational allocations, expenditure reversals 
have been modest (McGurk 1993, 7). In 1991-92, the persistent gap 
was evident in per capita pupil expenditures of RI ,248 for Africans, 
R2,701 for coloreds, and R4,448 for whites (SAIRR 1993b, 5). Fig- 
ures for 1993-94 were R1:659 for Africans, R2,902 for coloreds, 
R3,702 for Indians, and R4,372 for whites, indicating persistent in- 
equities despite reform measures (SAIRR 1994, 5). 
Aside from historical deficits in funding, there are other indicators 
of so-called backlogs in African education. In 1991, pass rates in the 
matriculation examinations were 41% for Africans, 83% for col- 
oreds, 95% for Indians, and 96% for whites (SAIRR 1993b, 5). Afri-
cans, constituting 74% of the population, accounted for only 25% of 
enrollments at technical colleges in 1992, despite a 230% increase in 
1986-92 (SAIRR 1993a, 575) and only 19% in 1993; Africans were 
only 34% of university students in 1993 (SAIRR 1994, 5). Pu-
pillteacher ratios in DET (African) classrooms were 55:l (primary 
schools) and 43: 1 (secondary schools) in 1988, and 4 1:1 and 36: 1 re-
spectively in 199 1, compared .with ratios of 16: 1 to 25: 1 in the other 
three systems (SAIRR 1993a, 575,607). DET schools are drastically 
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short of instructional materials; some have no functioning sanitary 
facilities or telephones. Teachers in DET schools are underpaid and 
underqualified compared to teachers in the other three systems, a 
major issue in the DET teachers strike in 1993, the first nationwide 
teachers' strike. 
The tradition of unequal funding, inadequate provision of places 
for black students, forced use of instruments of control (such as Afri- 
kaans), inadequate resources and teacher expertise, and resulting 
poor performance and opportunities for black students have com- 
bined in a volatile mix of township protests. Unfortunately, protests 
with just cause in education issues have been accompanied by a gen- 
eral escalation of violence and protest over a broader range of issues. 
Schools, students, teachers, and parents are often caught in the 
crossfire. African educational backlogs have been aggravated by 
unrest in the townships that accelerated in the 1984-86 protests under 
the battle cry of ))liberation before education((. In essence, African 
students have become twice-victimized. The education to which they 
have access is grossly inadequate, and intermittent depending on the 
prevailing climate of attack and protest in the townships. Secondly, 
students have become targets for intimidation and coercion by groups 
engaging in violence and ))mass action.(( The impact on students in 
these and other schools will now be discussed. 
T h e  I m p a c t  o f  R a c i s m  a n d  V i o l e n c e ,  
a n d  R e f o r m ,  o n  S c h o o l s  
The impact of the liberation movement, official reforms, and the cli- 
mate of violence and opposition can be considered differentially for 
township schools, urban and suburban schools, and rural schools. 
Costs for education have been steep. Some writers have characterised 
the education crisis (particularly in the townships) as nothing more 
than a political contest between a recalcitrant regime and undaunted 
black youths for control of education (see for instance, Mathiane 
1990). 
Township schools: Township schools and their students have been 
the most adversely impacted by the violence and actions undertaken 
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in the name of liberation, on top of the legacy of discrimination and 
oppression that was imposed officially. Schooling in many townships 
has degenerated into a state of anarchy. Students have been coerced 
into observing stayaways from school, staged as protests for a variety 
of reasons. With imposition of the Value Added Tax in 1991, stu- 
dents were supposedly ))exempted(( from the ))voluntarycc stayaways 
protesting the VAT (Kane-Berman 1993, 35). Some students were 
victims of necklacing, for writing their examinations in defiance of 
boycotts of black schools in 1986, organized as part of the ))people's 
warcc (Kane-Berman 1993, 43). Between 1984 and 1991 the DET 
reported damage to or destruction of 6,017 classrooms during rioting 
(Van Der Merwe 1991). Many secondary schools have been vandal- 
ized, some have been completely demolished. In Soweto township 
secondary schools that are still operational, 50% of school time in 
1992 was lost and only 20% of the syllabus had been taught by Au- 
gust, a result of teacher and pupil stayaways and mass action over 
teacher salaries, school fees, and sympathetic strikes on issues in 
other sectors. The lost time in school hurt black students' perform- 
ance on the matriculation examinations in which African students 
already have the poorest pass rates. Capricious actions by the DET 
aggravated the situation, such as in sudden raising of examination 
fees in 1992 that sparked rioting and refusals to pay. Physical as- 
saults occurred on unpopular principals and teachers in schools. In 
Kathorus College of Education a lecturer was set alight by disgrun- 
tled students in February 1992. The government announced a 
))National Emergency Programmecc in 1992 to address the deepening 
crisis in township education, particularly with reference to resources 
and financing (SAIRR 1993, 55-57). However, official measures 
proved weak against a growing force of youths taking control of 
school admissions and pupil promotions, and general administration 
of facilities. In June 1992 alone 16 schools were shut down as a re- 
sult of the situation. 
Visits by this researcher to several high schools in Soweto in 1993 
revealed that many principals have been banished from their schools- 
-they spend their days at the DET central offices in the city. Some 
facilities are occupied by gangs of armed youths. Others are open, 
but attempting to function without running water, electricity, doors 
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and windows removed or damaged by rioting and vandalism. The 
isolated secondary schools that are functioning have principals who 
have actively resisted pressure and intimidation from gangs of armed 
youths seeking to close down all schools in the township. It is inter- 
esting to note that primary schools are little impacted by these forces, 
they are open and running as normal. The impact of adverse political 
socialization is quite tangible in secondary schools, where any in- 
strumental value of education has been obliterated by anger focused 
on the DET, despair over the rewards of schooling, and by the higher 
cause of liberation. 
The so-called ))delinquent youth culturecc in the townships has be- 
come a major problem for the authorities as well as the ANC and 
other opposition groups who are unable to control the cycle of vio- 
lence and random attack that regularly sweeps parts of the country, 
particularly in the townships. Tambo's ))young lions(( have become 
unmanageable, in the process rendering the current generation of 
students further deprived of educational opportunity. The township 
schools are being held hostage by activists, teacher morale has been 
crippled, parents have been marginalised, and students have been 
victimised. Better off children have been removed from this setting, 
attending schools in the cities or abroad - with the result that the 
township pupil population is becoming progressively disadvantaged, 
losing hope not only for education but also for liberation (Pereira 
1992,21). 
Urban and Suburban Schools: Several progressive schools have 
forged ahead of the reform process, initiating grass-roots programs 
such as multicultural, contextually based curricula in Integrated 
Studies, and social interaction and tolerance programs designed to 
mitigate the harmful effects of racism and violence on students who 
attend a progressive, nonracial school but who live in a still largely 
segregated society. While these pioneer schools are few in number, 
their impact is significant in that their programs are highly publicized 
and keenly observed by other schools as well as by the media and 
education officials who are endeavouring to shape new non-racial, 
decentralized policies for the future system. While the examples 
shown in this presentation are the most ))non-racial(( or multiracial 
schools in the country, their administrations and faculty daily battle 
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with the spillover of sustained racism and violence in the society 
outside. For instance, their African students have been targets of at- 
tacks by township youths who resent their attending a nonracial 
school. These students have been afraid to wear their i~niforms to 
school for fear of attack. Outbreaks of violence have occasioned 
sleepovers at school because tlie administrators feared for the stu- 
dents' return to the townships. These schools recognize ongoing 
needs for counseling and values clarification to deal with students' 
conflicting notions of home and school sociocultural environments. 
The progressive schools have been the target of bombings and other 
acts of intimidation by conservatives disapproving of their liberal 
policies. 
In contrast, many of the formerly-white government schools report 
little impact of events outside, but some of their principals also admit 
to having little real understanding of their black students' perceptions 
and needs. However, all sampled by this researcher did report know- 
ing of acts of intimidation against their black students for attending a 
non-township school. Some of these schools have more than 90% 
black enrollments, yet they are still run essentially as white schools 
and without overt attention to issues of racism and the impact of 
violence on their students. There is much variation across schools in 
the degree to which administrators and faculties acknowledge that 
issues of racism and prejudice must be addressed in the reform proc- 
ess. This phenomenon has also been reported by other researchers 
(see Penny et al. 1993). 
Rural Schools: Prior to 1993, rural schools were relatively un-
touched by tlie violence that was focused primarily on the township 
schools, and that secondarily spilled over into city schools. However, 
several incidents have occurred in rural schools in the northern 
Transvaal and Natal that indicate a spread to these more remote 
schools of the patterns of violence and intimidation previously seen 
mostly in townships. In some missioli schools in the northern 
Transvaal, teachers and principals have been attacked; students have 
been intimidated and pressured to participate in mass actions of pro- 
test organized in the name of liberation (Thiernan, B., January 21 
1994, personal communication). The development is cause for con- 
cern: rural schools too are being faced with the damaging intersection 
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between demands for educational equality and tactics to further the 
))causecc of liberation on the part of one or another group or faction. 
C o n c l u s i o n  
There exists widespread concern over the escalation in violence in 
South Africa in the last two years, accompanying the advancement of 
negotiations for a new Constitution and for elections to be held in 
April 1994. In the period September 1984 to November 1993 18,379 
people were killed in political violence in South Africa (SAIRR 
1994, 3). The Goldstone Commission Report (1992) underscored the 
difficulty in addressing the problems associated with persistent ra-
cism and opposition to change from the right, planned and random 
incidents of protest and violence on the left, the questions of possible 
government implication on either side, and the distortion of informa- 
tion fed the public. The country is besieged by an epidemic of blame 
and counteraccusation with the government security forces, ANC, 
Inkatha Freedom Party, and several conservative groups each being 
implicated in particular episodes of violence. Sorting out who is to 
blame is a major issue, one that still fails to address the toll taken on 
vulnerab'le populations such as schoolchildren. The overwhelming 
climate of uncertainty over the upcoming elections has aggravated 
concerns over violence and the potential for further violence. Frus- 
trated expectations of students so lcng denied a fair and equal chance 
at education are a major potential source for still more unrest. With 
such massive backlogs to address in African education, it is a fragile 
hope that all students will indeed enjoy the fruits of a future nonra- 
cial, democratic education system. 
As an outgrowth of the concern over the escalating levels of vio- 
lence in all corners of society, the recent embracing of a National 
Peace Accord is significant. National Peace Day was observed in 
September 1993, and schools across the country participated with 
their own programs and pledges. Although such gestures may be little 
more than symbolic, they are testimony to a growing awareness on 
many levels of South African society that the agendas of various par- 
ties and groups will have to be subordinated to a new conception of 
Diane L.Brook 
nationalism and unity, devoid of the self-destructive effects of attack 
and retribution, if there is to be any hope for building a new multira- 
cial and democratic society in South Africa. Furthermore, the rela- 
tionship between liberation and education needs realignment in a 
))culture of learningcc that will replace the ))delinquent youth culturecc 
that is subverting schooling for Africans in particular and for the na- 
tion in general. 
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